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Abstract 
This thesis examines the manner in which public policies are initiated, formulated and 
implemented in Pacific island countries and regional organisations, and determines the 
factors which are most critical for their effective implementation. It employs narrative 
inquiry and grounded theory approaches, supported by the computer software Nvivo, to data 
collection and analysis of case studies from Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Samoa, and key 
regional inter-governmental organisations. 128 semi-structured interviews were drawn from 
ten policy cases (three for each of the Pacific island countries and one from the Region’s 
Pacific Plan), together with a general narrative of the policy environment spread across all 
four contexts. A social constructionism worldview allows for the grounding of the research 
and its findings for both subject and context of the study. Participant voices are utilised as 
rich descriptions of policy processes, triangulation provided by documentary analyses and 
participant observation.  
Motivating this inquiry was my observation of the lack of visibly significant improvements 
in service delivery in Samoa and other Pacific island countries. These perceptions echoed 
criticisms in the literature about the slow improvement of development performance across 
the region despite high levels of foreign aid. Yet, such assessments often lack a solid 
understanding about the actual processes of public policy in the Pacific islands. Prevailing 
theories of public policy have remained largely westernised, and lenses to development 
primarily ethnocentric.  
Accordingly, this study’s findings shed light on the strengths and limitations of current 
public policy and development scholarships evident from Pacific public policy experiences. 
There are five key findings: First, policy processes have remained heavily top-down, shaped 
significantly by political and external interests, and where society has been the neglected 
element. In essence, the genesis of public policy has been insufficiently rooted in the context, 
problems and needs to which policies have been directed. This constitutes a significant 
democratic and development deficit that must be addressed in ongoing public policy 
development. Second, the use of evidence-based policy has been limited. While existing 
formal policies were often those transferred from elsewhere, and which do not fit well in the 
receiving context and culture, the practices were ad hoc, driven by various ideological or 
social constructions. Third, the success of policy and its implementation depends on 
mutually reinforcing factors of policy culture and stakeholder support, capability, 
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implementation modality and leadership. These factors are critical for ensuring that 
participation, partnership, ownership, understanding and learning are built into policy 
processes. Fourth, the integration of these elements into ongoing public policy development 
of Pacific island countries and the region requires a fundamental shift of focus about the role 
of society, particularly the adaptive capability of indigenous systems to legitimise notions of 
public policy in state-society relationships. Fifth, following a meta-analysis and synthesis of 
the four (country) case studies, the overall findings are conceptualised into a (explanatory) 
model of public policy. This model is a heuristic one that could be used when thinking about 
adopting and designing public policies in the Pacific islands capable of effective 
implementation. The model could be applied to non-Pacific small island developing states.  
Finally, the model provides a framework for discussing the normative implications of this 
study’s findings for public policy and development theory, practice and needed future 
research, and yielded five broad recommendations for future improvement: (1) the centrality 
of context; (2) societal needs incorporated into the public policy space; (3) focus on the 
political dimensions of further reforms; (4) international support that is more appreciative of 
context; and (5) needed changes to the way in which we think about development public 
policy.
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CHAPTER 1: THE CONTEXT OF THE RESEARCH 
1.1. The research purpose and question 
Societies worldwide are confronted with enormously complex problems such as climate 
change, security, poverty, ill-health, unemployment and sustainable development. 
Addressing these challenges is essentially ‘public policy’. The making and implementation 
of public policy is core government business at various frontiers—national, regional and 
global. My interest in public policy—its notions and practices being the subject of this 
inquiry—stemmed from my personal and professional experience in Samoa, a small Pacific 
island state not immune from the above challenges. Climate change for instance is a complex 
public policy phenomenon immediately confronting small Pacific island countries (PICs)—
so critical that it is not only of concern to national but also regional and global government 
institutions.  
This study examines public policy processes in a PIC. Research into public policy issues of 
PICs are rare but essential to our understanding of how they impact on the lives of Pacific 
islanders. Public policy ultimately refers to the ability (or inability) of governments to 
penetrate society and bring prosperity improvements to their people by adopting and 
implementing policies (Polidano, 2000). The significance of public policy is echoed in the 
developmental experience of the past decades that little can be accomplished to encourage 
such development unless the right policies are adopted and implemented by effective 
institutions (Duncan, 1995, p.15; Prasad, 2008; Turner & Hulme, 1997, p.59).  
For various PICs, public policy development has proven inadequate in bringing about the 
desired results for societies (Duncan, 2010, p.1; Hughes, 2010; Lua’iufi, 2010). In my 
experience, I have often questioned the impact of various policy reforms on local community 
and standards of living. The same experience has been echoed in regional exchanges: it 
brings to light questions concerning the practice of public policy in PICs over state 
functioning, capacity and the nature of its public policy processes.  
1.1.1. Public policy status  
Over the years, reforms guided by the so-called ‘good governance’ agenda have been 
adopted to strengthen PICs public policy capacity at state and regional levels (Amosa, 2007a, 
2007b; Binayak, 1999; Duncan, 2010; Knapman & Saldanha, 1999; Larmour, 1995; 
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Macdonald, 1998; Pollard, 2013). To support these initiatives, aid has poured into the region, 
policy institutions flooded with technical assistance. There is no lack of ideas given the 
availability of international best practices at the disposal of technical advisers. Various 
regional and national plans and strategies are adopted, and technologies brought in to 
improve ways of operating (Alley, 2006; Hook, 2009; O'Donnell & Turner, 2005; Prasad, 
2008; Tisdell, 2002; Toatu, 2004).  
However, despite various waves of reforms, total results are disappointing. PICs struggle to 
improve their standards of living, and continue to experience increased poverty and hardship 
(Abbott & Pollard, 2004, p.x; ADB, 2002, 2003; Bowman & Chand, 2008; Tisdell, 2000). 
Development performance measurements show that the region has underperformed. Hence 
the region’s average Gross National Income per capita of US$4,116 in 2013 (World Bank, 
2013) has grown by only 1-2% a year for the past 25 years (Hughes, 2003). Most PICs are 
now classified as lower middle income countries or small island developing states (see 
Appendix A). The UN (2015a) Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) report showed that 
despite progress in some areas (improved access to primary education, protection of marine 
areas and women’s access to paid employment), the region ‘continues to experience high 
levels of poverty and slow economic growth and is in danger of missing critical MDG 
targets’.  
Accordingly, concerns have been voiced consistently over a lack of development progress 
despite the enormity of aid resources and technical inputs. Pacific economies fail to grow 
(Gibson, 2006; Mishra, Sunila, & Smyth, 2010; Pollard, 2013; Prasad, 2008): a phenomenon 
labelled the ‘Pacific Paradox’ by the World Bank (1993). Hughes (2010) posited that ‘aid 
has failed the Pacific’i—suggesting that much of the US$50 billion (in 1998 dollars) given 
to the region since 1970 has been wasted (Hughes, 2003). Here giving more aid is unlikely 
to fix this dilemma, exacerbating PICs situations, undermining domestic revenue, creating 
economic rents, increasing dependency and debt, and eroding governance (Batten, 2010; 
Hughes, 2003; Jayaranman & Ward, 2006; Knack, 2001; Mellor & Jabes, 2004, p.ix). 
Disappointing outcomes suggest that PIC’s public policy systems are somewhat 
dysfunctional (Abbott & Pollard, 2004, p.x; Tony Hughes, 2013; Lua’iufi, 2010). Given this 
inability to meet development priorities, some PICs have been labelled ‘failed states’ 
(Guoliang, 2006; Reilly, 2000; Wainwright, 2001, p.1), something associated with historical 
                                                                            
i Hughes’ argument is strongly debatable and has been criticised for generalising a development record across a diverse 
region and ignoring many development successes. However, her critique is not wholly without merit and has brought into 
more discussion some of the real development issues facing the region (Morris, 2013). 
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upheavals. Informally, the region has been known for many plans but little or failed 
implementation.  
Failure to understand such poor performance exhibits a public policy lacuna. Limited 
development progress requires an inquiry into the nature and status of public policy 
processes in PICs and their region. This includes examining current policy reform 
approaches, their applicability, and the extent to which the state has the capacity to 
implement and sustain change. Pacific societies are confronted with complex issues (e.g. 
climate change, youth unemployment, limited sustainable monetised bases, poverty, poor 
infrastructure, corruption) best addressed and understood through a public policy lens. The 
need for a better understanding of the Pacific paradox lies at the heart of ‘public policy’. 
That is, do PIC governments address these issues in their public policy systems—and if so, 
how and with what impact—or if not, why not? This ‘how’ question is a central concern of 
this inquiry.  
1.1.2. Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this study is to examine how public policies are adopted, formulated and 
implemented in a Pacific island state. This is to detemine key factors at play when public 
policies are first introduced and developed, those which are critical during the process of 
implementation and that have led to effective or ineffectual results. To achieve this purpose, 
the following questions guided the research: 
a) What are the roles of different stakeholders as actors in the policy process and what is 
their understanding of (public) policy? 
b) What policies were adopted, why were they considered and where did they originate? 
c) How were policies formulated, implemented and evaluated and to what extent did the 
key stakeholders perceive that policies had been implemented successfully? 
d) What were the key issues affecting the policy process across its different stages? and  
e) What can be drawn from the experiences of the selected PICs and the region in terms 
of implications for public policy and development theory, practice and future research?  
1.1.3. Scope and approach  
Of some 25 PICs (see Appendix A), three (Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and Samoa) 
formed the focus of inquiry into national policy processes. The diversity of these PICs helped 
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provide a comparative grounding of this study’s research process and findings. Regional 
policy making is also a core component of PICs public policy frameworks: it allows a holistic 
lens to cross-cutting issues and commonalities across PICs. Hence the inclusion of this inter-
governmental level’s policy processes.  
This study is guided by the methodological approaches of qualitative research within a 
worldview of social constructionism. Case study research was the overarching research 
design complemented by grounded theory and narrative inquiry approaches. Semi-structured 
interviews, documentary analysis and participant observation were the research methods. 
Ten policies (three for each of the three PICs and the region’s ‘Pacific Plan’) (see section 
3.3.2) were selected as sub-case studies in addition to the general narrative of the policy 
environment across all four case studies.  
1.1.4. Myself as a researcher  
Every researcher brings to their research worldviews or ways of seeing things that are 
influenced by their upbringing and experience. As such, knowledge is socially constructed, 
shaped by a researcher’s interests and background. I undertook this study because I am a 
Pacific islander, born and raised in Samoa. My schooling in a rural setting and in Apia, and 
tertiary studies in New Zealand (NZ) and Australia, provided me with an understanding of 
both worlds, internal and external. I worked in the public sector for 12 years in various roles 
where I learnt about this ‘thing’ called ‘government’; a ‘thing’ I knew little about in my 
previous village life under the fa’aSamoa.ii Although we are diverse in various demographic 
and social-political aspects, regional networks have indicated that PICs share common 
public policy challenges. As a participant, stakeholder and observer in the implementation 
of 15 donor-sponsored institutional strengthening programs in Samoa, I experienced various 
local and external interactions.  
This background shaped my interest in pursuing this study. The motivation was driven by 
anxiety over the lack of significant improvement in public policy delivery in Samoa and 
other PICs, despite various reforms. The desire to gain a better understanding of this 
dilemma required an inquiry into how public policies are made and implemented, the 
underlying thinking behind policy practices, and what public policy theory has to offer. As 
well, I am interested in local participants’ perspectives of these policy processes, something 
                                                                            
ii Literally means Samoan way of life but refers to society’s complex systems of relationships, authority and culture.  
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which lacks sufficient attention but is given emphasis in this study. 
1.2. The Pacific context of public policy 
A contextual introduction to the region and the three PICs (the four case studies in chapters 
four to seven) is required, while acknowledging the enormous complexity of the region 
which cannot be fully accounted for in this study. The Pacific island archipelago spread over 
300 million km2, more than 98% of which is ocean, is the largest in the world. Only 500 of 
approximately 7,500 islands are inhabited (Haberkorn, 2008). What is referred to as the 
Pacific (islands) region comprises some 25 states and territories noted for their smallness, 
remoteness, vulnerability and diversity in geographic, social-political, economic and 
historical dimensions (see Appendices A and B).  
The region is home to approximately 10 million people,iii projected to reach 18 million by 
2035. 70% of this population belongs to Papua New Guinea (PNG). If PNG, Fiji and the 
Solomon Islands (countries with population of 500,000 and over that make up 84% of the 
regional population) are excluded—then the other 21 PICs (excluding Hawai’i and West 
Papua) are micro-states with populations of around 200,000 and less (ranging from 57 for 
Pitcairn to 268,270 for French Polynesia). These 21 PICs contribute only 16% of the regional 
population. PICs have young populations with about 56% under 25 years.  
Land area in relation to ocean territory also varies significantly amongst PICs. PNG accounts 
for 84% of the land area but its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is only 10% in the region, 
compared to French Polynesia which has the largest EEZ of 17% (of all PICs) but a land 
area of only 0.6% (3,521km2). Kiribati has the second largest EEZ of 12% but a land area of 
only 0.2% (811km2). Samoa has the smallest EEZ of only 0.4%.   
1.2.1. History  
The history of the Pacific is complex given the diversity of its islands. It is said that between 
30,000 and 50,000 BC, settlers from Indonesia arrived in New Guinea and Australia. The 
Polynesians and Micronesians are believed to have sailed and drifted from Southeast and 
East Asia between 2,000 and 1,000 BC. Over time the islanders spread across the region 
forming three relatively distinct geographical and cultural groupings: Melanesia (to the west), 
                                                                            
iii Extracted from the Secretariat of the Pacific Community’s (SPC) statistics (http://www.spc.int/sdd/) which are based on 
22 PICs as members. Figures for Hawai’i, East Island and West Papua are excluded.  
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Polynesia (in the centre and east) and Micronesia (northwest). Contact with Europeans began 
with the arrivals of explorers, missionaries and colonisers around the 15th century who, 
gradually but significantly, changed the islands (Campbell, 2003; Crocombe, 2008).  
The Solomon Islands were first explored by Spanish navigator, Alvaro de Mendana in 1568. 
Given the discovery of gold he named it after the rich, Biblical, King Solomon. British, 
American and German seamen and Christian missionaries followed around the mid-19th 
century. Colonial influence included ‘black-birding’ where islanders were enticed or brutally 
forced to work in Britain’s plantations in Fiji and Queensland. Britain took control of the 
Solomon Islands from 1877 until it became a British Protectorate in 1893 and independent 
in 1978 (Fitto, 2009, p.2).  
Vanuatu was first visited by Ferdinand de Queiros (Portuguese) in 1606, followed by Louis-
Antoine de Bougainville (French) in 1768. Later in 1768, James Cook (British) arrived and 
named the archipelago the ‘New Hebrides’. In the mid-1820s, British and French interests 
developed when sandalwood was discovered on Tanna Island triggering the arrival of traders, 
planters, and church missionaries. Increased settlements led to a tug of war between France 
and Britain for control over Vanuatu. This rivalry ended in 1906 through the signing of a 
joint administration, the so-called ‘Anglo-French Condominium of the New Hebrides’. Joint 
rule ended in 1980 with political independence and a renaming of the country as the 
‘Republic of Vanuatu’ (Miles, 1998).  
Dutch explorer Jacob Roggeveen first visited Samoa in 1722, followed by Louis-Antoine de 
Bougainville (French) in 1768, and Christian missionaries in the 1830s. Commercial 
interests of British, US and German entities flourished during the mid-19th century with the 
establishment of their local base offices and joint boards. In 1899, the three powers 
partitioned the islands—Germany annexed Samoa (Western); the US took over American 
Samoa (Eastern); while the British renounced all claims with territorial compensation in 
other parts of the Pacific. At the outbreak of World War I in 1914, what was Western Samoa 
was seized by New Zealand (NZ), after which it became a mandated territory under the 
League of Nations but still under NZ control. Later it became the first PIC to gain 
independence in 1962 (Davidson, 1967). 
In addition to these colonial histories, each PIC has its own dynastic history. From 1962 up 
to 1980, nine PICs became independent states with Tonga the only PIC that was not 
colonised (see Appendix A). Five are self-governing states (semi-dependent PICs) and 11 
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are territories (dependent PICs)—retaining political, constitutional and citizenship ties to 
former or current colonial masters. Pacific states are products of the decolonisation process 
in the late 20th century (see Figure 1.1), some of the youngest nation-states worldwide.  
 
Source: Extracted from http://geography.about.com/od/lists/a/independenceday.htm in March 2015 
1.2.2. Socio-political and economic dimensions  
Most Pacific societies were governed by indigenous systems under chiefly authority and 
customs without a centralised government. Chiefs were largely chosen through service to 
tribes or clans and were responsible for managing community affairs, resolving conflicts and 
maintaining law and order at a local level. This system of traditionaliv governance changed 
through external contact and has continued to evolve. With the formation of a state 
government at independence, most PICs adopted systems of government based on the 
institutions of their colonial masters (see Appendix A). Thus current governance systems, 
while differing across PICs, consist mostly of a mixed construction of three key influences): 
traditional, colonial and independence formations. At the local level, around 70% of the 
population reside in rural subsistence communities, their daily lives governed by traditional 
systems of governance, and in clusters of villages and islands holding the majority of land 
                                                                            
iv Refers to an indigenous system in terms of local communities and cultures to differentiate it from a modern state 
system. Given the continuing intertwining of indigenous systems and other systems (e.g. church, colonial, state) what is 
purely indigenous is difficult to define clearly.  
Figure 1.1: Nation-states and period of independence 
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resources under communal customary arrangements. Cultural and linguistic dimensions also 
vary significantly. For example, Samoa is homogenous in terms of one ethnicity, indigenous 
language and common culture. Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands, on the other hand, are 
diverse with more than 100 indigenous languages co-existing with English, French, Pidgin 
and Bislama (see Table 1.1).  
PICs have narrow open economies based largely on agriculture and fisheries as the main 
sources of livelihood. Tourism and the service sectors are other major sources of foreign 
exchange earnings and Gross Domestic Products (GDPs). For Polynesian countries such as 
Samoa, remittances are a major source of cash. The Solomon Islands is well-endowed with 
rich and abundant natural resources, with logging and minerals major economic contributors. 
Concerns have been raised over poor resource governance, ecological destruction and 
upheavals in various PICs. Development is challenging given the lack of a sustainable 
monetised resource base which, allied to vulnerabilities, particularly climate change, 
negatively impact on small island economies (Alley, 1999; Anderson, Ivatts, Somanathan, 
& Rolfe, 2014). The region is known for its fiscal dependency on foreign borrowing and 
overseas development assistance (ODA), being the largest recipient of aid per capita (see 
Figure 1.2).  
 
Source: Extracted from http://www.oecd.org/dac in January 2015 
Figure 1.2: ODA per capita (US$) by region in 2013 
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1.2.3. Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and Samoa—the national case studies 
In addition to the information provided in Appendix A, Table 1.1 gives a comparative 
summary of these three PICs’ contexts, providing background information for case studies’ 
analyses of findings in chapters four to seven and a synthesised discussion in chapter eight.   
 
Source: UN databases; SPC Statistics for development division website; electoral figures extracted 
from http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp in January 2015 
Table 1.1: Contextual information on Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and Samoa 
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1.2.4. The regional inter-governmental level—the regional case study 
The decolonisation process, beginning in the 1960s, created a strong push towards regional 
public policy making. Regional policy making concerns nine Pacific Regional Inter-
government Organisations (PRIGOs) listed in Table 1.2. They are the core ‘regional public 
service’, coordinated through the Council of Regional Organisations of the Pacific, CROP 
(PIF, 2004c). Appendix C gives a brief history of Pacific regionalism.  
PRIGO Created Headquarter 
Membership 
Status/Type 
Mandate/ 
Sector No. Countries 
Secretariat of the 
Pacific Community 
(SPC) 
1947 
New 
Caledonia & 
Fiji 
26 
22 Pacific States and 
Territories, Australia, 
NZ, France and USA  
Community Technical 
University of the 
South Pacific (USP) 
1968 Fiji 12 
12 PICs (campus in all 
member countries) 
University 
Academic/ 
Training 
Pacific Islands Forum 
Secretariat (PIFS) 
1972 Fiji 16 
14 Pacific states plus 
Australia and NZ 
Forum Political 
Secretariat of the 
Pacific Regional 
Environment 
Programme (SPREP) 
1973 Samoa 26 
21 PICs, Australia, NZ, 
France, USA and United 
Kingdom  
Program Environment 
Forum Fishery 
Agency (FFA)  
1979 
Solomon 
Islands 
17 
16 Forum Islands 
Countries (PIF 
Members) and Tokelau  
Agency Fisheries 
Pacific Islands 
Development Program 
(PIDP) 
1980 Hawaii 20 20 PICs  Program 
Academic/ 
Training 
South Pacific Tourism 
Organisation (SPTO) 
1983 Fiji 17 
16 PICs plus Timor-
Leste 
Organisation Tourism 
Pacific Power 
Association (PPA) 
1992 Fiji 23 
21 PICs, Australia and 
NZ 
Association 
Power/ 
Energy 
Pacific Aviation 
Safety Office (PASO) 
2005 Vanuatu 13 
9 Pacific Independent 
States, Cook Islands, 
Niue, Australia and NZ 
Office Aviation 
Table 1.2: PRIGOs or CROP agencies  
Source: Extracted from PRIGOs websites and PIF communiqués (see Appendix A) 
Of the PRIGOs, the PIFS, SPC, FFA and SPREP are the ‘core’ group of the regional policy 
architecture having enmeshed inter-governmental interactions in regional and national 
policy processes. The other five PRIGOs perform relatively low-level forms of political co-
operation and are sector specific in focus such as education (USP, PIDP), tourism (SPTO), 
power utilities (PPA) and aviation (PASO). PRIGOs are semi-autonomous bodies with their 
own governance structures and mandates based on country membership. From this it is 
evident that, to work, regional policy making and implementation has to depend closely on 
co-operation, coordination and integration (the key requirements of regionalism) from PICs 
national level (PIF, 2005c). 
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The PIF has 16 members of the region’s states as the Forum Islands Countries. As the pre-
eminent political grouping, PIF is the regional (government) policy making institution 
meeting annually as the ‘Forum’ of all Forum Islands Countries’ Heads of Government (‘the 
Leaders’). The PIFS, governed by the Forum Official Council of national officials (Foreign 
Affairs, Prime Minister or Finance), provides policy advice, coordination and leadership in 
implementing the Forum decisions (see Figure 1.3). These officials and Heads of PRIGOs 
formed the ‘Board for Pacific Regionalism’, formerly called the ‘Pacific Plan Action 
Committee’. This is the body overseeing the ‘Framework for Pacific Regionalism’ (formerly 
known as the ‘Pacific Plan’), the key regional policy. 
Source: Extracted from PRIGOs websites and PIF communiqués 
The SPC on the other hand has 26 members; 16 Forum Islands Countries, eight territories 
including the USA and France (SPC founding members and the territories’ administrators). 
The SPC is the key regional technical (implementing) institution with a cross-sector mandate 
in areas of applied geoscience and technology, economic development, education, training 
and human resource development, fisheries, aquaculture and marine ecosystems, land 
resources, health, statistics, strategic engagement, policy and planning. The other seven 
PRIGOs are sector specific (e.g. education, fisheries, aviation) in their implementing roles. 
Figure 1.3: PIF’s basic structure and relationship with other PRIGOs  
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Forming the regional network are about 20 sub-regional blocs (PiPP, 2010), 26 development 
agencies (e.g. World Bank, ADB, UN, AusAID, NZAID, European Union) and various non-
inter-governmental and private organisations forming the regional network. New or 
redefined bodies appear from time to time.v  
1.3. Thesis outline 
The remaining chapters are as follows: 
 Chapter two reviews the current theory of public policy and development and the 
relevant literature on PICs;  
 Chapter three outlines this study’s methodology and research design; 
 Chapters four to seven analyse the findings from the four case studies in terms of the 
policy processes in Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Samoa and the region; 
 Chapter eight synthesises the findings from the four case studies and discusses the overall 
patterns against the literature in chapter two; and   
 Chapter nine concludes by highlighting the implications of the study’s findings for public 
policy and development theory, practice, methodology and future research. 
                                                                            
v For example, the Pacific Islands Development Forum is a regional body and emerged in 2013, a Fiji-led initiative 
viewed as an attempt to bypass the PIF from which Fiji was suspended in 2009 when under military rule (ABC News, 
2013, August 8; Tarte, 2013). Fiji was reinstated in 2014 after returning to an elected government.   
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE THEORY AND EMPIRICAL 
LITERATURE 
2.1. Introduction 
This study is about ‘public policy’; how public policies are initiated, formulated and 
implemented within a Pacific island state. This chapter reviews the relevant literature against 
which the empirical findings about the policy processes of Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, 
Samoa and their region are examined. This review sets out the following arguments:  
 Knowledge is socially constructed and so is knowledge in public policy;  
 Public policy dominant theoretical currents are constructions largely based on the 
historical experiences of Western ‘developed’ countries;  
 The transference of these theoretical currents to other countries including Pacific 
island countries (PICs) through development theory is based on the assumption that 
PICs, as ‘developing’ contexts, will become ‘developed’ by emulating the experiences 
that led to the development of developed countries; and 
 Examination of these theoretical currents against policy processes in PICs or 
theoretical insights from PICs experiences are sparse.   
Within these arguments, three theoretical strands are identified: social construction, public 
policy, and development which help form the theoretical framework (Figure 2.1) for the 
review of the (mainstream) literature in the following sections. The strengths and limitations 
of theoretical currents in explaining this study’s findings are discussed in chapters eight and 
nine.   
 
Figure 2.1: Theoretical framework 
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2.2. Social construction  
Every theory has a perspective: ‘each perspective unfolds in a particular historical setting’ 
(Pieterse, 2010, p.8). To understand a theoretical perspective or lens is to understand its 
philosophical basis; to reflect on where that knowledge came from and how it was 
constructed. Knowledge is socially constructed, relative, and contextual, depending on the 
worldview or paradigm employed at a particular time. A paradigm according to Kuhn’s 
(1996, p.10) scientific revolution theory is a body of knowledge ‘which some particular 
scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further 
practice… but which is sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the 
redefined group of practitioners to solve’. Knowledge such as facts and natural laws are not 
neutral; they are subject to human constructions influenced by popular concepts, cognitions, 
values or beliefs shared by a community of individuals at a given time. Knowledge 
communicated in a paradigm (dominant theory) carries with it certain assumptions and 
constructions about the nature of the world (Gergen, 2003; Koch, 2005; Kuhn, 2003, p.9; 
Lock & Strong, 2010, p.2).  
Kuhn is referring to ‘epistemic’ knowledge; the basis of modern development and academic 
disciplinary discourses. However, such ‘epistemic’ or ‘technical’ knowledge is not the only 
type of knowledge. Habermas (1987) suggests there are three types of knowledge—technical, 
practical and emancipatory, which Shotter (1993, p.vii) refers to as knowledge of what a 
thing is, knowledge derived when making sense of the world (hermeneutics), and knowledge 
of being in touch with, and grounded within the everyday world. The first is founded on the 
modernist theories of scientifically grounded rationality; the search for absolute truth and 
standardised knowledge of the world is construed in the hope for a hegemony of one unified 
school of thought. The second is based on everyday language, implicit in personal and 
institutional practices. The third is where communication without the domination of ruling 
ideas or paradigms leads to new knowledge. (Burrell, 1994; Taylor, 1997, p.4).  
Emancipatory knowledge is based on notions of duality rather than dichotomies, 
contextualisation rather than generalisation, pluralism rather than the universal, and 
accumulations from what seems disorderly, not that which is assumed to be rational and 
orderly. The key is reflexivity and shared interpretations based on social interactions where 
language is central to contextualised understanding. It is about making sense of why things 
are by moving away from just assessing reality, as against dominant theories or ideologies, 
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towards a critical discursive reflection about how dominant theories shape the constructions 
of knowledge and social existence (power, interaction and work) (Burrell, 1994; Shotter, 
1993, p.1; Taylor, 1997, p.6). It is ‘phronesis’; ‘practical value rationality’ based knowledge 
involving ‘a sense of the ethically practical rather than a kind of science’ (Colebatch, 2006, 
p.315).  
Public policy and development involve all three knowledge types; the third provides the lens 
to examine dominant perspectives and how they shape historical thinking in both fields.  
2.3. Public policy theory 
2.3.1. Defining public policy 
Public policy is broadly conceived as about ‘government’; its behaviours, actions, intentions, 
interactions and commitments (or otherwise) for the common good. It is an interdisciplinary 
field that emerged from Europe and North America in post-World War II to study the 
relationship between government (authority) and society (people). Pioneer Harold Lasswell 
envisioned the field as one of problem solving, methodological and theoretically 
sophisticated (causal theory), and value oriented (to maximise democracy) (deLeon & 
Vogenbeck, 2007, p.4; Howlett, Ramesh, & Perl, 2009, p.17; Smith & Larimer, 2009, p.4).  
Public policy is variously defined as simply about ‘what governments do, why they do it and 
what difference it makes’ (Dye, 2002, p.1). Or ‘the sum of government activities, whether 
acting directly or through agents as it has influence on the lives of citizens’ (Peters, 2004, 
p.4). Or ‘an emergent and self-organisational complex system concerning the whole of the 
activities and relations among self-conscious, purposeful and interdependent actors’ (Morçöl, 
2012, p.9). With over 26 theoretical perspectives (Burton, 2006) ‘participating in a policy 
theory shootout is a daunting task’ and demonstrating one theory is superior over another is 
‘wildly optimistic’ (Meier, 2009, p.5). This diversity signifies that public policy is a complex 
phenomenon; conceptualisations attempting to make sense of its complexity are at best 
constructed approximations of realities. Settling on a single definition limits the need to 
make sense of such complexity and ‘to build a richer understanding of the multi-faceted 
nature of policy’ (Shaw & Eichbaum, 2011, p.5).  
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2.3.2. Current paradigms of public policy  
The applicability of knowledge derived from the natural sciences to social sciences continues 
to raise philosophical and meta-theoretical issues. Nevertheless, academic knowledge and 
hence public policy (and development) conceptualisations have developed through dialogue 
with principles derived from the natural sciences and Western philosophy, progressing 
largely in three paradigmatic movements.  
2.3.2.1. Scientific rationalism—physical sciences  
Given its intellectual origin in the 17th century Enlightenment era of European and then 
North American scientific revolutions, much of the thinking underlying public policy in its 
foundation, institutionalisation (government systems) and theoretical currents are grounded 
in the philosophical-scientific (analytical) thinking of Descartes, Newton, Copernicus and 
others in the study of physical systems (Byrne & Callaghan, 2014, p.18; Geyer, 2003; Geyer 
& Rihani, 2010, p.12; Morçöl, 2005, 2012; Stacey, 2007, p.28). Central to this first-ordered 
paradigmatic movement are the following beliefs and conceptualisations: 
 The universe is conceptualised as a mechanistic system, so the behaviour of a system 
(phenomenon) is understood as a clockwork or cybernetic machine;  
 Reality (truth about the world) is absolute and universal; the beliefs in the discovery of 
absolute universality through the scientific methods of positivism. Truths are in the form 
of timeless, deterministic and linear causal laws;  
 The belief lies in the power of autonomous individuals to reason about causal 
explanations of phenomena; 
 The hope is to bring order to the world through rationalism and scientific discovery to 
eliminate medieval myths (e.g. religious) about the nature of the world; and 
 Truth is obtainable by dividing a system into parts, observing their behaviours 
objectively and forming a complete view of the system’s behaviour obtained from the 
summative views of the parts—‘the whole is the sum of its parts’.  
This first-ordered paradigm’s deterministic, linear, causal and orderly notions have profound 
influence on public policy conceptualisations (Stacey, 2007, p.21). They are embedded in 
Lasswell’s vision of the policy science to be analytical (causal theory), and as featured in 
Sabatier’s (2007, p.8) call for better policy theories that meet the criteria of scientific theory. 
This dominant paradigm consists of the following constructions (ideas, values, ideologies, 
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etc.) shaping historical and prevailing notions of public policy (Byrne & Callaghan, 2014; 
Geyer, 2003; Geyer & Rihani, 2010; Morçöl, 2005, 2010, 2012; Stacey, 2007, p.36): 
 The rise of modern states and bureaucracy in post-World War II given the need to 
bring order to the world;  
 The separation of powers within government such as in the Westminster system or 
Weberian bureaucracy;  
 The study and conceptualisation of public policy in different parts, levels, units or 
stages are largely influenced by this mechanistic view of the world as existing in 
separate parts; 
 Rationality, long-term planning, classical management theories, instrumentalism and 
incremental change as espoused public policy models;  
 Understanding about the nature of the world is in terms of mechanisms like input-
output linear causality models; and 
 The individual as an objectivist detached from reality. Government (as a rational actor) 
is separated from society in order to be objective and neutral.  
2.3.2.2. Systems thinking—biological sciences 
The first-ordered paradigm’s limitation to account for dynamic interactive behaviours of 
phenomena brought to the fore systems thinking. Systems thinking is as old as Aristotle’s 
holistic and teleological views of ‘the whole being more than the sum of its parts’. It existed 
in the study of quantum physics but was suppressed by the prominence of the first-ordered 
paradigm (Morçöl, 2012, p.64). Kuhn (1996) posits new/prior knowledge 
(suppressed/neglected previously) emerged/re-emerged from new research and practices 
when a dominant paradigm becomes inadequate. Systems thinking was largely advanced by 
the study of organisms (living systems) in the 19th century by Wiener’s (1948) cybernetics 
theory, von Bertalanffy’s (1968, 1975) general system theory, Maturana and Varela’s (1987) 
autopoiesis theory, and Bogdanov’s work on system theories in the 1910s (Midgley, 2003, 
p.xxii). This second-ordered paradigm advanced the following conceptualisations (Capra, 
1983, 1996; Geyer & Rihani, 2010, p.16; Midgley, 2003; Morçöl, 2005, 2012; Stacey, 2007):  
 Phenomena (natural, human) are systems (irreducible wholes) within larger wholes 
(supra-systems) with interdependent parts (subsystems) embedded in context 
(environment); 
 A holistic understanding of a system requires examining its parts and dynamic 
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interactions amongst these parts and other interconnected systems, all nested as 
hierarchical wholes (levels) in the supra-whole. Thus the whole becomes more than 
the sum of its parts;  
 Open systems (e.g. human, society) exchange matters with their environment through 
negative and positive feedback mechanisms allowing the system to self-regulate 
(stabilise) and self-renew (grow) itself;  
 Moving the system towards stability requires finding leverage points to strike a balance 
between negative and positive feedback loops and maintaining orderly relationships 
within subsystems;  
 A living system self-defines and self-creates itself (autopoiesis) through its parts and 
boundaries (identities) which separate, yet also link the system to its environment. The 
system and its parts emerge from their own operations and interactions (as self-
organising wholes), not imposed from outside (pre-given); and  
 Loss of identity means the destruction of the system. Maintenance of identity requires 
that change be internally determined and facilitated by a process of autopoiesis, not 
external perturbations.  
Systems thinking in contrast to the positivism/rationalism limitation explains historical 
forces and irrational behaviours that appeared to ascribe more to socio-cultural elements 
(macro aspects) than primarily to individual actions. The individual is not a rational entity 
standing outside observing, but is part of a system; ‘they have to be necessary for the 
production of the whole, otherwise they have no relevance as parts’ (Stacey, 2007, p.31). 
Systems thinking implications for social phenomena and public policy are as follows 
(Durlauf, 2012; Geyer & Rihani, 2010; Morçöl, 2005, 2012; Stacey, 2007; Teisman, Gerrits, 
& van Buuren, 2009): 
 Public policy is a system made up of interconnected parts (individuals, groups, 
organisations, institutions, etc.) co-evolving with their environment;  
 Understanding a (public) policy system requires a holistic understanding of its parts 
and their dynamic interactions (processes, structures, organisation) as a whole;  
 A policy system’s survival and growth require regulative mechanisms (negative 
feedback) for stability and positive feedback (learning) for change;  
 Change cannot be imposed, but emerges from interactions (the unfolding self-
organising processes) of different parts; 
 Autopoiesis is the cognitive process of actors to collectively interpret meanings, 
 19 
maintain identity, and communicate actions contributing to the system’s survival, 
destruction or growth. Actors’ key roles are to ensure the system’s stability; and  
 Individuals’ actions emerge from their self-organising interactions where they co-
construct reality (public policy); not necessarily a result of own rational thinking given 
their boundedness in context.  
2.3.2.3. Complexity thinking—a synthesis   
Systems thinking emphasises phenomena’s wholeness, irreducibility and dynamics. 
However, it overlooks phenomena’s disorderly, iterative (orderly-disorderly) and in-
deterministic behaviours advanced by the science of complexity in late 19th century. Based 
on the mathematical modelling of irregularity behaviours of phenomena (chaos theory) 
(Gleick, 1987; Stewart, 1990); and the study of chemical and physical systems (theory of 
dissipative structures) (Prigogine, 1980; Prigogine & Stengers, 1984, 1996); and complex 
adaptive systems (e.g. flock of birds, human) (Gell-mann, 1994; Holland, 1998; Kauffman, 
1995); complexity theory has advanced the following conceptualisations:   
 A system contains iterative movements of stability, cyclical (peaks, troughs) and 
instability (chaos); paradoxical nonlinear dynamics due to negative feedback 
(producing stability); and positive feedback (producing instability/chaos)—leading to 
increased complexity where long-term predictions are impossible. The system is 
sensitive to initial conditions (history) hence small fluctuations in one period can 
escalate over latter periods (butterfly effects);  
 Influenced by fluctuations (feedback loops) in the environment, a system that is far-
from-equilibrium can maintain stability or undergo sudden changes at bifurcation 
points. At these points (‘at the edge of chaos’), the system undergoes a self-organising 
process; it may decay into chaos, or emerge into a new behaviour or order called 
‘dissipative structure’—‘an order out of chaos’ without a blueprint; 
 Through interaction and co-evolution, entities form a complex adaptive system with a 
population-wide pattern leading to the maintenance or emergence of order or 
complexity. This evolutionary experience is unknown (hence the basis for creativity) 
and is a fitness landscape (not given but co-constructed by agents) of hills/mountains 
(increasing fitness) and valleys (decreasing fitness). All of this represents a stumbling 
journey in which a system moves forward and backward through self-organisation, not 
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by chance; and 
 The self-organising interaction of (diverse but connected) agents in its evolving system 
(network) create enabling and conflicting dynamics. The system’s evolution (life and 
its organisation) arises from a dialectic between competition and co-operation, and 
where agents evolve to new forms; including that formerly unknown (‘transformative 
causality’). The whole takes on a life of its own, is never finished, but is always 
evolving. (Kauffman, 1995; Morçöl, 2005; Stacey, 2007; Waldrop, 1992).  
Advocated as a new paradigm, providing alternative ways of looking at the natural and 
human worlds, complexity theory has attracted scholarly attention in the last 50 years in 
most fields as it challenges dominant notions based on predictability, linearity, causality and 
orderly worldviews (Cairney & Geyer, 2015). Implications for understanding social 
phenomena are as follows:  
 Stability keeps a (policy) system where it is, but a far-from-equilibrium operation 
destabilizes that system opening it up to change through feedback loops (e.g. 
information, rules, learning, adaptation); 
 A (public policy) outcome is not pre-given or unknowable but under perpetual 
construction through the paradox of stability/instability and conflicting/enabling 
behaviours and where time irreversibility plays a constitutive role. This evolution 
process involves encountering bifurcation points where the policy system undergoes 
change;  
 Taking paths and creativity at these points depend on agents’ self-organising 
interactions; can cause a system to unfold in unpredictable behaviours; and 
 Self-organisation is the system’s collective response, not a result of an external agent 
applying feedback loops. (Geyer & Cairney, 2015; Geyer & Rihani, 2010, p.24; 
Morçöl, 2005, 2010, 2012; Stacey, 2007).  
2.3.3. Approaches to studying public policy  
The paradigms just discussed have influenced public policy conceptualisations, 
notwithstanding the limitations inherent when attempting to transfer methodologies from 
one field of investigation to another quite different in nature. This is evident once public 
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policy itself comes into focus, as discussed in the following sections. Here scholars have 
approached the study of public policy at different elements/parts/levels—micro (individual 
actor); meso (multiple actors, institutions or action arenas); macro (context); ideas and the 
whole (system) with associated theoretical perspectives as outlined in Box 2.1. 
 
Source: Author’s construct based on reading the literature 
2.3.3.1. The policy cycle  
As Lasswell’s (1956) first attempt at theory, the policy process is viewed as a cyclic 
operation of distinct but interlinked stages: agenda setting, formulation, decision-making, 
implementation and evaluation. The model is an oversimplification of reality where the 
policy process is often complex and messy. Yet despite criticisms, the model remains of use 
as a heuristic understanding. By studying its different parts as stages, it can readily show 
how they fit into an overall process (Birkland, 2011; Howard, 2005; Sabatier, 2007, p.7).  
Box 2.1: Units/elements in a policy sub-system and theoretical perspectives 
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2.3.3.2. Public choice theories  
The individual rational actor is regarded as the foundation of political action/inaction 
pursuing policies to maximise self-interest. State versus market policy processes are 
advocated with the state providing an enabling environment for the market to function in 
public good provisions and curb individualist maximising behaviours. Critics view these 
perspectives as oversimplifications of human behaviour since actors do make choices 
advancing the public interest. This lens misses institutional factors, being based on a liberal 
culture (e.g. US) with little recognition of other perspectives (Andrews, 2007; Cairney, 2012; 
Hill, 2005, p.51; Howlett et al., 2009, p.35). What constitutes rationality when fostering the 
public goods of democracy remains unclear (Kuruvilla & Dorstewitz, 2010). 
2.3.3.3. Group and network theories  
Emerging from Marxist, pluralist and corporatist analyses in the modern era are a range of 
different group/class theories that view the policy process as involving mainly state-society 
interactions. Here society comprises nothing more than a complex (of) groups/classes 
pursuing distinct interests based on those primary identities. Critics have argued such 
theories underrate the role of government, international actors and collective action arenas 
in shaping policies and that are based in open societies (e.g. US, Europe). Such groups are 
free-forming, acting as state-societal groups’ institutionalised through forms of co-operation 
and bargaining, and contributing to historical development processes. Countries that lack 
these features evolve differently (Hill, 2005, p.63; Howlett et al., 2009, p.40). 
2.3.3.4. Institutional theories  
Institutionalists stress the need to see policy making in its own context (Howlett et al., 2009, 
p.43). Institutions refers to organisations (bureaucratic, networks, families, voluntary groups, 
international regimes, etc.), legal and cultural codes, norms and rules (Crawford & Ostrom, 
1995). Actors’ interests are pursued within institutional contexts that shape expectations and 
outcomes. Institutions affect what the state does in legitimising actions and fashioning 
constraints and opportunities. Institutions embody historical patterns as path dependencies 
shaping future possibilities. They are defined broadly, making it difficult to empirically 
identify on the ground commonalities (Ostrom, 2007, p.23). Institutionalism can also assume 
relatively static policy processes, and thus fail to explain why change happens or how 
institutions are created (Howlett et al., 2009, p.45; John, 2003).  
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2.3.3.5. Socio-economic approaches  
Marxist political analyses in capitalist societies view the policy process as dominated by 
powerful societal classes (the capitalist), the state an instrument of class domination and its 
policies reflecting capitalist interests. This is a heavily society-centred approach which 
contrasts sharply with a state-centred focus where the policy process is affected not so much 
by society, as by the state’s organisational context. Here the state is a rational actor with its 
own interests to pursue (Grindle & Thomas, 1989; Kuruvilla & Dorstewitz, 2010; Smith & 
Larimer, 2009, p.45). The focus is on how decisions are made through various explanatory 
models such as the ‘perfect rationalist’, ‘bounded rationality’, ‘satisficing’, ‘incrementalism’ 
and ‘muddling through’ (Bendor, 2015; Forester, 1984; Hill, 2005, p.147; Lindlom, 1959).   
2.3.3.6. Ideas and ideational approaches  
The manner in which an issue is interpreted, recognised and mapped by policy makers 
determines how it will be addressed. This ‘raises deep questions about the nature of human 
knowledge and the social construction of that knowledge’ (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p.121). 
Policies are created out of actors’ social construction process (not necessarily in any rational 
or self-interested manner) involving histories, traditions, language, moral values, individual 
judgement, group beliefs, public attitudes, seeking meaning and offering competing 
worldviews across different time and issue settings (Adams, 2004; John, 1998, p.144; 2003; 
Sutton, 1999). Colebatch (2006) argues that good policy should be based on all three types 
of knowledge (see section 2.2), not just epistemic knowledge. Ideational approaches 
challenge conventional rational-based perspectives, but ‘there is little systematic 
investigation into why, how and when decision makers utilised policy knowledge’ (James & 
Jorgensen, 2009). Hence the call for more explicit research on these approaches (Campbell, 
2002). 
2.3.3.7. Policy as (self-organising, emerging and co-evolving) systems  
Systems theorists consider the historical debate of one element/level being more important 
than another as limited; instead all such elements/levels are nested parts of a (policy) system. 
Their interaction as irreducible wholes co-create and co-maintain the system they are part of. 
Complexity theory brings a synthesis lens to breaching traditional macro versus micro 
approaches to studying policy processes by demonstrating that a policy system contains 
nonlinear, emergent and paradoxical (e.g. stability-instability, conflicting-enabling) 
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behaviours. The following are complexity theory’s implications for public policy: 
 participants in a policy system self-organise and co-evolve in ‘fitness’ to context, the 
environment in which they operate;  
 a policy system is complex given the dynamic interaction of elements within its 
boundaries that cannot be defined clearly, but are nevertheless constructed by an 
observer; 
 policies change as intended or unintended because they depend on the feedback loops 
and attractors in the system (endogenous). External factors can trigger change but are 
not the causes of systematic change; 
 policies may emerge as planned or unplanned because of actors’ self-organising, 
emerging and co-evolving behaviours; and 
 a policy system should be studied as a ‘whole’ to understand the complexities and 
dynamics that shape nonlinearity movements in the system (Bittick, 2010; Colander, 
2014; Eppel, 2009; Geyer & Cairney, 2015; Geyer & Rihani, 2010; Meek, 2010; 
Morçöl, 2012; Teisman & Klijn, 2008).  
Easton (1957) applied system theory to politics but his model follows a mechanistic view of 
the political system. Freeman (1965) and Heclo (1977; 1978) also developed a policy 
(sub)system framework (see Figure 2.2) where the policy process involves actors’ complex 
interactions over time in pursuit of their interests and ideas within the social-political, 
economic and international environment (Considine, 1994, p.22; Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, 
p.53). How environmental factors shape actors’ interactions is not spelt out in this framework: 
this remains a task awaiting empirical investigation.  
 
Source: Adapted from Howlett & Ramesh (2009, p.84) 
Figure 2.2: The policy (sub)system framework 
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Chapman (2002, p.10) argues that dominant approaches based on mechanistic, rational and 
reductionist thinking contributed to much ‘system failure’ in government. Rather 
government should learn to think differently using the lens of a complex system. Utilising 
complexity lenses to conceptualise public policy systems as evolutionary, and involving 
unpredictable long-term complex changes, are approaches yet to develop fruitfully (Cairney, 
2013b). Some attempts include the Punctuated Equilibrium approach which conceptualises 
how policies change over time (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; John, 2003; Petridou, 2014). 
Also, the institutionalism emphasises path dependency, irreversibility, locked-in and 
sequencing phases to show how history and context matter in policy processes (Cairney, 
2013b; Howlett, 2009b; Howlett & Rayner, 2006). These theories conceive of policy 
processes as largely random, accidental or economic crises-based and have had limited 
application in settings outside the US (Baumgartner, Green-Pedersen, & Jones, 2006). 
2.3.4. Conceptualisations of the policy process 
In addition to the different approaches to studying public policy are perspectives on sub-
processes of the policy process (see Box 2.1).  
2.3.4.1. Where does public policy originate?  
In view of the (sub)system framework, policies can originate from domestic or external 
policy systems or both (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p.29; John, 1998, p.28). It can emerge 
from policy makers directing an agenda, groups or networks making demands for attention 
on a particular issue, social-economic forces forcing government to adopt an agenda, or 
policy transfers or pressures for compliance with a particular international regime. Agenda 
setting theories have sought to explain why some issues and not others come to get 
considered.   
2.3.4.1.1. The Multiple Streams  
Building on Cohen, March and Olsen’s (1972) ‘garbage can’ model of organisation choice, 
the Multiple Stream posits that policy actors take advantage of ‘windows of opportunity’ to 
push an item on to a government agenda. Three streams (problems, solutions and politics) 
mix in a ‘primeval soup’ that intersect to produce a policy once a window of opportunity 
opens. Such windows may include a change in the political arena, ideological shift or 
appearance of a compelling problem (Kingdon, 1995). The theory is criticised for a lack of 
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empirical rigour and for making unrealistic assumptions based on unforeseen circumstances 
(Birkland, 2011; Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p.138; Robinson & Eller, 2010; Zahariadis, 
2007).  
2.3.4.1.2. Groups, networks and institutions 
Group theories view the policy process as involving an ‘iron triangle’ (dominant interest 
groups, state and bureaucracy) and their interactions (Adam & Kriesi, 2007, p.129; Howlett 
& Ramesh, 2003, p.38; Smith & Larimer, 2009, p.77). More recently, that has been 
challenged as the policy process becomes less elite dominated, but more open and 
fragmented to involve multiple interactions among networks. Policy networks are no longer 
confined to top-down/bottom-up/centre-to-periphery structures, but involve horizontal 
relationships within-and-across state and non-state actors as ‘networked governance’, 
‘joined-up government’ or patterns of interactions in a (sub)system. Network theories have 
gained momentum as they are consonant with democratic public policy values, service 
delivery demands, and inter-organisational/governmental collaboration for addressing 
complex problems extending beyond a single organisation/state capacity (Adam & Kriesi, 
2007; Ansell & Gash, 2008; deLeon & Varda, 2009; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2006; Koppenan, 
2012; Rausser & Swinnen, 2011; Teitz, 2009; Ulibarri, 2015).  
The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IADF) and the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework (ACF) offer some prominent theory of this form of the policy process. 
The IADF focuses on how rational actors can collaborate to solve common pool dilemmas 
through incentives, rule formation, de facto coalitions and existing authorities (Feiock, 2013; 
Ostrom, 2007, 2011; Petridou, 2014). The ACF (Sabatier, 1988) on the other hand, views 
policy as driven by strong coalitions with shared, deeply held beliefs within societal sub-
systems. Beliefs are difficult to change but engagement in ‘policy oriented learning’ can 
modify them. (Sabatier, 1991; Sabatier & Weible, 2007; Schlager, 1995; Weible, Sabatier, 
& McQueen, 2009).  
However, the application of these theories outside the US and Europe remains limited (Han, 
Swedlow, & Unger, 2014; Nedergaard, 2008; Petridou, 2014; Weible, Sabatier, & Lubell, 
2004). The ACF loses traction when applied to processes operating across overlapping 
(sub)systems, or cross-cutting integrative policies (e.g. drugs, terrorism, poverty) (Jochim & 
May, 2010). Operative deep beliefs within an ACF construct go unspecified. Recent attempts 
to address such limitations by integrating cultural theory are limited, given its emphasis on 
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group as distinct from individualised definitions of culture (Jenkins-Smith, Silva, Gupta, & 
Ripberger, 2014; Ripberger, Gupta, Silva, & Jenkins-Smith, 2014; Swedlow, 2014). 
2.3.4.1.3. Policy transfer and policy diffusion  
Nation-state based theories often fail to recognise how political and economic relationships 
and interdependencies between states shapes public policy (Obinger, Schmitt, & Starke, 
2013). Policy transfer refers to the process whereby policies/ideas from one jurisdiction or 
domain are used in the development of policies/ideas in another by involving processes of 
‘copying’ (same policy is replicated), ‘emulation’ (policy is modified to suit different 
contexts), and ‘inspirational’ (policy stimulates the creation of novel policy elsewhere) 
(Dolowitz, 2003; Dolowitz, Greenwold, & Marsh, 1999; Dolowitz & Marsh, 1998, 2000). 
Policy transfer instances are commonplace (Carroll, 2012; Larmour, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 
2002d, 2005) involving global networks of experts and organisations, sharing so-called 
international ‘best practice’, ‘what works’, ‘off the shelf’, or ‘not to reinvent the wheel’ 
policies, ideas or practices (Common, 1998; Pal & Ireland, 2009; Peel & Lloyd, 2007; Prince, 
2012).  
A related idea is policy diffusion, ‘the process by which an innovation is communicated… 
over time among members of a social system’ (Rogers, 1983, p.5). The adoption of a 
program by a state arises because of internal determinants (domestic) or policy diffusion 
(external), and where states borrow innovations perceived as working elsewhere, influence 
by states that are geographically proximate—the ‘neighbour models’ (Berry & Berry, 2007, 
p.224). The relationship between policy transfers and outcomes is an area of growing 
importance but remains under-researched (Fawcett & Marsh, 2012).   
2.3.4.2. How is public policy formulated?  
Policy formulation concerns how the government addresses the issues on its agenda. It is a 
normative question of policy analysis and design in relation to the kinds of instruments 
available to implement policy decisions (Lascoumes & Le Gales, 2007). Normative aspects 
involve the rationalist versus social construction approaches. Divided by philosophical and 
epistemological underpinnings, the former takes positivist, while the latter prefers post-
positivist, stances.  
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2.3.4.2.1. Rationalist  
As a public choice theory (see section 2.3.3.2), the rationalist approach sees actors behaving 
rationally to achieve goals by pursuing optimum courses of action. Technocrats or experts 
conduct objective data-based assessments of problems and advise on the best possible 
solutions. Involving this rationalist approach is a welfare economics approach seeking 
reconciliation of state versus market instruments as to how government can best allocate 
resources to maximise the public interest. Efficiency is the dominant value judgment in this 
evidence-based policy process (Adams, 2004; Albæk, 1995; John, 1998, p.116; Kuruvilla & 
Dorstewitz, 2010; Peel & Lloyd, 2007; Smith & Larimer, 2009, p.107).  
2.3.4.2.2. Social construction  
This post-positivist approach views the rationalists as promoting a particular set of values 
(efficiency) at the expense of democratic values (equity). Rationalism encourages 
bureaucratic policy- making that reinforces the status quo, giving little room for citizen 
participation. For a post-positivist, alternative policy is viewed as the prerogative of politics, 
making it unlikely to respond to any objectively rational analyses (Andrews, 2007, p.224; 
Smith & Larimer, 2009, p.116). Based on the worldview of ‘the (political) world as socially 
constructed’ (Smith & Larimer, 2009, p.121), policy making is largely driven by worldviews 
and values rather than technocratic process (Geva-May, 2002; Yanow, 1993, 1995, 2000). 
Discourse and interpretive analyses are more appropriate, involving the art of constructing 
policy arguments (‘the argumentative turn’) and recognising non-economic factors (e.g. 
culture, social realities) in shaping policy making (Jones & McBeth, 2010; McBeth, 
Shanahan, Arnell, & Hathaway, 2007; Shanahan, Jones, & McBeth, 2011). Social 
construction has gained considerable scholarly attention (Petridou, 2014; Pierce et al., 2014; 
Trousset, Gupta, Jenkins-Smith, Silva, & Herron, 2015; Wilkins & Wenger, 2014). This is 
on account of gaps now evident between rationalist prescriptions and lived reality (Head, 
2014).  
2.3.4.3. How is policy implemented?   
Implementation is ‘the process whereby programmes or policies are carried out and the 
translation of plans and laws into practice’ (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p.185). Advanced by 
Pressman and Wildavsky’s (1973) influential study of implementation failures in California, 
implementation studies were generated by interests in examining the ‘black box’ between 
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intentions and outcomes (O'Toole Jr, 2004; Schofield & Sausman, 2004; Wolman, 1981). 
This led Hargrove (1975) to denote implementation as the ‘missing link’ in policy studies 
(Wheat, 2010). Implementation studies have proceeded in three generations: examining what 
has or has not worked (1973-1980s), theory construction (1980s), and theoretical 
synthesis/verification (1990s) (Bowman, 2011; Smith & Larimer, 2009, p.156). 
Implementation studies have pointed to the need to better integrate so-called ‘top-down’ 
versus ‘bottom up’ models. 
2.3.4.3.1. Implementation models  
Top-downers focus on the translation of goals into actions and what makes the achievement 
of intentions difficult. Analysis starts from policy decisions and the extent to which formal 
objectives are realised over time as they go through the government machinery (Butler & 
Allen, 2008). Top-down models include Van Meter and Van Horn’s (1975) ‘policy-
implementation model’, Bardach’s (1977) ‘game metaphorical model’, Hogwood and 
Gunn’s (1978) ‘perfect implementation’ and Sabatier and Mazmanian’s (1983) ‘process 
modelling’ (cited in Hill & Hupe, 2009, p. 45). 
Top-downers focus largely on central decision-makers neglecting local level actors (Butler 
& Allen, 2008; Hill & Hupe, 2009, p.51). By contract, bottom-up models focus on the 
behaviours of implementers as ‘the decisions, routines, and devices adopted and used by 
street-level bureaucrats to cope with uncertainties and work pressures effectively become 
the public policies they carry out’ (Lipsky, 1970, 1980: cited in Hill & Hupe, 2009, p. 51). 
What gets done becomes policy. Bottom-up models include Hjern’s (1981) ‘implementation 
structure’ and Barret and Fudge’s (1981) ‘policy and action’ model (cited in Hill & Hupe, 
2009, p. 53). 
The ‘top-down/bottom-up’ debate relates to that between the ‘rationalist/post-positivist’ 
approaches. Both perspectives claim legitimacy; hence studies have long moved beyond top-
down/bottom-up to synthesis models (O'Toole Jr, 2000, 2004). Application of Sabatier’s 
(1986) ACF and Elmore’s (1979) backward mapping models were some early syntheses. 
Applications of governance theories (Conteh, 2011; Exworthy & Powell, 2004; Hill & Hupe, 
2009, p.123; Howlett, 2009a), collaborative approaches (Koontz & Newig, 2014), 
institutionalism (Rice, 2013), and others (May, 2013), are some recent synthesis examples. 
They overlap with policy theories already discussed, and in which policy making and 
implementation are not distinct but iterative parts of an (overall) policy process.  
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Well-established implementation models have not been fully advanced (Hill & Hupe, 2009, 
p. 12). Research has largely been concentrated in the US and Europe but lacking adequate 
cross-national comparison (O'Toole Jr, 2000). This has led Smith and Larimer (2009, p.178) 
to conclude that implementation studies comprise a prospective third generation. Others 
maintain that, since implementation remains the missing link, its integration into overall 
policy theories remains weak, not reconciled (O'Toole Jr, 2004; Robichau & Lynn Jr, 2009; 
Wheat, 2010).  
2.3.4.3.2. Public management versus public policy 
This ‘missing link’ conception led scholars to revisit Wilson’s policy/administration 
dichotomy, where policy (making) belongs to the political realm (politics), and 
administration of policy (implementation) to the bureaucracy (Howlett, 2011; Stewart, 1996; 
Wheat, 2010). This sees the study of (public) administration as separated from that of (public) 
policy, with implementation as the ‘missing link’. But the issue here is that such a dichotomy 
‘bears little reality to political and administrative behaviour’ (Hill & Hupe, 2009, p.31), 
limiting attempts to synthesise the policy processes as a whole (Bozeman, 2013), and 
undervaluing management’s roles in policy making (Meier, 2009). Policy making and 
implementation ‘overlap and cannot be separated even analytically’ (Dror, 2008). Thus the 
study of ‘public administration’ including its (new) public management variant is relevant 
to studying implementation. The New Public Management has asserted that adopting 
market-based instruments will improve public policy and management, a claim that has 
superseded attention to implementation issues themselves (Barrett, 2004).  
2.3.4.3.3. Implementation and success/failure  
How evaluation is used to judge policy outcomes may involve positivist and/or post-
positivist assessments. However, what actually constitutes policy failure or success is an 
under-researched, poorly understood area in the literature. While failure is a wider concern, 
accepted definitions or agreement over its causes are absent. Limited agreement is partly a 
reflection of the complexity and contested nature of public policy where assessments are 
socially constructed and political. Failure or success for whom, how, when and why mean 
different actors frame success or failure differently in terms of relevant impact and 
attributing factors (Fotaki, 2010; Ika, Diallo, & Thuillier, 2012; Marsh & McConnell, 2010; 
McConnell, 2010, 2011, 2014).  
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2.3.4.3.4. Implementation and evaluation  
Debating implementation success, failure or shortcomings requires ‘giving a normative 
qualification as a result of a comparison between what is observed and what is expected’ 
through evaluation. While the conceptual distinction between evaluation and 
implementation is important, they overlap in practice (Smith & Larimer, 2009, p.157). 
Evaluation (administrative, judicial, political) depends on its purpose, methodology, venue, 
actors involved and effect (Hill & Hupe, 2006, p.11).  
Evaluation can involve finding out what actually happens during implementation, 
determining value for money in terms of results, establishing accountability for these results, 
or learning lessons from past experiences. How such lessons are then used to effect further 
change will depend on two types of policy learning: lesson-drawing and social learning (Hall, 
2011; Hall, 1993; Real-Dato, 2009). Lesson-drawing takes place among sub-systems aimed 
at effecting changes in the policy process (e.g. assessing instrumentalities that have failed or 
succeeded). Social learning, by contrast, concerns fundamental changes in goals, paradigms 
or the underlying thinking from which lesson-drawing is based. It originates ‘outside the 
formal policy process affecting the capacities of policy makers to change society’ (Howlett 
& Ramesh, 2003, p.222). Argyris and Schön (1978, 1996) call these two ‘single-loop’ versus 
‘double-loop’, or incremental (technical, trial and error) versus transformational (complex) 
learning. The latter concerns changes in governing beliefs, ideologies and construction of 
policy, power relations and political learning (Hall, 2011; Heikkila & Gerlak, 2013; May, 
1992; Stacey, 2007). Hall (1993) refers to the latter as ‘third level change’, and where the 
state and society are in a constant dialectic of reciprocal and communicative influence. When 
state capacity is high and remains the dominant actor, then lesson-drawing is expected. When 
state capacity is high but society dominates a sub-system, social learning may be more 
evident (Howlett et al., 2009, p.193). 
2.3.5. Summary of public policy theory 
In sum, public policy is studied at different levels: individual, groups, networks, institutions, 
ideas, socio-economic dimensions and systems. These levels are complex elements nested 
within a setting comprising the ‘whole’ of a policy system evolving with other systems. As 
approaches to studying public policy are divided in terms of focus or unit of analysis, it is 
difficult to reconcile a promulgation of various theories so as to provide an overview of a 
policy process that is applicable to particular situations (Eller & Krutz, 2009; Kuruvilla & 
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Dorstewitz, 2010; Meier, 2009). Each theoretical lens attempts to fill a gap within an area 
unexplained, or limited in explanation by a different theory. Studies of implementation are 
disjointed from those of policy making, but a solid understanding of why policies are either 
more or less effective requires an understanding of that policy process in totality. Thus 
scholars call the current status of research a ‘synthesis’—a thinking of multiple perspectives 
that are complementary for advancement of the field (Nowlin, 2011; Schlager & Weible, 
2013). This task is onerous as perspectives are constructed from different philosophical and 
methodological underpinnings (Cairney, 2013a). Diversity in perspectives is a reflection of 
the multi-faceted nature of social phenomena. That ‘no one model has yet been developed 
that can fully explain all the nuances and intricacies of the policy process’… perhaps ‘the 
very complexity of politics and society will make a universal theory of the policy process 
impossible to achieve’ (Birkland, 2011, p.1263).   
2.4. Development theory  
Public policy discourse developed primarily in Western societies (Baumgartner et al., 2006; 
Carroll, Carroll, & Ohemeng, 2003). Its universality and applicability to other countries is 
central to the purpose of this study and raises the question of what is different about the 
policy processes of other countries. Seeking answers to these questions requires an 
examination of the development discourse, a field dedicated to the historical conceptions of 
developing countries’ public policy development.  
2.4.1. The development agenda 
Despite their diversity, countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean and the 
Pacific are categorised as developing, underdeveloped, Third World, the South, or the 
periphery. Conceptions of their states’ basic institutions emerged from the development 
(policy) agenda constructed in post-World War II following European decolonisation of 
Africa, Asia and, previously, Latin America. The agenda was a response to the need to 
understand the causes and solutions of underdevelopment. Conceptions underpinning this 
agenda have their origins in political economy, more specifically the modernisation 
perspectives from the modernist philosophers such as Durkheim, Marx and Weber (Davis, 
2002, p.31; Martinussen, 2007, p.50; Pieterse, 2010, p.20; Thomas, 2000, p.5; Turner & 
Hulme, 1997, p.4). Forming this agenda are various conceptualisations set out in Box 2.2. 
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Source: Adapted from Pieterse (2010, p.10) 
2.4.1.1. Modernisation theory  
This perspective viewed developing countries’ underdevelopment as caused by limitations 
of material wealth, modernity and rationality, this due to their ‘backwardness’ (‘traditional’) 
as compared to ‘modern’ societies. For countries to step out of underdevelopment, they 
needed to emulate Western societies’ development experience. Provided that the 
preconditions for development already existed in Western societies, and that a ‘form of 
structural heterogeneity’ was assumed to exist in countries, all that was required was a 
process of transfer. This transfer process took place through structures, institutions, laws, 
policies and planning largely involving international development agencies. This perspective 
was ethnocentric as the Third World’s development problems and solutions were determined 
in other locations (Martinussen, 2007, pp.4, 168; Turner & Hulme, 1997, p.6). 
‘Modernisation was… synonymous with Westernisation’ (Pieterse, 2010, p.23). 
By the 1960s, the theory had not lived up to its aspirations. Situations in various countries 
deteriorated, leading to a fundamental rethinking of development from Neo-Marxist and 
Box 2.2: Development theory in history 
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other reformulations (Martinussen, 2007, p.85; Pieterse, 2010, p.9; Turner & Hulme, 1997, 
p.6). 
2.4.1.2. Dependency theory  
Neo-Marxist dependency theorists, writing in the 1970s claimed that ‘imperialism’ and the 
international system have contributed to the underdeveloped world. Colonialism had 
distorted countries’ ability to develop independently. The international system was an 
instrument of the nations of the ‘centre’ to control the ‘periphery’, exploiting their 
weaknesses through various regimes leaving peripheral countries to remain trapped in 
poverty. Economic domination by rich countries was the main determinant of 
underdevelopment as distinct from domestic factors. Thus real development required a state-
led development model, de-linking the ‘periphery’ from world markets to allow for self-
determining development. (Martinussen, 2007, pp.86, 168; Pieterse, 2010, p.26; Turner & 
Hulme, 1997, p.7). 
2.4.1.3. Neoliberalism  
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War, development failures 
in the South, and differential development experiences in emerging economies (China, 
Malaysia, etc.), dependency theories lost ground (Schuurman, 2008, p.12). This led to the 
revival of neoliberalism and prominence of the ‘Washington Consensus’ promoted by 
development agencies since the 1980s. Privatisation, deregulation, liberalisation and New 
Public Management reforms characterised this agenda, designed to roll-back the state in the 
belief that development requires the market do the work of setting prices right. Neoliberal 
reforms are still promoted despite widespread criticisms (Leftwich, 1993; McGillivray, 2009; 
Pieterse, 2010, p.7).    
2.4.1.4. Capacity building—the developmental state  
In the late 1980s, the development focus again shifted, this favouring the capacity to make 
and implement decisions—to roll-in the (developmental) state again (Leftwich, 1995). This 
‘Keynesian Consensus’, not pursuit of market-led recipes, saw development policy 
redesigned for strategies strengthening the state’s autonomous capacity and community 
involvement in decision-making, and adoption of welfare goals (meeting basic human needs, 
poverty elimination, employment creation) (Martinussen, 2007, p.41; Pieterse, 2010, p.185). 
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Others (Turner & Hulme, 1997, p.6) regarded this policy shift as ‘liberal reformulations’; a 
set of goals impossible to achieve in the global context while Martinussen (2007, p.41) 
viewed it as ‘capacity building’. The UN began advocating this development agenda through 
its Human Development Report beginning in 1990 (UNDP, 1990) and subsequently through 
the MDGs in 2000 (UN, 2000) and the Sustainable Development Goals, adopted in 
September 2015 (UN, 2015b).  
2.4.1.5. Good governance  
A catch-all notion of development policy to emerge was the ‘good governance’ agenda, in 
the form of aid-funded reforms, a further wave of policy transfer that began occurring during 
the 1990s (Macdonald, 1998, p.22; Santiso, 2004). With its origin in institutional economics, 
this agenda emphasised the state and its (institutional) capacity to pursue development 
(Grindle, 2011; Polidano, 2000; van Arkadie, 2012, p.55; World Bank, 1998). The ‘good 
governance’ concept was invoked following the World Bank (1989) report on high failure 
of development projects in Sub-Saharan Africa where a ‘crisis of governance’ was identified 
as the underlying cause. Since then, good governance became the development paradigm of 
donors (Abrahamsen, 2012, p.31; Kulshreshtha, 2008; Larmour, 1998a; van Arkadie, 2012, 
p.53). ‘Governance’ is defined as the ‘manner in which authority is exercised in the 
management of a country’s resources for development… the government capacity to design, 
and implement policies… and discharge functions’ (World Bank, 1991, 1992). ‘Good 
governance’ is defined in dimensions such as voice and accountability, quality of 
government’s policy making and public service delivery, rule of law and protection of 
property rights, independence of the judiciary and control of corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay, 
& Zoido-Lobatón, 2000; World Bank, 1994). Yet when it came to the question about how 
to attain these objectives, then market-oriented policies, implemented through New Public 
Management reforms, were still advocated (Barzelay, 2001; Larmour, 1998a, p.2; Sundaram 
& Chowdhury, 2012, p.1).  
Criticisms of this agenda contest the notion that only liberal democracy and public policy 
making in a ‘one-size-fits-all’ model can bring good governance (Kulshreshtha, 2008). 
While there are no doubts that poor governance adversely affects development, there is no 
consensus over a single model for the practice of good governance (Collins, 1996). Evidence 
has concluded that countries only improve governance with development, not as a 
precondition to such development (Grindle, 2004; Sundaram & Chowdhury, 2012, p.9). 
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Development outcomes (e.g. East Asia versus Western countries) do not depend on any 
particular form of government (Andrews, 2012; Larmour, 1995, p.109). Furthermore, good 
governance reforms are often conflicting and not synonymous with democratic principles 
(Pieterse, 2010, p.197; Ryan & Lewis, 2007). Hence ‘what ought to be’ in implementing 
‘good governance’ becomes more prominent but still ambiguous (Grindle, 2011).  
What appears to matter is the abilities of states and their political processes to decide on the 
types of institutions and policies to progress development (Hughes, 1995; Leftwich, 1993; 
Rodrik, 2000). That ‘institutions matter’ (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Davies & Pickering, 
2015; Goldsmith, 2012, p.117; Prasad, 2014) is evident, but little is known about how to go 
about establishing effective institutions (Duncan, 1995; Grindle, 2011; Toatu, 2004). These 
are ‘institutional puzzles’ or ‘missing pieces’ (Orrnert, 2006)—a central issue confronting 
agents when trying to understand the underdevelopment dilemma (Duncan, 2010).  
Applications of this agenda vary across countries. McCourt’s (2008) analysis of 28 studies 
in developing countries during 1999-2008 found that incidences of policies under this 
agenda were modest. As well, Goldfinch, Derouen, and Pospieszna’s (2013) literature 
review of good governance reforms in 49 low income (UN classified) countries found ‘only 
a small number of documents linking good governance reform with implementation’ and 
‘little empirical evidence… that reform enhances service delivery’, hence leaving the good 
governance a ‘flying blind’ agenda. A thematic analysis of some 18 studies (Andrews, 2008; 
Andrews, 2011, 2013; Batley, 1999; Grindle, 2004; Jones & Kettl, 2003; Laking & Norman, 
2007; Manning, 2001; McCourt, 2008; Minogue, 2002; Mongkol, 2011; Norton, 2007; 
Ohemeng, 2010; Pillay, 2008; Polidano, 1998, 1999; Polidano & Hulme, 1999; Pritchett, 
Woolcock, & Andrews, 2012; Samaratunge, Alam, & Teicher, 2008; Soeters & Tessema, 
2004; Zafarullah & Rahman, 2008) highlighted that this agenda and its policies have been: 
 modest in take-up and limited in achievement with more endogenous reflections on what 
works in specific contexts; 
 limited in implementation with issues concerning formulation and lack of capacity and 
ownership highlighted;  
 promoted despite being a contested model even in developed countries. This is an 
inappropriate application of one-size-fits-all concepts impacting on social capital, 
accountability and ethical government; and  
 criticised for having no empirical foundation in developing countries’ contexts (so 
difficulties in application are expected); exacerbating capability traps in various 
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developing countries by adopting best practice reforms that do not work, crowding out 
alternative ideas and ignorance of context within which reforms occur.  
2.4.1.6. Alternative development  
Much of the attack over development agendas surfaced in the 1990s from neo-populist or 
post-modernist scholars. They criticised these development paradigms for universalistic 
treatment of countries and normative development based purely on state versus market 
prescriptions. Given development failures, they suggested that the whole notion of 
‘development’ should be problematised and deconstructed, from its ‘standard assumptions 
about progress, which possesses the keys to it and how it may be implemented’ (Sidaway, 
2008, p.17). They advocated ‘alternative development’ on the basis of socio-economic 
diversity, the role of indigenous knowledge, culture, civil society, social capital, eco-
sustainability and bottom-up approaches (Potter, 2008, p.67 & p.107; Turner & Hulme, 1997, 
p.9).  
Critics view the post-modernists as another ‘intellectual fad’ of little use to the Third World. 
However, such criticisms ignore the merits of examining the underdevelopment dilemma 
from multiple lenses. ‘Development’ is only one way (carrying certain assumptions and 
consequences) of dominating worldviews and approaches to development (Sidaway, 2008, 
p.17). This is driven by the ‘epistemic’ of Western expertise forming and transmitting 
universal forms of knowledge and beliefs about what constitutes development, which is a 
rational scientific process (Sutton, 1999). 
2.4.2. Impasse in theory and measuring development 
With this paradigmatic crisis between positivist and post-modernist positions on what is 
development, the field is viewed as at an impasse (Pieterse, 2010, p.5; Schuurman, 2008). In 
the absence of well-established theories over what constitutes development, the established 
ways of modelling development are development agencies’ constructions (e.g. income level, 
GDPs, MDGs, Human Development Index, good governance indicators) to simply label 
countries as ‘developed’ or ‘developing’. However, ‘when it comes to classifying countries 
according to their level of development, there is no criterion (either grounded in theory or 
based on an objective benchmark) that is generally accepted… in the absence of a 
methodology or a consensus… some international organisations have used memberships of 
the OECD as the main criterion for developed country status… resulting in the designation 
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of the 80-85% world’s countries as developing… An explicit system that categorises 
countries based on their level of development must build on a clearly articulated view of 
what constitutes development’ (Nielsen, 2011, pp.3-4) .  
2.4.3. Public policy processes of developing countries    
Previous sections have attempted to trace how development theory came about. However, 
questions concerning why and how issues come to be considered by government, and how 
policies are formulated and implemented in developing settings remain unanswered. Studies 
mentioned are largely evaluative in focus, leaving theoretical perspectives on the so-called 
‘processes’ of policy making sparse. Standing back, the conceptual research into these 
processes would seem to involve questions such as: 
 Are developing countries’ policy processes largely determined by externally prescribed 
development agendas or by domestic factors? And for either, to what extent? 
 Is policy transfer the predominant explanatory theory of policy making processes in 
developing countries? If not, are there other perspectives? 
 Are there differences between policy processes among countries, developed and 
developing, and, if so, what are they? 
Horowitz (1989) has asked ‘is there a third-world policy process?’ His response was that 
‘this depends on whose view of Western policy is preferred’ as there are ‘divergences of 
policy in terms of disparate access to resources, levels of economic development and social 
patterns’, but convergence ‘in terms of the deeper exigencies of human problem solving in 
highly structured contexts’. Peters (1996) argued however that the difference ‘is largely 
those of degree rather than the fundamentally different types of policy problems and 
processes’. Exceptions to a general observation that little has been written about these 
comparisons are summarised here: 
 Grindle’s (1980, p.15) studies showed that policy activities in the US and Western 
Europe largely focused on the input (policy making) while in developing countries, the 
focus is on the output (implementation) stage. As mechanisms of aggregating interests 
are weak, the implementation stage is where actors seek to participate in policy processes 
and where political relationships are prevalent in influencing resource allocation.  
 Grindle and Thomas’ (1989, p.217) study in 12 developing countries showed that policy 
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options are constrained by ‘societal interests, past policies and historical and cultural 
legacies’. A policy’s characteristics largely influence whether it will get consideration. 
Elites shape policy significantly and are not as constrained as suggested by pluralist 
theories.  
 As the policy process is political, Thomas and Grindle (1990) resisted the linear model 
predominantly adopted by donors (as it treats the link between formulation and 
implementation as automatic). They noted that various reforms were attempted, even 
when resources did not exist, often leading to unintended results. They advanced an 
‘interactive model of implementing policy reforms in developing countries’ to show the 
iterative reality of policy processes.  
 Turner and Hulme (1997, p.66) argued that policy models based on societal class and 
pluralist analyses (see section 2.3.3.3) are inappropriate for developing countries. 
Compared to developed countries, interest groups are not diverse and formal channels 
are limited hence informal mechanisms are often utilised to secure voice in the process.  
 Carroll et al. (2003) assessed the limited contributions from developing contexts as 
attributable to studies focusing mostly on public administration (implementation) aspects, 
not policy making. While arguing the policy process is the same in developed and 
developing contexts (although the weighting of some variables is different), they 
advanced ‘an approach to the policy making process in developing countries’ model 
emphasising the interaction of structural and contextual factors in shaping policy.     
 The United Kingdom Overseas Development Institute’s large case studies research in 
developing countries showed that ‘policy making is a dynamic, complex and chaotic 
process especially in developing countries. This is attributed largely to troubled political 
contexts, lack of credible policy research, donors’ influences in imposing agendas of 
little relevancy and emergence of civil society as a key player (Young, 2005).  
 And with the Pacific in mind, (Duncan, 2010) identified the following thematic issues 
from a review of recent studies on the political economy of reform in developing 
countries including PICs: 
 ‘There was little in the way of political economy studies of the factors underpinning 
economic reform and why some reform attempts fail’ (p.6);  
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 There is little understanding about how to bring about needed change;  
 Reforms do not follow the linear model of the policy process adopted by donors; 
 ‘Policy making process is complex and needs to be country-specific’ (p.8); and  
 Binding constraints to reform (requiring in-depth exploration) include weak 
governance institutions, inadequate infrastructure, corruption, poor quality of 
education and lack of good institutions (emphasising incentives).  
2.4.4. Summary of development theory 
Integrated development and public policy theories provide sparse insights about developing 
countries. Few studies discuss what is either distinctive or similar about policy processes as 
between developed and developing countries. Divergence and convergence in experiences 
depends on the lens adopted when studying these processes. Studies are largely empirical in 
nature, often attempting to examine reforms advanced under prescribed (development) 
agendas, highlighting the modest take-up and limited achievement of the good governance 
agenda, but giving limited attention to local context.       
Development theory is regarded as a Western construct lacking empirical grounding in fields 
that purport to explain, thus losing legitimacy (Andrews, 2012, p.97). Reading development 
theory is like ‘reading a history of hegemony in political and intellectual Eurocentrism’ 
(Pieterse, 2010, p.9)with relationships between knowledge and power a central issue in 
development and antidevelopment lenses (Jalali Rabbani & Ebooks, 2011). Scholarship has 
turned to the limitation of current approaches and what matters most to development is 
context, specificity, history and institutional variations within countries (Grindle, 2013).   
The key to development via hegemony is neoliberalism (Duncan & Codippily, 2014; 
Sutherland, 2000). Late-comers in the development journey can catch up with development 
if neoliberal models based on Western pioneers’ experiences are adopted and implemented. 
The question then is how in the pre-defined models that countries have been advised to adopt, 
will policies be implemented from the basis of the experiences and ideologies of others? 
Such problems and assumptions of the development theory remain unexplored.  
2.5. Pacific public policy and development  
PICs are part of the global system, hence the review of the public policy and development 
theories in preceding sections. We now examine public policy and development studies in 
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PICs and their region, the core of this study. 
2.5.1. Policy and development studies  
To date, ten PhD studies were found to have direct relevance to this study. Sause (2008) 
examined PNG’s central agencies’ policy advisory capability. Two studied the role of civil 
society in development (Swain, 1999) and governance (Iati, 2007). Gani (1996) studied the 
application of International Monetary Fund (IMF) policies in some PICs. Three examined 
aid and development relationships in Fiji (Ruru, 2010), PNG (Davis, 2002), Samoa (Lua'iufi, 
1995) and some PICs (Schultz, 2012). Kerslake (2007) examined the privatisation of 
Samoa’s former public works department. Amosa (2003) assessed Samoa’s public 
management reforms and Martin (2014) examined the implementation of international 
health treaties in some PICs.  
These PhDs and including Masters studies (Jackson, 2010; Lealea, 1995; Moe, 1998; Puna, 
2008; Ulu, 2013; Vanua, 2014) and other contributions (which are mostly donor-sponsored 
studies) are country-specific, evaluative and empirical in nature (see section 2.5.3). While 
informative in understanding PICs issues, such studies are limited in their theoretical insights 
into the processes of public policy—how they are developed and implemented in a PIC 
environment. Comparative lenses are also limited as to what is either distinctive or similar 
about policy processes between PICs and other countries.  
Thematic areas highlighted in existing studies are discussed below. 
2.5.2. The significance of context  
While relevant knowledge is socially constructed or contextual, context is considered ‘a 
missing link’ in public policy and management theory (Pollitt, 2013, p.xvii). Such context is 
‘not sufficiently recognised and appreciated by researchers’ (Johns, 2006). Only recently has 
its significance been signalled for further research to better inform development policy in 
PICs (Duncan, 2010, p.1).  
2.5.2.1. The concept of small-island state 
Small-states are commonly defined using land area, GDP and population size (Sarapuu, 2010; 
Schahczenski, 1990). The World Bank (2015) and Commonwealth Secretariat (2015) 
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defined small-states as countries with populations of fewer than 1.5 million, leaving PNG as 
the only non-small-state PIC. Not all small-states are ‘islands’ and ‘developing’ nations. The 
UN Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries (2011) uses a 
vulnerability index to classify 52 small island developing states. All 25 PICs are classified 
as small island developing states.  
The ‘islandness’ of PICs, in addition to being ‘small’, makes them the most ‘remote’ region; 
40% further from major GDP markets compared to the Caribbean and Indian Oceans 
(Gibson, 2006, p.15). This isolation is validated as a determining factor in their slow 
economic growth (Gibson, 2006, p.24; Yang, Chen, Singh, & Singh, 2013). And, as well, 
they have small markets, limited economies of scale, imperfect competition, high 
transportation and transaction costs, vulnerability and little power to compete. 
Most of this (section 1.2) is well-known, but how distinctive are these entities in shaping 
policy settings, and policy design and implementation? This is less understood and largely 
overlooked in development research and policy (McGillivray, Naudé, & Santos-Paulino, 
2008a, 2008b; Veenendaal & Corbett, 2015). Interest in the special nature of small states in 
terms of appropriate administrative models and capacity to manage development programs 
grew in the 1980s/1990s following the decolonisation of small-states in the 1960s/1970s era 
(Murray, 1981; Schahczenski, 1990; Wijeweera, 1992). This interest faded in the mid-1990s, 
only recently gaining revival (Corbett, 2013; Hezel, 2012; Horscroft, 2014). 
Sarapuu (2010) identified five traits of small-states that potentially influence policy making: 
limited scope of activity, a tendency towards multi-functionalism, reliance on informal 
structures, constraints on steering and control and high levels of personalism. However, there 
is little research on ‘the relationship of the size of a state and the operation of its 
administrative structures’. Small-states generally have limited manpower, a dominant 
government workforce and closeness or cohesiveness in relationships that can enhance 
collaboration. However, personalism can compromise professionalism over how policies are 
decided upon and delivered (Schahczenski, 1990; Wijeweera, 1992).  
These features bring unique challenges to the types and nature of policies under 
consideration (Gibson, 2006; Kotzebue, Bressers, & Yousif, 2010; McGillivray et al., 2008b; 
Panke, 2010; Peretz, Faruqi, & Kisanga, 2001, p.41; Sarapuu, 2010). Wrighton and 
Overton’s (2012) research in Tuvalu showed that ‘size matters’; ‘the constant stream of 
consultants, officials, missions, and researchers that arrives to consult creates a burden that 
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is extremely disproportionate relative to the size of its own bureaucratic resources’. The 
Haque, Knight, and Jayasuriya (2012) comparative study confirmed that smallness matters 
for countries with populations of less than 500,000. Thus most PICs suffer from endemic 
capacity constraints undermining the implementation of financial management functions, 
hence the need for careful reform design and prioritisation. 
2.5.2.2. Other contextual implications 
The relationship between government and indigenous institutions (see section  1.1.2) is 
another matter of growing scholarly discourse involving contested views over dimensions 
of modern versus tradition distinctions, their relevant tensions, and scope for a blending and 
legitimation (Curry, Koczberski, & Connell, 2012; Hassall, 2010; Hassall, Kaitani, Mae, 
Tipu, & Wainikesa, 2011; Kavaliku, 2005; Schoeffel & Turner, 2003; White, 2007). 
Arguably, indigenous institutions matter more to the lives of many islanders than what the 
government does (Laking, 2010) and this raises important questions about the legitimacy of 
the state. Why and how such distinctions matter, or whether they can be synthesised, matters 
to policy making and implementation yet remains under-explored in the literature. 
Scholars differ on the centrality of indigenous or cultural dimensions of public policy and 
development. Most taking the positivist or economic perspective see the dominance of 
cultural dimensions in PICs as institutional constraints impeding a market-driven 
development (Duncan & Codippily, 2014; Sugden, 2008). Others, taking an insider or post-
positivist position, consider cultural dimensions crucial for social capital, protection, 
security, and social governance (Morrison, 2008; Ratuva, 2014). Some consider cultural 
influences as either negative or positive, positing that the connection between policies and 
realities lies within such cultural dimensions (White, 2007). While the role of cultural aspects, 
indigenous systems, and community-based institutions in grassroots development have 
gained recent research interest (Hassall, 2012; Hauck, 2010; McNee, 2012; Thornton, Sakai, 
& Hassall, 2012), their legitimate recognition in development and policy thinking remains 
minimal (Morgan, 2005). How such dimensions matter to policy making and implementation 
is less understood (James, 2005). 
In turn, this relates to how historical patterns have featured in the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of public 
policy, but again less known empirically. Legacies may affect international relationships, 
inter-governmental co-operation, and how Pacific societies (as recent ex-colonies) generally 
perceive the world of development (Binayak, 1999; Fraenkel, 2013b).  
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2.5.3. Public policy development  
Since the 1990s, PICs have been adopting reforms under the good governance agenda 
(Abbott & Pollard, 2004; Binayak, 1999; Fraenkel, 2013a; Tony Hughes, 2013; Larmour, 
2005, p.1; O'Donnell & Turner, 2005; Prasad, 2008; So'o & Laking, 2008; Swain, 1999; 
World Bank, 1998) or as answers to the ‘Pacific paradox’ (Hameiri, 2009; Henderson, 2003; 
Sutherland, 2000). This agenda appeared to others a second wave of colonialism or donor 
countries’ ways of governing the region (Hodge, 2014; Larmour, 1998b). PICs’ struggle 
with development raises questions about the appropriateness of prescribed agendas, and 
whether Pacific states have the capacity to implement them (ADB, 2009b, p.1; Henderson, 
2003; Hughes, 2010; Larmour, 2005). Others point to the need for appropriate policies that 
account for development complexities in PICs (Alley, 2006) and what works, doesn’t work 
and why (Heppell, 2008, p.v). A review of existing studies (Bolger, 2008; Duncan, 2010; 
Huffer, 2006; Tony Hughes, 2013; Kavanamur, Okole, Manning, & Levantis, 2005; Laking, 
2010; Larmour, 2002a, 2005, 1998b; Levin, 2013; Lua’iufi, 2010; May, 2009; McCormick, 
2014; O'Donnell & Turner, 2005; Paton & Fairbairn-Dunlop, 2010; Peake & Marenin, 2008; 
Ratuva, 2011; Sarker & Pathak, 2003; Sharma & Lawrence, 2009; Sutherland, 2000; Tisdell, 
2000; Utoikamanu, 2013; World Bank, 1998) highlighted the same thematic issues identified 
in sections 2.4.1.5 and 2.4.3. These include reforms being advanced irrespective of 
suitability and, whilst implementation varies across PICs, a high degree of unsuccessful 
results being reported. Reasons include limited ownership and commitment, weak policy 
coordination and planning, political instability, staff turnover, growing reliance on outside 
assistance, reforms seen as mostly donor-driven, and little consideration of local conditions. 
Capacity has been a key challenge affecting implementation.  
A major focus with existing studies concerns the ‘take-up’ and ‘outcome’ of reforms with 
little explicit examination given to the processes of policy making and implementation—
what is really going on inside the arena of local interactions in these processes. Thus Hughes 
(1995) points out that PICs’ (governance) issues ‘are not given the explicit examination that 
they deserve (p.24)… absent from this discussion is what we might call ‘process’… how 
policy is made and why some projects succeed and others fail’ (p.23). Insights into the 
practice and context of policy processes are limited. Previous studies are largely conducted 
from an ‘outsider’ point of view, detached from a PIC context. The voice of local actors in 
these processes often lacks sufficient attention by existing studies. Overall, then, there is a 
need to develop both empirical and conceptual understanding of PICs’ policy processes. 
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2.6. Summary—gaps addressed in this study  
PICs contextual features are well-known, but lacking is a solid examination of how 
contextual factors such as culture, civil society and indigenous institutions impact on policy 
processes. This literature review has revealed the modest take-up and limited achievement 
of the development agenda in most developing countries. Reasons include inappropriate 
formulation of policies, limited capacity, and neglect of local context. Given limited 
implementation of ‘good governance’ reforms, this development agenda remains a contested 
model with its theoretical constructs coming under increasingly critical scrutiny.    
The existing literature is predominantly ethnocentric, based largely on Western contexts. 
Saetren’s (2005) comprehensive literature survey on public policy implementation shows 
that ‘the Western hemisphere accounts for close to 90 percent of all publications’, with only 
two percent for the Oceania region, one percent for the Third World and three percent for 
the international/global level. Thus the public policy theory is very limited in its empirical 
examination in PICs and small island developing states. A deeper understanding of a 
country’s public policy practices and processes is fundamental for gaining an understanding 
of why reform attempts fail or succeed. Addressing this gap is crucial to improving public 
policy and development theory and practice. Knowledge is socially constructed and insights 
from the experiences of other contexts such as PICs are essential to addressing the 
ethnocentric nature of current theories, hence strengthening their wider applicability. New 
insights would advance existing knowledge on how public policy and development 
phenomena should be better understood. The number of small island developing states (with 
a combined population of 63 million) (UN, 2014) is quite significant, so the study of public 
policy processes from the perspective of a small island developing states matters for an 
understanding of their development status. This study contributes to the need for policy 
studies in PICs, helping to form a base-line case that could be further developed for non-
Pacific small island developing states. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1. Introduction  
This chapter describes the methodology and research design of this project. This has 
examined how public policies are initiated, formulated and implemented in three Pacific 
island countries (Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and Samoa), and key regional inter-
governmental organisations (the ‘Region’). The investigating design needed to be 
appropriate to the research purpose and subject under study (Flick, 2002, p.129), involving 
the intersection of guiding philosophy, methodology and methods. Philosophy refers to a 
worldview (‘a set of beliefs that guide action’) (Guba, 1990, p.17 cited in Creswell, 2007, 
p.17) about the nature of reality (ontology), the nature of knowledge of what exists may be 
known (epistemology) and how we inquire about what we want to know (methodology) 
(Crotty, 1998, p.3; Guba & Lincoln, 2005, p.191). Method refers to ‘a procedure, tool, or 
technique used to generate and/or analyse data’ (Glesne, 2006, p.6). Figure 3.1 gives this 
study’s research design and methodology with each element discussed in the following 
sections:  
 
 
Source: Adapted from Crotty, 1998; Cresswell, 2009; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Flick, 2002 
Figure 3.1: Research design, methodology and methods 
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3.2. Philosophy  
Some research designs allow for the three interconnecting elements of ontology, 
epistemology and methodology to stay distinctly articulated; others adopt a more fluid 
design where they are blurred and intertwined within data collection and analysis (Connelly 
& Clandinin, 1990). This study is guided by this latter style. It is grounded in a social context; 
built on the epistemology of reality that is complex and socially constructed—a 
‘constructionist’ (as opposed to a ‘positivist’) worldview (Crotty, 1998, p.6; Morçöl, 2012, 
p.21).  
Positivism holds that an objective reality or truth is obtainable through inquiry. Knowledge 
is a function of measurement, so positivist research concerns empirical observation, 
measurement and theory verification. The researcher is an observer detached from the world 
being studied. Constructionism, in contrast, holds that reality can never be fully captured, 
only approximated through interpretation of human and social interactions. Knowledge is 
constructed through multiple meanings that people ascribe to realities; thus constructionist 
research is concerned with understandings, multiple participant meanings, contextualised 
construction and theory generation. Data is contextual and so is knowledge, hence total 
objectivity is not possible: the researcher and the researched are interactively linked within 
a process of co-interpreting and co-constructing social experiences as they unfold within a 
particular context (Crotty, 1998, p.6; Flick, 2002, p.31; Torres & Arminio, 2006, p.5; Yanow, 
1993). 
3.3. Methodology  
Methodological strategies are taken from the qualitative research tradition as this is 
congruent with the research purpose. Qualitative research enables the researcher to ‘get 
under the skin of a group/organisation to find out what really happens in order to view the 
case from the inside out—to see it from the perspectives of those involved’ and ‘to carry out 
research into the processes leading to results rather than into the significance of the results 
themselves’ (Gillham, 2000, p.11). Qualitative (as compared to quantitative) research is 
concerned with the how and why questions, and hence impart value rich descriptions into 
the studied world (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p.12; Punch, 2006, p.34). Qualitative research 
is therefore guided by principles of naturalistic inquiry; fieldwork is conducted in the natural 
setting of the subject under study where the researcher is the primary instrument of data 
collection and analysis (Creswell, 1994, p.145). Broadly speaking, quantitative research is 
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mostly deductive (theory-led), whilst qualitative research is mostly inductive (theory-
generated) (Flick, 2002, p.2).  
3.3.1. Criteria for selection of methodology and methods 
Within a range of qualitative strategies, common approaches include case study, 
ethnography, grounded theory, narrative inquiry and phenomenology (Creswell, 1998, p.15). 
Punch (2006, p.33) distinguishes research types as to whether they are descriptive, 
explanatory or interpretive. A descriptive study is concerned with ‘making complicated 
things understandable; it involves summarising specific factual information into empirical 
generalisations’. An explanatory study ‘sets out to explain and account for the descriptive 
information… making things understandable but on a different level—it aims to find the 
reasons for things, showing why and how they are what they are’. ‘We can describe within 
explaining but we cannot really explain without describing’. Descriptive study asks the ‘what’ 
questions and explanatory study asks the ‘how and why questions’. But there is a third 
category—the ‘interpretive questions’ which ask about meanings of things for people 
directly involved.  
Box 3.1 specifies the range of qualitative approaches of concern to this study, which are to: 
describe and explain the processes of policy initiation, formulation and implementation in a 
Pacific island state (to find the reasons for these things); interpret policy actors’ experiences 
in these processes (how the practice of policy processes and activities appeared to them, not 
only of how things ‘are’); identify patterns common in the cases being studied; trace policy 
processes, practices and events; and compare such patterns in policy processes against 
theories outlined in chapter two.  
 
Source: Taylor (1997, p.71); Tesch (1990) 
Box 3.1: Five qualitative approaches or requirements of this study 
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The qualitative strategies and methods were chosen for their appropriateness to the five 
requirements in Box 3.1.  
3.3.2. Design framework—case study research   
Case study was considered the most appropriate research design. A case study is ‘not a 
methodological choice but a choice of what is to be studied using any methodologies or 
methods (Stake, 2000, p.435). It is ‘an in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives of 
the complexity and uniqueness of a particular project, policy, institution, program or system 
in a ‘real-life’ context’ (Simons, 2009, p.21). Figure 3.2 presents this study’s multi-case 
design:  
 
Figure 3.2: Case study research design  
The research purpose, interest and questions (section 1.1.2) and literature review (chapter 
two) provided the theoretical overview for this design. The design followed a replication and 
cross-experiment—the researcher moving from case to case—firming up key findings and 
propositional refinements as the data analysis progressed across Vanuatu, the Solomon 
Islands, the Region and Samoa (see Table 3.1) as a four part case study. This allowed a 
model to be developed inductively, tested, and then validated from these four data-sets 
(inclusive of the pilot).  
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The selection of national case studies (Table 3.1) was influenced by the researcher’s 
background and choice of countries within the need to achieve the research purpose. Samoa 
was chosen for the obvious reason of the researcher being a Samoan (see Section 1.1.4). 
Vanuatu’s (a Melanesian country) population size and economic development outcomes are 
comparable to Samoa (a Polynesian country) but these countries differ noticeably in 
geographical and social-political circumstances (see Table 1.1 and Appendix A). The 
Solomon Islands (another Melanesian country) was viewed as a deviant case study that 
offered a challenge to findings (or propositions) from the Samoa and Vanuatu case studies. 
The Solomon Islands is relatively bigger in geographical setting and population size, and 
richer in natural resources than Samoa and Vanuatu but is one of the few ‘least developing 
countries’ in the region. It is a PIC that had been subjected to external influences (through 
the Australia-led Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands) over 10 years 
following the 1998-2003 tensions. These contrasts in the three national case studies brought 
interesting insights into why things happen the way they are, or why policy processes are 
similar or vary across places, and whether the same propositions hold across different public 
policy contexts.   
 
Approaching the research purpose in its subject and context involved two iterative processes 
of data collection and analysis (see Figure 3.3). The first comprised talking to key people 
who are either are or were at the core of policy processes in each country about how policies 
are generally adopted, developed and implemented in each local setting. The aim was to 
obtain a sound grasp of the policy environment and key contextual influences, strengths and 
challenges. The second was selecting specific policies and exploring their initiation, 
formulation and implementation processes, to gain deeper insights into the specifics of the 
dynamics, practices and factors shaping such processes and their outcomes. The downside 
Table 3.1: Fieldwork for the pilot and four case studies  
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of the first approach is a risk of research that is too abstract having been based on a surface 
understanding of the subject under study; the second is missing the bigger picture of a 
holistic understanding of policy processes within and across contexts. The intention, 
therefore, was to achieve a balance between a big picture overview of the policy context 
while also delving into the specifics of a small number of examples of policy processes in 
each jurisdiction.  
 
 
The selection of policies (Table 3.2) examined in depth was based on a combination of the 
following dimensions; namely, a policy that: 
 highlights the processes, practices and capacities of public policy operating within the 
internal public administration (government and its public service);  
 explicitly identifies the interface between the state and society (particularly civil 
society and its indigenous system);  
 explicitly explains the interface between the state and private/business actors (the 
market system);  
 cogently details the interface between the domestic policy system and relevant regional 
and global policy systems; and  
 is perceived/assessed by participants as either effective or ineffective.  
Figure 3.3: Visual presentation of the research purpose and interest in section 1.1.2 
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While participants were asked to discuss these particular policies, they were encouraged to 
raise other policy examples to better amplify points and concepts under discussion. This 
open approach helped ground the research in its place of study. Participants drew from own 
lived perspectives, rather than telling the researcher what they believed she might have 
wanted to hear. Here it was vital to keep in mind that the focus of the research was not so 
much about any particular policy. Rather it lay in ascertaining people’s meanings and the 
key concepts and principles guiding participants when talking about policy processes from 
within their own experiences and public policy worlds. That is, the research seeks to 
understand why things are as they ‘are’ in understanding key issues, dynamics or factors 
behind any adoption, formulation and implementation of a policy that has led to particular 
results.  
3.4. Research methods  
While a case study design guided the overall project, grounded theory, narrative inquiry and 
participant observation provided complementary techniques for data collection and analysis. 
Grounded theory is the technique most suitable for this project, given its ability to validate 
theoretical propositions that are well based in the field using the constant comparative 
method for within-case and across-case search for patterns (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007; 
Charmaz, 2005, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Morse et al., 2009; 
Strauss & Corben, 1990). Grounded theory is the most widely adopted approach to generate 
theory in qualitative research (Denzin, 1994; Punch, 1998: cited in Simon, 2009, p.168).  
Table 3.2: The ten policies (as sub-cases) within the four case studies 
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Narrative inquiry such as talanoa (conversation) and fono/tok tok (meeting)vi captured the 
‘lived experiences’ of participants in story-form or narratives (Simons, 2009, p.75). Stories 
of policy makers, formulators, implementers, funders and observers offered depth of 
richness in descriptions, and interpretation as to how and why policies emerge and then their 
results. In telling (constructing) and re-telling (re-constructing) these experiences 
‘interpretation is inevitable because narratives are representations’ (Reissman, 1993, p.2). 
Excessively grounded theory coding can distort the meaning of data (Eisenhardt, 2002) 
hence the need for supplementary techniques of narrative inquiry. 
3.4.1. Data collection  
Interviews (semi-structured) were the main data collection method utilised, documentary 
analyses and participant observation used for triangulation. Fluid and face-to-face 
conversations produced meaningful relevant data, particularly relating to PIC cultural 
contexts. The sampling method was ‘purposive sampling’ (Creswell, 1998, p.18) or 
‘theoretical sampling’ (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), where ‘particular settings, persons, or 
events are deliberately selected for the important information they can provide that cannot 
be gotten as well from other choices’ (Maxwell, 2009, p.235). Theoretical sampling applies 
where cases are chosen to replicate others and to either extend an emergent theory or fill 
conceptual categories involving frequent overlap of data analysis with data collection and 
reflectivity (Eisenhardt, 2002, p.12). Policy documents, reports, cabinet and parliamentary 
papers, budget documents, project documents, newspaper reports, donors’ documents and 
databases and other relevant materials were analysed to trace and map processes, validate 
participant narratives and allow my own participant observation and interpretation.  
Given a conducting of multiple case studies, prior preparation was essential. Preparation of 
fieldwork protocols included a pilot in Samoa that tested and refined selected methods. The 
use of social networks in finding gatekeepers in-country was essential when screening policy 
cases for final selection, and for having induction to research locations (the Solomon Islands, 
Vanuatu and the Region) where the researcher was less familiar.  
Table 3.3 outlines this study’s participants. While they are grouped according to location, 
most provided not just within-case but also across-case perspectives. Prior to interviews, 
                                                                            
vi While other scholars (Suaalii-Sauni & Fulu-Aiolupotea, 2014) refer to talanoa as a methodology, this inquiry adopted 
talanoa as a method. In my Samoan experience, talanoa means the binding (noa) of the stories/words (tala) through 
having informal, open and culturally appropriate conversations between two (or more) individuals. Fono is referred to as 
a group meeting (or talanoaga in Samoa). Tok is the Melanesian pidgin word for talk.  
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they were informed about the four case studies, specific policies under investigation, and the 
overall research focus. A personal letter, information sheet and consent form (Appendix D) 
explaining the research were sent in advance to every concerned organisation and individual 
requiring support and permission before arrival in-country.  
 
Interviews were tape recorded. The first interviews were heard and used to shape those 
following as an iterative learning process. Important points made during interviews needing 
further clarification were followed-up with later interviews.  
3.4.2. Data analysis  
Enabling data analysis identified in Box 3.1 required diligent application of analytical case 
study tools (Eisenhardt, 2002; Simons, 2009; Stake, 2000, 2006; Yin, 2009); grounded 
theory (Charmaz, 2000, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Morse et al., 2009); and narrative 
inquiry and qualitative methods in general (Creswell, 2009; Flick, 2002; Miles & Huberman, 
1994). The Nvivo software (Bazeley, 2007) was utilised for data management, thematic 
coding, process mapping, pattern matching, and memo writing (e.g. to self-reflect on 
strengths and gaps in data collection and record thoughts at different times). Overall, data 
analyses involved the following:    
 Each case study being analysed ‘as a case’ where data was analysed and interpreted in 
accordance with the research purpose;  
 Importation of data sets (interviews, documents, observation sheets, field notes) to 
Nvivo. Data was organised into folders (four case studies) and sub-folders (specific 
policies, types of data, memos); 
 Self-transcription of interviews and translation of Samoan narratives; 
 Using pilot data to test out (grounded theory) coding procedures, and where an initial 
Table 3.3: This study’s 128 participants  
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coding tree (see Appendix F) was inputted into Nvivo as codes (nodes). Codes were 
descriptions of participants’ responses to interviewing questions based on the research 
purpose, interests and questions. Figure 3.4 is a screen-shot of Vanuatu’s coded 
participant narratives; 
 As data collection and analyses progressed across the four case studies, the coding tree 
was amended concurrently to accommodate new or different themes emerging from 
the data, or to reflect concepts consistently emphasised by participants;  
 The coding process involved several iterations of listening to interviews, reading 
transcripts, coding, interpreting, reflecting and making sense using memoing;  
 Based on the frequency of coded narratives and validated by documentary analyses 
and participant observation, the stand-out patterns (core thematic variables) were 
interpreted, compared, and then constructed into findings/propositions;  
 Findings/propositions were further synthesised/re-coded to help form a model. This 
model was revised when moving from within-case to cross-case analysis to compare 
findings;  
 Once each case was analysed and written up as a narrative, cross-case analysis further 
identified similarities and differences. This confirmed or validated final 
findings/propositions (overall patterns) and key variables (of the model).  
This research dealt with socially constructed realities. Participants’ views were subject to 
their own interpretation of these realities influenced by their own backgrounds, worldviews 
and positions held. From my background as a Pacific Islander, I have interpreted these 
realities (as told by participants) and constructed them as evidence of how public policies 
have been initiated, formulated and implemented within a Pacific island setting. Given this 
social constructionism lens to the research, narrative extracts are presented in this thesis in 
verbatim forms (the manner in which they were said). Given that most participants were 
from non-English speaking backgrounds, and the use of colloquial languages in interviews, 
the grammar in verbatim quotes might not be accurate. Narrative extracts are coded 
according to participants’ roles (see Appendix E).    
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3.4.3. Participant and researcher in the study 
Grounding this research requires an in-depth insight into a PIC context and what actually 
goes on. All research, whether conducted by an insider or an outsider, faces limitations and 
challenges in execution. This study was no exception. My background as an insider (see 
section 1.1.4) could be construed as constituting a bias when undertaking this research. 
However, subjectivity is a facet of human nature significant to any research and should not 
be seen solely as disadvantageous. Being a Pacific islander with inside knowledge and 
experiences in the subject of this study brought insights and certain advantages such as in 
establishing rapport with participants, obtaining their frank responses and acquiring 
documentation. Some researchers (Iati, 2007, p.16; Sause, 2008, p.96) have encountered 
similar difficulties when accessing confidential and sensitive documents and interviewees 
given a culture of secretive, protective and ‘guarded jealously’. Hence personal links 
Figure 3.4: A screenshot of coding participant narratives from Vanuatu 
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facilitated access to people who had the required information about the policy cases. 
Participants saw me as an insider. This affected their responses such as making comparison 
of their situations to Samoa and related to things that I think they might not have mentioned 
to a non-Pacific person.  
Cultural orientations, in particular, are central to Pacific people influencing observer-
observed interactions. A researcher unfamiliar with these considerations can face difficulties 
in comprehension and in turn may lead to misinterpretation of the meanings of things (policy 
practices) to local people. Duncan (2010, p.19) has alluded to the difficulties faced by 
development agencies when informing themselves about such orientations. This has had a 
significant impact on understandings of why certain reforms have been unsuccessful. PICs 
are known for the informalities of process, hence the need to account for what people say 
about themselves or policies (espoused theory) and what they actually do or practice (theory-
in-use) (Argyris & Schön, 1996, p.13; Gillham, 2000, p.14; Jones, 2009). Attending to these 
distinctions during interviews, observations and analyses was vital for getting a good grasp 
of what actually occurs when policies are made and implemented. 
3.5. Research validation  
Certain criteria are used to assess and judge the validity and reliability of research. Validity 
concerns the quality of the research to the extent that it contains procedural errors or bias of 
the researcher and how far her construction (of reality) is empirically grounded in the field 
being studied. Reliability concerns the quality of methods and procedures used and how 
methods are made transparent (and to whom) so as to assure the trust of a research audience 
as to findings (Kirk & Miller, 1986, p.21; Lincoln & Guba, 2002, p.205; Maxwell, 2002, 
p.41; Yin, 2009, p.40). Acknowledged criteria that scholars have used to assess the validity 
and reliability of qualitative research included: 
 ‘trustworthiness of reported observations, interpretations and generalisations’ 
(Mischler, 1990); 
 procedural validity: clarifying the researched-researcher relationship throughout the 
course of the research and when presenting the final product (Flick, 2002, p.225); 
 triangulation of the research using different methods, study groups, settings and 
theoretical perspectives in dealing with a situation (Denzin, 1989, p.23); 
 credibility: likelihood of ‘prolonged arrangement and persistent observation in the 
field’,  checks of data and interpretations by participants and discussing research with 
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others to ‘disclose one’s own blind spots’ (Flick, 2002, p.228);  
 dependability: checking of research dependability through an auditing trail and quality 
management procedures (Flick, 2002); and 
 generalisation: the ‘transferability of findings from one context to another’ which 
involves the ‘gradual transfer of findings from case studies and their context to more 
general and abstract relations’(Maxwell, 2002, p.52). 
The researcher had to stand back a pace as someone undertaking the role of interpreter in 
this research. Previous experience assists but possible bias (conscious or unconscious) when 
conducting this research cannot go ignored. Reducing such bias and enhancing the reliability 
and validity of the research were facilitated through a proper, diligent and careful execution 
of the research according to design. In accordance with the above criteria, the following 
procedures and approaches facilitated the reliability and validity of this study and its findings:  
 Multi-case study using multiple sources of evidence led to triangulation of findings 
(Stake, 2006, p.33; Yin, 2009, p.18); 
 Case study research was carefully designed with protocols, procedures and guidelines 
ensuring the rigour, reliability and validity of the research (Yin, 2009, p.40); 
 Multiple-case study with 10 policies as sub-cases provided ‘analytic generalisation’ 
(rather than statistical generalisation), because the aim was to be ‘generalisable to 
theoretical propositions’ (not to populations or universe) (Yin, 2009, p.15); 
 The use of ‘multiple-case study’ (as opposed to a ‘single-case study’) gave confidence 
to ‘generalisation’ because of multiple experiments’ through the ‘logic of replication’ 
(Yin, 2009, p.38); 
 All procedures used in the course of the research were properly documented using 
well- established research methods and tools, being adapted to suit Pacific cultural 
contexts. This ensured procedural validity, credibility and trustworthiness; 
 Data collection and analysis employing appropriate techniques (grounded theory, 
narrative, cultural methods, etc.) to ensure the quality of texts and interpretations; 
 Findings were read and commented on by supervisors and various other experts with 
in-depth experience in the field of public policy, development and in the region; and  
 Declaration of my bias (both positive and negative) as a Samoan and a Pacific Islander 
throughout the conducting of this research.  
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3.6. Research limitations  
Data obtained were voluminous (128 interviews) each rich in participants’ perspectives. 
Much of the analysis written during within-case processing to gain deeper insights into each 
country’s policy process was omitted due to limited space. However, nuances and key 
themes emerging across cases were maintained. Examining the processes of public policy is 
complex because public policy is a living, intersubjective and paradoxical social phenomena. 
Data presented here was collected in 2012 with some added in January 2014. Changes that 
took place after this period were not validated by participants but only through available 
media sources up to June 2015. 
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CHAPTER 4: POLICY PROCESSES IN VANUATU 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter analyses Vanuatu’s policy processes based on patterns emerging from 
participant narratives (see Appendix E), documentary analysesvii and participant observation. 
The research was conducted in accordance with the methodology outlined in chapter three. 
Vanuatu’s background is provided in section 1.2. A total of 33 participants (see Table 3.3) 
shared their experiences and observations of the three policy cases (see Table 3.2) and how 
public policies were generally initiated, formulated and implemented in Vanuatu. Section 
4.2 examines the policy cases while Section 4.3 describes the general patterns of policy 
processes. Section 4.4 summarises key findings emerging from Vanuatu.  
4.2. The policy cases  
Vanuatu’s policy cases are the Comprehensive Reform Program (CRP), Telecommunication 
Liberalisation Reform (TLR) and Employment Law Reform (ELR). Policies were selected 
based on requirements outlined in section 3.3. The emphasis of examining these policies is 
to determine critical factors at play in the initiation, formulation and implementation 
processes, and that have contributed to the actual results (see section 1.1.2).  
4.2.1. The CRP 
4.2.1.1. Background 
The CRP, Vanuatu’s first major reform, was instigated by the Vanuatu government in 
response to a mid-1990s economic crisis. As the mainstay of ongoing public sector 
development, the CRP remains relevant having occasioned various offshoots, such as the 
forced resignation and subsequent contracting of the Directors General of 13 Ministries in 
2012 ("Directors General likely to go on contract this year," 2012, August 30). The CRP 
began in 1997 and ended in 2000 in relation to the US$20 million Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) loan program used to design and implement the first two phases (see Table 4.1). 
Australia and New Zealand aid support continued phase three which was long-term and not 
                                                                            
vii Participant narrative extracts are indented and italicised whilst quotes from documents are also indented but non-
italicised.  
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necessarily attributable to the original CRP. 
 
Source: Extracted from Gay (2004); Pal (2002, p.6)  
The CRP’s vision was ‘to empower ni-Vanuatu, through the private sector to lead the 
development process in Vanuatu, with government playing a supporting and enabling role’. 
The goal was ‘to enhance economic growth and raise the socioeconomic standards of all ni-
Vanuatu’. This involved five objectives: renewal of the institutions of governance; a 
redefined role for the public sector; improved public sector efficiency; encouragement to 
private sector led growth; and improved equity between sections of the population (Pal, 2002, 
p.5). Designed to be comprehensive (encompassing all sectors), the first two phases 
comprised 46 reform measures (see Table 4.2) drawn in an ADB ‘program loan matrix’ and 
for implementation by government departments.  
 
Source: Extracted from Pal (2002, pp.30-53)  
Table 4.2: CRP elements  
 
Table 4.1: CRP design  
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4.2.1.2. Initiation 
The CRP was initiated in response to an economic crisis driven primarily by political 
instability, corruption and social unrest. Vanuatu was at a critical point of nation-state 
building and had faced turmoil (e.g. 1994 public service strike, 1997 riot) after 15 years of 
unsettled post-colonial independence. Reform trends around the region added momentum 
for the CRP adoption:  
When we became independent, there was a rout, a fight, nearly a war here… They (colonisers) went 
home and we had to start a lot of things from scratch. After 15 years there (independence) we went 
down. We went broke like everybody else... The problem is that political governance continued to 
ruin this country… The mid-1990s was where everybody went crazy about reform. That was where 
we precipitated this CRP. [VPA.1]  
The critical point for the CRP movement was the first change in government in 1991 when 
the Vanua’aku Party (in power since independence) then split (see Table 1.1), leading to the 
formation of the Union of Moderate Parties. This became the ruling coalition from 1991-
1998 and its Prime Minister (PM), Serge Vohor started the CRP process from 1995. 
However, party fragmentation within subsequent governing coalitions (a ‘crisis in 
government’ (Huffer & Molisa, 1999)), made it difficult to obtain policy stability and 
consensus. What then enabled the CRP to act was the two mentioned main parties’ leaders 
(Serge and Natapei) adopting a political compromise not to bring the government down on 
grounds of precipitating reforms needed to address the crisis facing the country: 
1991 was the first time we changed the government… But then the government was changing every 
time. We had like four governments in a row..... Some ministers served for one month… So we were 
so fed up because this new Minister came and said to go this way. We started working on it but 
another Minister came and said to go that way. [VPS.1] 
Serge started the reform and we knew when we went back to government that we needed him... So 
we came up with this idea of ‘agreeing to disagree’—‘Natapei and Serge’. You are talking about 
Serge, our rival. We fought and hated each other, French and English speaking… It was a decision 
we had to make. There was no choice. That we disagree but we don’t need to break the government… 
We needed to hang on for four years to be able to bring about the reform. [VP.2] 
The CRP, as a reform package was adopted as part of the structural adjustment agenda 
promoted in developing countries during the 1980s/1990s. ‘It was seen as a structural 
adjustment program and therefore must be treated as one. The ADB acts as a kind of IMF or 
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World Bank for the Asian and Pacific Region. Conventional methods are employed’ (Gay, 
2004, p.25). One participant gave a strong view about how this agenda was adopted: 
CRP was spearheaded by the ADB… and other foreign forces for the sake of good governance. There 
had been fear in those days because that’s how these big donors come in to overtake. They came and 
said ‘you are going down, if you aren’t careful you will go bankrupt’. They came and went through 
our political system and said ‘go through reform’. [VPS.12] 
4.2.1.3. Formulation 
According to various participants, the CRP adoption and formulation were shaped by a 
combination of ideas from technical advisers, reform-minded agents in government and the 
region, and politicians who had had exposure to similar reforms across the region:  
We were learning what happened in the Cook Islands and Samoa, clearly the signs were there for 
reform… Samoa managed the reform well but Cook Islands reform was drastic. We didn’t like what 
happened in Cook Islands. [VPS.2] 
We are talking about the 1990s… Samoa was leading the whole thing and we came after you. I was 
in charge of this reform at the Forum but Vanuatu was never interested. Suddenly John Sammy from 
ADB in Fiji, one of the regional guys with a regional vision came and whispered to my ears and we 
started the reform here. [VPA.1] 
As indicated by participant narratives and available documents (ADB, 2009a; Pal, 2002), the 
CRP’s knowledge basis was a ‘state versus market-led’ public policy model. Ideologies of 
‘private sector led economy’, ‘a more open economy’ (market) in the name of ‘good 
governance’ (state) were adopted. However, reforms for the private sector were limited to 
10 compared to the 34 for the public sector (see Table 4.2). Here the political element was 
not the main emphasis. The nature of the reform measures entailed structural (rather than 
behavioural) change within the public sector. There was little consideration given to the 
possible role of civil society despite intentions to enhance rural development. The 
formulation process involved work of various working committees and technical advisers, 
reporting to a steering committee headed by the PM and coordinated and facilitated by the 
PM’s office. Elements of policy transfer were evident in the reform content:  
The reform was done in a form directed to the PM. The Deputy PM was Chair of the Reform 
Committee. We had the governance and economic sector areas and I was chairing that sub-
committee. Everybody was requested to make submissions on the reform to the CRP Secretariat in 
the PM Office… We were doing all this work and we got bits and pieces from Samoa. [VPS.8] 
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As part of the package of the ADB loan we had some technical advisers. So many I cannot count 
them, mainly to do reforms at Finance and PSC. [VPS.3] 
The CRP summit, the first held in June 1997 during the CRP inception, entailed a nationwide 
consultation process. As this was an annual event, the CRP day-to-day formulation was 
largely a top-down process driven by parliamentary back benchers, officials and technical 
advisers:  
If the CRP was to be the whole thing inclusive of Vanuatu, it never… They said that they had 
consultation nationally. But in terms of education it didn’t reach the majority of people. [VPS.4] 
Technical advisers came and started writing these initiatives and strategies. It helped but that was 
where it went astray because it was done by them and a small contribution was from the ni-Vanuatu 
part. [VPS.6] 
4.2.1.4. Implementation  
All 42 reform measures were ticked off as completed (Pal, 2002, pp.30-53). Value added tax 
was introduced, the government machinery was restructured with a 10% (over 700 
employees) reduction in employment (ADB, 2009a, p.75), financial institutions (e.g. 
Vanuatu National Bank, Vanuatu National Provident Fund) were restructured, and public 
sector financial, corporate management and planning systems introduced. Over 200 laws 
were passed and policy functions and processes established. The Priority Action Agenda 
(PAA) and the Planning Long Acting Short (PLAS) (Vanuatu Government, 2006, 2009b) 
that emerged from the CRP became national policy frameworks:  
We have this value added tax which we didn’t have before. We passed more than 247 pieces of 
legislation. We came up with a new government structure including Director General posts... A lot 
of initiatives mostly in finance and the public sector like this statutory office, the financial intelligence 
unit where loans are injected, measures to collect debts and restructuring of financial institutions. 
[VPS.2] 
From the summit, we came up with the CRP matrix, a wish list of many refurbishments… Currently 
when you talk about the PAA, it emanated from that matrix. [VPS.3] 
Implementation of the 42 measures became loan conditionalities (see Table 4.3). These 
conditionalities were ‘overwhelmingly governmental in nature’. Furthermore,  ‘part of the 
loan was used to employ 42 international consultants who were to carry out the first stages 
of the program’ (Gay, 2004). ‘There was very little if any procurement of goods and services 
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apart from the services of the consultants’ (Pal, 2002, p.15). A major challenge according to 
participant narratives (and as Nari (2000) reiterates) involved trying to balance the 
government’s commitment to the program against the loan and local needs. Yet the 
commitment was more towards the former. Moreover, the reform was seen as a ‘big bang’ 
(Gay, 2004); ‘the government itself viewed the CRP as deliberately ambitious and reflecting 
the scale and urgency of the task’ (Pal, 2002, p.6):  
 
Source: Pal (2002, p.13) 
A lot of changes during a short period. In some sectors we did a lot of drastic reforms that people 
are still questioning. [VPS.10] 
The implementation was consultant-driven. Most technical advisers were from developed 
countries on short-term assignments focusing largely on meeting loan covenants. The 
completion report (Pal, 2002, p.14) mentioned one consultant employed as Vanuatu National 
Bank’s General Manager fudging accounts to show that the Bank was making a profit and 
the ADB monitoring making no mention of this deception. Together with participant 
narratives indicating a lack of focus over context, ownership, understanding and 
sustainability, the CRP can be assessed as based largely on foreign ideologies and concepts: 
We made a royal mess at everything. To begin with I recruited the wrong consultants. I got this 
American friend with some powerful connections. He wrote this fancy M&E system. Oh it was so 
complicated. He gave it to his counterparts and I don’t think they understood it. Every time he 
explained it I got more confused. Then Penny came and reviewed the M&E and she said he wrote a 
non-sense of it all. [VPA.2]  
It took us a long time to understand the CRP concept and what was beneficial to us. They were 
foreign ideologies. The challenging part was how the reform connected with our cultural values. 
[VPS.13] 
Most things they suggested to include were to recruit technical advisers… When they left, most things 
in these institutions collapsed… When they left PSC they just left the templates with these guys. 
[VPS.5] 
Table 4.3: ADB US$20 million loan allocation and conditionalities 
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Although the CRP was consultative (the summit), implementation was largely top-down. 
Local people were neither sufficiently consulted nor cognisant of the reform’s specifics; it 
treated Vanuatu as an experimental object that could be moulded to externally designed 
specifications:  
Perceptions about the CRP were different from the design by consultants… I was summoned by my 
own leaders for providing these foreigners. They built the wharfs and aren’t working… That’s what 
happen when you come up with a plan and without consulting people for the local knowledge you 
end up putting them in the wrong place. That wharf was built on the dry side. That’s why I had to do 
a lot of public relation exercises as we got a backlash for those silly projects. They say, no, not the 
Natapei government, not the ADB, because they don’t know how to build wharfs. [VPA.1] 
People didn’t know what was happening… In terms of where the traditional society came in, I worked 
in customs and I didn’t look at that. It’s either you pay tax or not and that's it. There are no grey 
areas. [VPS.3] 
I was one of the expatriates involved in the CRP at the time. At the end of the process you go and 
give a report to your donor. It always happened outside the country. Our report happened in Noumea. 
[VP.1]  
The CRP was not a linear process. Politics and political leadership were critical in 
overcoming resistance and differences. But loss of momentum was evident through 
reversion to old practices and some implementation activities were discontinued when 
funding ran out:   
There were big differences in opinions about the reform... My Minister didn’t support it. But as the 
PM was in charge I used to go behind his back and said ‘PM, your reform, we are delivering it, but 
the Minister is not supporting it’… The PM said ‘don’t worry, I will fix this up, if someone doesn’t 
comply I will sack them’. [VPS.8]  
When the CRP was put forward, the intention was clear but in the implementation, people forgot 
what they agreed to; the principles, the bigger picture. I said this because the public service has 
grown by 2,000 employees... The issue of tax was to be considered after one year but nobody wants 
to talk about it... The CRP summit has stopped as there’s no funding. From that non-convening of 
the summit you see people falling off. [VPS.14] 
Several participants considered political leadership as a key issue affecting reform 
effectiveness and sustainability. ‘It is not evident enough whether or not there is a real 
political will and support for the CRP as political instability and continuous changes that are 
contradictory to the agreed principles under the programme’ Nari (2000):  
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There are about 29 political staff despite the law in place… So was it a good change. Do we really 
need Directors General because politicians still want to have their own political advisers? [VPS.3]  
Under the CRP, we came up with the Lands Act giving powers to the Minister to consent the signing 
of land leases. But we have huge problems with land dealings because when you become Lands 
Minister you get superpowers… In 2006 we had the land summit’s resolution to remove these 
Ministerial powers. But till now, every Minister and government doesn’t want to amend the Act. 
[VPS.5]  
4.2.1.5. Results 
Based on participant narratives, a completion report (Pal, 2002) and available assessments 
(ADB, 2009a; Gay, 2004), the  CRP’s results were mixed. Success was assessed mainly 
against achievement of some macroeconomic, financial, and policy stability and relevant 
outputs. Key financial institutions were revived from insolvency. Public sector legal, 
financial and human resource management, policy and planning and accountability systems 
were put in place. In the eyes of the development community (ADB, 2009a, p.75), Vanuatu’s 
governance had improved:  
We came in when the Ministry had no plan. Without the reform, we wouldn’t have some stability. 
[VPS.1] 
In early 2000 we started to see some results. Our economy is booming… The National Bank is making 
profit. The Provident Fund has a… cash flow standing at about $16 million. [VPS.8] 
After 10 years we can see some successes and weaknesses of the reforms. It’s successful only in terms 
of like donors giving lots of funds to Vanuatu because of improved governance ratings. [VPS.4] 
However the CRP was unsuccessful when assessed against its objective, where ‘the 
important consideration of the reform is to ensure that it leads to greater openness of the 
global economy and also to a more equitable distribution of benefits’ (Pal, 2002, p.5). 
Economist Gay (2002) assessed the CRP as having succeeded only in enhanced public sector 
governance, while failed in private sector development. He reiterated at a 2014 seminar that 
the CRP was a failure:  
CRP failed on almost every one of its objectives… CRP was sold on the basis of a predicted rise in 
GDP growth to 5.8% in the period 1999-2005. In fact GDP declined… there were major recessions 
in 1999 and 2002; the latter the worst since independence. (Makin, 2014, January 22, 2014, 
January 30) 
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Contributing to limited success was locals’ unpreparedness to embrace the change process. 
Sustainability was a concern as several changes were introduced within a short period. The 
importance of leadership in reform effectiveness has been highlighted but was not part of 
this reform’s focus:         
The speed with which the CRP was implemented did not fully prepare the public servants and the 
community at large to fully embrace the reform process… CRP brought in a lot of amendments to a 
number of legislations… too many to implement and enforce in a short period of time… It is the 
view of most people that CRP was force fed in Vanuatu. (Pal, 2002, pp.16-17) 
We need to do something but people just don’t have the will. You give Directors General powers but 
PSC still hire and fire. Recruitment takes about seven months and disciplinary takes 18 months to 
reach a decision. [VPS.2] 
All the reforms from the late 1980s up to the 2000s were about the public service. We didn’t include 
the political side... No one looked at how you support the political machinery, how you get the great 
minds into the political arena because they are the decision-makers. [VCS-M.2] 
The CRP has contributed to rising debts, but not improved service delivery. The public 
service downsizing negatively impacted upon some services and led to unnecessary 
redundancy. Savings from downsizing, supposedly to double health and education budgets, 
were used to fund public sector restructuring: 
The CRP is still quite contentious as it resulted in a misguided downsizing of the public service 
especially in agricultural outreaches. [VPS.13] 
So what was the CRP for? It didn’t materialise because we did some serious cut of the public 
service… But it never works because the very people who were taken away were appointed back. 
[VCS-M.2] 
Has CRP helped? Probably not… the service since the CRP has not significantly improved. A visit 
to a village will perhaps give one a shocking account of type of service delivery meted out to the 
rural population… Such is the service after reform… Respective consultants must definitely be aware 
of these situations but no mention has been made in reports made available. (Pal, 2002, pp.20-22) 
A major flaw in the CRP was its ignoring of civil society. On paper, social equity was the 
CRP’s objective but its implementation was just one of structural adjustment committed to 
meeting loan conditions. ‘The CRP was thus a faint echo of the global structural adjustments 
of the 1980s and with few of the positive results’ (Gay, 2004). Given that focus, and with 
over 40 technical advisers brought in-country and absorbing most of the loan money, some 
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labelled the CRP as missionary, which harboured resentment towards this reform:   
I regard my traditions and church as very important, influencing the ways villages are set-up. But in 
service delivery under the reforms, I don’t think we gave them the recognition they deserve… If we 
use local institutions fully, it demands very good changes. [VPS.14]  
The reform we adopted in 1997 focused mostly on the public sector... in terms of policy consistency 
without addressing the community side. [VPS.6] 
In 1997 we saw a flood of people coming in from all angles taking up the PM office... They lifted up 
and decided ok… we came to set up these systems, reforms and structures. They have done their jobs. 
I call them missionaries. They come, steal, kill and destroy. [VPS.12] 
4.2.1.6. Key factors  
Table 4.4 summarises the critical factors of the CRP’s policy process.   
 
4.2.2. The TLR 
4.2.2.1. Background 
The Vanuatu government initiated the TLR in 2007 to end the monopoly status of Telecom 
Vanuatu Limited (TVL) and encourage competition in the telecommunication sector. 
Table 4.4: CRP key factors 
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Telecommunication services were provided solely by TVL operating as a joint venture 
between the government and France Telecom and Cable and Wireless. TVL was accused of 
having poor services, high calling costs, and poor network coverage. Together with global 
liberalisation trends and rapid technological development, this led to the TLR. TVL’s 
exclusive franchise ended in 2012. Digicel entered the market in 2009, other providers 
(Telsat Broadband, INCITE) followed (PiPP, 2009, p.1). AusAID and World Bank provided 
financial and technical support to the reform which was still ongoing during the 2012 
fieldwork.  
Various participants assessed the TLR as a success story. Attributing factors are explored by 
examining its policy process.  
4.2.2.2. Initiation  
TLR had been on the agenda since the late 1990s as part of the CRP, but its initiation came 
to fruition when the government recognised the need for competition and that 
monopolisation was not good. There was societal demand for improved telecommunications 
amidst pressure from other actors to enter the market. Leadership at political and public 
administration levels spearheaded this reform with donors supporting it: 
Amongst the politicians, there was broad consensus it was time for the monopoly to end. This whole 
process began in the late 1990s and it took a long time to come together. In fact it was almost 
accidental. The Finance Minister while at an IMF meeting in Washington took a taxi down to the 
World Bank to follow up a letter he sent to them asking for telecom assistance… And it was something 
the World Bank couldn’t refused anymore as they forgot to reply. So they were quite available to 
Vanuatu’s request and provided us with some researchers… who had been through the same process 
in the Caribbean. [VPS.11] 
There are 150 international liberalisation cases influencing the stand that monopolies are not good; 
high prices, poor services, it’s an expensive world. Also, Digicel was knocking on the door saying 
give us a licence… It was obvious to people that the reform was beneficial. So it really landed on the 
PM at the time to recognise the need for competition. And AusAID said yes. [VTR] 
4.2.2.3. Formulation  
The development of the telecommunication industry has been guided by the PAA and the 
PLAS. For the TLR, the key policy document was the ‘2007 Telecommunications Policy 
Statement’ (Vanuatu Government, 2008) consisting of four principles: open and competitive 
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market; modern, independent and proportionate regulation; non-discrimination and 
technology neutrality and optional use of scarce resources. These principles guided the 
following TLR’s content: 
 The 2007 Telecommunications Act amendment and the new 2009 Telecommunication 
Regulations;  
 The 2008 establishment of the Telecommunications and Radio-communications 
Regulator;  
 The formulation of telecommunications operational policies, such as the universal 
access, licensing and dispute resolution policies; and  
 Negotiations for the monopoly’s end allowing new providers to enter the market.  
A series of policies were formulated, negotiated, and tested before becoming laws, making 
this a phased trialling process. For example, to ensure nationwide coverage, a bond between 
the government and Digicel obligated Digicel to provide 85% telecom service coverage, 
including uneconomical islands, this was supported by a universal service fund:   
We had to make a number of key decisions before putting in laws… Under the universal obligation, 
the licence given to Digicel obligated them to provide 85% coverage.... We wouldn’t have this 
coverage today because 20% of the areas are uneconomical. The second obligation was the universal 
service fund… we collect between 0 and 4% of the operators’ revenue to fund infrastructure in 
specific areas… Payments to the fund were used to tender for 10 mobile sites including Ratura and 
Futuna, some of the uneconomical areas. So a draft law was passed, an agreement was reached with 
TVL after a great deal of debate. And licences were issued to TVL and Digicel. [VTR]  
International experts were deployed working with a taskforce of local change agents. As this 
was a new development, three expatriates with relevant experience were recruited in 
succession to the post of Telecommunication Regulator from 2007. International evidence 
was taken into account, but policy instruments were adapted to local conditions:  
The government appointed four directors and an outside lawyer with telecommunication experience 
as a taskforce to look into all the issues—policy, business model, concessions, etc concurrently… 
That was how we tackled the reform. It was a lengthy process, looking at the implications of this 
liberalisation. [VPS.11]  
The PM recognised that liberalisation was the right thing, experts were employed to develop the 
laws, and international experience was taken, but not just vaulted into Vanuatu, it was appropriately 
adjusted. [VTR]  
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The process involved a great deal of consultation and negotiation amongst different actors 
(TVL, Digicel, government, donors, etc.) in developing, coordinating and understanding 
policy instruments. Recognising culture added value to the whole reform such as securing 
land for infrastructure and having the required support through positive working 
relationships:    
They didn’t just fly in and do their technical research… We really needed to make the point of 
familiarising them with the ways of the think, work and speak and all of that. So part of my job was 
to help people understand better. [VCS-M.1] 
All pieces of the jigsaw were enacted. A regulator was set up. We interviewed stakeholders 
particularly consumers and businesses… People understood what they got to do, how their actions 
play a greater role and what rewards they get if they succeed. [VTR] 
We had dialogues with chiefs to reach a common understanding before we can build the 
infrastructure. The traditional system plays an important role as the culture is very strong … If 
there’s a disagreement, we can leave all these papers and go to Nakamal and talk in informal ways. 
It added value to the whole arrangement and the government should take advantage of the culture 
to do stuff. [VPS.10] 
4.2.2.4. Implementation  
The implementation process was not smooth, with resistance, court battles and 
disagreements encountered. Political instability and politicking led to disharmony and delays.  
Disagreements over the monopoly’s ending led to a court case in 2006 where the government 
prevailed over TVL. TVL’s refusal to negotiate the monopoly’s ending led to the use of 
deportation notices; this was designed to threaten TVL’s expatriate management (from 
France Telecom and Cable and Wireless) into co-operation. At one point, the key change 
agent behind the TLR was removed. Another court case occurred in 2012 involving the 
Regulator’s illegal suspension by the Minister:   
The government had minority share, so its says it didn’t affect TVL decision-making… So we traded 
that share to incentivise TVL to end its franchise. But TVL disagreed and the case ended up in court. 
Then we took advantage of the political will and sovereignty of this country. We advised the PM to 
deport all expatriates in TVL. As once they leave, no one would run TVL… So we were telling them, 
you either come to the table or you will be given deportation notices. TVL then agreed. [VPS.11]  
It’s not like this was done without disharmony. At one point the Chair of the transition committee 
was removed as Director General of public utilities on flimsy charges. His dismissal was politically 
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motivated; TVL went to their friendly Minister and had things put in motion… And there was a six 
week period where Natapei was removed as Minister. It was a political shake-up and he briefly joined 
the opposition while the politician behind this Director General’s dismissal was moved in as Minister. 
He immediately went on a trip paid for by France Telecom… while announcing to put everything on 
hold… After six weeks, the party that had moved into the opposition was back in good grace as the 
government. Natapei was back and everything moved again. But for six weeks it looked like all of 
that was going to die on the line. [VC.4]  
Vanuatu’s unstable political system meant that obtaining policy consensus was difficult, yet 
essential for implementation. This involved finding key local change agents who were able 
to maintain policy stability. Understanding the limitations of operating within the political 
and sociological (cultural) dynamics of a small polity was critical to the instrumentation of 
the reform—the ‘how’ of implementation. One participant described this as follows: 
It’s always about accepting we work within limitations. That the best people in-country will never be 
specialists. They have to be generalists. They’ve got too many other responsibilities. People at the 
core of the negotiations weren’t telecom experts but had experts available to them. They were 
however experts on Vanuatu. They know more about how things fit together here than any outside 
experts could ever hope to learn… So I’m always careful when people talk about capacity because 
you have no choice but identifying what the actual lack is and how to fill them is significant… You 
can throw anything into a gap but it doesn’t make it safe… You can throw popcorns into a big pothole 
and fill it up quickly but the next truck over is going to break into an accident. So people went on 
about political instability. But it’s not like there’s nothing we can do about it… The key is maintaining 
policy stability. Because a Minister is leaving from one week to the next and you don’t know where 
you are going to be next week… But there needs to be this small group of people capable for the sake 
of the country, who maintain this policy stability in spite of being in the midst of this turmoil... It’s 
not obvious how it’s going to work tomorrow but by-and-large it’s been workable… Telecom 
stabilisation is one example. And that understanding of the dynamics was key to the whole thing. In 
the Pacific you cannot ignore the fact that all social dynamics are driven by personalities. They are 
institutions but they are not the same. I’m from Canada and Canadians understand institutions as 
the parliament, court; the big things that never change. It doesn’t feel at all like that here. We have 
institutions constantly in a state of flux subject to re-interpretation every day. Personalities manifest 
themselves more, so these enduring things keep running through our lives but they find their voice 
through the individuals who are involved. So the key in development policies is finding these key 
individuals and that’s how you ensure continuity. [VC.1]  
Critical to the implementation process was the timing or sequencing of the reform in relation 
to the monopoly’s ending. Given political instability and small local capacity, more flexible 
or emergent approaches were critical in facilitating the change process. A top-down process 
or one-size-fits-all approach, often advocated by donors, may not work and risks being 
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obstructed by opportunism within a fluid political system. Reforms will not work unless they 
take account of such dynamics:  
The other factor we looked at in negotiating this was the timeframe. We knew the TVL concession 
ended in 2012, so we started preparing everything now in anticipation of that. [VPS.10]  
It was rather an ad hoc process in the sense you are reinventing it every day. Like this is what has 
worked up to now… But the moment the circumstances changed a new personality evolved, I have to 
change to accommodate this. It means it’s hard to plan for any significant period… Planning in 
details gets in the way, like what a donor wants… It’s more appropriate than a top-down process... 
Because it’s stupid to assume you can put too many processes on top of one another, as the guy who 
has to do it isn’t going to be one person… This means that the administrative processes you see in 
most donor agencies don’t work. They cannot react… So we are talking about the lack of capacity 
in the Pacific but it’s also the inability of donors to match their capabilities to the Pacific. They 
cannot drop a 100 thousand bucks on a quick win. Because it’s utterly unrealistic for developed 
countries to think ‘oh well, we just get this country working like us so we all be divine together’. No, 
things just don’t work that way. [VC.4]  
Leadership, ownership and capability building were critical to reform sustainability. As the 
former Regulator, Crook (2010, p.6) stated in a submission to AusAID, ‘in the smaller 
countries a great deal of capacity building is needed to enable the indigenous peoples to take-
up governance roles in a meaningful and effective way’. The inclusion of a monitoring 
component ensured that the TLR’s obligations were progressing: 
There’s a danger that might happen when you have experts coming in without effective local staff. 
That you get a policy written, experts go away and nobody here understands it. So ownership is one 
of my things, to develop local capability to lead and manage projects. We have built an exemplary 
group and good governance mechanisms. When I leave, the show can go on. [VTR]  
No matter how good the people are when there’s no leader at the top things start falling apart. So 
the other success factor is visionary political leadership. And we didn’t just employ expatriates. Ni-
Vanuatu were at the core of this process. We spent a lot of time training them… getting our 
procedures, corporate memory, structure, policy, everything internally. [VPS.14]     
We have 90% coverage now. Digicel didn’t meet that at the time. But they had a bond that was big 
enough to incentivise them to meet their obligation. [VC.4]  
4.2.2.5. Results 
Based on participant narratives and other evaluation (PiPP, 2009), the TLR was a success. 
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Contributors included local demand for improved telecommunication services. It was not a 
public policy that people saw as a threat, being deemed beneficial. 
The Director, Pacific Cable and Wire said in an interview this was the most successful negotiation. 
He had worked in the Caribbean where Digicel started and he knew just how bad it can get. The 
breaking of the monopoly was just agonising with huge court battles. You couldn’t call the other 
services and this went on for years while they were basically dragged, kicking and screaming into 
co-operation with one another. [VPS.11]  
The TLR has been a success for a whole lot of reasons. Primarily, there was a gap in the market so 
people wanted that service, low prices and new products… It’s national. It’s really not a political 
football. It’s something that benefit us all. [VTR]  
Coordinated working relationships between Ministers, officials and donors was another 
contributor to success, as Crook (2010) has highlighted. Leadership was a fundamental 
factor. The TLR was locally driven with ongoing donors’ support to ensure sustainability.  
As long as there’s understanding and good relationships, things come and go. We achieved more on 
that, around 60% on that relationship. [VPS.10]   
Leadership is a key factor. You need somebody who can drive this through, who is futurist on where 
this type of infrastructure will take the government. [VPS.14]  
Research shows that the TLR has led to ‘nearly universal access to mobile telephony’ with 
rural access increased by 23% in 2008. Costs of doing businesses were reduced and 
household productivity, resource distribution, access to services, information and social 
networks improved (PiPP, 2009).  
4.2.2.6. Key factors  
Table 4.5 summarises the critical factors of the TLR’s policy process:  
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4.2.3. The ELR 
4.2.3.1. Background 
The ELR was instigated by the Vanuatu government in 2008 to enact domestic employment 
law changes in compliance with international labour standards. Vanuatu became an ILO 
member in 2003 and is signatory to eight ILO conventions (ILO, 2009, p.10). Implementing 
these conventions requires domestic policies and laws. The ILO Decent Work Country 
Programme (DWCP) has been the key policy document utilised to specify domestic labour 
reforms. About 81 countries have DWCPs, all developing nations (ILO, 2015). Vanuatu’s 
DWCP (2009-2012), based on ILO standards, regional agendas (MDGs, Pacific Plan), and 
its national policy, the PAA, guided the ELR. Building on the ILO’s primary goal ‘to 
promote opportunities for women and men to obtain decent and productive work in 
conditions of freedom, equity, security and human dignity’, Vanuatu’s DWCP contained 
four priorities: 
 ‘labour legislation reform and application of international labour standards;  
 promotion of decent employment opportunities particularly for young women and men, 
and inclusive of persons with disabilities;  
Table 4.5: TLR key factors 
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 capacity building of tripartite partners and improvement of social dialogue; and  
 increasing social protection’. (ILO, 2009, p.14) 
As part of the ELR, Vanuatu’s Employment Act 1989 (‘the 1989 Act’) was amended in 2008 
to enact increased employees’ benefits. Amongst other changesviii was a substantial 300% 
increase in severance allowances and a 100% increase in maternity leave. A Bill introduced 
in Parliament on 19 November 2008 was passed the following day but suspended from 
gazetting following hostile reactions from the business community. Submissions to the PM 
made by the Chamber of Commerce on behalf of employers requested a compromise on the 
Bill given its huge impact on businesses. Communication between the two parties ceased 
only when the President referred the Bill to the Supreme Court in February 2009 on 
unconstitutionality grounds (Jowitt, 2012, p.86).  
In 2009, the 1989 Act was further amended altering provisions of the original 2008 
amendment. Maternity payment provisions, for instance, were reduced by a third, as was the 
severance allowance. The 2008 Bill was not gazetted until October 2009 along with the 
amended 2009 Bill. The 2008 Bill was not assented to by the President until June 2009. This 
followed a May 2009 court ruling that the 2008 Bill was a political issue beyond the court’s 
mandate (Jowitt, 2012, p.94). The unsettled status of this legislation continued in 2010, when 
the 1989 Act was further amended to incorporate a Tri-partite Labour Advisory Council 
(TLAC) comprising government, employers and employees’ representatives. Law reforms 
continued during the 2012 fieldwork investigations. A new employment relations Bill, 
consolidating three existing labour laws was in draft form with further policy work to follow.  
Various participants assessed the ELR as an unsuccessful case. Attributing factors are 
explored by examining its policy process in the following sections.  
4.2.3.2. Initiation  
Participants were asked where the ELR originated from and why it was initiated. All 
responded that the reform was introduced as an ILO requirement, seen as foisted upon 
developing countries:  
When I said it was externally driven by ILO, this is because on their website you will find their 
DWCPs through the majority of ILO members are developing countries. It’s like the ILO pushing 
                                                                            
viii Jowitt (2012) gives a detailed accounts of the amendment. 
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these onto developing countries as developed countries are wise enough to tell them to go away. 
[TLAC-M.1] 
Participants were subsequently asked why local actors accept these agendas if they felt that 
they were impositions. Responses demonstrated that the adoption of these agendas occurred 
largely to secure aid funding as conditionalities, or to meet performance criteria:  
There’s always this conditionality… If you don’t meet them then we still don’t access funding. If 
there’s no policy, there will be no funding. If you have a policy, yes. It’s a performance-based thing 
for them – these UN or semi-UN agencies… They are subject to performance, a deadline to meet 
their results… They bring aid and super programs but also ask us to abide by their rules. So in being 
a UN member we are gazetting the new bill next year. [VCS-M.4] 
Consideration of the ELR comprised mainly ILO representatives talking to the Minister and 
Ministry of Internal Affairs about reforming the law to reflect ILO principles in the DWCP. 
Generally the ELR was adopted to meet political interests:  
There has been this external influence pushing the country in directions it’s not ready for. During 
the 2008 election there was a lot of scrambling in trying to form a government. Eventually 
government got formed and the first thing the Minister did were these radical law changes… He and 
others made deals with voters they are going to get more pay-outs. [TLAC-M.2] 
4.2.3.3. Formulation  
This was a classic example of a top-down policy with little prior consultation or warning. 
An ILO consultant did the drafting, a process that involved elements of policy transfer 
without consideration of contextual issues and implications:  
The ILO people just talked to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and did the amendment. This is why 
people are angry because there wasn’t much consultation. [VPS.12]  
A consultant was engaged by the ILO to draft the bill. There were drafting notes suggesting there 
had been some discussion. But these notes are generic. I never saw or talked to anybody who had 
the opportunity to make inputs to these notes… This bill got drafted by being copied and pasted from 
Fiji. Then in 2010, they decided to go back to reform the law again. And what they did is resurrected 
an already problematic process which didn’t have a sound base in the first place. So we pay 
severance allowance the Minister increased with no discussion, no prior warning, nothing. That 
DCWP was never contextualised… It’s an excellent example of a totally irrational policy process. 
[TLAC-M.3] 
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The basis for these increases remained unclear. For instance, according to participant 
narratives, some provisions such as the maternity leave could be based on ILO standards, 
but that used for other provisions, such as the severance increase, remained elusive. The 
increase was promulgated via a Ministerial directive, suggesting limited neutrality by public 
servants and TLAC in policy formulation and advice provisions:  
Employers are struggling to pay these increases. They are saying where on earth did this come from? 
For the severance payment I cannot see where that came from. The maternity leave can be based on 
international standards but that in itself is problematic because these standards are inconsistent. 
There is a convention on maternity leave from 1919, one from 1952 and the most recent in 2000 and 
they all contain different standards. [VPSM.1]  
The law changes four years ago were done unilaterally by the Minister. He promised certain voters 
he would increase the minimum wage and severance. But this is not the way to do things because 
there’s a TLAC set-up by legislation and he didn’t even think of going through that system. [UR.1] 
The Directors General have to be very strong, people who can say sorry Mr Minister, this is the way 
to do it. But if you are slow… and have fear of your boss, it put you in a weak position. [VPS.13] 
The public only became aware of the 2008 Bill when it went to Parliament. It was passed 
with little deliberation and against concerns from the opposition as to its negative 
implications. There was no time allowed for any public submission:   
I went to parliament to get the records of their discussions. Funny enough the tapes were lost. There’s 
one lot of minutes from the first reading indicating they spent half an hour discussing the bill. 
Wednesday was the first reading and the second reading took place the following day where the Act 
got voted in. 50 out of 52 Member of Parliaments voted for it despite the opposition leader saying 
the day before that this is going to destroy our country. Then, of course, the outcry started. None of 
these (2008 Bill papers) was publicly discussed and I cannot find documents on it. [TLAC-M.3] 
The ELR’s ideological foundation has been the ILO standards and principles upholding the 
rights of individual workers in formal employment (ILO, 2009). Promoting human rights in 
employment relations involved adopting contractual and bargaining arrangements, tri-partite 
structures and union representation. These arrangements were promoted and adopted despite 
international criticisms such as limited civil society representations. These arrangements, 
based on a well-developed private sector, were problematic for Vanuatu’s current economy 
with an underdeveloped private sector, and where unions are small. Tri-partite structures 
only represent formal employment, not those in the informal system. About 77% of the rural 
population are engaged in informal subsistence employment. Only 14,272 people are in 
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formal employment with government being the dominant employer (Vanuatu Government, 
2009a). Accordingly, TLAC representatives wear multiple hats lacking neutral 
representation:  
Internationally, it is recognised this tri-partite structure is exceptionally problematic… Here unions 
are exceptionally low and they represent people who already have jobs. The majority of our workers 
don’t have jobs, are looking for jobs, are in the informal sector or are unionised. In this tri-partite 
structure, there’s no space for civil society representation and this is your international criticism. 
And as government representatives, you would think they contribute to the policy dialogue. In 
practice, we get the Commissioner of Labour and his staff as union members. So they aren’t able to 
play that mediation role effectively, to say, ‘hang on, this is the policy and the priorities’. [TLAC-
M.1] 
It’s funny because when I sit on the TLAC I represent the employers. But I have been asked by the 
employees’ representatives to go and talk to the people. And I say um, can I do that? But I can do 
that because that's what I need to be doing. [VP.1]  
We want a body that is independent to choose its own chair. But now the TLAC chair and its 
Secretariat are both public servants. So I don’t know if we have moved past what we had before. 
[UR.2] 
The PAA’s ideological position is ‘private sector led development’ while that of the DWCP 
is ‘human rights’ through decent work (ILO, 2009, p.4). The latter was the basis of the law 
change, but it impacted negatively on the former, in particular its employment functions. 
Policy actors were unaware of the trade-offs between these ideological positions: 
There are insights that employers aren’t employing too many people. This is reducing the number of 
new jobs every year. This is a trade-off. [VPS.12]  
This unawareness was attributed to a lack of prior discussion about the changes being 
foreshadowed. Some articulation of the rationales behind the law changes did subsequently 
take place to justify the changes and as defence against employers in disputes. The Internal 
Affairs Minister’s justification in a December 2008 meeting with employers’ representatives 
was that ‘the workers’ perception is that employers have had it good for 25 years’ (Jowitt, 
2012, p.84):  
This is a huge part of the problem. They jumped into reviewing the law rather than going, we got this 
DCWP, the PAA, how do these things fit together, what are our labour policies and priorities. Then 
you need another level of discussion as per what we want with the labour reforms before the laws. 
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So there’s this post-justification process. You made your decisions and justify it later, rather than 
starting with a context analysis of issues, policy aims and specific interventions… That process 
simply doesn’t happen. [TLAC-M.2] 
Participants saw the ELR as not adjusted to Vanuatu’s situation in terms of its development 
status. The 2009 Bill was a reaction to employers’ complaints against the 2008 Bill rather 
than an opportunity to consider the core issues and rationales behind the 2008 change and 
its appropriateness or likely impact:  
This redundancy payment is inappropriate. It could be a big issue in years to come as we develop 
more… Our economy is quite superficial. We depend a lot on aid. We don’t produce money for our 
budget. So we need to be careful about the way we legislate our employment because it affects the 
private sector, the government and its finance. It’s very delicate. [VPSM.1] 
There was an order to say rather than a rational consideration of what should be done, a consensus 
was reached, for everyone to save face and feel happy. This is somewhat problematic. The policy, 
this DWCP, has been driven by the ILO and not contextualised. If you look across the Pacific 
programs you will find they are all similar. If you look at the problems internationally… it’s a mess. 
[UR.1] 
In a rational process, the policy groundwork involving discussion and analysis of the issues 
did not happen before law making. Instead, the approach was something of a ‘cart before the 
horse’. The 2010 amendment was just a name change of the TLAC without considering why 
such a body did not work before, and why it should work now. Understanding (or an 
emphasis on) that rational process was lacking in previous and ongoing ELR work:  
We haven’t reached that stage where we actually work on the employment policies, because we are 
still in the process of amending the Act again. Once it’s gazetted then we work on the policies… The 
tradition is to go with the legislation first and then the policy. [VPS.12] 
There was an advisory board… under the 1989 Act but it never met or did anything. They decided 
rather than getting this body to work, let’s amend the Act which did the same thing as before. The 
TLAC, the body that develops labour policies got established in 2011 and the first thing on its list 
was let’s review the Employment Act. The connection between policy and law is problematic and 
whether people don’t understand the policy process is one possibility. [TLAC-M.2] 
4.2.3.4. Implementation 
As a law change, the ELR was enforceable. This change was regarded as both an imposition 
and a threat to businesses and investment development. It was described as ‘chaotic’, or 
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‘very messy’ with employers reacting in various ways to manage this sudden change:   
We were all surprised because these are imported factors that became new paragraphs of the bill… 
Most employers here don’t know what ILO is. [VPS.13] 
Because employees are able to access enforcement mechanisms of any sort, the laws are by-and-
large enforced. These changes are exceptionally chaotic. This is where we are… trying to make the 
best of a very messy situation. [TLAC-M.1] 
Evidence shows that the ELR increased business liabilities affecting solvency and 
investments.  Court cases continued, ix particularly over the retrospective aspects of the 
severance increase.  
It’s essentially putting companies into liquidation as suddenly businesses are saving for this 
employee’s severance for 10 years. With the information released by the Vanuatu Investment 
Promotional Authority, there was a significant drop in investment renewals and new applications in 
2009; anecdotal evidence that this was happening. [TLAC-M.3] 
It’s a financial burden to businesses. We got some big companies in court like ANZ (Australian and 
NZ) Bank, RICOH and TVL challenging whether the Act should be made retrospective or not. [VPS-
M.2]  
It was assumed that employees were happy with the increase but the evidence suggests 
otherwise. The change impacted negatively on decent employment as employers reacted in 
various ways to manage the implications involved. Employers who afforded the pay-outs 
then terminated all their employees’ employment arrangements, paid out whatever severance 
was owed under the old provisions, and then re-hired some employees under different 
conditions. Casualisation rather than full time employment was seen in Vanuatu’s low-skill 
labour market. Gender discrimination in employment was a concern because of the cost of 
the maternity provisions to employers:  
Maternity leave concerns me because the obvious response is we are going to stop employing women. 
There’s data and you can find in the MDGs report that the participation rate of women in the formal 
sector is decreasing. You have to wonder if this is because of the labour law. [UR.2] 
Small businesses are problematic because they try all sorts of ways to avoid paying such entitlements. 
They are struggling to make their investments work. [VPS.12]  
                                                                            
ix See http://www.paclii.org/vu/cases/VUSC/2011/333.html for an example. 
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4.2.3.5. Results 
Improvement in decent work and private sector development as ELR’s key objectives have 
not been formally evaluated, but participant narratives suggest limited improvement. The 
ELR has not worked because it was a policy seen as imposed on the business community 
lacking consultation and contextualisation, impacting negatively against its objectives:  
Did they achieve the policy objectives? First and at one level this is hard to answer because there 
were never any clearly stated policy objectives. On another level, if you step back and say the policy 
objectives are in the DWCP, well no, not really because these are all about increasing employment 
through private sector development. [TLAC-M.2] 
They haven’t worked because we don’t know what it is about. A lot of this labour stuff is just because 
the ILO wants it… Not because anyone here wants it. This policy stuff is a lot of work. You have to 
understand it. You have to sit down and talk hard. [VP.2]  
This case demonstrates the risk of adopting a policy when a country is not ready for it. While 
intentions seemed good, contextual factors question the suitability of advancing such reform 
types at this stage. What could work locally in terms of specific policy instruments did not 
take place. However, as a sovereign country Vanuatu could resist any change if that was 
deemed unsuitable. Rather than blaming the ILO alone, the law change was adopted for 
political interest, within an unstable political situation, and where politicians had freedom to 
do whatever they wanted with limited public awareness. 
Here, where you got an extremely unstable government, politicians are so concerned with their 
manoeuvring games that policy isn’t given the attention that it deserves. Instead we got things like 
the labour law changes as ways to manipulate and gain an advantage rather than looking at how 
they further the national objectives. Unfortunately that happens in a number of areas. [TLAC-M.1] 
The population needs to get its act together through local authorities to have an influence. At the 
moment if you look hard you cannot see a clear picture coming out from the mass. This is 
demonstrated in their silence in labour issues and others. [VCS-M.1] 
4.2.3.6. Key factors 
Table 4.6 summarises the critical factors of the ELR’s policy process:  
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Chapter eight further discusses key factors emerging from Vanuatu’s policy cases, in 
comparison with those in Samoa, the Solomon Islands and the Region (see Appendix G), 
and against existing literature.  
4.3. The policy processes in general 
This section examines participant experiences and observations of Vanuatu’s policy 
processes in general. Their stories are analysed in accordance with the research question of 
how public policies are initiated, formulated and implemented and what are critical factors 
for effective implementation.  
4.3.1. Policy initiation 
Participants were asked where issues that became policies mostly originate. Narrative coding 
(content analysis) yielded the patterns in Table 4.7. They show that participants experienced 
issues that became public policy as originating from actors in government, from society, and 
from abroad (external). The narratives frequency depicts three key patterns. First, the origins 
of what became public policy was influenced significantly by politicians (frequency of 34) 
and external actors (frequency of 34). Second, external influences came as policy transfers 
but also through the roles performed by donors and consultants. Third, public policies 
originating from society were limited (frequency of 22 and 11). The genesis of Vanuatu’s 
public policy was more supply (politicians and outsiders) than demand (society) driven: 
Table 4.6: ELR key factors 
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Narrative extracts illustrate these patterns: 
The ideas are from two people; the foreigners and big people up there, the politicians. If foreigners 
come with big money things will go fast. But if there’s no money things will still be there. [VCS-
M.2] 
We have many donors and sometimes our policies are donor-driven. They inject millions in Vanuatu 
but they got their own agenda. [VPS.6] 
One of the difficulties is they have been left out for so long—the community. [VPS.3] 
We have produced a good plan for the next 5 years but there’s no real demand from the people who 
we are trying to impact. The supply side is there but its miss-targeting the demand side. [VC.3] 
4.3.2. Policy formulation 
What is constructed by various policy actors as (public) ‘policy’ and how they are 
constructing policies are the concerns of this inquiry.  
4.3.2.1. Construction of policy  
Participants were asked about what they refer to as ‘policy’ and how they see the nature and 
characteristics of existing polices. Sections 4.3.2.1.1 to 4.3.2.1.3 analyses participant 
responses to these questions.  
Table 4.7: Origins of public policy in Vanuatu 
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4.3.2.1.1. What is mostly referred to as policy 
Participants made reference to various documents in Table 4.8 as policies, indicated that the 
term ‘policy’ can be diluted, and can refer to different things. However, the narratives 
frequency reveal the following key patterns about the construction of policy in Vanuatu:   
a) Most participants equated ‘policy’ with a strategic plan; e.g. the PAA, PLAS and plans 
at sectoral and organisational levels (frequency of 30);   
b) Participants also talked of policy in terms of the espoused, rational top-down approach; 
the ‘policy for policy’ (frequency of 17) process held in Cabinet manuals, and for 
Ministers and public servants to follow as to how it should be developed and approved;  
c) Some considered legislation, rules, policy statements, and procedures (frequency of 14 
and 11) as all policies, but with limited understanding and practice about what comes 
first or later in a policy sequence;  
d) Some referred to policies based on international and regional agendas (frequency of 
11) as part of domestic policy. An ‘aid driving policy’ tendency with policy 
development a prerequisite for aid (as opposed to an ideal situation of ‘policy driven 
aid’) (frequency of 8) meant that aid conditionality was a policy component; and   
e) Political policy platforms or visionary type policy (frequency of 9).  
 
Table 4.8: Construction of policy in Vanuatu 
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Narrative extracts below illustrate what participants meant about these patterns:  
When you talk about national policy, it’s the PAA and the PLAS. Then Ministries got their Annual 
Plans identifying what they should do based on the PLAS. [VPS.13] 
There are all kinds of policies... But the policy I’m talking about is the template Ministries should 
follow in formulating a policy and get it approved by the Council of Ministers… But most don’t follow 
that because at most times the problem is being identified by the Minister. [VPS.7] 
We got legislations coming out of our ears to which people don’t understand. They don’t know why 
we have them because they don’t have a policy. We got huddles of legislation but that's not policy, 
that's not vision. [VP.1]   
Once you are a UN member you are obliged to accede. If you don’t, they will look at you worriedly. 
Even if you don’t have the will power, it’s just to see there is a paper format to say yes. [VCS-M.2] 
When that (US Millennium Challenge) project came in,x they say it’s US and World Bank’s policy 
that you pay the quarry materials. Now everybody wants the government to pay for the quarry. But 
the roads are theirs to use. [VPS.14] 
Across the Pacific we don’t have the Obama’s figure coming in and portraying the vision of hope for 
the next 20 years for our young people. [VDA.1] 
4.3.2.1.2. Levels of policies  
A dimension of why participants referred to ‘policy’ as different things occurs because they 
constructed its manifestations according to different levels. Such levels are interdependent 
formulations, seen as corresponding to different stages of the policy cycle. Table 4.9 depicts 
Vanuatu’s policy framework constituting various documents existing (or yet to exist) at 
various levels. Implementing the PAA as the national policy required its translation to other 
levels; sector, industry (meso), organisational and individual levels (micro). Documentation 
of this top-down policy framework was incomplete at various levels:  
                                                                            
x See https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work/program/vanuatu-compact.  
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Narrative extracts below illustrate what participants meant about these levels:  
The PAA hasn’t been translated into sector and corporate plans in order to implement. This work is 
missing. Most Ministries’ corporate plans are not updated, still based on the old CRP. [VPS.5] 
We don’t have all operating policies and processes written down, why a lot of things are falling apart 
and sticky hands coming in. [VPS.1] 
4.3.2.1.3. Features of policy  
Participant narratives indicated that various participants regarded plans in place as ‘wish 
lists’, and seen as isolated from societal realities. There was an interpretation from the 
narratives that these were not public policies since they did not emerge as issues from society, 
but something seen as imposed. While these plans, regarded as national policies, sit nicely 
on paper in Port Vila, often what gets adopted and implemented has been mostly driven by 
dominant political agendas:  
I’m not saying we don’t have policies. But we have lots of policy transfer, stuff that gets thrown on 
us and we end up taking those as policies… It’s not policy because we didn’t create it. So it can’t be 
ours. [VP.1] 
It's a national policy (PAA) that doesn’t sink or land itself in the different islands… I don’t see that 
PLAS happening. [VPS.12] 
Because a lot of interest is in the use of power and getting a quick fix, a lot of government resources 
are allocated to where it’s inappropriate. [VCS-M.2] 
Table 4.9: Vanuatu’s policy framework 
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4.3.2.2. How are policies formulated? 
Participants were asked about how policies are formulated; the processes employed, who 
has done the work of formulation, what is used as a knowledge basis for policy, and 
stakeholders’ understanding of policies. Table 4.10 gives the coded participant narratives for 
this ‘how’ question. Patterns shown by the narratives frequency are discussed in the 
following sections.  Narrative extracts provided shortly illustrate what these patterns meant:   
 
4.3.2.2.1. Knowledge basis of policy  
Table 4.10 shows five key patterns about the knowledge basis of policy – what has been 
influencing the construction of policies as written and practised: 
a) Policy formulation was a process dominated by policy transfers and social construction 
(frequency of 55 and 41);  
b) There was limited evidence-based policy process (frequency of 1) and what emerges 
is largely espoused rather than practised. The formulation process was largely ad hoc, 
Table 4.10: Knowledge basis, methodology and formulation of policy in Vanuatu 
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reactive, of a ‘cart before the horse’ nature and lacking consistency. Legislation was 
often introduced without proper analysis;  
c) The policies and practices have been influenced by these types of social construction, 
involving interwoven belief systems that have co-evolved over time from:  
i. traditional culture;  
ii. religions;  
iii. politics and business;  
iv. colonial administrators (e.g. Anglophone versus Francophone);  
v. donor countries and the global policy system (policy transfers); and  
vi. formal education;  
d) What got ‘written’ in policy documents was dominated by v) and influenced to some 
extent by vi). However, the ‘practices’ were strongly influenced by i), ii), iii) and iv). 
Thus what was practised often deviated from what was regarded as policy in any 
formal sense; and   
e) The influences of i), ii) and iii) lack sufficient attention in formal policy processes and 
reforms. In essence, the context of (public) policy was largely ignored.  
Narrative extracts below illustrate these patterns:  
Why does it fail, simple, we have almost no formulation… If you watch the silent movies, there’s a 
group called the Keystone Cops in this old car driving around town with policemen hanging out, 
falling over and doing dumb things. That’s a lot like our governments… We are always reacting to 
things happening. And we aren’t setting a policy of development. We aren’t setting a policy of what 
we believe in. [VP.2] 
The first government adopted this model from Tanzania and tried to fit it in a tiny country… And they 
only did a couple of plants here, not the other islands. We came up with these reforms but this 
Westminster still hasn’t taken into account other layers of traditional governance… the influence of 
culture in policy formulation. [VPS.12] 
How are these policies formulated? It’s been rammed down the throat of politicians by donors and 
public servants… Although they don’t understand government they have to be seen to be dictating 
policy to get them into power. That’s how things are done. [VCS-M.6] 
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4.3.2.2.2. Methodology—how is it constructed? 
Various participants (see Table 4.10) experienced the formulation processes as top-down 
(directive) (frequency of 82), where most policies were constructed with little stakeholder 
involvement. While consultative approaches (frequency of 12) have improved recently, the 
meaningful participation of civil society in policy processes was limited (frequency of 0). 
Various participants experienced donor actors’ significant infuences in these top-down 
processes:   
Significantly we suffer because the policy formulation starts only within government. Very few in 
civil society; whose lives are affected by the policy are consulted. [VCS-M.3] 
Sometimes instead of the government driving the agenda, the donors drive the agenda. We have lots 
of examples. The donors say I will give you money but I will send you my consultants. The consultants 
fly in, sit in Vila for two weeks and write everything nice on paper but have never visited the islands. 
They just based everything on the Vila perception. So nothing gets filtered down. [VPS.15] 
4.3.2.2.3. Formulators of policy—who is writing the policies? 
Table 4.10 shows that most policy documents were developed by consultants (frequency of 
39) and some by public servants (frequency of 19). Stakeholder participation (e.g. through 
working committees) were limited (frequency of 1). Narrative extracts below illustrate these 
patterns:  
If I take a picture of a child trying to write something and someone comes along and helps the child 
to hold his pen, that’s the picture of how we do policies. When we want to write policies for Vanuatu’s 
development we get an expert from France or somewhere to come and hold our hand. [VSP.4] 
I’m a consultant myself and I’m cynical about this. A lot of these plans were written by consultants 
and with vested interests. A lot were designed to be lucrative. To be fair to donors, a lot of their 
projects are contracted to consultants and consultants are human… We must think more of the impact 
in why are we doing this policy. [VPA.1]  
4.3.2.2.4. Understanding of policy 
The patterns in Table 4.10 further indicate that most policies including systems of 
formulation and implementation were not well understood (frequency of 36). This limitation 
is attributed to lack of education, poor understanding of concepts and terminology (in policy 
documents), limited access to quality information, language diversity, and top-down 
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approaches to policy:  
The chiefs still have the people with them… but they are afraid because they don’t understand the 
system. They don’t understand these western concepts on which our constitution is written. [VCS-
M.6] 
Our concern about the policy cycle is the level of understanding of these processes, not only at the 
community but also the politicians. They just rushed up stuff bypassing the processes. [VPS.6]   
The people who got voted in are not educated so how can they understand the PLAS. That’s why 
Vanuatu is in this way because most Member of Parliaments went as far as class six. [VPS.10]  
4.3.3. Policy implementation  
Examining the processes to determine factors or issues critical to implementation is central 
to this research. Table 4.11 identifies factors participants talked about most: 
 
Given their interrelatedness, these factors are condensed and narrated in the following 
sections under five headings: public policy leadership, stakeholder support and feedback, 
policy culture and ownership, capability, and translation of policy to community.  
4.3.3.1. Public policy leadership  
Section 4.3.1 confirms that the policy process is political. Vanuatu’s public policy emerged 
as significantly influenced by political instability, lack of accountability, misunderstandings 
as to the role of government, and the influence of the ‘big man’ culture.  
Table 4.11: Issues or factors central to implementation in Vanuatu 
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4.3.3.1.1. Political instability  
Political instability is a symptom of Vanuatu’s diversity (see Table 1.1). In such a 
fragmented society, nation building is challenging but essential to public policy setting. 
Societal fragmentation translates into the instability of the political system. Policy consensus, 
and confidence in the government to ensure policy and implementation continuity, are 
difficult but important ingredients of the whole process:  
We have to learn and accept this instability is the symptom of our diversity, 102 different dialects. 
Unless you have stability, you find it difficult to generate commitments and remain there to implement 
it. The way politicians think is like if you are going to switch from one side to another, what’s in it 
for me without bothering to think about how it’s going to affect the country. [VPA.2] 
There isn’t a political party that hasn’t split. So many parties for a small country. The government 
needs to work together to do something but the PM is not able to do anything because if he does 
something these guys aren’t happy with, they jump off and join the other group and throw him out. 
[VPS.14] 
4.3.3.1.2. Accountability  
Participant narratives suggest that the dominant, state-led public policy system in Vanuatu 
has contributed to politicians becoming self-serving individuals corrupting the state system 
and with weak accountability. xi  The public policy system became politicised affecting 
effective implementation and equitable resource distribution:  
If it’s corrupt they forget about public policy. These guys are elected to government but still behave 
and act as though they are down in the village… The government system is being manipulated for 
personal gain affecting everything especially these plans. [VPS.9] 
I believed this is where Vanuatu has gone wrong. It has come up with a system that allows for 
politicians to do things unchecked. [VCS-M.5] 
How do you implement policy when the bosses can’t work together and within the rule of law? 
[VPA.1] 
                                                                            
xi Vanuatu was ranked 77 (out of 182) on the 2011 Corruption Perception Index. 
(http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/results). Data unavailable for subsequent years. 
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4.3.3.1.3. Big man culture  
Vanuatu’s public policy leadership and practices are largely influenced by ‘big man’ beliefs 
and political practices. Big men are not necessarily traditional chiefs but ‘men’ acquiring 
powerful status (‘big’) through wealth accumulation and influence in society. Improving 
accountability of this big man leadership requires making the checks and balances of the 
government system more relevant to the electorate:  
The reality is that we live in the arena of big man politics. It’s not going to change anytime soon. 
That leadership has worked for thousands of years… as checks and balances so you won’t get 
tyrannical chiefs becoming dictators… How do we build those checks and balances into the 
government system so there’s more expectation of the leadership to be accountable? The greatest 
check and balance is the motion of no confidence but the most misused in bringing government down. 
Partly because these rules and processes aren’t relevant to the majority of the electorate basis. So 
they are open to misuse and multiple meanings in the Pacific. [VDA.2] 
4.3.3.1.4. Understanding of public policy  
Participant narratives pointed to a lack of understanding about the role of government in 
public policy, not only at the political level but throughout society. This issue has affected 
leadership capability to aptly deal with dynamic foreign influences and what is suitable 
locally. Similarly, this limited understanding has people’s ability to effectively hold their 
leaders accountable:  
We got this problem where our Ministers go in government but have no idea of what they are 
supposed to be doing. So you end up with foreign influences because they come and say you need 
this. And the Minister says yeah, that’s a good idea. But you end up with something you don’t really 
need. [VP.2] 
You cannot get the leaders to perform and refrain from doing something. People write to the media… 
and that’s it. They don’t really know how to channel their grievances and get to be listened to. 
[VPS.5]  
4.3.3.2. Stakeholder support and feedback  
Lack of consolidated community support and feedback is a key area affecting the policy 
environment and implementation, particularly in a geographical and culturally diverse 
country such as Vanuatu. As the policy process is largely top-down and driven by the 
interplay of political and external interests, there is a need to bridge gaps in state-society 
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relationships, and a wider understanding of public policy has been limited. Efforts to 
improve these relationships saw the establishment of the Malvatumauri National Council of 
Chiefs. However, the Malvatumauri’s influence on public policy matters has been limited. 
Its role is restricted to advisory matters (over customs) (Vanuatu Government, 1980) and it 
is not mandatory for an issue to be given to the Malvatumauri for discussion or approval:   
The further away you are from Vila, the less and less you see government, its policies, control and 
governance... The further away, governance is totally traditional… and the less you expect to see 
any service delivery or policy impact. People just continue with their own lives, with whatever they 
have. [VCS-M.1] 
We have the chiefly system but our masters said ‘no, we needed the Westminster system’. But we 
don’t understand that. It’s fine if we are talking about Vila but there are 83 islands. 80% of Vanuatu 
doesn’t happen in the urban areas. It happens out in the villages. [VPS.2] 
If Parliament talks about anything concerning land or a bill they should consult us (Malvatumauri). 
But we don’t get consulted… People in that red house (Parliament) are fighting against the 
traditional system so they could hide and be involved in corruption. [VCS-M.5] 
4.3.3.3. Policy culture and ownership 
Issues concerning implementation reflect policies already in existence. Most are not 
contextualised, being too distant in their formulation from those who implement them. 
Implementation then becomes difficult as there is a lack of policy ownership and engaged 
understanding. This issue concerns the limited collective ownership of the whole system of 
public policy, namely the government. Such limited ownership is reflected in the lack of 
influences from local people over public policy settings (see Table 4.7):  
The whole reason is we don’t have enough expertise in the country. If we want policies that suit 
Vanuatu, those policies need to be written by Vanuatu experts, not foreign people. People who 
understand the cultural background, who can influence people to change mind-sets... There’s no 
willpower. We need a system that can influence. [VCS-M.3] 
When you go to church, they have structured meetings. Then you look behind there is a planner there. 
But when it comes to his work here that doesn’t apply. It’s good to use in the church but why don’t 
you use it also in your job because the government sent you for training. Why are you promoting it 
in your little corner? So it’s that issue; the government is not for the people. [VPS.13] 
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4.3.3.4. Capability (people, budget, education and learning) 
Vanuatu’s distinct situation (e.g. isolation, smallness, a young nation-state) posed ongoing 
challenges for the required capability to implement policies and sustain their impact. 
Implementation depends on fiscal capacity and how resources are utilised. Vanuatu does not 
have personal income tax. Value added tax was only introduced in 1998. Development 
mostly occurs in the capital with about 70% of the population engaged in subsistence living. 
Some experienced aid as a boomerang.xii Sustaining implementation has been an issue given 
the short-term modality of aid programs:  
It all depends on the cash flow in the country. That’s a big contributing factor in policies not 
implemented... We need to implement this decentralisation policy but there’s no budget. [VPS.5] 
To get government services to all 80 islands involved huge costs. Most of the services and budget are 
centralised. We are talking of a national vision yet all the minds are in Vila. [VPS.8] 
Donors are putting a lot of resources… But many people are questioning the effectiveness of the 
Paris Declaration. Because at the end of the day we just find little achievements. So most say its 
boomerang as only 20% is used here. So in the mind of a ni-Vanuatu, it’s not about how much you 
give but how much you use it for. [VPS.7] 
Often we do something for a while and that’s it. But continuing it so it will have an impact is the real 
issue. Because a lot of these changes aren’t overnight. But often when the money runs out, it stops. 
It’s not giving it enough time to be part of their lives, for them to do it. The issue of longevity of 
keeping it going is often the difficulty. [VPS.1]          
4.3.3.5. Translation of policy to community 
Previous reforms have focused mainly on ‘planning’ in public administration. What was 
limited is the actual work of determining how high level plans can be operationalised, 
monitored, and evaluated in the normal system of functioning within a small PIC. 
Measurement of reforms was mostly about outputs, yet without looking at how policy 
change could be built into the fabric of society. That task has been challenging given the 
short-term modality of aid programs/projects, and where policy (implementation) as a 
process often ended once a project finished, whereas achieving change from a reform is long-
term. Policy functions were recently established as part of the CRP and capacity for M&E 
                                                                            
xii Aid money mostly returned to donor countries (see sections 8.5.2 and 8.5.1.2). 
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remained a significant developmental need:  
The approach to policy must not be something just to cover, but part of building what is there and 
understand it. The difficulty with the aid coming in is we put it in but the context is not understood… 
Projects are for three-five years—that’s not enough to change attitudes. So after the project, it hasn’t 
had any impact on people and society... In the next five years, we do the same thing… under a 
different name… Our people have got used to their way of life for years… To expect change isn’t 
easy—building it into the social fabric already there… So if the change brought to them isn’t enough 
to influence it just dies out. For example, the concept of schooling isn’t new. But how we apply it at 
home is different—because people come together in a Nakamal or groups… But we have taken all of 
that out and put them in this little thing called ‘school’... Quite often, the school is detached from the 
community, instead of being part of the community, the school is part of itself. So the kids go to school 
and learn different things they find it hard to apply when they go home. [VPS.9] 
An M&E unit had just set up this year in the PM’s office. We need indicators to tell whether this 
policy has been implemented, or not. That’s missing in most policies. [VPS.6] 
4.4. Summary of findings  
Based on the narrative of evidence presented in the preceding sections, Table 4.12 
summarises key findings in terms of propositions emerging from Vanuatu. Chapter eight 
discusses these findings further, in comparison with findings from Samoa, the Solomon 
Islands and the Region (see Appendix H), and against existing literature (in chapter two): 
Stage/category Key findings or propositions 
Initiation and adoption of 
policy 
1. The origin of public policy is dominated by political and 
foreign actors. 
2. Policies emerging from society are limited. 
3. Adoption of policy is political. Political interests and 
legitimisation play a major part on policy consideration, 
consensus and stability. 
Formulation of policy 4. Policy development is largely top-down, shaped by ideas 
and models of donor countries and are written by consultants 
without proper consultation and involvement of civil 
society.  
5. Evidence-based policy is limited, more often espoused than 
practised. There is no proper process of formulation; it is ad 
hoc, reactive and inconsistent.   
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6. Constructions of policy are influenced by multiple 
intertwined beliefs (culture, religion, politics, colonialism, 
education, donor countries and the global policy system). 
Written policies are largely influenced by the last two while 
the practices are strongly influenced by the first three which 
receive insufficient attention in formal processes. 
7. There is no consistent understanding of policy. References 
are often made to policies as documents manifested at 
different levels and scope shaped by multiple influences of 
both the domestic and global policy systems. 
Implementation of policy 8. Limited implementation is a reflection of policy and how 
they were put into place. There is little policy understanding 
and ownership and translation on the ground.  
9. Reforms over the years have produced plans with little 
implementability with regards to Vanuatu’s context. 
Implementation issues largely concern the complex 
political-social dimensions of society and development 
status. 
10. The key interconnected factors influencing policy 
implementation (and the whole process) are leadership, 
stakeholders support and feedback, policy ownership, 
capacity and the interplay of aid politics. 
Policy process as a whole 11. Contextual factors (geographical, social, historical and 
development status) have a significant influence on the 
practices of public policy and status of development. 
12. The concept of public policy and its notion of serving the 
public interest are not well understood. Isolation, education 
level, lack of policy discourse and access to quality 
information largely contribute to such limited understanding.  
13. Society needs to have collective ownership of government 
requiring a better understanding of the state and its role in 
public policy. 
Table 4.12: Key findings emerging from Vanuatu 
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CHAPTER 5: POLICY PROCESSES IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter analyses Solomon Islands’ policy processes based on patterns emerging from 
participant narratives (see Appendix E), documentary analyses, xiii  and participant 
observation. The research was conducted in accordance with the methodology outlined in 
chapter three. Background on the Solomon Islands is provided in section 1.2. A total of 34 
participants (see Table 3.3) shared their experiences and observations of the three policy 
cases (see Table 3.2) and how public policies were generally initiated, formulated and 
implemented in the Solomon Islands. Section 5.2 examines the policy cases while Section 
5.3 describes the general patterns of policy processes. Section 5.4 summarises key findings 
emerging from the Solomon Islands. 
5.2. The policy cases  
Solomon Islands’ policy cases are the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), 
Constituency Development Fund (CDF) and Public Service Improvement Program (PSIP), 
highlighting critical factors across their policy processes. The emphasis of examining these 
policies is to determine critical factors at play in the initiation, formulation and 
implementation processes, and that have contributed to the actual results (see section 1.1.2). 
5.2.1. The TRC 
5.2.1.1. Background  
The TRC was set up by the Solomon Islands government (SIG) following persistent requests 
from civil society groups (namely the Solomon Islands Christian Association and Civil 
society Network), for a fact finding commission to look into the causes of the 1998-2003 
tension (the ‘tension’). The Solomon Islands is still recovering from this tension which led 
to a breakdown in governance and suffering amongst its people. Fundamental public policy 
challenges confronting the Solomon Islands lie at the heart of the tension, shaping ongoing 
and future development efforts. Examining the TRC provides a rich comparative 
                                                                            
xiii Participant narrative extracts are indented and italicised whilst quotes from documents are also indented but non-
italicised. 
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understanding of those challenges.  
The TRC was costed at US$3,029,886 in donor funding (European Union, UNDP, AusAID 
and NZAID) and SBD14,840,336 in local government funding (TRC, 2012, p.1228). It 
started in April 2009 when Parliament passed the TRC Act 2008 (SIG, 2008c) and completed 
in February 2012 upon submission of its final report (TRC, 2012) to government. The report 
detailed the TRC’s work in meeting its objective: ‘to promote national unity and 
reconciliation by engaging all stakeholders in the reconciliation process, by discovering and 
helping to understand what happened in the tensions and why’ (TRC, 2012, p.9). To achieve 
this objective, the TRC was to: 
 ‘Examine the patterns of human rights abuses and intervene in synergy and co-operation 
with other initiatives and strategies being implemented in the process of reconciliation 
and peace-building in the country;  
 Investigate and fully report on the root causes of the tensions, human rights and 
international humanitarian law violations and abuses which occurred and those 
responsible for them, whether government, groups or individuals, as well as the role of 
internal and external factors in the conflict;  
 Report on the raid on police armouries and the destruction or damage done to public 
property; and 
 Work to restore the human dignity of victims and promote reconciliation by allowing 
victims to tell their stories about the violations and abuses suffered and providing for 
perpetrators to relate their experiences, creating a climate fostering constructive 
exchange between victim and perpetrator’. (TRC, 2012, p.9) 
Understanding the TRC requires an understanding of the tension. The tension was rooted in 
issues concerning the historical concentration of development and political power in 
Guadalcanal (where the capital of Honiara is situated) since colonial times. Within the 
Solomon Islands’ imbalanced changing social and economic environment, anxieties about 
land, development and identity fermented resentments amongst Guadalcanal people 
(Gualés), mostly towards Malaitans who settled and worked around Guadalcanal. Gualés’ 
grievances were mostly about land ownership, state government, benefits distribution from 
Guadalcanal resource exploitation, halts to internal migration and compensation for the 
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killing of some Gualés years ago. These crystallised into ‘the bona fide demands of the 
indigenous people of Guadalcanal’, first presented to the government in October 1978 (three 
months into independence) and then re-submitted in 1988 and 1999 but which have not been 
fully addressed (TRC, 2012, p.54):  
Because of the centralised system, you see all development centralised… people moving into inner 
parts of customary lands by force… claiming these are theirs. People here alerted every government 
to listen to their demands. They said ‘please listen to us, you are killing our people, spoiling our 
lands, not respecting our customs, you think we are silent people and you move boundaries. Move 
back to your provinces, give us state government so we could benefit more, give us compensation for 
20 people you killed in our lands’. But the government kept closing its ears. So they opted for trouble. 
They started forcing people to move on from Guadalcanal. That was how the tension started and 
somehow it escalated to confrontation. [TRC-M.1]   
The tension emerged in late 1998 and led to the eviction of about 30% of Guadalcanal’s 
population (TRC, 2012, p.337). This epitomised Gualés’ dissatisfaction with the 
government’s lack of response to their grievances. Underpinning them were issues 
concerning nation building and development since independence that successive 
governments had failed to address. Addressing them remained a complex task in a 
fragmented society; a society that former PM Mamaloni portrayed as a ‘nation conceived 
but never born’ (Crocombe & Tuza, 1992, p.14) and one in which self-independence was 
said to be given rather than fought for. Political leaders have manipulated local people’s 
limited understanding of what political power entails in a nation-state governance system for 
personal advantage: 
We got 34 years since independence and they haven’t changed the constitution or anything. [SIPS.2] 
Solomon Islands was made independent without the majority knowing what that entailed. They didn’t 
fight for independence. It was just given to us. People don’t know what political power is. Most are 
illiterate about these things. So the greedy people capitalise on that. During elections whoever tells 
the best lies wins. That’s a big problem and that’s where corruption starts. [SIPS.13] 
The tension and subsequent riots (Radio NZ, 2014, May 21; Spiller, 2006, April 21) 
expressed how people felt about the government and its public policy. Evident from these 
conflicts was a type of development that had bred corruption, encouraged dependency, 
damaged the social fabric, and deprived the people of the living standards they believed they 
deserved from resource exploitation. Many locals also believed that if the government 
continued in failing to address these issues at the root, then conflicts would continue:    
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Culture held the people together and the social fabric was strong that if you do this you get punished. 
It’s no longer the case. The social fabrics have been damaged, corrupted so much by what we make 
of the economic situation... A simple example is when you drive along Honiara you see people 
opening car doors spitting out. You see youths standing around eating betel nuts... The peace we now 
experience is on the surface. Very fragile. Last week there was a shooting on the Weather Coast… 
by a logger and was to do with land. Land is the core issue at the tension but left unresolved. If we 
aren’t careful we are going to explode again. [SIPS.8] 
The tension saw criminal activities by armed groups of militants (Guadalcanal Revolutionary 
Army, Malaita Eagle Force, etc.) and retaliation by police joint forces that resulted in the 
killing of about 200 and displacement of around 35,000 people. Abduction, torture, pillage, 
sexual violence (mostly against young girls), and loss and destruction of personal and public 
property were other crimes. The impact was not only social-political-economic, but also 
physiological in its dimensions (TRC, 2012). Truths about the tension were unknown until 
the TRC:  
This is where the TRC went in and got stories… The stories are very bad. There was rape and murder 
and these people are walking free. A lot of kids couldn’t continue schooling. They were raped. They 
were forced to marry… These children are traumatised for the rest of their lives… This police joint 
operation went around just enjoying themselves. A lot of these stories aren’t known. [SIPS.16] 
While often called ‘ethnic tension’, the involvement of criminal activities and material 
interests indicated that it was much more than an ethnic polarisation between the Gualés and 
Malaitans. Spillover effects onto other islands, and a government unable to provide law and 
order, indicated that it involved deliberate manipulation, power competition, and corruption 
amongst political elites behind the scene (Dinnen, 2002):  
The government made the coup… A lot of the violations took place under this Police-Malaitan 
militants’ joint force. They took advantage of the opportunity to be extreme. It was inhumane. [TRC-
M.2] 
With the arrival of the Australia-led Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands 
(RAMSI) in July 2003, the tension gradually came to an end. Within the need to bring peace, 
healing and reconciliation, the idea for a TRC was advocated. The following sections 
examine the TRC’s policy process, highlighting factors attributing to its success.  
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5.2.1.2. Initiation 
Civil society campaigning and lobbying pressured the government to initiate the TRC. 
Political leadership also supported the TRC initiation: 
The TRC idea came from civil society. They pressurised the government and the public gave their 
full support for TRC… saying this is the only option to mend relationships and go back to peace. 
Finally the government was convinced. Ati Uale (Member of Parliament) who was with civil society 
came back to government and they got him the model for TRC. [TRC-M.3] 
The nature of the issues concerning the tension signifies the role of civil society in peace 
building, a process such as the TRC relevant to the Solomon Islands’ turmoil and cultural 
dimension:  
RAMSI came and formed this Peace Monitoring Council to monitor RAMSI. The Council was made 
up mainly of women… These women and church leaders campaigned for a TRC establishment. Due 
to the culture of the people, it sort of demanded that when such things happen they have to do 
reconciliation. [SIPS.8] 
5.2.1.3. Formulation 
The formulation process of the TRC (its mandate, policies, programs and operationalisation) 
was participatory involving civil society, government and international actors. This process 
involved two key stages: 
Stage 1: TRC as a policy idea (2000–2006). The TRC originated from peace building work 
already undertaken by the Solomon Islands’ Christian Association and Civil Society 
Network who lobbied for the TRC formation from the early 2000s. A series of interactive 
processes established support for the TRC and its modalities.  
 A Solomon Islands Christians’ Association Peace Committee engaged in peace 
advocacy researched into a TRC establishment involving study visits to Africa and 
Timor Leste to examine similar TRCs;  
 A consultative committee assessed and then confirmed wider support for the TRC;  
 These civil society groups formulated a TRC concept paper approved by Cabinet and 
Parliament;  
 The Ministry of National Unity, Reconciliation and Peace, established in 2006, took 
over TRC functions previously undertaken by the Peace Monitoring Council since 
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2000; and   
 PM Sikua’s Grand Coalition for Change government took up peace and reconciliation 
as a priority in a policy statement. (SIG, 2006, p.4; TRC, 2012, p.1187): 
We wanted to give chances to everyone; victims, perpetuators, ex-combatants, children and women 
who were involved in the tension to come up. The policy is to reconcile everyone. There was a policy 
statement to work on a forgiveness period. [TRC-M.1] 
Stage 2: TRC instrumentalisation (2007–2009). This stage was the TRC formalisation 
involving the following:  
 A Steering Committee of external experts and respected members from every sector 
was tasked with the TRC establishment. Consultation on the TRC Bill further validated 
strong support for TRC;  
 A National Selection Committee, mandated by the TRC Act and chaired by the Chief 
Justice, had membership from every sector and was tasked with the selection of (Truth 
and Reconciliation) Commissioners;  
 Two Commissioners were non-nationals (Sophia Macher (Peru) and Ratu Joni 
Madraiwiwi (Fiji)) and three were nationals (Sam Ata (Chairman), Caroline Laore 
(Western Province), and George Kejoa who was later replaced by Kamilo Teke 
(Guadalcanal)); and  
 Commissioners’ selection involved the National Selection Committee calling for 
public nominations, working with the UN office on non-national nominations, and 
raising awareness over the importance of nominations comprising persons of integrity, 
credibility and competence. (TRC, 2012): 
It was a long process involving lots of consultation. An overseas person assisted in formulating the 
TRC Act. People were called in to look at the draft before it became a bill... The selection committee 
went to the provinces and said ‘we are looking for people not involved in politics to help us’. [TRC-
M.2] 
There was wide support from the international community. International experiences were 
deployed given limited local experiences in TRC. The localisation of these experiences was 
evident in the inclusion of community actors and an experienced commissioner from Fiji. 
The UNDP local office provided a project coordinating and supporting mechanism (called 
the ‘International Support Facility’ (TRC, 2012, p.1198) amongst donors:  
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Donors came together and put in a pool of funds to support the TRC. TRC falls under my programs 
here so UNDP was given the funds to administer the whole program. [SIDA.2]  
TRC was the first in the Pacific. We sent somebody to look at how they did it in Africa… We were 
lucky to have Sofia and Joni who were involved in the Peru TRC and reconciliations in Fiji. Our 
local commissioners were committed but they weren’t trained in this. [TRC-M.3] 
5.2.1.4. Implementation  
The TRC’s work involved research, investigation, counselling, awareness raising and 
reconciliation. This work was significant for preventing future conflicts. Here procedures 
had to be established to guide staff. Given the sensitive nature of the issues surrounding the 
tension and involvement of previous governments, civil society played a critical role in 
implementation:  
They had all these documents on the whole plan of TRC and how it was to work. They had counselling 
sessions, closed hearings for ex-combatants and high level people like Member of Parliaments. 
[SIDA.2]  
The policy was the government does the reconciliation. But that was difficult as government was a 
party to the tension. When government people went out, the people weren’t responding. So we used 
civil society organisations and it worked far better than the government trying to do it - to encompass 
all nine provinces as future conflicts can arise anytime anywhere. [SIPS.13] 
Leadership was provided by the TR Commissioners. About 167 total staff (field workers, 
volunteers, experts, etc.) were employed and provided with relevant trainings in 
implementing TRC activities to ensure that the work reached the grassroots. (TRC, 2012). 
The process was sufficiently confrontational and traumatising for some not to continue:  
We were confronted by people. They said ‘who are you, you think you can solve problems in Solomon 
Islands, where’s the government all these years?’… What they said was true. But we slowly got thick 
skins and continued. The expatriates were traumatised and went home. [TRC-M.1] 
We were doing reconciliations, workshops and training for the chiefs and youths in the hope that by 
establishing these conflict resolution methods they would do it amongst themselves. [SIPS.16] 
Some people were reluctant to come forth in the process of truth telling and reconciliation. 
Yet public awareness and utilising the potential of community actors facilitated people’s 
understanding, trust and participation in the process: 
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They were reluctant at first. But because there was awareness people were prepared to have 
negotiations within their communities. Prior to any public hearings father Sam Ata and his team 
visited the provinces and did consultations so people were aware before the TRC arrivals. [SIDA.1] 
Guadalcanal has to reconcile with the government and Malaita but these haven’t been done as we 
can’t reconcile people unless they want to. So we had to use the faith organisations and women as 
they were instrumental in making people come forward. This is the best way because there’s progress 
with this… Not everybody came forward but they got a good number. [SIPS.8] 
There was some conflict of ideologies underpinning TRC activities, such as reconciling and 
forgiving versus prosecution. In the broad sense, conflicts such as these centred on the 
ideological differences underpinning modern versus traditional public policy settings:  
Parliament passed an amnesty to forgive those involved in the tension… The Ministry has worked on 
a forgiveness bill. But our thinking is they shouldn’t be forgiven. So we are still talking with the PM 
in throwing out this bill. Even with that amnesty, people were still prosecuted under the TRC mandate. 
The information collected is used as evidence in court. [SIPS.13] 
The biggest challenge was the political element. Some politicians obstructed the TRC 
process given their involvement in the tension; this was further demonstrated in the non-
release of the TRC report after submission to the PM in February 2012. The report editor, 
however, leaked it to the news media:  
We had lots of hiccups because people don’t want to get exposed. Prominent leaders… are anti-TRC 
because it did dig up what they did. So the PM is under pressure because of this report. This is the 
biggest battle we fight. How can you weed out corruption because you never hear a real story when 
these people are in police custody? We cannot fully account for what happened because it’s high 
corruption…. the politicians and high ranked police officers were involved in the tension. [SIPS.16] 
The PM has refused to pass on the Report to Parliament… claimed that its release will re-ignite 
‘ethnic tension’... I don’t believe this. The Report is very accurate… gives proper recognition to the 
victims of the conflict whose stories should be heard… I am convinced that the TRC Report, as an 
exercise in truth telling, painful as the recollection may… will help bring… lasting justice, peace, 
reconciliation and unity that Solomon Islands so badly needs. ("Solomons Truth And 
Reconciliation Report leaked by editor," 2013, June 29) 
For the TRC to work it had to take into consideration different cultures. Following a 
standardised approach was difficult given the cultural diversity involved. The nature of the 
TRC work indicated the impracticality of following a strictly prescribed process:        
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We asked them ‘what is your culture when you preside at, or over a meeting or reconciliation’. So 
they said ‘you make a custom like this…’ So there was a bit of culture, custom and wisdom. We didn’t 
have a standard. We respected whatever location… There was no straightforward policy that says 
you go like this but it was very much about how you program yourself in the process. We didn’t have 
interferences in the process of respecting culture. [TRC-M.2]     
That’s the only way you go about implementing anything in the Pacific. You have to do it in their 
culture… traditional ways that you need to address before entering into anything. It’s different for 
Melanesians as there’s no one culture. So it’s got to be different types of approach. Although you 
have these documented policies, there are always these unwritten ones. [SIDA.1] 
Some activities (e.g. exhumation) were beyond the scope of TRC in terms of its capacity, 
resources and timeframe. This, and further reconciliation comprise ongoing work:  
About 200 were killed. We exhumed only four. People are still waiting for the remains of their 
relatives buried in foreign lands. It’s a lot of work. We have no qualifications for this job. We got 
overseas expertise and were very expensive. This exercise is left open. [SIPS.13] 
5.2.1.5. Results 
Peace and reconciliation remain a long-term change process given the impact of the tension. 
The TRC was only a start to that process. That a lot of people came forth, told their stories, 
and were counselled and reconciled, meant that the TRC added value to national 
reconciliation, something essential to nation building and the Solomon Islands state of 
national affairs. Contributing to this was the TRC process built from within the local context. 
International experiences were utilised, but adjusted to local conditions through participatory 
mechanisms:   
It was challenging but a successful project. This was the first time for the Pacific to have such a 
commission for a post-conflict country but had impact on the people. There were families able to 
forgive each other. Although there were organisations doing similar things the TRC was on a 
formalised basis. Donors provided support but were totally hands off. [SIDA.1] 
The TRC was seen as by the people for the people. It was supported by the donors as getting around 
Solomon Islands is difficult. They used a wide range of people from different communities who know 
who to approach in the provinces. That was why it worked. [SIPS.8] 
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5.2.1.6. Key factors  
Table 5.1 summarises the critical factors of the TRC’s policy process:   
 
5.2.2. The CDF  
5.2.2.1. Background  
During fieldwork in the Solomon Islands, the CDF was consistently voiced as a key concern. 
Examining the CDF’s policy process brought out key issues affecting the Solomon Islands 
overall public policy setting and implementation. The CDF developed originally from the 
1989 Mamaloni’s (People’s Alliance Party) Government’s Small Island Community Project 
Special Assistance Grant (SICOPSAG) (SIG, 2013f, p.6). Intended to support rural 
economic stimulation and empower provincial governments (SIG, 2008b; To'abaita 
Authority for Research & Development, 2008), the SICOPSAG and other provincial funds 
were initially managed by the Ministry of Provincial Government (Suluia, 2012, p.35). It 
then evolved in nomenclature (also called the Rural Development Fund, discretionary fund 
or slush funds) and in its management and methods of allocation. 
Table 5.1: TRC key factors 
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In 1993, the Hilly Billy government abolished the SICOPSAG and replaced it with the Rural 
Development Fund (SIG, 2013f), entrenching and increasing the Fund’s value from 
SBD100,000 to SBD200,000 per constituency (Alaisa, 1997; Harry, 2014).xiv This largely 
contributed to the re-election of 61% of Members of Parliament (Fono, 2007) in the 1993 
election. In 1997, Mamaloni‘s National Unity, Reconciliation and Progressive Government 
reintroduced the SICOPSAG and also increased the CDF based on constituencies’ 
population size (instead of the previous standard amount). In 2007, the CDF was transferred 
to Member of Parliaments discretion and management under a newly created Ministry of 
Rural Development. Constituencies also increased from 38 to 50 (SIG, 2013f). CDF 
allocation has increased every year; from SBD600,000 in 2007 to SBD6 million in 2013 
(Anti-corruption Network Solomon Islands, 2013).  
Other than it being a patronage mechanism, there was no specific policy on the CDF. 
Government documents and Parliamentarians’ speeches however advocated ‘rural 
development’ as the rationale. Member of Parliament Oti in a parliamentary speech on the 
29 August 2008 stated that ‘rural development became a specific policy target by the then 
People’s Alliance Party Government’ and every successive government has taken rural 
development as the basis for the CDF (SIG, 2008b). Other labels such as ‘bottom-up’, ‘rural 
growth centres’, ‘people centred development’ and ‘empowerment of the people’ were used 
in every coalition government policy statement (SIG, 2006, 2008a, 2010a):  
That’s the signatory policy of government. That’s what they preach to get into power, to create rural 
development. They will create rural development centres with infrastructure like buying centres, 
banks and all services farmers and people can access. [SIPS.10]   
In March 2013, the CDF Bill (SIG, 2013d) was passed despite public opposition. A petition 
organised by Transparency Solomon Islands (TSI) was signed by more than 2,000 people 
and presented to Parliament including a public protest at Parliament house (SIG, 2013g; TSI, 
2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d). Opposition also came through the local and social media, plus 
public hearings and submissions made to the National Parliament of Solomon Islands Bills 
and Legislation Committee inquiry into the Bill (SIG, 2013e, 2013f). Concerns regarding 
the Bill were:  
 The CDF is flawed, has no basis and since its introduction development and service 
delivery have not improved; 
                                                                            
xiv SBD means Solomon Islands Dollar. 
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 The Bill does not set out any governance mechanisms for the CDF but will legitimise 
corruption which has been endemic over the years;  
 The CDF distracts Member of Parliaments from their public policy making role;   
 The Bill is unconstitutional, violates the separation of powers in government, and 
further weakens administrative capacity at national and provincial levels;  
 Huge financial resources are given to few individuals depriving the role of community 
leadership in the development processes; and  
 The Bill’s preparation was rushed and lacked consultation. 
This petition was defeated with only 10 Member of Parliaments voting for it (SIG, 2013g). 
The Bill was passed without any consideration of the concerns raised by participants during 
this study’s 2012 fieldwork. Parliamentary speeches and debates on the Bill cannot be found 
on the Solomon Islands’ parliamentary website.  
5.2.2.2. Initiation  
Participants asserted that the CDF was an idea local politicians copied from PNG’s ‘electoral 
development funds’ introduced in the 1970s. The take-up of CDF under different names in 
PNG, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu mirrored what was happening in other countries 
including the US (Baskin, 2010). At least 23 countries have adopted and are considering 
CDFs (van Zyl, 2010). Every government had continued the CDF and increased its 
appropriation despite public complaints:    
It’s a borrowed concept from PNG but the fund is from Taiwan. [SIPA.9]  
If you read the paper people are complaining about the CDF… Before the recent election there was 
a public outcry that it must be shifted back to Ministries. [SIPS.14] 
5.2.2.3. Formulation  
There has not been any formulation of the CDF. In the absence of a written policy there were 
no articulated objectives about what the CDF was specifically intended to achieve. Current 
practices indicated that the CDF’s purpose for rural development was counterproductive. 
The CDF has transformed from an original intention of providing just a small fund into a 
patronage system delivering services on behalf of politicians and their supporters:   
The Bill does not comply with Standing Order 43(7) which requires an explanatory memorandum 
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setting out the financial impacts if a bill will involve expenditure of public funds. Without a policy, 
a study or wide consultation, it is not possible to make such an assessment for this Bill. (TSI, 2013d) 
The CDF is expanded from its initial intention… for Member of Parliaments to support constituents 
when they ask for anything. But it’s being developed into a delivery mechanism of services. [SIPS.6]  
Narratives of justifications included ‘empowering Member of Parliaments’, ‘no 
development in the constituency’, and ‘nothing is going down’ to the rural people. Others 
loosely mentioned in Member of Parliaments speeches and government documents included: 
‘bringing development closer to the people’; ‘for Member of Parliaments to deliver services 
to their people’ (Fono, 2007); ‘avoid having Member of Parliaments behaving like beggars 
at the foreign missions in Honiara’; ‘ease the mounting pressure from constituents by their 
demands upon their Member of Parliaments’ (Alaisa, 1997); and ‘this is the only fund that 
goes down to rural people’ (SIG, 2008b):  
That stemmed from people saying all the money is spent in Honiara and nothing is going down. So 
the politicians say to address this issue by empowering Member of Parliaments with funds so it will 
take only two days to reach constituencies. This double with the fact there’s no development in 
constituencies. [SIPS.2] 
The CDF management was at Member of Parliaments’ discretion. The Ministry of Rural 
Development assisted in the CDF operationalisation after Member of Parliaments’ directives, 
provincial governments having no role in the process. The guidelines given below for the 
CDF management were procedures loosely adopted, being largely understood as practices 
rather than set policies, until the CDF Act 2013 came into place. This initially provided: 
 The CDF allocation is in accordance with the 50 constituencies or Member of 
Parliaments;  
 Member of Parliaments to develop their Constituency Development Plans as the basis 
for funds allocation and disbursement; 
 Member of Parliaments to appoint their Constituency Development Officer or 
committees (political appointees) to assist in CDF planning and implementation;  
 Member of Parliaments to approve the funds which are then deposited into Member of 
Parliaments’ Constituency Development Accounts. Member of Parliaments and 
Constituency Development Officers are signatories of these accounts;  
 Ministries to assist Constituency Development Officers on technical aspects of 
implementation; and  
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 The CDF divided into six funds. Four were specific (Rural Livelihoods Fund, 
Millennium Development Fund, Micro Projects Fund, and Water and Sanitation Fund) 
while two (Rural Support to CDF and Support to Rural Development Fund) were not 
specifically targeted, their purpose being at the Member of Parliament discretion. 
The CDF Act 2013 legislated for all of the above arrangements except the last. While the 
budget specified different funds, it did not specify allocations in terms of programs/projects, 
activities, costs and implementers (SIG, 2013c). These requirements were designated 
Constituency Development Plans, but most Member of Parliaments lacked such plans:  
If you look at the Ministry of Rural Development’s budget there are no activities there. It’s just 
project figures and titles. Most funds end up in the hands of Member of Parliaments. [SIPS.12] 
A lot don’t have Constituency Development Plans. They are working with Constituency Development 
Officers on whatever they want to do. [SIPA.14]  
It is already in Member of Parliaments accounts so there are no more requisitions, no more 
vouchers…if you want to hand out cash the Member of Parliament can hand out cash.[SIPS.5] 
5.2.2.4. Implementation  
Few Member of Parliaments have utilised the funds for projects, most ending up captured in 
the hands of Member of Parliaments and supporters for their own purposes—for 
campaigning, free hand outs and consumables:  
That CDF is where politicians get those funds. So we have 50 millionaires in the Solomon Islands. 
[SIPS.10] 
The reality is that the population that touches that money is very small. But how they talk is the entire 
system, on behalf of their constituencies. [SIPS.7]     
They did in a way that it’s a fund allocated purposively for constituencies’ development activities. 
But a small portion is used for capital projects or investments. Most are for consumables and all 
sorts of things for supporters. [SIP.2] 
There was little transparency, accountability or equity in the CDF management and 
distribution. Compliance with these principles largely depended on the trustworthiness of 
Member of Parliaments. Procedures required were meaningless as they have not been 
followed:  
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I won my first and second elections. I got knocked out in the third. I couldn’t compete with the amount 
of money that was needed. But the CDF helped a lot. That looked after issues in my four policy areas 
I campaigned on… My CDF came to my account. I approved the acquisitions. My Constituency 
Development Officer had to check and sign off. But even then there were many problems… You have 
to retire your first allocation before you go for your next CDF. The accounting officer is the 
Permanent Secretary, not the Member of Parliament. If there is misuse of funds, the Leadership Code 
Commission investigates, but usually nothing is ever audited. [SIP.1]     
Our officers haven’t seen any single form (for projects) but this is what they want. What else can we 
do? When cabinet makes a decision you can’t refuse. It’s difficult. [SIPS.5]      
The CDF was a classic case of the separation of functions in government breaking down. 
Politicians and their officers were directly involved in implementation, bypassing 
accountability to parliament and the public service’s implementation role. There was 
ignorance of why such a separation of functions is critical to good governance: 
The PM is saying we aren’t going to put money through the government. We are going to give it to 
the politicians to hand it out. There’s an assumption there this is a more effective way of delivering 
public policy than using the bureaucracy… It’s an improper model, a complete breakdown of the 
separate roles of the bureaucracy and politicians. [RAMSI-M.2] 
In one way it’s good because we struggle to do it the normal way… We have technical officers 
running around doing procurement but in this way we give that load to Constituency Development 
Officers. [SIPS.12]  
What’s happening is that the PM keeps on having votes of no confidence. One came up last night. So 
he’s hoping that by giving politicians more money they will continue to vote for him. [SICS-M.2] 
There are various justifications for political interference in CDF administration: lack of 
political trust in public servants, inefficiencies in using the bureaucratic system, and using 
Member of Parliaments and their officers as a more efficient means of delivering services:  
Politicians thought public servants would get the money for themselves if funds are paid through 
Ministries. [SIPS.2]  
Member of Parliaments want something to happen during the four years but the public service 
machinery is difficult to use. [SIPA.18] 
Member of Parliaments decided to follow this way because they said ministries are too slow in 
mobilising funds. [SIPS.17] 
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The functions and capacity of public administration and the provincial systems were further 
weakened through CDF practices. Huge funds were given to a few individuals having little 
capacity in management or technical areas of implementation:  
I spoke to PM Philip two months ago and he said Member of Parliaments are going to receive 
SBD9million in their accounts. Normally that money goes to the Ministry of Rural Development. So 
there’s no more jobs for that Ministry. [SIPS.6] 
Last year’s budget identified a number of programs allocated to the Permanent Secretary of Women 
and Youths. Just before that meeting, the PM gave instructions to give the youths’ allocation to the 
Member of Parliament discretionary funds. The question is do Member of Parliaments have qualified 
people to run these things. All they have is a Constituency Development Officer but what 
qualifications do these fellas have. Most are wantoks of Member of Parliaments. They have qualified 
people in ministries yet these fellas do the distribution. This is why there isn’t much rural 
development because the preference is determined by this man who sits here. [SICS-M.1] 
The CDF had the largest budget allocation and thus impacted significantly on overall public 
resource allocation. In the 2013 development budget, the Ministry of Rural Development 
had the largest allocation (22%) compared to the other 29 ministries (SIG, 2013c). About 
38% of that 22% allocation comprised donor funds, Taiwan being the main contributor. That 
allocation however did not fully reflect actual CDF expenditures as Ministries’ budgets were 
often diverted into CDFs and ‘remained outside the auditors’ range’ (Bennett, 2002). Aid 
support towards the CDF became a contentious issue in the donor community with civil 
society calling for a ‘general aid freeze’ to the Solomon Islands as corruption had become 
out of control (Pacific Islands Report, 2014, March 9):   
The government is looking at $500 million for development projects. Its taxpayers’ money and 
Taiwan. My ministry (of rural development) alone got half of this budget and most will go to the 
Member of Parliaments. [SIPS.12] 
This year the politicians saw the cocoa and coconut budget for rural development and wanted that 
as well to be deposited into their accounts. [SIPS.5] 
It’s about SBD5.5 million per Member of Parliament. My trouble is whether this money is SIG or 
Taiwan. This is a print out of where the tourism fund is going to. I would say 1/3 of that money goes 
to Member of Parliaments’ relatives. We put bilateral money into renewable energy, tourism and 
cocoa rehabilitation and I had to write to the government we can’t keep putting money in if you are 
taking it out. This is a big problem here. [RAMSI-M.1] 
Continuous diversions of funds intended for the implementation of Ministries’ programs and 
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service delivery suggests that the bulk of the Solomon Islands’ fiscal capability has been 
taken up by CDFs. Conventry’s (2009) analysis of the Solomon Islands’ budget processes 
indicated that public policy lies in these CDFs, rather than any formal pronouncements, 
priorities or plans:  
From the Cabinet agenda, the only thing I see is this trend of that funds. If there are Ministries’ 
projects submitted for approval and there are funds, Cabinet will divert them to CDFs. [SIPS.11]   
We see the budget as a hindrance, most projects’ funds that should touch the lives of people are 
diverted to the 50 constituency accounts. [SIPS.7]  
Monitoring of CDF projects was limited. Although some politicians have been imprisoned 
for corruption, Member of Parliaments continued to misuse CDFs. Some public servants 
devised odd mechanisms to safeguard against being criminalised for CDF practices. For 
instance, the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock signed an agreement with the Member 
of Parliament, West Honiara Constituency, for the transfer of SBD350,000 from the 
Ministry’s budget into the Member of Parliament’s constituency account. The contract for 
this agricultural livelihood project was signed by the Member of Parliament as the 
‘implementing part’ representing West Honiara Constituency and the Ministry’s Permanent 
Secretary representing ‘SIG’ (SIG, 2012b):  
There’s absolutely no monitoring. The money goes to Member of Parliaments but they say it goes to 
the operators, then that’s the end of implementation… We have a good number of politicians in jail 
for misuse of these funds... Based on the things I see, some will be on trial in years from now. [SIPS.6]  
Most participants see leadership as the core issue in terms of politicians using CDF practices 
over the years to politicise the whole public policy system for personal advantage: 
It’s the absence of strong leaders… And maybe it goes back to the culture of the people where they 
are aligned through their wantok. Public servants are aligned with politicians, so the public service 
is so politicised. This CDF is making it worse. They are legislating it for their purpose. [SIP.2]      
This is policy free. This is just about handing out money…. It’s undermining public policy by this 
business. This is not a culture of the big man. It’s the big men standing between traditions and the 
state, manipulating both. [RAMSI-M.1]  
5.2.2.5. Results  
CDF has not been formally evaluated for its impact. Nevertheless, evidence from participant 
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narratives and documentary analysis revealed that the CDF has done more harm than good, 
undermining public policy, governance and development:  
On the whole, CDFs are not delivering public goods. They are used for outboard motors, funeral 
needs, etc., which are private, not public goods. [RAMSI-M.2]     
Rather than reinforcing an empowering and developmental culture, the CDF has reinforced 
a hand-out and dependency mentality amongst people in patronage state-society 
relationships:  
Why things are the way they are is because of our political system. It keeps on creating this hand-
out mentality. Our Ministry has a lot of projects for farmers. But once the funding stops, they stop 
working. But it’s their fields... People see these projects as government, not theirs. This hand-out 
mentality ruins a lot of things… This is where we aren’t doing well because our modality of delivery 
is all over the place. The first thing is to remove that money from Member of Parliaments. But it’s 
difficult. [SIPS.4]  
The CDF and its practices have been referred to by some as a curse or evil contributing to 
corruption as a result:xv  
It’s almost evil in the sense it’s the pro-use of public money to serve the interests of politicians than 
the public interest. Every element of this CDF is a curse. It’s politicising our resources. [SIP.2]     
Our policies are informed by the rural development needs. But they don’t even have trained teachers. 
Why? The system itself and the people manning it are so corrupt that it’s a disease. [SICS-M.3]      
5.2.2.6. Key factors  
Table 5.2 summarises the critical factors of the CDF’s policy process:   
                                                                            
xv The Solomon Islands was ranked 120 (out of 182) on the 2011 Corruption Perception Index. Data unavailable for 
subsequent years. (http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/results).  
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5.2.3. The PSIP 
5.2.3.1. Background 
The PSIP was a five-year (2009-2013) program instigated by the SIG as part of RAMSI to 
rebuild the public service institutional capacity following the tension (see section 5.2.1.1). 
The PSIP’s goal was ‘to contribute to an improved capacity to deliver government services 
across the Solomon Islands’. Its purpose was ‘to strengthen human resource management 
(HRM) and so improve the delivery of government services’ (SIG-RAMSI, 2007, p.21). It 
comprised 23 outputs to be implemented within a (rolling) period of five to 10 years and 
under six components, namely:  
 ‘Change management framework, principles, policies and processes; 
 Strengthened capacity of central agencies; 
 Strengthened capacity of line agencies; 
 Strengthened human resource management in the provinces; 
 Response to emerging issues under the umbrella of an integrated public sector  
improvement program; and  
 Management of the Machinery of Government assistance’ (SIG-RAMSI, 2007, p.3).  
The PSIP offers a closer look at internal public administration and the relationship between 
local actors and RAMSI, the main foreign intervention present in the Solomon Islands for 
Table 5.2: CDF key factors 
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10 years (2003-2013). RAMSI was deployed at the request of the SIG and under the auspices 
of the Pacific Islands Forum (see section 1.2.4) ‘to restore law and order, stabilise the 
economy and repair the basic machinery of government’ under the three pillars of law and 
justice, economic governance and machinery of government. The Machinery of Government 
pillar aimed ‘to enhance the capacity of the Solomon Islands public service, ensuring it can 
deliver services more effectively’ through strengthening programs for the public service, 
Cabinet, Parliament, accountability institutions, provincial government and the electoral 
system (SIG-RAMSI, 2007, p.7).  
While public service strengthening had been on the agenda since 2003, a program was only 
formulated in 2005 with its Project Design Document approved by government in November 
2006. Implementation was to follow in 2007, but implementation only began in 2009 due to 
delays in mobilising the project team (SIG-RAMSI, 2008, p.17). Implementation went for a 
year but went on hold in 2010 to await a review. It restarted in 2011 and was ongoing during 
the 2012 fieldwork, and was due to complete in June 2013. The PSIP was costed at 
AUD$5,791,980 of funding provided by RAMSI (SIG-RAMSI, 2012).  
The 2010 review led to a significant reduction in the PSIP’s scope, focusing on just the four 
components stated shortly in the Ministry of Public Service, the central agency responsible 
for HRM functions. There was no more ‘whole of public service’ (central and provincial) 
strengthening as outlined in the 2007 Project Design Document. The rationale was that the 
Ministry of Public Service’s internal capacity first needed strengthening before it could 
similarly assist ministries and provinces. The PSIP management was thereafter brought 
under the Ministry of Public Service from an original oversight role of a multi-stakeholders 
committee. The review sought: 
 ‘Improved HRM systems and processes; 
 Expanded opportunities for individual capacity development;  
 Organisational development for improved HRM; and  
 Planning for external support beyond RAMSI’ (SIG-RAMSI, 2012, p.9). 
5.2.3.2. Initiation  
The need to rebuild the public administration was self-evident given the tension’s impact 
and where the public service was near dysfunctional. Public servants were unpaid for months, 
the payroll system had a number of ghost workers, the backlog of recruitment processes 
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reached about 300 vacancies, and phones and counter services were left unattended:  
After the tension our governance frameworks collapsed… Service delivery was zero. Officers weren’t 
secure in making decisions as guns were there… We didn’t receive our pay for months. The morale 
and those things went down. It was a sad situation and everybody realised the mistake. When RAMSI 
came, they put in place law and order, then strengthened finance and governance where the PSIP 
comes under. [SIPS.10]     
The PSIP’s starting point was the 2005 Pacific Public Service Commissioners’ Conference 
held in Fiji. This annual dialogue provided an opportunity to discuss and place reforms under 
consideration in the Solomon Islands within a regional context. Solomon Islands leaders 
participating in that conference then took up further discussion of a reform agenda with 
RAMSI (SIG-RAMSI, 2007, p.7). The critical point for initiating that agenda was the 
formation of a new government, in April 2006, that took up public service strengthening as 
its key policy (SIG, 2006, p.37).    
5.2.3.3. Formulation 
Stakeholders’ workshops conducted in November 2005 and February 2006 informed the 
2007 Project Design Document. External expertise was recruited to facilitate the PSIP 
scoping and design. A senior official from Samoa shared her experience of similar reforms 
(SIG-RAMSI, 2007, p.Annex C). The 2007 original design was complex, but it 
acknowledged that building a professional public service in the Solomon Islands was a long-
term or generational change. The difficulty in enacting transformational change in a post-
conflict context was reflected in initial lapses. Accordingly, the PSIP’s redesign from a 
complex reform into an incremental program only occurred after one year into 
implementation:  
We had workshops at the design stage and it was clear that people want to improve these services 
and put into place procedures. [SIPS.14]     
The PSIP only went for 12 months and at the end of 2009, AusAID and RAMSI became aware that 
the PSIP was too ambitious… So there was an immediate review and a redesign reducing the project 
to just four components. It was about slowing down. [RAMSI-M.4] 
It’s a generational change. It’s not like before now. Younger graduates come and don’t show much 
commitment and take instructions. [SIPS.9] 
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Part of the difficulty was a lack of local ownership. In its original stage, the PSIP operated 
largely in isolation from local actors and was driven by RAMSI. It took time for RAMSI to 
realise that this was a significant issue:  
The PSIP was driven by RAMSI people originally. We, Solomon Islanders continued to voice that no, 
you should come together, we should have tales and even to lead. [SIPS.10] 
This was a big shift… Part of the redesign was to make sure the PSIP wasn’t running as a separate 
program… So it’s much more integrated than before. It’s not good having counterparts working 
away on one project and we work on something else. Because if it’s not a priority to them, they won’t 
implement it. You might as well forget about it. I look back at my two years here and I said ‘gee, I 
was a naive adviser. I really didn’t get it’. I reckon it took us a long time to realise that. [SIC.1] 
5.2.3.4. Implementation 
Initial delays in implementation led to the loss of momentum generated during the design 
stage (SIG-RAMSI, 2008, p.17). As well, a lack of trust between locals and RAMSI 
colleagues was reflected through counterparts having little knowledge of or authority over 
PSIP resources:   
My biggest challenge is not knowing what resources are available as it’s all controlled from Lelei 
(RAMSI headquarters). The money for our program doesn’t come to the government’s consolidated 
funds. The issue is they don’t trust local people... But how can you plan and run a program when you 
don’t know what resources are there. [SIPS.10] 
A constant change of advisers also impacted negatively on sustaining trusted relationships 
and skills transfer, in a setting where absorptive capacity was already critically low:  
The whole model of aid policy in bringing in and taking out advisers on a 12 month contract isn’t a 
useful approach. [SIC.2]  
Too many short-term advisers and few are for 12 months. Mostly from Australia. Skills transfer has 
been a point of concern since RAMSI came. Most are on certain assignments so there’s limited 
emphasis on skills transfer and sustainability. It is also the absorptive capacity of Solomon Islanders 
to take on these changes, to see why we have this change. [SIPS.14] 
Understanding local cultural context, such as the importance of relationships and working 
environment, was critical to making sense of what could work in the reform process:  
It takes a long time for us, particularly Australians to understand that some things are done 
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differently in the Pacific and that’s okay. It doesn’t have to be our way. Once you can shift your mind, 
you can get to where your counterparts are coming from, and work around that on ways to deal with 
work… It helps you to be better at the job as you have some idea of what life is like for Solomon 
Islanders. Not many advisers here live like that. It’s about what works here… One of my counterparts 
said ‘us, the white fellas come in the room with the issues all listed ready to make whatever decision 
in the best interest of those issues. But the important thing for us will be leaving that room with the 
relationship intact’… After the tension public servants didn’t get paid for months so people relied on 
their wantoks. These guys haven’t forgotten that. Always on their minds I’m not going to spoil my 
relationship if I have to rely on that one day. That’s how this society works. It’s how people survive 
in this town. [SIC.1]   
Conflicts between advisers and counterparts led to non-implementation of some activities, 
hence a change of some advisers:  
I ran into conflicts with our advisers sometimes… There was a functional review in 2010 but during 
implementation there were conflicting views between the adviser and my staff… So we didn’t 
implement the functional review and we filed it away. [SIPS.17]    
We changed the adviser to the PSC Chairman from an Australian to a Fijian. And it’s working much 
better because he was a Fijian public service commissioner himself and he understands much more 
the political context of these people. [RAMSI-M.1]    
However, leadership, ownership and learning did lead to the implementation of some 
activities:  
The permanent secretaries’ contracts were taken away from the PM’s office and put under PSC to 
try and depoliticise that process. This is the first time it ever happened. We got a strong Chairman 
who wants this to work. When we got a champion like him it makes a big difference. It keeps us 
motivated. [SIPS.9]    
One thing I was given to do was the development of a Human Resource Strategy… And I could have 
done it quickly by using the same approach used many times before. I come and give a document to 
a local and he said okay. But there’s no ownership. So I was fortunate to convince AusAID and 
RAMSI that we tried something different. We picked a group of local managers and worked with 
them to develop this strategy and I was their facilitator. It took me 12 months to develop it because 
it was driven by them. Aside from the fact we came up with this product, it was the growth of the 
individuals along the way. They learnt by doing. They co-operated and created it. Because they own 
it they want it to work… This is a great example of something that is carried through to 
implementation and everybody would argue it’s because it is owned. It’s not perfect in my eyes but 
that doesn’t matter. It’s theirs. They are using it. This tells me that all those nice documents on the 
shelves are never going to get implemented. There are general orders, systems and rules that aren’t 
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complied with. Why? I’ve come to realise it’s because they were imposed at some point on places 
like the Solomon Islands and that often clashes with who we are, the values of the country we live in. 
So imposing doesn’t work. We’ve got to find other ways. [SC.1]    
Some activities were difficult to implement, needing time to mature given capacity 
constraints and a constrained reform environment. Consistent understanding of the reform 
process was critical, but this was often lacking:  
Our aim is getting these HRM functions delegated to Ministries. But we aren’t ready. We need to 
build ministries’ capacities. It will take years before we see much delegated. In fact we delegated 
discipline but Ministries don’t utilise that authority… It was the tension time. We have this bombard 
of these concepts; performance management, workforce planning, etc. and we didn’t make the rest 
of the workforce understand why we are doing these things. [SIPS.10]     
We may have the qualifications but not the experience. So we need technical assistants in some areas. 
One objective was to look into the Public Service Act but it never happen. [SIPS.3]     
The implementation of the expected outcome is always hindered by the budget, human resource 
capacity, technology and most of all the political environment. [SIPS.6]     
5.2.3.5. Results 
Based on participant narratives and PSIP documentation (SIG-RAMSI, 2012), the PSIP’s 
results were mixed. Success was seen by putting in place some HRM policies, systems and 
processes. They included the HRM strategy, a code of conduct, Human Resources Managers’ 
Forum, the Institute of Public Administration to provide public service training, and some 
improvement in the public service recruitment and selection culture. The Aurion HRM 
information system resulted in a removal of about 400 ‘ghost’ workers and an annual $2 
million saving by rectifying such anomalies:  
We are more confident in how to recruit people now than before where you just go for your wantok. 
You cannot totally rule out those elements but it’s fairer than before. People are knowledgeable 
about setting interviewing panels and things like that which is the intention of the program. [SIPS.7]     
While those directly involved in the PSIP were to some extent satisfied with the results, 
some stakeholders saw the PSIP as just tinkering with the status quo given its redesign to 
focus on the Ministry of Public Service only. To them, the opportunity was lost to address 
fundamental HRM issues facing the public service:  
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I’m satisfied with the PSIP although it could be better... We have benefited in terms of having that 
knowledge of exposure and how we approach advisers. [SIPS.10]     
There’s no reform there. They are just improving existing programs. People were thinking the PSIP 
is across the entire government. It’s not. It’s for the Ministry of Public Service only. [SIPS.6]      
That’s the worst program around. There’s a lot of sticks coming to the public service but no incentive. 
It’s all punishment and no empowerment. [SIPS.8]      
5.2.3.6. Key factors 
Table 5.3 summarises the critical factors of the PSIP’s policy process:   
 
Chapter eight further discusses key factors emerging from the Solomon Islands’ policy cases, 
in comparison with those in Samoa, Vanuatu and the Region (see Appendix G), and against 
existing literature.  
Table 5.3: PSIP key factors 
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5.3. The policy processes in general 
This section examines participants’ experiences and observations of policy processes in 
general. Their stories are analysed in accordance with the research question of how public 
policies are initiated, formulated and implemented and what are critical factors for effective 
implementation.  
5.3.1. Policy initiation  
Participants were asked where issues that became policies mostly originated. The patterns 
of the coded participant narratives in Table 5.4 show that the origins of what became public 
policy was significantly influenced by political elements (frequency of 48). Public policies 
originating from society were limited (frequency of 11). The ‘external’ limited coding 
(frequency of 11) did not mean limited external influences, but an indication that they were 
confined during RAMSI’s prolonged presence in the Solomon Islands, and when it acted as 
a kind of filter over them: 
 
Narrative extracts below illustrate what these patterns meant: 
Policies are only at the political level. When it comes to the endorsement by the people, no. [SIPS.18]  
This NCRA policy never had any public discussion. It’s only in the political circle and they refer to 
it as policy. But the word is ‘public’ and they don’t have that because they cannot be bothered talking 
public policy until they get themselves organised. This has been going on for many administrations 
that policy is the last thing to talk about after the government is formed. [SIPA.2] 
Table 5.4: Origins of public policy in the Solomon Islands 
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I apologetically joked that in this country the social contract is with RAMSI, not with government 
because RAMSI is here to keep the peace and it’s keeping the peace. [RAMSI-M.1] 
Foreign interference into the country is too strong. It unbalances everything... RAMSI is becoming a 
donor instead of a program. They don’t want other donors to come and find anything in it. [SICS-
M.2]    
We have big companies influencing fisheries but we got the economic reform unit basically run by 
RAMSI advisers... A lot of policies in Cabinet are made by RAMSI anyway. We are at the bottom of 
the heap because we got RAMSI basically looking after our country… I cannot help to feel that the 
air you are breathing is getting less and less. [SIP.1] 
These extracts represent how various participants experienced how politicians and RAMSI 
exercised significant influences over public policy settings within a post-conflict polity. Here, 
existing policies lacked societal inputs, public discussions and political deliberations. These 
views further reflect local actors’ agonies over these influences, particularly against the fact 
that a foreign element has been cleaning up their mess after the tension. They reveal local 
actors’ frustrations and lack of confidence in their government to resolve issues at the tension 
(see section 5.2.1). These issues continue to shape Solomon Islands development, as one of 
the (few) ‘least developing countries’ in the region (see Appendix A). The narratives depict 
major problems with how Solomon Islanders perceived their government and themselves as 
a nation.  
5.3.2. Policy formulation  
What is constructed by policy actors as (public) ‘policy’ and how are they constructing 
policies are concerns of this inquiry.  
5.3.2.1. Construction of policy  
Participants were asked about how they conceive (public) ‘policy’, its nature, and 
characteristics of existing policies. Sections 5.3.2.1.1 to 5.3.2.1.3 examine participants’ 
responses to these questions. 
5.3.2.1.1. What is mostly referred to as policy 
No consistent construction of ‘policy’ emerged, although it was mentioned in various 
documents cited in Table 5.5. National policies identified were the National Development 
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Strategy (NDS), National Coalition for Reform and Advancement (NCRA) policy 
statement ,xvi and the NCRA policy translation and implementation document (SIG, 2010a, 
2010b, 2011). The first was a strategic plan developed by the Ministry of Development 
Planning and Aid Coordination. The second was a collection of statements picked from 
policy platforms of different parties in the (NCRA) coalition government. The third 
translated the NCRA policy statements into concrete strategies. Ministries were meant to 
implement both the NDS and the NCRA policies, two systems of formulation running in 
parallel—that is, from the political level and from the public service. Yet it was unclear 
which took precedence as national policy. Other documents (procedures, legislation, donor 
and international requirements) were also variously referred to as policies: 
 
Narrative extracts below illustrate what these patterns meant:   
Not only is our NDS but there are also international and regional commitments like this national 
adaptation policy on climate change. [SIPS.15]     
We have national and sectoral policies. There are other links. Donors have their own policies and 
priority areas. [SIPS.11]     
In the public service, when they talk policies the word policy itself always refers to guidelines. 
[SIPS.3]     
Public policy is a set of rules to guide the public as a whole on whatever they want to do like we have 
a policy on early childhood. [SIPS.2]     
                                                                            
xvi During the 2012 fieldwork, NCRA was the government under PM Gordon Lilo. Following the December 2014 
election, PM Manasseh Sogavare’s Democratic Coalition for Change became the new government (SIG, 2014a). 
Table 5.5: Construction of policy in the Solomon Islands 
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The NCRA policy is from different parties. Normally they form and call themselves a coalition 
something, an alliance or rural development. They also have the NDS. There’s a mismatch there. 
[SIPS.10]     
5.3.2.1.2. Levels of policies 
Table 5.6 depicts the Solomon Islands’ policy framework consisting of various documents 
that participants referred to in Table 5.6. Participants constructed policy documents as 
manifestations at different levels of the framework co-existing with other policies from 
regional and global levels:  
 
Narrative extracts below further illustrate these different policies: 
Policy is more than a statement. Different people look at policies at different levels. This NCRA 
policy is for politicians to make... As it comes down to Ministries and divisions, it involves a whole 
process to make it operational in corporate and work plans and to link it to the budget. [SIPS.4]     
We are working with Ministries on this Medium Term Framework in terms of programs, projects and 
indicators to implement this NDS within the four years life of government. [SIPS.1]    
But from sector to the ministry levels huge gaps remained, up-to-date policies such as sector 
and corporate plans, regulations and operating procedures still not yet in place. Attributing 
factors included political instability and limited local formulation capacity and culture:  
Most Ministries don’t have corporate plans… The Permanent Secretaries will say something that 
sounds so good but it’s not the reality. They probably have a good reason for not having a plan 
Table 5.6: The Solomon Islands’ policy framework 
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because of instability. Not like Samoa, it’s being the same government so there’s consistency in 
policies. [SIPA.1] 
The frame is there but the documentation is little… One factor why policies fail is because there’s 
no legal backing. If you talk about qualification there’s no act to accommodate that. Often there are 
acts but regulations and standard operating procedures are missing. Like when you charge him, you 
say ‘charge him with what?’ Maybe they don’t know how or I don’t do it and I still get pay. [SIPA.3] 
5.3.2.1.3. Features of policy  
Most participants regarded those policies in place as wish lists, largely isolated from the 
realities of need, and developed for purposes of political positioning or satisfying donor 
requirements. They were fragmented, ad hoc and not implementation-focused; reflecting 
political instabilities and problems of administrative functionality within the government 
system: 
The consultant who wrote this NDS pulled together everyone’s ideas, so we called that not public 
policy but a wish list as it’s got everything in it… Donors… write these documents because we ask 
for these big documents to be written. This is about meeting donors’ needs. Like this NCRA policy, 
this is not about implementation; this is about making politicians look good. [RAMSI-M.2]  
What is expected of ministries is to implement this NCRA policy but the difficulty is that these policies 
don’t reflect the realities in sectors. [SIPS.3] 
There are policies of ministries and policies of politicians and their marriages are problematic in 
terms of implementation. And there are these de facto ones. When you have donors’ interests coming 
in that’s the worst thing. It’s difficult for donors to engage in situations where things are ad hoc and 
unsteady, not only political security but also administration functionalities. [SIPS.18]         
Despite political instabilities, every government policy statement has remained more or less 
the same in content. While constructed as national policies (on paper), what got adopted has 
been driven mostly by political agendas:  
They make statements and normally they are just a continuation or little variation of what already 
exists… we just twist the language to make it not look like previous governments’ policies. [SIPS.7]          
Politics divert things regardless if you have a policy, project or whatever. Cabinet decides to do 
otherwise even if it is not in policy or budget. [SIPS.4]     
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5.3.2.2. How are policies formulated? 
Participants were asked about how policies are formulated; the processes employed, who 
does the work of formulation, what is used as the knowledge basis for policy and 
stakeholders’ understanding of policies. Table 5.7 gives the coded participant narratives 
about this ‘how’ question. Sections 5.3.2.2.1 to 5.3.2.2.4 elaborated on the patterns shown 
by the narratives frequency. Narrative extracts below the table illustrate what these patterns 
meant:   
 
5.3.2.2.1. Knowledge basis of policy  
In Table 5.7, most participants regarded evidence-based policy as limited (frequency of 106). 
Instead, the policy process was typically ad hoc, dominated by ideologies (frequency of 78) 
and policy transfers (frequency of 35):     
It’s ad hoc. You have a coalition government and issues that go into their policy document would be 
Table 5.7: Knowledge basis, methodology and formulation of policy in the Solomon Islands 
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magic, scenery assessments type of things. You don’t bring in people to say this is what we are going 
to do, give me the cost for next year and you factor it in. No. It’s just guess work. [SIPA.1]   
In most policies I’ve seen, they are policies from another country and you try to fit it here. Like this 
national cocoa strategy, they just do it out of what the expert wrote to achieve. [SIPS.3]   
One policy that has failed are rural development centres. It’s in that NCRA policy but has never 
taken off the ground… It’s ill-conceived. There hasn’t been any feasibility study into that idea. 
Implementers have different views about it. There hasn’t been a budget to support it. It’s just a 
statement trying to discover an elephant, without knowing what to do. [SIPS.10]   
When you talk national in whatever policy it’s based on the 50 constituencies. The best you can 
handle in this country is 50. People in these political groups come with their own thoughts or 
philosophies in writing the policy. So what is important for me is whose context is that policy 
referring to? It has to be robust to accommodate over 70 cultures and languages. There are common 
beliefs that we tie together as policies but when it comes to implementation, it’s different for every 
island. Very complex. It took us 30 years (of independence) to realise when you talk about modern 
laws and you try to put them into over 70 cultures, they are bound to fail. [SIPA.3]  
Limited evidence-based policy revealed the lack of local consultation, discussions and 
rational assessments of policy issues and implications. Participants assessed the NCRA 
policy as ill-conceived and lacking shared understanding, ownership and support, hence 
the limitation in its translation into implementation. The complication concerning the 
lack of policy consensus at the political level reflected the complexity of society. 
Accommodating common beliefs of different political actors from diverse ethnicities in 
the formation of a national policy document can be straightforward. But the challenge 
lies in implementation: how to accommodate different cultural interests and worldviews.  
5.3.2.2.2. Methodology  
The patterns in Table 5.7 also show that the policy process has been commonly top-down 
(directive) (frequency of 26), reaffirming similar patterns in previous sections. Given the 
exclusiveness of policy processes, existing policies were assessed as lacking presentation of 
the public interests and stakeholder support:  
Policies are made in the room. We don’t know where those policies come from, what research they 
take them from. It’s top-down. Parties come together and make some consensus like you give that 
policy, my party give this policy and we use this from my manifesto. [SIPS.2] 
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The process of getting these plans endorsed is to invite stakeholders. I haven’t seen it here. The lack 
of consultation and support from the people is the major problem. [RPS.5] 
When we made public policy it loses touch with the people… The election system gives the 
opportunity to inform public policy but that doesn’t happen. So policy like this NDS becomes diluted. 
It’s an exclusive process influenced mainly by donors… rather than us. [SIC-M.1]      
5.3.2.2.3.  Formulators of policy  
Further, policies have been formulated mainly by political groupings (frequency of 57) and 
consultants (frequency of 54) (see Table 5.7). There has been some policy formulation by 
the public administrative structure (frequency of 18), but it was not the main formulator. 
Backbenchers who drafted the NCRA and other political policies were mostly Member of 
Parliaments’ wantoks while donor influences through consultants were evident in the 
formulation of the NDS and Ministries’ policies. Participatory mechanisms (where working 
committees could be involved) were limited (frequency of 6). Reflecting as well in 
participant narratives was the lack of attention to issues of implementation:  
Unfortunately we don’t have debates or discussion of issues used to formulate policies. People who 
put up these policies are campaign managers of candidates forming the government… You are my 
nephew, come join our group, you draft our policy and hopefully give you a job. [SIPA.1]  
They just did a policy for the Ministry of Health… It was done by this guy from the World Bank. He 
used languages like what are we doing good, what we can do better, more, less or the same. No one 
has been able to figure out this plan. [RPS.9] 
The NDS is a classic piece that outsiders wrote it. It’s going to annoy a lot of people for a long time 
but in the meantime we keep referring to it. But it’s meaningless. It’s all too easy to get somebody to 
come and write a policy. It’s much harder to sit down and say what is it that we want and how are 
we going to do it? So policy is very demand rather than supply driven. If donors want a policy, they 
say pay a consultant to write it and that has happened a lot. But the real game is what is the next 
step and making sure it gets to budget. We often look for these ambitious documents that are never 
going to be played. This (NDS) is good to show it’s not going to get implemented. [RAMSI-M.1] 
5.3.2.2.4. Understanding of policy  
The patterns (Table 5.7) indicate that existing policies (including the government’s role in 
public policy) were not well understood (frequency of 54) by stakeholders (internal and 
external). Attributing to this limitation is societal development status: limited education and 
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access to quality information within the top-down nature of the policy process. These issues 
fundamentally affect state-society relations and how local people see their government’s role:  
Because it (NCRA policy) came as a finished product, something pre-made, you don’t understand 
where these come from, but we continue to try and do it. [SIPS.2] 
These people’s whole cycle is around one place, in villages, so it’s usually a word of mouth when 
people talk and know about policies. [SIP.1]  
It’s an educational problem. You can publish your policy platform but not many people understand 
it even if you write it simply. It will become another piece of paper in the house. [SIPA.2] 
This country elects people into government and that’s it. Its civil education that doesn’t touch base 
with people’s realities and linking the people to what the government’s roles are. All they see is 
what’s there. They don’t see the government, only the schools and health clinics and that’s all. 
[SICS-M.2] 
5.3.3. Policy implementation  
Table 5.8 outlines what most participants considered as critical factors or issues impacting 
on implementation:  
 
These factors resonated in the findings presented in previous sections. Given their 
interrelatedness, these factors are condensed and further narrated in the following sections 
under five headings: public policy leadership, capability, policy culture and ownership, and 
translation of policy to community.  
Table 5.8: Issues or factors central to implementation in the Solomon Islands 
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5.3.3.1. Public policy leadership 
The immediate section shows a policy process that was highly politicised. Public policy 
leadership was largely affected by political fragmentation, the ‘big man’ culture, lack of 
accountability, and insufficient societal understanding of governmental functions.  
State building which involved developing a  shared national  identity, political  community  
and  expectations  about  what  is  required  of  government is central to national public 
policy. Yet this is a challenge for a society of over 900 islands and 120 languages (see Table 
1.1). Where people are divided as a community, leadership, politics and public policy are 
also fragmented. However, leaders have neither focused on nor are prepared to deal with 
nation-state building in such a complex society. Patronage or social connections shaped 
leadership interests and politics, more than written policies:  
The ideal situation (NCRA policy) is what I just said. But that’s not what is happening… Party groups 
aren’t understood so they only pop up near election. They identify themselves to their ethnic groups 
so we have policies within ourselves… The leader has its own people, so they listen to their people, 
not the party… These people are from different island spaces and coming into power it's a shock to 
their lives. They don’t know what policy is. So it’s uncomfortable to put up the right policy because 
personality comes in. Whoever has the strongest say can defeat a policy despite how good you may 
think of it. [SIPA.3] 
It’s fragmented that the only thing that unites them (politicians) is the need to be in government. 
What this PM has done is made it worse. As soon as he came in, he reshuffled everybody. [RPS.5] 
In such patronage relationships between people and government, ‘big man’ leadership and 
politics have played a huge part:   
The Minister is a big man. Big men are warriors because they destroy the challengers and are left 
only with themselves. So the terminology becomes the ‘big man’ in terms of power, legacy and 
providing for the people. The people simply depend on them. [SIP.2] 
We have politicians who once elected they think of themselves as someone probably next to God. I 
keep telling them ‘if you don’t see them in the law, there’s a custom, a convention on doing these 
things’. But they say ‘I’m the Minister, I have the power’. They actually don’t listen to public servants. 
[SIPA.1]    
The idea of big man is being transformed from the village to the national level… But in here the 
arena and resources are much bigger. And unfortunately party politics are weak. [RPS.9] 
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Instead of focusing on nation building, the task of leaders has been to maintain political 
power. Accountability lies with people, but that requires a common understanding of 
government and its public policy role. Unfortunately, this understanding is limited reflecting 
the underdevelopment of society to participate in government affairs (see section 5.3.2.2.4). 
Politicians have capitalised on these gaps and differences in state-society relations to gain or 
maintain personal advantage:  
If there are more people educated then they should contribute more effectively. You notice that our 
literacy level is very low compared to Fiji and Samoa. [SIPS.9]        
They are discussing policies but what is coming from the people isn’t necessarily what they need in 
development. Most are worried about getting cash in hand for kerosene, tobacco, etc. so they vote 
for wherever that’s coming from. [SIPS.17]    
People see their politicians as sources of money. But they see government with great frustration and 
suspicion. The state is failing to deliver public policy and that’s an accountability issue between the 
state and people. So public policy is floating around because it’s not linked to budget, outcome and 
people. There are weaknesses and strengths with nations joining traditional and modern structures… 
in ways to ensure accountability and all that. These institutions can be powerful but it all depends 
on how people are engaged... Here, we have big men exploiting the differences for personal gains. 
But the strong leaders are saying ‘how do we get these structures to work to meet the needs of both 
sides’? [RAMSI-M.2]        
5.3.3.2. Capability (people, resources, learning, monitoring and evaluation)  
The capacity to formulate and implement policies in a modern state is comparatively low in 
the Solomon Islands. This lack of capacity is also reflected in the lack of understanding of 
public policy and how it functions within a modern nation-state setting. The machinery of 
government does not work properly and the role of the public service expected in a 
Westminster government system is largely undermined by political agendas. The political 
sphere operates in isolation from the bureaucracy. Existing policies are not linked to budgets, 
and budgetary provisions are often underspent or misused by politicians. The lack of 
mechanisms to implement, monitor and evaluate policies are a reflection of the government 
administrative system:  
A lot of things in the NCRA policy haven’t trickled down. The whole machinery doesn’t work and 
that starts from the top. We have Ministers who don’t know what they should be doing in government. 
Permanent Secretaries can get kicked out any time and get people who don’t know much about 
government. That lack of legislation and these things are a reflection of that. [SIPA.2]           
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Cabinet is setting this year’s budget and there’s nothing behind it on how to implement policy. 
Nobody knows the ‘how’. So the easy way is to take it (money) all out and give it to Member of 
Parliaments accounts... The question then is who makes who accountable about your policy. 
[SIPA.1]          
There are big gaps here… We have problems of functionalities, public servants not turning up to 
work, not getting paid and their morale is very low. The upper ranking is very different from the 
rest… Permanent Secretaries are detached from the public service. They are about 20 political 
appointees set up here and their salaries are like three times the salaries of the whole public service. 
[SIPS.18]    
5.3.3.3. Policy culture and ownership 
A fundamental issue remains: who owns the government and its public policies? Here a lack 
of ownership was due to limited understanding of the government’s role in public policy, 
attributed largely to the policy processes as being too top-down. Collective ownership within 
government itself was an issue, actors working in isolation, and not within one institution. 
This fragmentation at vertical and horizontal levels of political and public administration 
domains signified a lack of a collaborative culture, which has reduced to broader problems 
within society:  
I can only speak for my people. For them the government is non-existent. [SIPA.3]            
National identity is very weak. There’s no sense of ownership of the nation. That’s why the Honiara 
streets are dirty. When you talk about national public policy and laws, people just go ‘it’s your worry, 
not ours’. Our leaders have every freedom to get whatever they want. So people see that and say oh, 
these properties belong to the Member of Parliaments. [SIPS.2] 
Everyone builds a fence around themselves. I don’t have faith in the public service… The only thing 
they have against their fellowmen is like hey, don’t do that, he comes from Nukufalala, he is targeting 
me because he does not like my ethnic group. [SIP.1] 
I don’t align myself to his (political appointee who wrote the NCRA) policy but I try to push him to 
recognise the importance of aligning himself to us, otherwise we go nowhere. [SIPS.3]         
5.3.3.4. Translation of policy to community, stakeholder support and feedback  
Political accountability for public policy and translation of existing plans at a local level 
require consolidated community support and feedback. Public policy development needs to 
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address this issue in a highly fragmented society. However, the centralisation of public 
policy development over the years has meant that the need to bring society towards an 
understanding of government objectives has lacked focus. This state-led model, which has 
been the focus of the development agenda of development agencies, has meant that external 
actors’ involvement and interests add layers of complexity to local society’s existing 
complications and problems. How to balance external and local interests has been another 
key challenge:    
One thing about public policy is that it’s not understood… There’s no dialogue on what the role of 
the state is and how it can function best with the community… That notion is non-existence. 
[RAMSI-M.3]  
Solomon Islands is so fragmented. We in Honiara are from thousands of islands and language 
groupings. That’s what makes it complex. Ownership is different. Some islands like Malaita are 
matrilineal. Some like Guadalcanal are patrilineal. So to put policies to effect is hard to get accepted 
by the rest of the country. Often these government policies aren’t real to people. [SIPS.9]   
I get a bit complex because we don’t need these guys (RAMSI). But if it weren’t for them, it wouldn’t 
happen because this public service will try and screw the country again. It’s like where do we find 
the right balance… The fact reminds us where’s our confidence to rebuild our country? As long as 
we depend on aid, our future is getting control. [SIP.1] 
5.4. Summary of findings 
Based on the narrative of evidence presented in the preceding sections, Table 5.9 
summarised key findings in terms of propositions emerging from the Solomon Islands. 
Chapter eight discusses these findings further, in comparison with findings from Vanuatu, 
Samoa and the Region (see Appendix H), and against existing literature (chapter two):    
Stage/category Key findings or propositions 
Initiation and adoption of 
policy 
1. The findings from the Solomon Islands confirm the same 
propositions from Vanuatu. 
2. The key difference is that foreign influences in the Solomon 
Islands are more confined to RAMSI with direct external 
interventions. 
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Formulation of policy 3. The findings from the Solomon Islands reinforces most of 
the propositions found in Vanuatu. The key differences for 
the Solomon Islands are as follows: 
a. The formulation of national policy is largely carried out by 
political groupings. The role of the public service in policy 
formulation is limited.  
b. The policy formulation process in the Solomon Islands is 
more fragmented compared to Vanuatu.  
4. The separation of powers under the national Westminster 
system of government is almost non-existent in the Solomon 
Islands compared to Vanuatu. 
Implementation of policy 5. Findings from the Solomon Islands are similar to Vanuatu. 
Some differences such as political interference in the public 
administration is a matter of degree rather than a major 
difference. 
6. The capacity to formulate and implement is considerably 
lower in the Solomon Islands compared to Vanuatu and 
Samoa.  
7. Policy sovereignty, culture, ownership and coordination are 
fundamental issues to the Solomon Islands that requires 
considerable attention for implementation to improve. 
Policy process as a whole 8. The same propositions from Vanuatu hold for the Solomon 
Islands. The key difference is a matter of degree. 
9. Both Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands have fluid political 
systems but the political system is more fragmented in the 
Solomon Islands – and so is the formulation and 
implementation processes.  
10. The extensive effect of the recent tensions that led to the 
collapse in the machinery of government reflected the lack 
of policy culture, sovereignty and integration and the 
problematic leadership in the Solomon Islands compared to 
Vanuatu. What thus becomes priority to the Solomon 
Islands in terms of public policy development differs from 
Vanuatu or Samoa. 
Table 5.9: Key findings emerging from the Solomon Islands 
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CHAPTER 6: POLICY PROCESSES IN SAMOA 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter analyses Samoa’s policy processes based on patterns emerging from participant 
narratives (see Appendix E), documentary analyses,xvii and participant observation. Samoa’s 
background is provided in section 1.2. The research was conducted in accordance with the 
methodology outlined in chapter three. A total of 36 participants (see Table 3.3) shared their 
experiences and observations of the three policy cases (see Table 3.2) and how public 
policies were generally initiated, formulated and implemented in Samoa. Section 6.2 
examines the policy cases; section 6.3 describes the general patterns of policy processes; and 
section 6.4 summarises key findings from Samoa. 
6.2. The policy cases  
Samoa’s policy cases were the Public Works’ Institutional Reform and Asset Management 
Services (PIRAMS), Public Service Commission Institutional Strengthening Program (PSC-
ISP) and Samoa Police Project (SPP). Policies were selected based on the requirements 
outlined in section 3.3. The emphasis of examining these policies is to determine critical 
factors at play in the initiation, formulation and implementation processes, and that have 
contributed to the actual results (see section 1.1.2). 
6.2.1. The PIRAMS 
6.2.1.1. Background  
The PIRAMS was a five-year (1999-2003) institutional reform, initiated by the government 
of Samoa (GoS) to transform the then Public Works Department’s role from a traditional 
service provider to that of policy advice, regulatory, asset management and developing 
partnerships in infrastructure. It was designed and implemented as a sub-project (the 
‘institutional strengthening’ component) of the Samoa Infrastructure and Asset Management 
Program (SIAMP), a sector-wide, multi-agency,xviii 10-year phased, World Bank Adaptable 
Loan Program (see Table 6.1). It comprised four components: organisational reform; 
                                                                            
xvii Participant narrative extracts are indented and italicised whilst quotes from documents are also indented but non-
italicised. 
xviii Public Works Department, Samoa Airport Authority, Ministry of Natural Resource and Environment, Ministry of 
Women, Community and Social Development, Ministry of Finance (MoF) and Public Service Commission (PSC). 
 142 
improved delivery of public works and services; asset management systems and road 
network; and transport planning (Kolone Vaai & Associates, 2001), PIRAMS aimed to 
achieve SIAM’s objective: ‘transport and coastal infrastructure assets are economically, 
environmentally and socially sustainable and managed by an effective partnership of 
stakeholders’ (World Bank, 2006, p.2). This public-private partnership was highlighted in 
the Statement of Economic Strategy (GoS, 1996),xix as the GoS’s vision for development, 
and included a consolidated reform package of expanding the private sector role, further 
market liberalisation, and human resource development.  
 
Source: Extracted from World Bank (1999a, 1999b, 2003a, 2003b, 2006) 
6.2.1.2. Initiation  
PIRAMS comprised part of ongoing economic reforms that began from the late 1980s and 
that were adopted to revitalise Samoa’s economy. This followed the 1980s global recession 
which weakened traditional exports into the early 1990s (GoS, 1992). Hopes for a quick 
recovery were dashed when the 1990 and 1991 cyclones caused damage estimated at ST$450 
million (World Bank, 1999a).xx The 1993 taro blight followed, wiping out Samoa’s staple 
food and main export earner. The budget deficit reached ST$66.7 million in 1992/1993 (GoS, 
1991-1995), this aggravated by state-owned enterprises’ financial losses (Clarke & Melei, 
1996); that of the Polynesian Airline, for example, amounted to ST$125 million (GoS, 1994). 
                                                                            
xix Replaced the three-year Seventh National Development Plan (GoS, 1992). The Strategy for the Development of 
Samoa (SDS) (GoS, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012) (replacing the Statement of Economic Strategy) has continued the same 
theme of private sector-led development.  
xx ST means Samoan Tala. 
Table 6.1: SIAMP design 
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Given this weak fiscal position, development agencies were active in economic revitalisation 
providing loans together with financial and technical assistance. Market-oriented models 
were advanced, noticeably in the contractual employment of Heads of Departments, 
introduction of a value-added tax, revision of the tariff systems and privatisation of 20 state-
owned enterprises by the mid-1990s (Clarke & Melei, 1996). Neoliberal reforms were 
adopted against a backdrop of political events, and advancement of the ‘good governance’ 
agenda in the 1990s considered a necessity for development. This necessity was articulated 
by the Controller and Chief Auditor (1994) report concerning the government’s failure to 
collect $20 million of revenue, unlawful use of public money, non-preparation of public 
accounts, and tendering of public works to relatives of Ministers and Heads of Departments. 
Controversy surrounding this report saw dismissals of the Chief Auditor and corruption 
allegations made against Ministers and departments, constitutional change to weaken the 
Chief Auditor’s independence and, most tragically, the 1999 assassination of the Public 
Works Minister. This latter event put Samoa’s political credibility under the spotlight, but 
proved a catalyst for change, particularly in the Public Works Department:  
There were periods when Samoa was excessively influenced by consultants… during difficult 
economic situations…the hurricanes, collapse of the copra industry, taro blight and so on. New 
Public Management ideas shouldn’t have been done as they were disruptive in services such as 
health. [SC.1] 
The assassination of a cabinet minister (Luagalau), the arrest of two leading politicians… is turning 
into a seismic event for Samoa, as a deep strain of high-level political corruption is revealed in this 
drama… When Tuilaepa became PM… Luagalau… was made Works Minister and reputedly was 
told to clean up a department riddled with corruption… Chief Auditor… revealed corrupt practices 
amongst half of the Cabinet… clear evidence of collusion, fraud, dishonesty and mismanagement at 
senior levels of public works. (Field, 1999, August 8) 
This political turmoil, allied to the Public Works Department’s failure to perform its roles 
were turning points for reform. Within pressing development needs and ongoing reform 
efforts, recognising the private sector’s potential in infrastructure and reforming the Public 
Works Department were vital for strengthening accountability and sustainability of 
development efforts. Leadership and the private sector’s positive response to the 
government’s vision expedited the reform process:  
If Public Works didn’t fail we wouldn’t have started that reform. But the private sector also 
responded to it well. [PSS.3] 
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Before the cyclones, the World Bank was already doing a lot of work. Then the cyclones came and 
infrastructure works were massive. A lot of aid came in to rebuild the economy. But the public sector 
was so comfortable in their pay and things like that. So we needed to look at ways to make people 
more accountable in delivering these services. We consulted the private sector and they allowed us 
to use their equipment to do the work. But there was a bad element in that arrangement. The private 
sector used to tip Faamoe (Public Works Department supervisor), even gave him some beers to falsify 
their claims like payments for eight hours of equipment hire for works done in only two hours. So 
there was a lot of corruption... Also we saw the private sector’s ability to take up these 
responsibilities. It was just a matter of saying well, you got the equipment, why don’t we give you the 
works and do it according to these specifications. If you don’t, we won’t pay you. If you stuff up, you 
have to do it again. Otherwise you won’t get any more work. Well, it works. [PSS.2] 
We had the involvement of three Ministers. It started from the time of Luagalau; that was where this 
vision got introduced. Then that incident happened and Liuga came in as Minister… Liuga is a 
person who doesn’t like to drag things. When we came back from that study tour, he wanted the 
reform to happen. So we went straight into implementing it. Leiataua (former Head of Public Works 
Department) led the reform from the start and when Liuga came in he backed the whole thing up. 
[PSS.1]   
6.2.1.3. Formulation  
The PIRAMS was designed and implemented within the SIAMP’s reform program and was 
shaped by the following processes:  
 Mutual understanding of the reform required aligning the Government of Samoa (GoS) 
and development partners’ agendas. AusAID’s institutional strengthening focus, and the 
World Bank’s physical infrastructure concentration, were based on these agencies’ 
regional policy agendas, prior involvement and experiences;   
 SIAMP’s complex and progressive design allowed for multi-agency commitments, long-
term partnership building, and sustainable infrastructure management. It was the first 
Adaptable Loan Program in the Region;      
 A Steering Committee comprising Heads of Departments of implementing agencies and 
a civil society representative, facilitated ownership and integration of various components 
across the sector;  
 The Secretariat was the Project Management Team. An individual project component 
manager was assigned to each sub-component project.  
 PIRAMS’ operationalisation was facilitated by experts through Opus International 
Consultants Ltd, and led by a former senior official from Kolone Vaai & Associates;  
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 A participatory approach was built into the design and carried through to implementation. 
This included community consultations on issues such as land acquisition and coastal 
infrastructure management; and  
 SIAMP was informed by evaluation of previous works and studies on relevant technical, 
environmental and social-political aspects. (Hopper, 1998; Martin Associates P/L, 2003; 
Opus International Consultants Ltd, 1998; World Bank, 1999b, 2003a, 2006). 
Models of infrastructure development and delivery were at the disposal of experts and local 
actors. However, the limitations of a small economy, and the need to adapt ideas and models 
to the social-political context of the reform were recognised: ‘specific requirements were 
made for the process to incorporate traditional cultural values’ (World Bank, 2006, p.10): 
The reform was approached with the underlying thinking involving three elements; social, political 
and economic. What I did which was very important was to drop the economic element and focused 
on the political and social elements. Because if you harmonise these two, the economic part naturally 
falls into place and we don’t have a lot of resistance or strikes as in other countries. [SP.1] 
In Samoa, as elsewhere in the Pacific, the indigenous culture and tradition are the fundamental 
parameters which guide national life… As per policy recommendations, an initial social assessment 
was made to identify the pertinent social and cultural issues to be taken into account (World Bank, 
1999b, p.17).  
6.2.1.4. Implementation  
Implementation resulted in key changes identified below. The PIRAMS program was 
adjusted to accommodate government-wide reforms occurring concurrently, such as in PSC 
and MoF.  
 The Public Works Department’s role was transformed from a service delivery to a policy 
and regulatory institution, now the Ministry of Works, Transport and Infrastructure. The 
PIRAMS covered only ‘works’ and ‘infrastructure’ but a later inclusion of ‘transport’ 
came from the 2002 government realignment under PSC; 
 The Land Transport Authority was established as a state-owned enterprise responsible 
for land transport functions and services;  
 Contracting out infrastructure works in terms of construction, maintenance and some 
monitoring;   
 Creation of business units for outsourced services (e.g. mechanical workshops, quarry, 
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asphalt operations, maintenance services);  
 Reduction in Public Works Department personnel from 403 to 58, involving staff 
redundancy, transfer to other departments, business establishment and training for new 
roles; and 
 Policy, planning, legislative, system and corporate cultural changes and capacity 
building (World Bank, 2003a, 2006). 
The change was gradually managed using a participative and consultative process which led 
to wider support and acceptance of the reform. International experience was incorporated, 
but the process was driven locally. Political leadership and direction was central to the whole 
process:  
One thing I reached out to was the Public Service Association so that they don’t stir up any 
resistance… The World Bank showcased our reforms but they didn’t have the profile to relate to our 
people. So that was what I did. We had several retreats where these guys started to come out and 
accept the change… The PM never believed it was going to be that smooth. [SP.1] 
The government is trying to apply the same outsourcing model in health but it hasn’t worked because 
health has a weak Minister. The public works reform worked because he was a strong Minister. He 
wanted to make sure the reform got implemented. [SP.3]    
Implementation encountered challenges, including those that Samoa continues to face in its 
distinct social-political setting and developing status. A lack of supervision and quality 
checks persisted as ongoing issues, this deriving from limited technical capacity and uneven 
accountability enforcement:    
Payments are given to us but there are no monitoring reports. We don’t have enough manpower to 
perform that onsite supervisory role. My division has only three staff… This always comes back to 
this issue of how we retain engineers as most leave for better jobs elsewhere. Then we bring in 
consultants to fill that gap but they are very expensive. So it’s difficult how you balance that. [PSS.2]  
People in government don’t do proper reporting… They just accept the payments. It’s to do with 
their policies and culture as local companies can do better supervision like the overseas ones. 
Nobody is checking their work. They are the bosses and can do whatever they want. [SPS-M.1]    
Lack of infrastructure quality is also affected by the practice of awarding tenders to the 
lowest (financial) bids. This was occasioned by limited affordability, and the difficulty of 
balancing development effectiveness against political interests within a vulnerable island 
economy operating off a narrow fiscal base:  
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That Malifa-Vailoa road, about 3km was constructed with a US$30 million loan and the quality is 
good because we built it according to the standards any road should be. But the LTA budget is only 
ST$30 million to cover 1000km of all roads. So what is built reflects the money going into it... Then 
from the political side, how do you satisfy everyone’s needs as people come and say why are you 
only building that road... Last year we constructed only 15km of roads as cyclone Evan came and 
SA$15 million went into recovery work. So it all depends on our affordability and level of 
development. [PSS.3]       
Political input has usually affected long-term development, a form of interference that 
remains significant in public works. The implementation process is largely driven by 
pressures seeking popular political support:  
When it’s near election it’s obvious that ministers’ constituencies have lots of work carried out… 
The   prioritisation comes from only two people; the PM and our Minister… With our three-year 
contract you have to do what the Minister tells you. The right thing is to rebut when something isn’t 
right. But that’s the end of you. You have to find ways of working with that if you want to continue 
as a CEO. [PSS.2]       
Participants saw political interference and top-down leadership as directly linked to the 
fa’amatai culture. The fa’aSamoa pervades the public service culture by limiting its 
neutrality in policy advice and implementation:   
ADB forced the removal of Ministers from government boards last year… Then they got these men 
and it ends up like a whole gang of Tuilaepa’s government. In other countries once you stuff up as a 
director they clean you up. But here, no way… That’s why policies aren’t working. Even with the 
works we are doing it’s whatever the Minister wants. It’s like how the matais run things in the village. 
I reckon everything is to do with culture. [SPS-M.2] 
With our fa’aSamoa culture of respect, love and relationship it’s difficult to turn people away. When 
a high chief comes, it’s natural to automatically think about those cultural aspects. There are cases 
where I say no but people turn around and go to the Minister. Then I get a directive saying there’s a 
law but use your common sense. But that’s corruption… But we still managed to achieve what was 
setup under the reform. We just have to learn how to deal with these challenges. [PSS.1]         
The challenge here is again not only about infrastructure development as such, but about the 
broad public policy issue of operating and fostering development within a small, intimate 
island economy:  
It’s about looking at ways for a small economy to survive. The only new money coming in is from the 
private sector. But the private sector is struggling. We got aid money but more than half goes back 
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to consultants. That aid is for new development initiatives… If we cut aid we are doomed. What we 
have is only for consumption. We don’t know where to get more tax or money. We need more exports... 
But if you go to NZ supermarkets, the bananas are from Asia, not from here. [SPS-M.4]    
Usually the lowest bid is picked. If Lucky tenders $500,000 and Bluebird tenders $100,000 then 
Bluebird gets the job. But Bluebird can withdraw as they want Lucky to get that job for the extra 
$400,000 to come to their family. Ah Liki, Bluebird and Lucky are all from the same family and Care 
Blue Allow is their joint contractor. Ott and King Construction are separate contractors but King is 
Ott’s son… They do a lot of collusion as it’s allowed and the market is too small. [PSS.1]      
6.2.1.5. Results  
The World Bank (2006) evaluated the SIAMP Phase I, where PIRAMS was the main 
component, as being ‘highly satisfactory’. Positive aspects included leadership, ownership, 
participatory nature of the process, consideration of local context, and positive working 
relationships with development partners. The reform was seen as a model for other small 
states: 
The project design and successful performance became a model for improving portfolio performance 
in small-scale countries… The overall outcome for the first phase is rated as highly satisfactory… 
The main component reformed the Public Works Department from a traditional service provider to 
an assessment manager and policy office, while transferring services and assets to the private 
sector… The institutional development impact has been high. (World Bank, 2006, pp.5-14)  
Participant narratives highlighted ongoing challenges facing infrastructure development. 
Nevertheless from the PIRAMS experience, participants cited instances of its visible impact:  
Instead of only two companies that were there, there are now 10 good contractors in Apia and 
another 10 in Savaii. Instead of the 300 jobs taken away during the reform, about 1,000 new jobs 
were created. The saving in roads construction is about $2 million a year. The private sector is 
growing. There’s good quality. That’s why you have to be bold enough to take that risk. [SP.1]   
Our people’s capacity to understand and run things on their own is improved. Success is seen like 
before the road cost $500, now its $50 a metre. The change enabled local companies to perform at 
a higher standard, instead of just bringing in overseas companies. The challenge is maintaining the 
standards. But overall the results are good and the reform is working. [SP.3]   
6.2.1.6. Key factors  
Table 6.2 summarises the critical factors of the PIRAMS’ policy process:   
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6.2.2. The PSC-ISP 
6.2.2.1. Background  
The PSC-ISP was a five-year (1999-2004) reform program initiated by the GoS ‘to 
strengthen the management of human resources in the public service as part of a continuing 
public sector reform, aimed at furthering the development of Samoa’. Its purpose was ‘to 
implement across the public service sound human resource management (HRM) practices 
supported by legislation, policies and manuals which assured that Heads of Departments are 
accountable’. The PSC, the statutory employer of all public servants, was the beneficiary of 
this ISP. With ‘more efficient policy and decision-making’ through HRM strengthening, 
improved service delivery was expected (PSC-ISP, 1998, p.30). The PSC-ISP was a three-
stage project funded through an AusAID AUD$5.5million grant and AUD$948,400 in 
counterpart costs (see Table 6.3). Gunn Rural Management International Pty Ltd was the 
Australian Managing Contractor: 
Table 6.2: PIRAMS key factors 
 
 150 
 
Source: Extracted from PSC-ISP (1998, 2004) 
6.2.2.2. Initiation 
Institutional strengthening gained strong momentum in the mid-1990s given the emphasis 
on capacity building for carrying out and sustaining ongoing reforms. About 15 donor-
funded ISPs were implemented during the 1990s-2000s period. Treasury and Customs 
Departments were the first to have ISPs, concurrent with initial economic and financial 
reforms. Later reforms identified in the Statement of Economic Strategy (1996, 1998) 
included performance budgeting, the devolution of central agency responsibilities to 
ministries, corporate planning, and redefining the public service’s role. The last three were 
the subject of the PSC-ISP.  
The PSC-ISP as an idea originated from donors and reform-minded officials who wanted 
Samoa to keep up with global trends. Leadership enabled the PSC-ISP’s initiation with 
AusAID being willing to provide support: 
The decision wasn’t something that happened overnight... Treasury and customs ISPs were first and 
were working well. And when Lofi came in as CEO, she wanted one for PSC… Because as more 
CEOs became knowledgeable of global trends they thought Samoa needed to follow. And AusAID 
was willing to assist. The government’s manifestos also spelt out reforms as one of their mandates. 
[PSS.4]  
Table 6.3: PSC-ISP design 
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6.2.2.3. Formulation 
The PSC-ISP’s formulation resulting in the 1998 Project Design Document were facilitated 
by the following processes:  
 The 1995-1997 Job Analysis formed the basis for further reforms;  
 Two leadership retreats in 1996 and 1997 allowed discussions and support for reforms;   
 Australia’s support for the PSC-ISP and Education-ISP was requested at a 1997 
Australia/Samoa high level consultation in Canberra; and 
 A five member team (a local member and four external specialists) conducted a 
feasibility study and stakeholders’ consultation for the design (PSC-ISP, 1998):  
One thing that sold the change was the Job Analysis. It boosted the remuneration of people at the 
middle level and so they thought the changes coming in further would benefit us even more. [PSS.6]     
The PSC-ISP was designed to reflect principles of Samoan-led reform, skills transfer, 
flexibility, achievement of change in support of the GoS policy, and Samoa-Australia 
partnerships based on mutual responsibilities. Thus the following mechanisms formed the 
design: 
 A multi-layered management structure consisted of the Program Coordinating Committee 
(PCC), Steering Committee, Secretariat, Project Monitoring Group, Project Director and 
Australian Managing Contractor; 
 Program management was the responsibility of the Steering Committee which consisted 
of an independent chair, two Member of Parliaments, six Heads of Departments including 
PSC, a civil society representative, PSC-ISP Head of Secretariat and Australian 
Managing Contractor’s Team Leader;  
 Management and implementation rested with the locals while the consultancy team was 
there to provide support, advice and mentoring;  
 Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) were conducted through the Secretariat quarterly 
reports, Project Monitoring Group reviews and Samoa/Australia governmental reviews 
through the PCC; and  
 Flexibility meant that the latter stages were revised, based on lessons learned from 
previous stages, and accommodating changes in the operating environment. (PSC-ISP, 
1998, 2004):  
Samoan ownership was there as represented by the Steering Committee. They knew this was going 
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to have implications for them so they got involved upstream before the change came knocking on 
their doors. [SC.4] 
The nature of the PSC-ISP’s knowledge basis meant policy transfer was inevitable given the 
involvement of consultants. Also the Steering Committee and project team members 
undertook a study tour in Australia, Philippines and Fiji  to examine similar reforms (PSC-
ISP, 2000). The reform was locally driven, invigorated by local actors’ strong sense of 
national pride in ownership:  
It was a reform transfer. I remember the project director influencing a lot of the design because he 
was a public service commissioner in Australia and he just picked up manuals, holus-bolus out of 
his office and brought them over. [SC.3]  
People in government have a strong sense of nationalism. Not only they knew what was best for them, 
they also weren’t prepared to just take what someone says, like from AusAID or ADB. We said this 
is the design but the design was talked through all the way. That got the project off to a good start. 
There’s a degree of tokenism about that which separates Samoa from other countries I worked in. 
They pay lip service to the whole notion of collaboration and performing an equal partnership. [SC.5] 
6.2.2.4. Implementation  
Participative approaches through departmental sub-projects (functional review, policy 
review, legislative review, corporate planning system and communication) were used to 
facilitate understandings of different aspects of the reform:  
My role as team leader was really about modifying stages of implementation, priorities and timelines 
to suit the context of the day. But we were using a fully participative model where every bit of the 
reform was being done by working parties… PSC-ISP absolutely proved that this is the only way to 
work in any culture. And I carried on with the same methodology in every other project after that. 
[SC.3] 
Implementation was experimental in most cases. For instance, before recruitment and 
selection was devolved to departments under the new Public Service Act 2004, that function 
was first piloted by instruments of delegation in groups of (six) departments. Lessons learned 
from the first group were fed into the next, and used to revise the recruitment and selection 
policy. This process involved legislative changes, policy reviews, manual write-ups, pilots, 
and workshops and training for PSC and departments in the performance of their new roles. 
The PSC’s role was eventually changed from ‘hire and fire’ to a policy role, while 
departments were empowered to assume that delegated authority. The same process applied 
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to other functions such as discipline, grievance management, and corporate planning:  
We had groups from departments. Their involvement made it easier when we went out to explain 
what was happening and coming out. We had a lot happening, one policy review after another. 
[PSS.6]  
Implementation was complex and did not follow a predetermined line. The GoS expectation 
of what it wanted from the reform was somewhat different from what was in the plans. For 
instance, the public service alignment was not a core project activity but a major reform. As 
this change was huge and sudden, it affected how people saw the PSC-ISP in its overall 
shape and content:  
The explicit outputs are clearly defined in all of the Stage Work Plans and PDDs. However, the GoS, 
and the PSC… were very clear about what they wanted out of this reform. This clarity was not shared 
by the Australian Managing Contractor until late in the process… The reduction in the size of the 
public service by up to 20% never appeared in any Project Design Document or LogFrame 
document... Full devolution was only explicitly requested in the 9 last months of the project… The 
general elections, the enactment of legislation and… the Realignment of Departments being the three 
most significant… were not unexpected, but their impact was sometimes greater than anticipated. 
(PSC-ISP, 2004, p.24 & p.43) 
After one year of implementation, there seemed few tangible achievements as outputs and 
AusAID was about to withdraw. Contributing impediments included the effects of the 2001 
election, staff losses and loss of momentum. Some experienced uncertain leadership as the 
key issue:  
There has been a lull in the project and a loss of momentum… attributed to the effects of the election 
period, the suspension of Steering Committee meetings over the election and post-election periods, 
staff losses in some areas and concentration on budget preparations. However, re-vitalisation of the 
project is not yet becoming evident. (PSC-ISP, 2001, p.1).  
At the end of 2002, AusAID sent in an M&E team… they wrote a report to the PM evaluating the 
PSC-ISP as a failed project. They brought everyone together and publicly announced that my project 
was failing. And everybody in the room knew why. The only challenge was leadership and that was 
how AusAID saw it. AusAID wrote a letter to the Steering Committee and CEO, PSC that unless 
things changed they were going to discontinue funding the program as there was no tangible result. 
[SC.3]   
Conflicting motivations behind the Australian Managing Contractor and local counterparts 
shaped the differences in their expectations and assessments of the reform, and how the pace 
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of change was managed to facilitate local acceptance and absorption capacity:  
There are always conflicting motivations behind project teams and how they operate with local 
people. I saw this first hand because Mick (team leader) was always stressing that nothing was 
happening. Whereas things were happening but the change wasn’t obvious. The Australian 
Managing Contractor had outcomes to deliver to AusAID and that was their main driver… But from 
our point of view we needed to take the change at the pace that was required. We can’t force things 
on people without explaining well. We in PSC also needed to understand what was happening so we 
can sell it to them. [PSS.4] 
Often the milestones are ticked off but the actual capacity to absorb and to buy into the real change 
isn’t there. That’s why reforms often don’t work. [SPS-M.2] 
Limited initial progress triggered major progress in stage three. Contributing to that was 
strong PSC leadership and a change in project team leadership. Furthermore the project was 
brought under PSC management, strengthening PSC’s commitment and accountability for 
the reform. The PSC-ISP multi-layered management facilitated awareness of the reform, but 
its conduct led to a diffusion of roles between the PSC, Steering Committee and PCC as to 
who had real responsibility for progress. Consequently, the PCC was removed, the Steering 
Committee’s role changed to that of an advisory body, and the Head of Secretariat position 
turned into a PSC management role. As intended, the Steering Committee and Head of 
Secretariat were dissolved at the end of the first year of stage three. This allowed the PSC to 
take full responsibility for the reform on grounds of sustainability (PSC-ISP, 2004). All of 
this change was obviously unsettling:  
The biggest attention I had was to the CEO, to get her on board. So for the next one year, she was a 
strong leader. She was interested in meeting the logframes, reading the reports, to see what the 
working parties were producing and what went to the Steering Committee. That was the year we 
made progress… She also delegated a senior officer who worked constantly with me in getting the 
outputs out to departments. Because unless you got a change agent little else can happen. If you got 
good advisers and capable executives you can modify the design to suit what you want to do. You’ve 
got to have a strong leader who backs you, who backs the project when it gets tough. [SC.3]    
Relating to reform fatigue was an inherent flaw in the way such reforms are often designed 
and anticipated within a notion of government providing for development. Here Stage two 
reforms set unrealistic goals for achievement within the existing local setting and project 
timeframe. Thus full devolution of PSC functions to Ministries were not reached, only four 
(out of seven intended) being delegated:     
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A third blockage in the design was the objectives for Stage 2 were far too unrealistic for the policy 
and context and capacity levels of both PSC and Ministries… The list of achievements for Year 1 of 
stage 2 was completely unachievable in any public sector context, much less that of a developing 
country… The donor and the contractor did not fully appreciate the enormity, and therefore the 
difficulties, that a project of this nature represented… a similar scale of reform in an Australia 
jurisdiction has taken over 20 years to reach a level that was expected in Samoa in five years. (PSC-
ISP, 2004, p.46) 
Development is always reform. One reason why that there has been a chequered history of not much 
success with reforms anywhere is that the more complex the reform, the longer it takes and the more 
tired and disinterested staff get… So there’s an inherent flaw in big projects that go on in developing 
countries. It’s just a flaw in any long-term change. I was dealing with huge reforms in Australia and 
the same thing happened. But the additional layers in PICs where you got different cultures and 
expectations of the role of government in development add to reform complexity. When you are a 
member of government you’ve got to do this work, you’ve got this role conflict and that add to reform 
fatigue. Because people doing reforms have own worldviews of what their roles are in there. [SC.5]     
Another challenge lay in understanding the psychological dimensions of how people were 
affected by such change. Yet, there was limited understanding amongst different actors over 
what the project entailed by changing the status quo in a conservative society. And here the 
traditional system (fa’aSamoa) retained its significant influence over the reform process:  
I don’t believe AusAID, the project team, even myself understood what releasing that power by PSC 
meant to them and how that was a subtle resistance. In that reform where you are completely shifting 
responsibilities, almost a psychological understanding is required from the start. You start working 
with people in how they can replace their sense of job pride by giving authority to others and replace 
it with something else. If you got everyone in the mindset ready to go, implementation is easy. It’s 
about designing reforms. And in my experience in every project I worked in, donors wouldn’t accept 
designs like that… In the original design, the design team would have a model in their heads of what 
a donor wants the design paper to look like—with the logframes, milestones and timelines. So it’s 
easy to blame the context when something goes wrong because you can wipe your hands and walk 
away. [SC.3]    
The major lessons learned during this project relate to the complexity of major public sector change 
at a central agency whole-of-service level, where there are enormous political, administrative and 
behavioural implications of changing the status quo… The power of the philosophy of hierarchical 
controls underpinning the traditional governance systems in Samoa remained a significant influence 
through the subsequent reform initiatives. (PSC-ISP, 2004, pp.3-5) 
Cultural aspects thus had a significant influence over the reform and how people operated, 
these aspects not reflected in the design:  
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I saw what fa’aSamoa did. It makes it hard for outsiders to have a legitimate role. I’ve never seen it 
anywhere else. They believe in it. That fa’aSamoa gives an enormous amount of pride. If you are 
sensitive to watch the way people reacted, other than the technical knowledge you might bring they 
want nothing more from you… They just want you to show them how to do this thing and go away. 
But that flies in the face of every design rule of any reform in a development context. [SC.4]  
The logic that underlay the output narratives, their indicators and their completion dates for the whole 
of stage 2 and some of stage 3 also indicated a poor understanding of the operational and cultural 
requirements of implementing such reform initiatives. (PSC-ISP, 2004, p.46)   
The fa’aSamoa reinforced local leadership, participation, ownership and acceptance of 
reform. But it also inhibited transparency of dialogue, frankness in discussion and effective 
utilisation of the expertise that was on tap:  
Our culture helps because we grow up to respect our elders and to work together. You listen to what 
the matai says. You respect what was coming from the leaders in terms of the change. So you got to 
absorb it. But you might not get the frankness of what people thought of the change. [PSS.7] 
It’s the nature of the folks there to be nationalistic. The Samoans through the Steering Committee 
were driving it. That talking in Samoan made things localised. But it made us feel useless to some 
extent because there were areas where Mick and I could contribute if we knew what was discussed 
in meetings. That ownership and talking in Samoan tended to underutilise what the project could 
offer. [SC.3] 
6.2.2.5. Results 
At the end of the project, the PSC-ISP was assessed as generally successful. Achievements 
included a 20% downsizing of the public service, with departments reduced from 27 to 14 
ministries. There were also legislative changes, HRM policies in place, operational functions 
devolved to ministries, professional development programs provided across the public 
service, and PSC performing a new policy role (PSC-ISP, 2004):      
When I wrote the final report in 2004 I made a cogent argument that it was a success. We got a new 
act, new regulations and general orders on every HRM aspects for the public service in that country. 
We have reformed it. So it was a successful project in the end. [SC.3]   
A 2002 community survey showed that 90% of those surveyed viewed the government 
services as good or very good (PSC-ISP, 2004). However there has not been a full evaluation 
of the PSC-ISP and other ISPs, hence it was difficult to determine through cost-benefit 
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analyses any of the long-term impacts not readily visible to the public eye. Some cast doubt 
on the impact of this ISP on public sector rightsizing and service delivery:   
A lot of these reforms were invisible. The real thing was that Ministries were able to recruit and 
select their people, we slashed the public service, and all that. But if you talk to the men on the street 
they wouldn’t see it because it’s a long-term institutional reform. And no one has questioned PSC 
through its annual reporting on the benefits of these reforms. No one has actually looked at that. 
[SPS-M.4]      
Millions are going into these ISPs... They were meant to right-size the public sector and improve 
service delivery. But it’s not reflecting that. The biggest challenge is the public sector growing, not 
the private sector. It’s a huge burden to this country. [SP.3]      
6.2.2.6. Key factors  
Table 6.4 summarises the critical factors of the PSC-ISP’s policy process:   
 
Table 6.4: PSC-ISP key factors 
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6.2.3. The SPP 
6.2.3.1. Background 
The SPP was a reform program initiated by the GoS in 2001 ‘to strengthen the Samoa Police 
Service (SPS) to enable it to contribute economic growth, social stability and ensure 
equitable access to efficient police services for all Samoans’ (SPP, 2005, p.6). The program 
has evolved in name, delivery, and management modality (see Table 6.5). Implementation 
commenced in 2004 as a five-year (Australia-Samoa) bilateral ISP, preceded by an Interim 
Assistance Phase (IAP) to prepare the SPS for reform. AusAID direct support through 
UniQuest Pty and Global Justice Solutions (GJS) (as AMCs) completed in December 2008. 
The January/September 2009 extension assisted the Australian Federal Police’s (AFP) take-
over through an Australia-Samoa Police Partnership (SAPP). The SAPP was ongoing during 
the 2012 fieldwork and was not known when and whether it will come to an end. The five-
year ISP was costed at AUD$16 million, AUD$7 million going into the new police 
headquarters and armoury. The SAPP was costed at about ST$2.64 in 2012. Components 
under different AMCs (Table 6.6) were geared towards improving the SPS technical and 
corporate capacity in modern policing: 
 
Source: Extracted from GoS (2012); SPP (2005, 2007b, 2009a)      
 
Source: Extracted from SAPP (2010a, 2010c, 2011); SPP (2005, 2007b, 2007c) 
Table 6.5: SPP movement in design and managing contractors 
 
Table 6.6: SPP movement in content 
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6.2.3.2. Initiation  
The SPP came considerably late compared to most government ministries that already had 
their first ISPs by the mid-1990s. Given the role played by the fa’amatai in local law and 
order, state policing was confined initially in having a restricted role in village law and order. 
However, as the economy developed, so did social problems placing pressure on traditional 
institutions to cope with increased criminal activities (particularly amongst unemployed 
youths in urbanised areas outside the fa’amatai). Noticeable was increased domestic 
violence, social offences, white collar crimes, transactional crimes and illegal drug use 
(Lua'iufi & Aiafi, 2010; SPS, 2011). Strengthening the SPS policing capacity consequently 
emerged as a significant need. Late acknowledgement of the centrality of social stability to 
economic development also contributed to the late birth of the Law and Justice Sector in 
2006, the last to become formalised within the umbrella of 15 sectors (GoS, 2009). This 
sector’s vision in its first plan was ‘justice for a safe and stable Samoa’ (GoS, 2008). A 
realisation that this vision required strengthening the SPS’s policing role was emphasised in 
the SDS 2005-2008 (and later versions).  
Within this strategic direction, the SPP became part of ongoing reforms (SAPP, 2010c). The 
need for reforms occurred during (Police) Commissioner Asi Blakelock’s leadership in the 
mid-1990s, therefore the instigation of the IAP to facilitate a culture for reform within the 
SPS. The IAP was initially for one year only (May 2001-April 2002) but this extended out 
to December 2002. Yet the SPP only began its implementation in 2004 when a new 
Commissioner was appointed. The IAP’s extension, followed by lapses in the SPP, indicated 
concerns over leadership of this reform and a consequential need for change at this level:  
These reforms were there all along waiting to happen. But Asi didn’t accept them. So the government 
decided to retire him and find someone else who was receptive to reforms. That was when Lorenese 
was appointed Commissioner in 2003 and he came in and started the SPP. [PSS.10]     
Edd Peek (AusAID) informed the PCC regarding the levels of risks associated with the project… 
there would be a break of between six weeks to a couple of months… due to uncertainty in the future 
of the project no further PCC meetings would be planned until notification. (SPS-ISP, 2002) 
6.2.3.3. Formulation 
The SPP’s four key movements, identified in Table 6.5 and Table 6.6, are summarised below. 
They indicate that the project underwent significant changes from its original formulation:   
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 The IAP aimed to ‘plant the seeds of change’ and assess the SPS’s culture, competence 
and capacity for implementation through training, community consultation, and testing 
models for a new organisational structure. Legislative changes facilitated the 
establishment of a new contemporary SPS structure with four Assistant Commissioner 
positions. The IAP informed the 2003 Project Design Document and confirmed wider 
support for reform. Five Australian consultants (two were long-term) under Uniquest 
assisted in the IAP under the stewardship of a multi-stakeholders PCC (Schofield, Solofa, 
Lewis, & Cain, 2006; SPS-ISP, 2001, 2002).  
 Uniquest, consisting of three long-term advisers, continued as the Australian Managing 
Contractor in the implementation phase in January 2004. The IAP PCC continued to 
provide oversight through quarterly meetings. AusAID and other external mechanisms 
provided M&E (Schofield et al., 2006; SPP, 2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c).  
 GJS took over from Uniquest in 2007 after the 2006 Medium Term Review. This led to 
an overall re-design of the SPP, realigning its components with SPS strategic direction 
and capacity building. The PCC was converted into a Steering Committee, and a senior 
police officer appointed SPP deputy team leader to strengthen the project and its 
counterpart linkages. GJS had a ‘culturally sensitive balanced’ team of internationally, 
regionally and locally engaged experts, as well as a mixture of four long-term and various 
short-term advisory inputs into different policing and corporate areas. M&E mechanisms 
(Steering Committee, SPP/SPS management meetings, reviews) were revitalised. (SPP, 
2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2009a). 
 AFP provided ongoing support through the SAPP following the Joint Review and 
Planning Mission towards the end of the SPS-ISP in 2008. The aim was to consolidate 
and stabilise the reforms (SAPP, 2010c) through a coordinated approach under the Law 
and Justice Sector. This was consistent with the GoS sector-wide approach and 
Australia’s regional Pacific Police Development Program (SPP, 2008).  
As was evident from various experts’ inputs, the SPP was based on ideas of modern policing 
and organisational development under a Westminster government system. However, 
research, consultation and analyses were undertaken indicating efforts to locally 
contextualise this reform.  
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6.2.3.4. Implementation 
After two years of implementation, the 2006 Medium Term Review assessed the SPP as not 
working. This was attributed to the following: 
 It was not reflective of contextual changes and priorities despite its rolling design;  
 Did not sufficiently take into account the socio-cultural environment. Community 
policing was not guided by an understanding of the relationship between police and 
fa’amatai;  
 Insufficiently directed towards capacity building and establishing relationships between 
advisers and counterparts;  
 Lack of local ownership, direction and relevancy;  
 Raising of expectations for which the SPS was not prepared to meet;  
 The historical neglect of the Law and Justice Sector as reflected by poor police 
conditions;  
 Dependence on too few advisers rather than a cadre of local change leaders; and  
 Lack governments (Samoa-Australia) monitoring and policy dialogue. The PCC met 
only once. (Schofield et al., 2006):  
That review assessed the project as failing… We also did a survey which showed no improvement in 
public confidence in the police. The project came and it wasn’t part of us. These guys came and just 
sat in their little office, doing their own thing. There was no sense of responsibility from us. [PSS.9]  
Tangible implementation largely took place in the 2007-2009 period, following the 2007 
overhaul of the project design to facilitate localisation, ownership, leadership and capacity 
development. Momentum loss during Uniquest’s management and following the 2006 
Review and redesign required a definite focus ‘to restore the project credibility with the SPS 
and other stakeholders’ (SPP, 2007a, p.7):  
The SPP has contributed to a range of noticeable achievements in capacity development since the 
Medium Term Review. Stakeholders widely attribute the success of this assistance to the increased 
use of local and regional expertise… within the relevant SPS work areas... a significant improvement 
in the morale within senior SPS ranks and an increased sense of ownership of the development 
process. Strong leadership from the Commissioner indicates his growing confidence in the SPS. 
(SPP, 2008, p.6)    
It was that redesign where the police started to realise it was their project…. The executive realised 
they should be leading the whole thing… It was the GJS time where all these changes happened like 
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this corporate plan we are using to guide our work instead of the ad hoc norm we had before. [PSS.8]   
The ups and downs of this project indicated the significance of leadership for reform within 
a police institutional culture. But that leadership saw three different Commissioners.  First 
was Asi Blakelock who encountered the first phase of major public sector reforms in the 
mid-1990s, but who was not receptive to change. Then came Lorenese Papalii who was 
instrumental in reform from 2004, but his leadership was discontinued in 2009 following 
involvement in gun smuggling (2009, September 21). Next, Lilo Maiava continued the 
reform from 2009, but his service was also discontinued in September 2014 after an 
investigation of mismanagement (Radio NZ, 2014, December 12). This left the reform 
environment unstable during the 2014 fieldwork, making change difficult to progress, given 
Lilo’s suspension since mid-2013, and the SPS being rendered subject to a commission of 
inquiry. Police leadership in Samoa has always been controversial, with external recruitment 
often considered an option to help break a cycle of corruption within the police. In March 
2015, a non-SPS Samoan with overseas police experience was appointed Commissioner 
(Radio NZ, 2015, March 26): 
There was never any commitment by Asi’s leadership… It was like let’s go with the flow. Everybody 
is reforming. And we have this money. Lorenese was pro-reform but he didn’t have the maturity and 
vision for the Ministry. But he was better than most of them. They must have a leader who is prepared 
to say no… Bringing in an overseas person would send a strong message to these people, to break 
their corrupt cycle. Lilo’s suspension is planting the seed for some change there. [PSS.12] 
The project since AFP’s takeover changed significantly with only limited institutional 
strengthening in focus. This was largely due to the project’s management and delivery 
staying conditioned by AFP home politics and processes, and where the project was treated 
as an AFP mission rather than a reform process within a developmental context:  
It’s the political thing back home that drives what we can do here, restricting how we move things... 
We have things in mind based on getting money like this police academy... But people at home keep 
stripping money from us. Because it’s got to be a cash grab and a quick spend rather than long-term 
projects that build in things. We are trying to improve things at an accelerated rate while we are 
here but I don’t think we have been successful like that. So we have to expect that our influences here 
are small steps at a time. [AFP-M.2] 
The only thing I see now is these Australian people coming in and buying things that are visible. 
Capacity building was the focus but there is no more of that… The project is stalled to await the 
results of this commission of inquiry. [PSS.11]   
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A major factor influencing policing work and its reform has been political interference. The 
police force is not independent in performing its law enforcement functions as is expected 
under a Westminster system:   
I see Ministers and CEOs doing corruption but most are dismissed not charged… The Commissioner 
has the power to investigate them. But no Commissioner will because he won’t last five minutes. They 
got enough evidence to summon the Deputy PM but they got a stop from up there. That behaviour is 
consistent across all executive members… That’s culture. Fatu (Assistant Commissioner) did his job 
but didn’t get re-appointed because he answered back to the PM. [AFP-M.3]   
Instead of coming to me, he (Associate Minister) directed Angie (Manager Corporate) to outsource 
the construction of police outposts to his business. I advised him that we can’t do that. But he went 
ahead and built some outposts… I had many problems with my management because of so much 
political interference. [PSS.12]   
Coupled with strong political interference and limited strong police leadership remains the 
pervasive influence of the fa’aSamoa. Locals take some cultural aspects as a normal part of 
life, while most external actors see them as part of the problem in maintaining an objective 
and accountable police service:  
This is a good police force. But there’s a big cultural influence holding the country back. Some 
elements of the culture are good but unfortunately it’s a bit like the egg and the chicken... There’s so 
much conflict of interest that it’s not funny. Everybody is related. There are lots of favours done. 
That influences a lot of what we are trying to do here. It’s like our Western system being imposed on 
this culture and it’s hard to fit in. And it doesn’t do a bad job. It’s got a long way to go. [AFP-M.1]   
There are considerable gaps in the SPS capacity compared to other ministries. Hence the 
ongoing challenges that are faced in sustaining introduced changes within an embedded 
police culture influenced by social-political elements. Given these influences, the approach 
to reform has largely been gradual and will continue accordingly. Major changes in policing 
are seen as generational, subject to determination by behavioural changes throughout society:  
If you look at the police force you are looking at the community in smaller aspects… If the police 
force is brutal, the community is. The whole thing is a circle. If you are the PM and you try to stop 
cultural influences and corruption, you aren’t going to be PM for long. It takes a brave leader. 
[AFP-M.2]   
The biggest gap is grasping the knowledge given by the project. When advisers go its back to square 
one. It’s not so much an issue of knowledge transfer. It’s more about the education and culture of 
these people (police). There are big gaps there. [PSS.10]   
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We gave a structure for how we see Intel to take advantage of training. I asked for 15 staff but they 
got only 8. They can’t afford more people. So they continue doing the same work as before… So 
training is not being used. Sustainability is a worry. That’s why I said small steps. It’s generational. 
[AFP-M.1]  
6.2.3.5. Results 
The SPP’s results were mixed. Formal evaluations and various participants considered the 
SPP as having contributed to positive changes. Improved physical infrastructure and 
resource base for police work did contribute to increased police mobility and visibility (GoS, 
2008, p.27). SPS corporate planning and policy culture were also improved with up-to-date 
mandates (legislation, policies and systems), and a modern structure (with functions such as 
domestic violence, professional standards, intelligence, HRM and training) in place. Gender 
equity xxi  and engagement in whole-of-government and regional processes have been 
enhanced: 
There’s a big improvement. A lot of policies are in place like an organisational structure, systems 
and processes to guide our work. [PSS.10] 
One noticeable success is in gender balance and sensitivitisation. Once we can get that balance at 
the Assistant Commissioner level we can see some breakthrough in the Ministry. [SPS-M.2] 
However, some stakeholders saw benefits accrued as not equating to resources consumed by 
the police reform program. Ongoing investigation of alleged mismanagement and corruption 
have also affected perspectives about the program’s overall performance. Nevertheless, 
those with close involvement in the project witnessed these benefits albeit not easily visible 
to external actors. Independent surveys have also shown improved public confidence in the 
police: 
That reform is an absolute waste of time and money… It’s more than 10 years and the money going 
into it is probably close to $40 million. But it’s not working. The only success I see is the new building, 
uniform, vehicles and things like that. [SCS-M.3]   
We still have issues with corruption. But compared to 10 years ago, there are major improvements. 
Surveysxxii show a big jump in public confidence in the police since the project started. [PSS.9]        
Significant progress has been made by the SPS since the formal commencement... To the casual 
                                                                            
xxi A survey (SPP, 2009b) showed an increased number of women being promoted over the previous five years. 
xxii SPS (2013). 
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observer this progress can be underestimated… The SPP has been the subject of intense scrutiny and 
consistently has been proven to be effective both in content and its style of delivery. (SPP, 2009a, 
p.21) 
6.2.3.6. Key factors 
Table 6.7 summarises the critical factors of the SPP’s policy process:   
 
Chapter eight further discusses key factors emerging from Samoa’s policy cases, in 
comparison with those in Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and the Region (see Appendix G), 
and against existing literature.  
6.3. The policy processes in general  
This section examines participant experiences and observations of policy processes in 
general. Their stories are analysed in accordance with the research question of how public 
policies are initiated, formulated and implemented and what are critical factors for effective 
implementation.  
Table 6.7: SPP key factors 
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6.3.1. Policy initiation  
Participants were asked where issues that became policies mostly originated. Table 6.8 
shows that issues that became public policies originated mostly from within government 
(frequency of 32) and external actors (frequency of 26). Issues originating from society 
(frequency of 5) were limited. These patterns indicated that public policy settings in Samoa 
remained top-down: 
 
Narrative extracts below illustrate what these patterns meant. They indicate that policy 
settings were influenced predominantly by politicians, public servants and donor aid-
sponsored policy areas:  
Most of what we adopt is what the government wants… things that get them re-elected. But we also 
have these plans to make them look good, to show people we are doing something, to show how 
clever you are and to get money from donors. [PSS.13]    
It’s the officials who are driving it (the SDS). And is driven, I won’t say by donors, but by where the 
aid is going into, like climate change because there’s so much funding coming into that area. But we 
need to ask in the overall context of our society where should really be our priority. [PSS.5]    
6.3.2. Policy formulation  
What is constructed by various policy actors as (public) ‘policy’ and how are they 
constructing policies are important areas of this inquiry.  
Table 6.8: Origins of public policy in Samoa 
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6.3.2.1. Construction of policy 
Participants were asked about what they refer to as (public) ‘policy’ and how they view the 
nature and characteristics of existing polices. Sections 6.3.2.1 and 6.3.2.2 examine 
participants’ responses to these questions.  
6.3.2.1.1. What is mostly referred to as policy? 
There was no consistent construction of ‘policy’, which might have referred to any of the 
documents in Table 6.9. Nevertheless, that mostly referred to as key policy documents 
included the SDS, and the plans at sectoral and ministry levels (frequency of 32). 
International, regional and donor requirements (frequency of 12 and 11), the rational process 
for policy formulation (‘policy for policy’) (frequency of 12), legislation (frequency of 8) 
and other documents were also referred to as policy. Political policy platforms were limited, 
often loosely portrayed (frequency of 4):   
 
Narrative extracts below illustrate what these patterns meant. The SDS’s development and 
policy advice to Cabinet have been driven bottom-up by public servants. Formal political 
agenda settings and policy discourse including feedback on existing policies were regarded 
as limited:  
If you look at the way the SDS was developed, the MoF just asked Ministries to give whatever 
strategies they wanted to pursue in the next five years. Then the MoF put them together and signed 
off. There needs to be top level agenda setting done. [PSS.5] 
Table 6.9: Construction of policy in Samoa 
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At the party level they don’t have institutional bodies to do research and develop policies… At our 
Cabinet there isn’t a strong institutional policy role either. Here, the advice is very ad hoc driven by 
the public service… There was a time when an emphasis was given to political manifestos. But that 
has drifted. Now it’s like a dominant squad. It’s only Tuilaepa promises and it’s like let’s go and 
listen to what he’s telling us to do. There’s no policy discourse—in-depth discussions to get feedback 
on where we are. [SPS-M.4] 
6.3.2.1.2. Levels of policies 
Table 6.10 shows Samoa’s policy framework comprising various documents referred to as 
policies in Table 6.9. Participants constructed these documents as manifestations evident at 
different levels of the policy process. The SDS co-exist with sectoral and Ministries’ 
strategic plans. Operational policies (legislation, procedures, etc.) exist within Ministries and 
M&E mechanisms encompassed Ministries’ annual reporting to Parliament, SDS and 
budgetary reviews and the Cabinet Development Committee’s process where major 
development projects are appraised and endorsed: 
 
A key issue identified was the need for an alignment and understanding of different extant 
plans. As well, specific policies to operationalise high level plans into actions across sub-
sectors and Ministries were required. This will vary with some institutions, yet a complete 
set of these hierarchical plans was required for inclusion within a coherent working 
framework:   
We have some major gaps as far as policies are concerned. If you go sector by sector, there will be 
some like health, education and water with policies. But there are sectors that have minimum to none 
documented policies. And a lot of things are beginning to go down the same path of individual sectors 
having silo mentality… Ministries do their own agenda and policies and just flip them up. Because 
Cabinet doesn’t have a policy coordination happening, things just get signed off without proper 
understanding. [SPS-M.1] 
Table 6.10: Samoa’s policy framework  
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A further gap in operationalisation has occurred at the legislation level. Having relevant and 
up-to-date acts and regulations, to support implementation and enforcement, involves 
reconciling modern laws and customs. This remains necessary although a long-term task: 
They stopped prosecuting anyone because they lost the court cases. Written procedures of how they 
operate it (breathalyser) and do blood testing were missing. The legislation (Traffic Ordinance 1960) 
was very difficult to read, even for me as a palagi. It was from NZ and wasn’t set to Samoa’s 
conditions. So I worked with the traffic people to get these procedures in place. [AFP-M.1] 
The Law Reform Commission is in the forefront of updating laws, to blend what’s acceptable... In 
many cases they make adaptations in reconciling customs and modern laws… Like the need to give 
order in the village community in your rights as individuals and communal interests and unity, 
through the village council and the decision-making system. [SC.5] 
6.3.2.1.3. Features of policy  
Most participants regard existing policies as glorified plans which, in their formulation, 
comprised an exercise that appeared mostly technocratic and isolated from known realities 
(see section 6.3.2). Plans were often produced for purposes of securing funding that may 
then go underutilised for implementation. They lacked long-term focus and remained more 
or less the same in content. In reality, what got adopted has been driven mostly by rewarding 
perceived political support:  
We don’t really come up with new policies. We just review and update these policies to ensure they 
remain relevant. [SPS-M.15] 
Policies are the basis of what we are doing… In many ways that’s why we are in trouble. There’s no 
national integrated policy on issues. There’s lots of plans. But they are glorified plans like this SDS. 
We keep referring to it but it’s just a Treasury plan for investment. It doesn’t reflect much other than 
the budget. It doesn’t spell out where Samoa is going to be in the next 10 or 20 years. It’s very much 
about whatever the government decides then we just follow. But a lot of things don’t add up. Like 
this schoolnet, it’s a great plan but it’s unrealistic, the infrastructure is terrible, internet is so 
expensive, because we don’t know where we are going with information technology. [SPS-M.4] 
A lot of aid agencies just go with the ‘tick in the box’ approach. There’s a plan and that’s it. If you 
look at the Public Administration Sector Plan, PSC basically abandoned it. It was only when it was 
reviewed that it was taken up again and passed onto us. If you look at its history, it was never utilised 
to improve policy. Like it was needed. It was really a plan to get more aid into the Public Sector 
Improvement Facility, to save this money from losing out for other commitments. [SC.6] 
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6.3.2.2. How are policies formulated? 
This inquiry examines how policies are developed: the methodological processes employed, 
who has been doing the work of formulation, and what is used as the knowledge basis for 
policy. Table 6.11 gives the coded participant narratives about this ‘how’ question. Patterns 
shown by the narratives frequency are discussed in sections below. Narrative extracts 
provided shortly illustrate what these patterns meant:   
 
6.3.2.2.1. Knowledge basis of policy  
The patterns in Table 6.11 show that evidence-based policy was limited (frequency of 23). 
Rather, the policy process was commonly ad hoc, dominated by ideological factors 
(frequency of 12) and policy transfers (e.g. development orthodoxies) (frequency of 8). 
Participants experienced rational analysis of issues and contextualisation of policies as 
limited. Often, high level plans (sector and Ministries’ corporate plans) are formulated. But 
prioritisation and making trade-offs amongst competing strategic policy areas needed proper 
consideration for the operationalisation of high level plans into implementation:   
Table 6.11: Knowledge basis, methodology and formulation of policy in Samoa 
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The operation of that policy cycle is ad hoc, very much depends on the priority of the Minister and 
CEO. We rarely get a policy paper that fleshes out the issues before we decide on what to do. What’s 
happening is we jump into law. Then you implement it, you have loopholes because we didn’t do the 
fleshing out first. So the whole process is problematic... What we are doing is guesswork, a copy and 
paste thing without attempting to contextualise what is suitable. If we look at child abuse cases it's a 
priority. But if you ask whether we have a policy to address this issue, there’s none. [PSS.16] 
It’s hard to make sense of what policies are driving the decisions. In these plans, agencies end up 
with broad —‘we want all things for all people’—statements. They don’t help you to prioritise, to set 
your agenda. These high level documents are easy to do because you just put everything in and not 
worry about how much you are able to do in this timeframe, what you can afford, and what to drop 
off the list. Here, they are a long way away from being able to take this proliferation of strategic 
documents and boil them down to a list of priorities, something practical. [SC.2] 
6.3.2.2.2. Methodology  
In addition to findings presented in section 6.3.2.1.3, the policy process remained top-down 
(directive) (frequency of 20). Consultation (frequency of 18) and participatory (frequency of 
11) approaches have improved, but in-depth dialogue and scope for constructive feedback 
remained limited. Some attributed this limitation to Samoa’s micro-context where 
constructive debates or criticisms are less welcome given strong social ties: 
The form of it seems technocratic—these overarching strategies like the SDS and Public 
Administration Sector Plan… It’s quite top down. The weakness is that it’s takes on a life of its own, 
becoming an exercise in its own right with no real connections to what the important things are. So 
you end up with a plan which is not implemented, gathering dust on the shelf. You get a small bunch 
of well-educated, analytical thinkers disconnected from the real world of politics writing this 
beautifully crafted document under the influence of consultants flown in from Canberra or 
Wellington. But it doesn’t reflect the realities of people and those whom it’s intended for don’t really 
feel they own it. [SC.1]   
In terms of a relatively independent body to review and advice back on policies, that we are drifting 
this way or that way, there’s none. The types of consultation we are doing is like we go there, have 
morning tea, say a prayer and that’s it. There’s no in-depth dialogue… This goes back to the micro-
context of our community, that the so-called constructive criticism of policy is not conducive. [SPS-
M.3]   
6.3.2.2.3. Formulators of policy  
Further, most policy documents were developed by public servants (frequency of 10). Given 
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lesser technical capacity in a small state, that role was often supplemented by overseas 
consultants (frequency of 18). Consequently, consultants’ influences and inputs into local 
policy formulation remained significant. Political direction of policy setting was however 
limited:  
My suggestion during the consultation was there should be a whole-of-government approach to the 
SDS in close consultation with the government... At the moment it’s not. Most Ministers don’t have 
much say in the agenda setting or the SDS. The only matter filling Cabinet agenda is travel and most 
policy setting is done at our level. [PSS.18] 
What’s influencing the whole policy process in any country is capacity in terms of scale. There’s this 
policy frame based on objectivity in terms of research, data and assessments. That rational approach 
requires a lot of brains and hands. Most PICs don’t have that luxury. In NZ most ministries have 
several analysts working full time on a particular policy area, the issues, and checks and balances 
of the system. We don’t. Our basic constraint is limited capacity to respond to the gaps in the whole 
process. Then we have an army of overseas consultants coming in to plug up those gaps to the extent 
they become parts and even drivers of policy. [SPS-M.5] 
6.3.2.2.4. Understanding of policy  
A limited understanding of existing policies (see frequency of 37 in Table 6.11) commonly 
signposts the lack of a consistent and clear comprehension of an actual policy and what it 
should achieve in the medium—versus long-term. At the macro-level, this limitation derives 
from a lack of understanding about the essence of national government and its public policy 
role:   
There doesn’t seem to be the attention given to public policies. People don’t talk about public policies. 
People talk about laws, regulations, plans and strategies but not policy rationales and objectives. 
[PSS.7]  
Policies are all in sector plans. We contribute to the long-term vision through the sector-wide 
approach. The short-term vision is addressed through corporate plans. The issue is whether we are 
clear in where we want to go in five or 10 years. I don’t think it’s clear. [SPS-M.3] 
6.3.3. Policy implementation  
Table 6.12 outlined key factors or issues most participants considered as significant to the 
whole policy process in terms of successful implementation:  
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Given their interrelatedness, these factors are condensed and narrated in the following 
sections under five headings: public policy leadership, stakeholder support and feedback, 
capability and translation of policy to community.  
6.3.3.1. Public policy leadership   
Leadership is influenced by the fa’aSamoa (see Figure 6.1). The government is another layer 
over the fa’aSamoa. As a homogenous society (see Table 1.1), every aiga, village and 
district is governed by matai ranked according to a customary constitution (fa’alupega) and 
decision-making and administration are in accordance with the fa’aSamoa. Those born and 
raised under this system know their place in terms of their relative roles, relationships and 
expectations. Actors (all politicians and most senior officials) are matai connected to their 
aiga as homes and sources of identity and obligation. Within a blending of fa’amatai and 
introduced institutions comes a mixture of expectations: some to a national system of 
government, others more strongly to fa’aSamoa where obligations are to your aiga operating 
within an immediate village fa’amatai governance setting: 
 
Table 6.12: Issues or factors central to implementation in Samoa 
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Source: Author’s construct 
6.3.3.1.1. Stability and power  
Samoa is regarded as a role model in the region because of its positive progress since self-
government contributing largely to political stability, which enables consistent public policy. 
Political stability reflects societal stability and the resilience of government and fa’aSamoa 
institutions. With limited exceptions, only matai can stand for election. Village councils 
under the Village Fono Act 1960 have authority for local law and order. The Land and Titles 
Court registers lands and matai titles and handles disputes. It is in the nature of the 
fa’aSamoa socio-political mechanisms to maintain stability across aiga and villages. The 
fa’amatai is a dispersed system with power not concentrated in any one aiga.  
However, Samoan political power is heavily concentrated. Since 1982 only one party (HRPP) 
has held office. The key to retaining this one party dominance lies in its gaining executive 
control of parliament, the public service, fa’amatai, and an often docile local news media. 
For instance, the 1988 establishment of Associate Ministerial posts (22 Member of 
Parliaments),xxiii in addition to 13 Ministerial posts and the 2009 Electoral Amendment Act 
                                                                            
xxiii Previously called Parliamentary Under-Secretaries. 
Figure 6.1: Basic structure of the village fa’amatai system 
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disallowing party-hopping helped maintain the HRPP majority.xxiv The Ministerial advisory 
committee system of salaried, high profile matai in every portfolio has secured HRPP’s 
patronage control, and continuing support at village levels. The hiring and firing of all Heads 
of Departments are subject to Cabinet approval. In 2015, Parliament passed a constitutional 
amendment subjecting the appointment of the Head of State, Speaker and Deputy Speaker 
to Cabinet’s recommendation (instead of the previous parliamentary nominations) (Radio 
NZ, 2015, May 28):  
This is why Samoa is like this with its public policy—they go ahead with anything even when it’s 
inappropriate and despite protests like this road switch. They can do it because of their majority and 
how they look after their Member of Parliaments. The whole system is corrupt, xxv—designed to 
maintain them in power, to demolish the opposition to where it’s almost non-existent. [SP.3] 
In a democratic system like NZ, the continuity is with the public service to provide the advice and 
non-political service, not with Ministers as they come and go. That’s missing in us. We don’t have a 
Westminster system. We have the form, but not the substance of it. [SCS-M.1] 
Such power concentration not only reveals a ‘one party state’ but also a ‘one man party’, the 
HRPP under the leadership of only three Prime Ministers in the last three decades, the current 
incumbent serving since 1998: 
The whole situation can become weakened in the sense that Tuilaepa is too powerful… If something 
happened to him, the vacuum could destabilise public policies because once you are in the tail spin 
you cannot make timely decisions in terms of policies and things like that. [SPS-M.2]  
We are no different from China… If you look at our fa’aSamoa, absolute power means the concept 
of ‘malo’ (win). In those days, once you win the ‘malo’ through the ultimate way, which is war, its 
absolute power. That’s what we are seeing now with our government. [SCS-M.1] 
6.3.3.1.2. Leadership and accountability  
This power concentration reflects the status of public policy leadership as directive but 
lacking in checks and balances. Much public policy making was seen as passive and reactive, 
thereby overlooking societal development needs. Table 6.13 shows that 50.4% of matters 
discussed during Cabinet meetings during 2009-2010 concerned overseas travel. Other items 
considered also concerned administrative matters. Only 2.9% concerned policy papers. This 
                                                                            
xxiv Preventing members from joining the opposition party which had only 12 Member of Parliaments in 2015. 
xxv The Corruption Perception Index ranked Samoa 69 (out of 182) in 2011 and 50 (out of 174) in 2014. 
(http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results). 
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analysis reaffirms the view of various participants about the lack of leadership focus on 
fundamental public policy issues: 
They don’t focus on fundamental policies. They focus on micro-management issues. Cabinet’s got 
the wrong mix… He (PM) was good but he’s tired. All he’s doing is looking for things to mark his 
time as if something is happening, like the time zone change and road switch. But those decisions 
have absolutely no positive impact for Samoa. [PSS.17] 
People are aware of how much power government has. But there’s fear. You even find it in the public 
service. For this democratic society to work, people have to voice the truth… It’s becoming 
dangerous. Our GDP per capita is US$3,000 but the reality of that indicator is skewed to only 1% 
of the population or five families. And government hasn’t given this issue enough attention. [PSS.6] 
 
Source: Samoa Ministry of Prime Minister and Cabinet 
Table 6.13: An analysis of Samoa Cabinet minutes for 2009-2010 
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6.3.3.2. Stakeholder support and feedback  
The key issue concerning limited political accountability for public policy is that most people 
residing in rural communities vote according to familial and traditional lineages, less so on 
public policy issues. This confirms the influence of the fa’aSamoa, together with a limited 
understanding of government and government’s patronage influence. Changing the status 
quo would require generational (long-term) changes:  
We vote on traditional kinships and familial affiliations. Only about 2% of people in Apia vote on 
issues. For that to change you are looking at new generations who are not embedded in the fa’amatai. 
[PSS.7] 
In the last election the opposition won most of the seats in town. It’s a reflection of people here 
knowing what’s going on. But most people at the back have no idea of what’s going on. That’s why 
the government just picks the top chiefs and pays them… They just vote for whoever… That’s why 
these policies don’t work. [SP.3] 
Limited understanding of government has resulted in a lack of common appreciation as to 
how the two systems (national government and fa’aSamoa) could collaborate to mutual 
advantage. This includes how democratic practices could be enhanced in government and 
village administrations. Given such limitation in understanding the principles underpinning 
the two systems, the differences have been used as a leverage to advance political power:  
We need to move forward but not give up fa’aSamoa. Nobody cares about China or Japan for that 
matter… This Westminster system is given to us but we have the fa’aSamoa. Both systems are 
different and so we are applying the principles of democracy differently. It’s all mixed up. This issue 
is old… but it’s never talked about. I’m in my village fa’amatai and people there don’t understand 
and know the differences. So we aren’t used to it. The system is thus being twisted by this group to 
get more power. We’ve got to plant those principles within people first as they affect public policy. 
These are the principles that drive and make me look at the world in certain ways. If democracy is 
what we want, let’s understand it—how the two systems relate in that. [SCS-M.2] 
6.3.3.3. Capability (people, resources, learning, monitoring and evaluation)  
Samoa’s narrow fiscal and technical base is a key challenge for implementation. The 2014 
budget deficit stands at ST73 million (MoF, 2014). The recurrent budget absorbed two thirds, 
one third going to the development budget financed mainly through external borrowing and 
donor funding (GoS, 2014). Plans when drawn up often take little account of this limited 
capacity and the M&E process of reforms already undertaken: 
 178 
Most plans are taken out of context. This Public Administration Sector Plan has many outputs yet 
you are looking at only one or two people to do the implementation. It’s unrealistic. It’s the same 
throughout the Pacific… There’s a need to rescale all these plans. Like 20 outputs in Australia should 
equate to only 3 outputs here so you can actually deliver. [SC.15] 
All ISPs didn’t have an M&E component... But when donors came to follow-up, they saw that a lot 
weren’t working. Because to them as long as we get that change and the system in compliance with 
good governance, it was okay and that was achieved. But M&E was never part of the reform. [PSS.4] 
6.3.3.4. Translation of policy to community 
While high level plans are in place, Samoa has not worked out for itself what is relevant and 
what could work within its own national setting. The challenge is how best to tap into the 
civic village space with its authority and resources. This requires a better articulation of both 
systems (state and fa’aSamoa) and their potential roles in development. There is a further 
need for these roles to build bridges into the modern world of development and as one 
requiring strengthened local institutions. This process can be regarded as evolutionary, being 
one not necessarily addressed through externally derived policy transfers or top-down policy 
processes. Policy contextualisation and effective implementation required proper 
deliberation of assumptions, contradictions and fitness of local institutions, rather than 
simply adopting conventional approaches often available through policy transfers or formal 
education: 
Why we remain underdeveloped is because we haven’t done much implementation. We did a lot of 
enabling activities… piloting things with experts to test whether they are good or not. But we haven’t 
got a step-by-step approach on what could work for us. Donors just give us the money but if you visit 
Ministries it’s a mess. [PSS.16] 
We are naturally not people who sit down and write out a nice plan. We go with the flow... It will be 
interesting to suss out these conflicts in a traditional versus modern system. When we look at what is 
required, a lot of the stuff is adopted from outside with certain assumptions and behaviours which 
we don’t share. There needs to be other ways. Like we are devolving schools management to village 
committees and health is applying the same model. But that model is based on assumptions that 
people at lower levels have the capacity to do that work... It’s an issue that you can’t really address 
through public policy. You can’t really say to people you need to write a policy and do this and the 
problem will be fixed… Those things require an evolution of individuals and society in terms of 
certain models and ways for doing things to be effective. Our people with understanding of both 
systems need to be part of these committees and models to help improve the capacity out there… 
Contexts are different and these things need consideration before we sign off on policies. Often in 
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developing these plans we don’t think deeply about these things. We simply take the easy way out 
like a training, legislation or reform. It’s the ways we are educated. We learn about Western thinking 
and when we come back, we seem to have forgotten about the local context, so it’s hard to apply that 
thinking in our community. [PSS.5] 
6.4. Summary of findings  
Based on the narrative of evidence presented in the preceding sections, Table 6.14 
summarises key findings in terms of propositions emerging from Samoa. Chapter eight 
discusses these findings further, in comparison with findings from Vanuatu, Samoa and the 
Region (see Appendix H), and against existing literature (in chapter two).    
Stage/category  Key findings or propositions 
Initiation and adoption of 
policy 
1. Most public policies originate from within government or 
external influences. Public policies originating from 
society are limited.  
2. Policy adoption is highly political. 
Formulation of policy 3. Policy formulation is largely top-down developed by 
public servants and consultants. 
4. Policy discourse and evidence-based policy are limited.  
Rather the process is ad hoc, driven by ideological factors 
of the local context and policy transfers.   
5. The term ‘policy’ largely refers to strategic plans made 
manifest at different levels which are seen as technocratic 
and isolated from realities. What is often adopted and 
implemented is driven by perceived political demand. 
6. The above findings are consistent with those from Vanuatu 
and Solomon the Islands – the difference being a matter of 
degree.  
Implementation of policy 7. Instrumentation of high level strategic plans into 
implementation in society appeared missing, this related to 
limited understanding of the introduced system of 
government and the traditional system, and how both 
relate when translating public policy to a community level.  
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8. Political power is highly concentrated in that the politics 
and public policy is regarded as passive and lack checks 
and balances.     
Policy process as a whole 9. The success of implementation is attributed typically to 
leadership (political and public administration), local 
ownership, participation and consultation, adaptation of 
reform to context and mutual partnership.  
10. Contextual factors of a small island state, status of 
development and culture (fa’aSamoa) impact significantly 
on the practices of public policy.   
11. Public policy development lies at the intersection of the 
practices of the principles underlying the modern system 
of government and those of the fa’aSamoa. This requires 
an understanding by locals of the two systems and about 
how they could evolve and function best to serve the 
collective interests of society. 
Table 6.14: Key findings emerging from Samoa 
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CHAPTER 7: REGIONAL POLICY PROCESSES  
7.1. Introduction 
The previous three chapters examined the (‘national’) policy processes of Vanuatu, the 
Solomon Islands and Samoa. This chapter examines ‘regional’ policy processes based on 
patterns elucidated from participant narratives (see Appendix E), documentary analysesxxvi 
and participant observation. The research was conducted in accordance with the 
methodology outlined in chapter three. Contextual background to this regional case study in 
section 1.2.4 must be read in conjunction with this chapter. A total of 25 ‘regional’ (see 
Table 3.3) and 21 ‘national’ participants shared their experiences and observations of the 
Pacific Plan (the selected policy case) and how policies were generally initiated, formulated 
and implemented at this regional inter-governmental level (the ‘Region’). Researching all 
relevant regional institutions was beyond the scope of this study— the focus being largely 
on the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS) and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community 
(SPC), as core Pacific regional inter-government organisations (PRIGOs) encompassing 60% 
of this study’s regional participants.  
Section 7.2 examines the Pacific Plan’s policy process. Section 7.3 describes the general 
patterns of regional policy processes. Section 4.4 summarises key findings emerging from 
this regional case study.  
7.2. The policy case  
The Pacific Plan was adopted by Pacific leaders in 2005 to promote and implement a Pacific 
regionalism agenda. At the completion of its 10-year life plan in 2014, the Pacific Plan was 
recast as the ‘Framework for Pacific Regionalism’. This case study is based on data collected 
in 2012 while the Pacific Plan was the key regional policy platform. 
7.2.1. The Pacific Plan 
7.2.1.1. Background 
The case for regionalism, following the development of regional systems elsewhere, has 
                                                                            
xxvi Participant narrative extracts are indented and italicised whilst quotes from documents are also indented but non-
italicised. 
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been promoted to address common development challenges facing Pacific island countries 
(PICs). Pooling of resources across PICs, it is claimed, can provide economies of scale, 
efficiencies, and effectiveness in services and international competitiveness. Adoption of the 
2005-2014 ‘Pacific Plan for strengthening regional co-operation and integration’ by Pacific 
Leaders promoted this regional approach to public policy through the following ‘Vision’:  
Leaders believe the Pacific region can, should and will be a region of peace, harmony, security and 
economic prosperity, so that all of its people can lead free and worthwhile lives. We treasure the 
diversity of the Pacific and seek a future in which its cultures, traditions and religious beliefs are 
valued, honoured and developed. We seek a Pacific region that is respected for the quality of its 
governance, the sustainable management of its resources, the full observance of democratic values 
and for its defence and promotion of human rights... (PIF, 2005c)   
The Pacific Plan’s goal was to ‘enhance and stimulate economic growth, sustainable 
development, good governance and security for Pacific countries through regionalism’. 
Within these four pillars, 13 objectives were identified to achieve this goal. xxvii  The 
implementation strategy outlined 37 initiatives for implementation during the first three 
years (2006-2008), eight initiatives requiring agreement in principle, and six requiring 
further analysis. Implementation was the responsibility of PRIGOs or CROP agencies under 
the Pacific Plan Action Committee oversight (see section 1.2.4). 
7.2.1.2. Initiation  
The Pacific Plan began with the 2004 Eminent Persons Group Review of the Pacific Islands 
Forum (PIF) and its Secretariat (PIFS). This was the first comprehensive review since the 
PIF’s establishment in 1971. The Review, agreed to by Leaders at its 2003 Forum (chaired 
by the New Zealand Prime Minister (PM)), was driven by concerns that PICs’ development 
situations had deteriorated since their independence and beliefs that existing levels of 
regionalism were not adequately addressing the challenges confronting PICs (PIF, 2003):  
The Pacific Plan started in 2003 when Helen Clark was NZ PM where there was a big push to reform 
the PIFS. Leaders endorsed a review of the PIF and its Secretariat by an Eminent Persons Group 
from around the Region. [PRS.4] 
Amongst this Review report’s 32 recommendations (on transforming the PIFS) were the 
                                                                            
xxvii Improved trade and investment, private sector development, sports, infrastructure, natural resource and environment 
management, health, education and training, gender equality, youth, political and social stability and safety, good 
governance, poverty reduction and protection of culture and traditional knowledge. 
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adoption of a ‘refreshed’ Vision (to that of the traditional ‘Pacific way’) supported by a 
redefined mandate—a Pacific Plan. This report was discussed by Leaders in April 2004 
where the above-stated vision was adopted and deep regionalism re-emphasised (PIF, 
2004b). The following prescriptions for the Pacific Plan’s development were further 
endorsed, namely:  
 A need to sequence priority areas for deep co-operation and integration;  
 Based on comprehensive research and analyses, identify the possible development of a 
regionalism model suitable for the Pacific;  
 Promote ‘regional integration that runs deeper than that established already’;  
 Placing the ‘big idea’ of Pacific regionalism at the front of regional political agenda and 
stimulating debate on the region’s long-term future;  
 Build on the evolutionary process of regionalism of the past, and policy proposals for 
several pooling of regional resources, services and capacities;  
 Emphasise the Forum’s key interests of economic growth, sustainable development, 
governance and security; and 
 See these objectives developed by a taskforce. (Chan et al., 2004): 
What came out of that Review was the Pacific Plan. The Review said the Pacific needs a clear 
strategy for what it is trying to achieve. The other element out of that Review was the Vision for the 
Pacific. [RPS.4] 
Leaders agreed that the serious challenges… facing the countries of the region warranted serious and 
careful examination of the pooling of scarce regional resources. (PIF, 2004b) 
Although the 2003 Forum was the turning point for the initiation of the Pacific Plan, 
participant narratives indicated that the Pacific Plan, as an idea or concept, appeared to 
originate from the UN ‘Sustainable Development’ agenda promoted at the first 1992 World 
Summit in Rio:  
At the time the Pacific Plan was mooted, we just came out of the world summit and the key aspect of 
that was that countries will develop Sustainable Development Strategies. That was a priority we 
picked up on the Pacific Plan. A lot of support from the PIFS and partners went into countries to do 
that. [RPS.13] 
7.2.1.3. Formulation  
The Pacific Plan Taskforce, endorsed by Leaders in August 2004, consisted of Forum Islands 
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Countries’ officials and core PRIGOs representatives. The Taskforce carried out the Pacific 
Plan formulation under the oversight of a ‘core group’ of past, present and future Forum 
Chairs (PIF, 2004a). A draft Pacific Plan produced in December 2004 became the basis for 
consultation in early 2005 (PIFS, 2007). Basing the consultation on a pre-drafted version of 
the Pacific Plan and the adoption by Leaders of a Vision for the Region, before undergoing 
consultation and before the Pacific Plan was formulated, seemed to some as the downfall of 
the formulation process from the outset:  
I knew the Pacific Plan inside out because I translated it into Solomon Islands pidgin… The Pacific 
Plan is not a dream of the people. The Leaders just dreamed for us. The Leaders met in Auckland in 
2004, drank wine, had a five course meal, got excited while they were talking and made an Auckland 
Declaration on the Pacific Plan. There was consultation but it came later after they formulated the 
Plan… There was no meaningful consultation… If they want us to share their dream, they should 
come and talk to us. That should give enough information on what the Pacific Plan should be about. 
But that didn’t happen. [RCS-M.1] 
The Vision linked to the Leaders was framed by Dr Senipisi Langi Kavaliku (one of the 2004 Eminent 
Persons Group Review), a Tongan intellectual and close friend…  Kavaliku told me that he drew 
inspiration for the Vision from Professor Amartya Sen’s notion of ‘Development as Freedom’… 
How many… Leaders who signed off on the Vision in Auckland in 2004 knew of the developmental 
intension is not known but what is clear to me now is that few of our current Leaders have a clue on 
the origins of the Vision that underscores the Pacific Plan. (Chand, 2013, March 13) 
An ADB-Commonwealth Secretariat (2005) project commissioning 17 regionalism studies, 
and the Hughes Review of the Regional Institutional Framework (2005), formed the analytic 
foundations for the Pacific Plan. The ADB-Commonwealth Secretariat (2005) report 
assessed regional initiatives most likely to yield higher benefits as improving labour market 
access between countries, telecommunication markets liberalisation, harmonising fisheries 
access arrangements, creating certain regional offices and facilities (ombudsman, aviation, 
nursing and police training, bulk purchasing of petroleum products)’ and capacity 
supplementation in economics, statistics, customs and auditing. As indicated by participant 
narratives, and as the ADB-Commonwealth Secretariat’s study (2005, p.6) reiterated, the 
Pacific Plan fell short of its prescriptions recommended in the 2004 Eminent Persons Group 
Review. The Pacific Plan did not have a new formulation: it merely reiterated the PIF’s work 
practices since its establishment: 
Identified under the Pacific Plan are things this Forum has talked about over the last 40 years of its 
existence. Common topics are trade, regional integration, climate change, environment and 
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development. [RPS.1]    
The Hughes (2005) Review suggested that deep regionalism required a radical reform of the 
regional architecture. Amalgamating PRIGOs into a single Pacific Community regional 
organisation would exploit capabilities and enable deeper integration. Although the Pacific 
Community was not a new idea, xxviii it had not materialised, being often resisted by some 
leaders and regional organisations: 
The Regional Institutional Framework was an attempt to radically reform the whole CROP family. 
The idea was that you would end up with one or two regional organisations; a political arm and a 
technical arm… It got undermined. Countries didn’t want to give up their regional organisations. 
SPREP is based in Samoa and your PM wasn’t keen to lose that. [RPS.15] 
The Pacific Plan was endorsed by the Leaders in 2005 including the following 
implementation requirements as identified in the ‘Kalibobo Roadmap on the Pacific Plan’: 
 The PIF to ‘move progressively towards a comprehensive framework agreement 
amongst all Forum Islands Countries that includes trade (including services) and 
economic co-operation’;  
 ‘Implementation is the responsibility of the PIFS’, overseen by a Pacific Plan Action 
Committee (a descendant of the Pacific Plan Taskforce);    
 Successful implementation is ‘dependent on the support and commitment of member 
countries, regional organisations, development partners and other stakeholders’; 
 ‘The development and implementation of national policies and strategies on regionalism 
are an important strategic objective of the Pacific Plan’;  
 Monitoring and evaluation (M&E), through quarterly and annual reports and 
independent reviews every three years; and 
 Implementation carried out through a centralised ‘Pacific fund’. (PIF, 2005a, 2005c) 
                                                                            
xxviii Moore (1982), NZ PM proposed a South Pacific Economic and Political Community. The NZ government 
subsequently commissioned a ‘Towards a Pacific Community’ study with a report suggesting further dialogue on the 
matter (Henderson et al., 1990). The same idea re-emerged in the Australian Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade 
References Committee (2003) Report which was the first time the issue of closer regional integration was acknowledged 
as part of Australia’s future Pacific policy. The idea was to have a Pacific parliament, certain regional offices, and a 
common labour market and currency (Sercombe & Peebles, 2005). The Hughes (2005) report was criticised as lacking 
consultation and its proposed Pacific Community was considered unworkable given PRIGOs unequal governing 
structures. A six person team (Tavola et al., 2006) was tasked with exploring Hughes’ proposed restructuring. The team’s 
recommendation, which was approved by PIF (2007), was to re-organise the Regional Institutional Framework into three 
pillars (instead of a single Pacific Community): a political and general policy institution (the PIF and its Secretariat 
(PIFS)); a sector-focused technical institution (the Pacific Community and its Secretariat (SPC)); and academic and 
training institutions (USP and PIDP). Four other PRIGOs—FFA, SPREP, SOPAC (Pacific Islands Applied Geoscience 
Commission) and SPBEA (Secretariat of the Pacific Board for Educational Assessment) were to be absorbed into SPC. 
Absorption of SPREP and FAA never took place. 
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The Leaders in 2005 also adopted the ‘Agreement Establishing the PIF’ as an inter-
governmental organisation at international law for the first time, and redefining ‘the Forum’s 
purpose and functions to reflect the vision and directions taken under the Pacific Plan’. This 
agreement awaits ratification by all Forum Islands Countries (PIF, 2005a, 2005b).  
Baaro’s (2009) Review of the Pacific Plan (after its initial three years) led to the 
establishment of in-country desk officers seeking to strengthen regional-national linkages on 
the Pacific Plan. As well, the ‘Compact on strengthening development coordination in the 
Pacific’ adopted at the 2009 Forum, emphasised three commitments to strengthen the Pacific 
Plan’s M&E: 
 peer (country-to-country) reviews of national policy systems and implementation;  
 donors’ commitments to improve development coordination and to report to the PIF on 
development effectiveness; and  
 expanding the post-Forum dialogue to include private sector and civil society 
stakeholders (PIF, 2009a).  
The 2013 Review (near completion of the 10-year lifespan) led the Pacific Plan to be recast 
as the Framework for Pacific Regionalism to address the misconception that the Pacific Plan 
was a regional development plan. Rather, it comprises a framework needing to be seen as a 
political process. The policy is no longer a ‘master strategy’ with a grand design but an eight-
page framework with sections on the vision (shortened from the 2005 one), values, 
objectives, forms of regionalism (definitions), process for priority setting (regional 
initiatives as proposed by interested stakeholders), M&E processes, and criteria (tests) for 
regional action. The Pacific Plan Action Committee was also reconstructed as the Board for 
Pacific Regionalism (Morauta, Peseta, Killion, Bazeley, & Poletti, 2013; PIF, 2014).  
The assumption shaping the Pacific Plan was the creation of ‘a region of peace, harmony, 
security and economic prosperity’ (the 2005 Vision). Ideas and models underpinning such a 
regionalism agenda (even ‘the possible development of a regionalism model suitable for the 
Pacific’) appeared to be mostly policy transfers, without much dialogue within PICs 
themselves (Chan et al., 2004). A clear example is Hughes’ (2005) proposed Pacific 
Community based largely on Caribbean regionalism: ‘such proposals have tended to 
originate more in the developed Forum members than in the newly independent PICs’ (ADB-
Commonwealth Secretariat, 2005, p.2). 
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7.2.1.4. Implementation 
The challenges facing the development and implementation of policies for Pacific 
regionalism 30 years ago remain pertinent today. They remain valid for regional 
development given the views of various participants, and the conclusion of the 2009 and 
2013 Pacific Plan Reviews, that actual implementation had been limited:  
The kind of regionalism envisaged under the Leaders’ 2004 Auckland Declaration—of sovereign 
countries of the region gaining from sharing resources and governance, and aligning policies under 
the auspices of a Pacific Plan—has been slow to emerge. (Morauta et al., 2013, p.16) 
The intention of the Pacific Plan is to have a common regional policy on integration. The 
implementation of that hasn’t materialised… That’s the frustration of members. [RPS.3]      
Limited implementation pointed, to a lack of ownership and understanding of the Pacific 
Plan across the Region which principally reflected the policy itself. It had not undergone 
meaningful consultation or promotion. The complexity of regional processes contributed 
considerably to such limitations:  
The Plan is not widely known about beyond its immediate stakeholders. It has so many priorities, 
and is so broadly framed, that it effectively has no priorities. It is not mandatory, and carries no 
powers of enforcement. It has no budget, timeline or robust indicators of what success looks like. It 
lacks ownership. (Morauta et al., 2013, p.17) 
My friend, Greg Urwin (former Secretary General) called me when I wrote an article that the ‘Pacific 
Plan is a ghostbuster’. That the Pacific people don’t own the Pacific Plan... It didn’t include them 
meaningfully to be part of the Pacific Plan…  So the Pacific Plan dream was doomed because we 
over-harvest, overfish, everything. Because it just was a dream of the Leaders in a cocktail room. 
[RCS-M.1] 
People knew there was a Plan but they didn’t know its implications. It was sitting in our little office 
near the Secretariat General and no one was going out and saying, hey we got a regional plan… 
Because there was no good understanding of what its focus was, people were pushing everything 
should be in the Pacific Plan. But it’s hard to know exactly which aspects contribute to this… There’s 
this whole process in the Region. Also are development partners with their own processes. There are 
so many forces that come into shaping, to form this misunderstanding. [RPS.8]      
A lack of shared understanding was evident in the inconsistency seen in participants’ views 
about what the Pacific Plan encompassed. This derived from tensions over ‘regional’ versus 
‘national’ public goods defining PRIGOs’ mandates. Some viewed the Pacific Plan as more 
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about regional co-operation where national capacity supplementation is deemed a priority 
and linking regional and national plans is required. Others viewed the Pacific Plan as about 
regional integration: an actual pooling of common policy practices across PICs. Still others 
viewed the Pacific Plan as more about strengthening the Pacific voice on global issues. In 
practice, national capacity supplementation and dealing with international issues 
encumbered PRIGOs with an immense workload of implementing roles:  
It’s too complicated to have a shared understanding. A lot say the Pacific Plan should reflect national 
priorities. But it’s not a national or regional development plan. People may understand it’s about 
regional co-operation or integration. But in having a clean story it’s not. What happened is that 
national work becomes align with regional programs. It becomes confused. [RPS.4]     
We have been criticised that the Pacific Plan is far removed from realities. But Leaders deliberately 
kept it at a high level because they don’t want the Pacific Plan to be interfering with national 
sovereignty… The Pacific Plan is not supposed to replace national plans… The other thing is that 
the RIO+20 conference identified the pillars of the global sustainable development agenda. Those 
pillars are the same as the Pacific Plan. [RPS.2]        
In the event, the regional integration envisaged under the Pacific Plan got buried under 
regional bureaucratic politics and processes. Operationalising the Pacific Plan through 
policy conversational and bureaucratic processes was lacking. Other than external studies 
undertaken during the formulation stage, ongoing assessment of options has been limited: 
One thing we don’t have under the Pacific Plan is an ongoing research program. That is what we 
need but it hasn’t happened. [RPS.6]  
In the bureaucracy you start focusing on activities at this level and you lose sight of the philosophy 
of that… What we do at meetings is you have this vision and four years later we are all fighting about 
projects and activities. That is what it’s all about. People here saw the Pacific Plan as a way to fund 
their programs… They list them as priorities. Instead of saying let’s talk about regional integration, 
about bulk purchasing that could work... That was the Vision. That got pushed aside. And we focus 
on the day-to-day things… So there hasn’t been that dynamic process of what the Pacific Plan meant 
to be. It was just everybody repacking what they want to do anyway. [RPS.3]      
Implementation did not happen because the Pacific Plan became the plan for everything with 
no clear focus about what it was trying to achieve. In practice, the Pacific Plan was used as 
a funding mechanism for parochial areas of interest, with limited prioritisation given to what 
should be most beneficial for regionalism:  
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It didn’t happen because regional organisations didn’t want to give up their pets… The whole 
process got hijacked as a way to get funding. That’s my version, cynical of it. Once it’s in the Pacific 
Plan everybody argues it’s a priority. I need funding… We need to go back and get our fundamentals. 
[RPS.2]   
It’s got 37 priorities. It’s too much. You need to cut it back. To do that you need to rebuild consensus. 
The question is where our real common interests are as Forum Islands Countries. We should focus 
on a few things that represent the best of regionalism; maybe trade, shipping, climate change and 
pharmaceutical purchasing… We spend more time and energy on these. The rest becomes normal 
work. So countries know what we are doing and the dollars to access. If we do these well then people 
say we care and the Pacific Plan has helped the Pacific… But at the moment people see the value of 
the Pacific Plan as a concept but the trouble is it’s hard to tell a clean story as everything isn’t 
necessarily as it seems. [RPS.17]   
Deeper regional integration initiatives grew too hard to progress within the existing status 
quo. Pooling requires a working consensus amongst PICs, but the demands of day-to-day 
realities, path dependency of existing policies, and bilateral arrangements all complicated 
implementing such initiatives. National interest mentalities, unwilling to cede on national 
sovereignty, and patchy experiences with previous integration initiatives, affected 
confidence in further progress:  
Some became too hard. So the ambition went down. We did a cost-benefit analysis for bulk 
purchasing of fuel and we said it’s not possible… We did that for shipping, but see the Pacific Forum 
Line (PFL), Air Pacific and USP were the Forum’s first initiatives. PFL was sold as it couldn’t make 
any money… But unless we solve shipping, our development remains handicapped. That’s the kind 
of issue the Pacific Plan needs to talk about… Air Pacific couldn’t make any money. So it pulled out 
and just focused as a commercial airline. Other governments got nationalistic and wanted their own 
airlines. [RPS.3]   
Progressing these major initiatives was considered a long-term process given the above-
mentioned difficulties. A translation towards a long-term view of implementation required 
agreed actions over what needs to happen over time. However, a consolidated, conscious 
approach towards an enduring implementation of the Pacific Plan was lacking: 
There hasn’t been a focus on how things are implemented. They try a piecemeal approach but we 
never had a conscious approach this is the project and this is going to work. What is missing is how 
you implement the vision in a calculated way… If you look at bulk procurement of fuel there’s a 
Memorandum of Understanding countries have signed up to. But there are no agreed standards. So 
you can’t even start the process. Countries all got different types of fuel, storage capacity and existing 
contracts… But there hasn’t been an agreement to say these are the steps to take in the next five 
 190 
years or so, this is where national governments need to come in, and national policies that need to 
change… It’s the same with pharmaceuticals. That’s what the Pacific Plan should be doing. We’ve 
got some regional policies but often it’s about policies that got implementation built around them 
that are missing. All we’ve got is the high level framework that says what we think is a good idea. 
But to make it happen you need the more detailed strategies and steps. So the Pacific Plan is a plan 
for a plan. We need to look at how to reform the implementation side. [RPS.8]      
The key issue was who was to actually implement the Pacific Plan? The Plan stated that 
implementation was the responsibility of PIFS (PIF, 2005c, p.10), but that is a ‘political’ 
sphere that should not interfere with implementation. The ‘technical’ PRIGOs are the 
implementers. Yet PRIGOs were not legally bound to the implementation of the Pacific Plan 
as such, nor did they share the same kind of legitimacy of a national government being 
accountable to an electorate. Thus implementation required a great amount of interaction 
across national spaces to ensure that the Pacific Plan got translated into local implementing 
roles, and with commitments from state and non-state actors. However, regional-national 
interactions were confined to a few central agency officials (as members of the Pacific Plan 
Action Committee/Board for Pacific Regionalism), but who were not implementers of the 
Pacific Plan’s sectoral initiatives. Private sector and civil society roles in regionalism have 
only recently, been recognised in Forum mechanisms:  
In a way we (PIFS) are in this comfort zone as we just do the policy and expect countries to implement. 
We get criticised for not having implementation. Whereas SPC does a lot of implementation… it goes 
there, does water tanks, that kind of stuff. We don’t. That’s our dilemma. [RPS.2] 
The problem is that PRIGOs don’t exist just to implement the Pacific Plan. They exist to implement 
many different priorities with different actors. What we would like to do more is recognise the 
contributions of non-government organisations on a priority. That’s an area that hasn’t been looked 
at very much. [RPS.6]   
The difficulty is this uncertainty about the role the Pacific Plan should play… The problem is that 
there’s no regional government that is tied to an election cycle. The Leaders come together but 
there’s no body that forces them to do this. You can only do things out of consensus. [RPS.18]      
The Pacific Plan lacked a specific budget, which was another contributor to limited 
implementation. Donors provide about 90% of the budgets of the PIFS and SPC (see Table 
7.1). PICs contribute only 2.8%. Australia and NZ are the biggest donors to PIFS, while the 
USA, France and others are the SPC’s major donors. Such aid dependency signifies the scale 
of donors’ influences over regional policy processes:  
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Source: Extracted from Morauta et al. (2013, pp.235-237) 
Australia does not support the establishment of a fund specifically for Pacific Plan implementation… 
The Plan should not be a list of activities solely designed to attract donor funding. (Australian 
Government, 2013) 
If all countries set up marine protected areas (MPAs), we would have full control of the ocean. 
However, countries are doing their own MPAs… We don’t want to end up like the Atlantic, it doesn’t 
have any fish anymore… But it’s hard because development partners come and blindfold us with so 
much money… We are trying to put a quota on fishing but the problem is that China says it will pay 
a country $50 million for free access of 10 boats. When a donor comes with big money like that, the 
licensing, any policy or effort, just breaks down... No matter how hard we try it’s the money that 
counts. Like who is going to deny $50 million that is being offered to your country. So it is also the 
politics of donors. Our problem is that we’ve got no money. So whoever has the biggest cheque gets 
it. [RPS.2] 
Furthermore, what was available to the region in terms of resources did not equate to that 
needed to implement the Pacific Plan’s ambitious agenda. The decision to have a ‘Pacific 
Fund’ never materialised, individual donors preferring to direct their funds to individual 
PRIGOs. Such aid bilateralisation meant implementation was complicated by a 
disconnection between Pacific Plan endorsed priorities and actual resource allocation:  
The thing with regionalism is the context. The way the Pacific is going through regionalism is to the 
experience for Asia. But institutions and resources are different. The resources we need for regional 
integration would be billions. The Pacific doesn’t have billions… There are issues in engaging with 
national governments on the Pacific Plan because they are small bureaucracies dealing with huge 
international and regional agendas and they aren’t resourced for that. They do a good job 
considering what they have. But they need to make it simple for the engagement. It’s too complicated. 
[RPS.13] 
Table 7.1: PIFS, SPC and FFA sources of income, 2011-2012 
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There’s this mismatch between where the resources are coming from and where the priorities are 
set. We sit here (PIFS) and say you need to implement this priority. They say ‘okay, but you aren’t 
giving us any money… we have to be accountable to those who give us money’. That’s a big issue 
with implementation… Development partners say if you’ve got clear priorities we will fund them. 
But it’s never as easy as that. They have their government support and bureaucratic processes… 
Often there’s no one sitting there to say to the Leaders ‘I don’t think you should agree to this as it’s 
going to cost this much’. No one is making the decision directly in between because the funding is 
coming from different areas. And it’s hard to control, hard to match up with the policies. [RPS.20]    
Fragmentation in the existing regional architecture is at the core of why the Pacific Plan’s 
implementation has been limited. Each PRIGO has its own governance structure and 
mandate competing for the same finite amount of available resources: 
They fight for the same bucket of resources. They have issues around mandates… The ongoing 
challenges are things like policy territory… tensions around who is doing what in this policy… Much 
is driven by personalities and views of the different governing councils of PRIGOs… SPC’s 26 
members include Forum Islands Countries but also territories and other donors. So you get different 
interests at play driving SPC policy positions beyond Forum Islands Countries… The politics and 
tensions between donors… are also brought into the governing councils’ decisions. China is a 
member of the South Pacific Tourism Organisation governing council so they forbid South Pacific 
Tourism Organisation to bid for assistance that Taiwan provides. These issues affect implementation 
because of the difficulty in policy coherence even in a particular sector and across PRIGOs who are 
part of that sector. [RPS.6] 
The answer to the question of why the Pacific Plan has not progressed lies in an examination of the 
institutions and processes that surround and support the Pacific Plan… This led the Review to its 
primary, most central, conclusion: what is needed to progress regionalism is not a revised list of 
priorities, but an overhaul of the processes, institutions and governance of the Plan. (Morauta et al., 
2013, p.18) 
Although the Pacific Plan is a political process, political interchanges around the Pacific 
Plan’s objectives have been limited. Instead, it has been an official-led process, driven by 
PRIGOs’ individual interests. Integration requires transformational change which requires 
strong leadership to change the status quo:  
Processes around the Plan appeared… to be dominated by bureaucratic and institutional interests, the 
result being that the Plan contains too many priorities, often of the wrong sorts (p.19)… Hard political 
choices… about economic integration and the future of the Pacific are much harder to pinpoint 
(p.54)… Yet the Forum is the Region’s ‘peak political body’, and the Pacific Plan is fundamentally 
about the expression of social and political values and making hard political choices (p.74). 
(Morauta et al., 2013) 
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It will take leaders to adopt that transformation... If we have an agenda to say we are going to force 
all PRIGOs into one agency in the next two years, it’s never going to happen, unless we’ve got strong 
leadership as everyone’s got their own interests and views of what the Pacific Plan is about.[RPS.18] 
Given an inconsistent understanding of the Pacific Plan, views about how it should be 
measured in national versus regional impact are also contentious. Either way, M&E have 
been limited: 
There are no indicators for the Pacific Plan. They have six monthly reviews, the Forum Compact 
and Pacific Plan Action Committee reporting. But it’s just outputs reporting… A good example is 
when I reviewed our Joint Country Strategy (JCS) for Kiribati where the President’s office said 
‘there’s so much money going into health but they’ve got the worst health indicator’. [RPS.8] 
People think the Pacific Plan should be measured at the national level with progress in different 
areas. It was never designed to do that... It’s a regional plan and it needs… indicators that appreciate 
the processes that are starting because of the Pacific Plan in bringing about policies over the next 
five to ten years. That’s what the Pacific Plan has done. And it’s not something people would credit. 
[RPS.13] 
7.2.1.5. Results 
Regional integration or pooling has been limited. Any success has been mostly seen in 
regional coordination and co-operation which was the key focus. Maintaining a collective 
Pacific voice internationally has been another benefit of regionalism. These successes cannot 
be attributed solely to the Pacific Plan; forms of regionalism that previously existed had 
progressed before the Pacific Plan came into being:  
Pooling of resources… in sea and air transport services improved… for a while, but ultimately failed, 
as did attempts to institutionalise common bulk purchasing of fuel and pharmaceuticals… Real forms 
of regional integration have been slower to emerge, but the common management of oceanic fish 
stocks… has been largely successful… Neither can they always truly be said to be products of the 
Pacific Plan, although the Pacific Plan captures them in its oversight... For many Pacific citizens, the 
Plan and its implementation just aren’t making enough of a difference. (Morauta et al., 2013, pp.52-
55) 
When you look at a plan for regionalism as being the first, a lot of people say the Pacific Plan has 
failed because you have a trade agreement for around 25 years and is still moving slowly. But 
integration of that nature is always going to take a long time whether or not you have an overarching 
framework. If you look at pooling of capacities it has been good. Our ability to better coordinate 
various stakeholders working on a sectoral issue has been advanced by the Pacific Plan. [RPS.14]       
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7.2.1.6. Key factors 
Table 7.2 summarises the critical factors of the Pacific Plan’s policy process:   
 
Chapter eight further discusses key factors emerging from the Pacific Plan’s policy process, 
in comparison with those in Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and Samoa (see Appendix G), 
and against existing literature.  
7.3. The policy processes in general  
This section examines participant experiences and observations of regional policy processes 
in general. Their stories are analysed in accordance with the research question of how public 
policies are initiated, formulated and implemented and what were critical factors for 
effective implementation.  
Table 7.2: Pacific Plan key factors 
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7.3.1. Policy initiation  
Coded participant narratives in Table 7.3 indicated that most participants saw regional public 
policies as influenced mainly by the Leaders (frequency of 21) and external interests 
(frequency of 28), with international agenda issues (frequency of 18) comprising a major 
component of regional policy. Given that the Region is inter-governmental, influences from 
societal actors (frequency of 4) have been restricted to the Leaders and a few national 
officials: 
 
Narrative extracts below illustrate what these patterns meant. The increased take-up of 
international issues or agendas reflects PICs joining more international organisations as 
members of the global policy community. Here, regional organisations have played a 
filtering role over global pressures and advocating for a Pacific voice on critical global issues 
such as nuclear testing and climate change: 
Two main things influenced the development of regional policies. One is the influence of 
international arenas; global issues that are popular at the time. Second is what the Forum decides 
are the major issues facing the Region. Those are related. [RPS.14] 
In my experience in this Secretariat about how we put things on the agenda it’s a mix of several 
influences. But I say the majority of policies are pushed from external interests, not necessarily by 
donors but even international organisations. The classic one was the International Atomic Energy 
Agency pushing for nuclear issues. It’s the pressure of globalisation… when our members join more 
international organisations, they come under pressure to join international frameworks. Climate 
change is now driven primarily by small island states. [RPS.3] 
Table 7.3: Origins of policy at the regional level 
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7.3.2. Policy formulation  
Participants were asked about what they refer to as (public) ‘policy’ and how they see the 
nature and characteristics of existing polices.  
7.3.2.1. Construction of policy 
7.3.2.1.1. What is mostly referred to as policy? 
There was no consistent construction of ‘policy’ embracing the various documents outlined 
in Table 7.4. Different constructions intersected between domains of national (frequency of 
59) versus regional (frequency of 119) versus international interests or issues (frequency of 
59) that PRIGOs dealt with. While regional integration and co-operation were often 
espoused as the focus, PRIGOs have also had to deal with other issues of national and 
international in nature: 
 
Narrative extracts below illustrate what these patterns meant. They further elaborate on the 
findings in section 7.3.1 about regional policies influenced by actors and issues of these three 
overlapping policy systems—global, regional and national. Hence policies are 
interdependent constructions:    
The only time the proliferation of policies becomes a problem is when we try to meet the obligations 
that are drafted by the consensus of countries in the UN system. All aspects they cover aren’t always 
Table 7.4: Construction of policy at the regional level 
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things we need to urgently address of policies but the processes are set up to start filtering out some 
of that noise down to the level that is practical. [RPS.13] 
I suppose it’s your definition of what is policy. One of our policies is regional integration. We work 
with members in negotiating these agreements and sign off. Then we have trade agreements and then 
we cut it down to the level of implementation. If you talk about non-communicable disease there’s a 
declaration on what you do with that. Then in implementing that policy, SPC dissects it because it’s 
not just about what you eat, it’s about your lifestyle, what you trade and the food governments bring 
in. You cut it up to have specific activities for each part of the policy. [RPS.7]     
7.3.2.1.2. Levels of policies  
Following from the findings presented in the preceding sections, further outlined in Table 
7.5 are various documents (and hence mechanisms) that make up the regional policy 
framework and manifest at different levels of the policy process. The Pacific 
Plan/Framework for Pacific Regionalism, the regional master plan, co-existed with other 
international, regional and national commitments. Implementation of policy largely exists at 
the sector level in regional frameworks, and with an expectation that these frameworks were 
to be translated into national policy:  
 
There are a lot of policy documents floating around at different levels. There are Forum policies but 
we also have our own policies. In every sector we have a policy framework… The Pacific Plan are 
regional commitments. Then there are international commitments. The funding requirement is one 
way of enforcing those commitments. Like the Federated States of Micronesia had to do a policy and 
Table 7.5: Regional policy framework 
 
 198 
legislation for human trafficking otherwise the USA wouldn’t allow them on their flights… So there 
are different layers and streams. [RPS.10] 
7.3.2.1.3. Features of policies  
Participant narratives revealed that the ‘espoused’ view of policy in documents little 
resembles the ‘in-use’ view of policy as practised. That practice has been driven by the 
personalities and interests of regional public servants, programs put up largely to justify their 
tenure and attract or justify funding:  
We have JCSs for all 22 countries as the basis for resource mobilisation. But a number of our 
divisions have used JCSs to put up wish lists but don’t deliver against it. It’s not aligned. [RPS.8] 
That’s how it’s done here. They use the communiqués to attract development aid… Because 
development partners only give when they see it’s in the Leaders’ communiqués. European Union’s 
contribution to the Region is about EUR$1.6billion and that’s how that money got here. [RPS.2]   
It’s really difficult to talk about core functions in separating your involvement in it because you want 
to justify the existence of your program. A lot of time is consumed in clarifying roles. [RPS.4]   
Some participants considered regional policies as comprehensive, but limited in 
implementability because the resources and support needed to enable their instrumentation 
are inadequate. These limitations were linked to issues concerning the fragmentation of 
regional processes:  
I would call them comprehensive, not sound, as I’m not sure if there are sound policies for the Region. 
To be sound means they are going to be used. At the moment they aren’t used. Why? It’s a question 
of time, money, sequencing policy and convincing governments it’s the right policy to take. [RPS.14]      
Different CROP agencies own different strategies. I haven’t seen a joint strategy for all CROP 
agencies for a single country. There isn’t a single place for you to go and say these are all the 
regional strategies and let’s regularly review them… There’s no common standard on regional 
policy. [RPS.15]  
7.3.2.2. How are policies formulated? 
Participants were asked about how policies are formulated, the processes employed, who has 
done the work of formulation, what is used as a knowledge basis for policy, and stakeholders’ 
understanding of current policies. Table 7.6 gives the coded participant narratives about this 
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‘how’ question. Patterns shown by the narratives frequency are discussed in sections below.  
Narrative extracts provided illustrate what these patterns meant:   
 
7.3.2.2.1. Knowledge basis of policy  
The patterns exhibited in Table 7.6 indicate that formulation of regional policies have been 
influenced by both ideological factors (local and policy transfers) and by rational (evidence-
based) analyses. The former (frequency of 42 and 26) was however stronger than the latter 
(frequency of 20). The participants viewed evidence-based policy as limited in regional 
processes and practices, even going so far as to say evidence was often gathered to justify a 
favoured policy. Policy transfers (imported knowledge and social construction) remained 
significant given path dependencies of colonialism and ongoing aid-sponsored programs 
where donors exert their influences:  
Table 7.6: Knowledge basis, methodology and formulation of regional policy 
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The central question is whether regional organisations are doing enough of the far sighted policies 
that we should be doing. We had the Forum Economic Ministers Meeting and I looked at the papers 
and I said to our directors ‘they aren’t good enough’. We need the real meat where we excite 
Ministers to go ‘yeah, we will think about it, go and do more work’. That’s what we are lacking. 
[RPS.3] 
If they do evidence-based policy, a lot of governments would avoid a lot of bad decisions… Instead 
what we have is policy-based evidence. They make the decision and say go find me some evidence to 
support this. Unfortunately that’s what happens. We start a new airline because it’s good for exports, 
actually we don’t export anything by air but we have an airline anyway. [RCS-M.2] 
The official processes in PICs would be fairly similar because a lot of institutional structures left 
during post-colonial times are similar. These continue with a lot of development assistance coming 
in because they send in consultants who draw from their own experiences and that further perpetuate 
the use of those same systems. [RPS.20] 
7.3.2.2.2. Methodology  
Policy formulation processes were largely top-down (directive) (frequency of 38). 
Participative processes were limited (frequency of 6). The inclusion of non-state actors in 
policy processes was not absent but has been often neglected:  
It’s also about how much policy is given space and time, to look at Cabinet papers, or is it just 
someone standing up saying ‘we should do this’. Like the PMs got together and all of a sudden we 
are told to do this, and we go ‘where did that come from?’ The question is then which part of 
implementation where there are no bodies on the ground, and which part is a reflection of the policy 
itself. That Leaders just go ‘we should do this’. And the members go ‘yeah, yeah’ and they won’t 
implement it. [RPS.2]      
Our peer review system has only been in two years of operation. But the reviews so far have shown 
a lot of criticism from civil society and private sector stakeholders that they don’t get consulted. That 
a lot of our development planning have been done without their involvement. [RPS.1]    
Policy design has always been top-down. It’s the role of government and bureaucrats. You go out, 
consult some people and come back and say ‘this is what the people want’. But once the policy is put 
into like a white paper, it’s not consulted widely. It runs across the entire region. [RCS-M.1]   
7.3.2.2.3. Formulators of policies  
The formulation of policies has been mostly conducted by regional public servants in CROP 
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agencies (frequency of 67), and using regional committees (frequency of 39) as coordinating 
mechanisms. External consultants (frequency of 26) have played a significant role in 
providing independent analyses and assessments. Participatory mechanisms (e.g. working 
parties where non-state actors could participate) (frequency of 4) have been limited:  
There are a lot of issues on the ground because countries don’t own the Pacific Plan. There has been 
a lack of consultation. Ideally the regional priorities should be from the countries but we‘ve got 
regional mechanisms designing regional priorities. [RPS.11]    
He came in as a lead consultant with a particular view of the PIFS… They made several 
recommendations without evidence… That reviewxxix however highlighted a big gap in the PIFS 
policy capacity… we should be doing more thinking work but we are too focused on meetings and 
administrative work. [RPS.19] 
Tuvalu last year had over 900 separate visiting consultants. That’s like 20 a week in between 
consultants coming to talk to you about your country. The poor country is confused. [RPS.18] 
7.3.2.2.4. Understanding of policies  
The patterns exhibited in Table 7.6 show a lack of understanding (frequency of 34 and 16) 
about regional policies within the Region: its presence and processes are particularly absent 
at national levels. Most national participants stated that they have little to do with the Region 
as interactions are restricted to Leaders and relatively few officials: 
There are too many plans, even legislations. But their implementation hasn’t been done. 
Implementation suffers because of the lack of communication. I have been to regional meetings and 
they gave us the Pacific Plan and I said I haven’t even seen this thing before. Those resolutions are 
basically taken as the resolutions of all Pacific Parliaments but we don’t even know anything about 
this Pacific Plan. [SP.3] 
If people say this (Pacific Plan) isn’t relevant, then we aren’t reflecting. The question then is what 
are your representatives doing when they come to regional meetings? Because often we get foreign 
affairs, finance or trade people and we go into countries and people say I didn’t know that. Even 
within your own ministry, often it’s the individuals who are making out the policies as they go. Often 
we get people who basically come unprepared for meetings. [RPS.4] 
                                                                            
xxix Winder, Lambourne E E, and Vaai (2012). 
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7.3.3. Policy implementation  
Table 7.7 summarises what most participants regarded as key factors or issues affecting 
regional policy processes and implementation. Given their interrelatedness, these factors are 
condensed and narrated in the following sections under five headings: the context of regional 
public policy, stakeholder support and feedback, policy culture and ownership, leadership 
and translation of policy.  
 
7.3.3.1. The context of regional public policy  
7.3.3.1.1. A diverse and divided region  
Regionalism is about integrating countries around their common interests. This requires a 
region with some shared sense of identity, solidarity, purpose and commitment to working 
together. However, regionalism has been and will continue to be a challenging agenda when 
there is no single agreed region. Currently, the Pacific islands are just a collection of diverse, 
largely insignificant countries (see Appendices A and B) facing unique development 
constraints, but all with different backgrounds and national situations. Identities are multi-
layered and contextual. You cannot imagine a Solomon Islander conceiving regional identity 
without a sense of nationhood in a nation with over 70 different ethnicities. Further 
complication involves the 15 PICs retaining constitutional and citizenship ties to external 
countries. The nine sovereign states are not wholly independent states given the scale of their 
external aid and loan dependence and therefore their formal domestic policies influenced by 
external interests. These contextual challenges continue to complicate the implementation 
of a regionalism agenda:  
Table 7.7: Issues or factors central to implementation at the regional level 
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Describing the Pacific as a single region is an artificial construct, it is cartographic, rather than ethnic 
or political, construct. Smallness and remoteness, and for some a shared natural resource (oceanic 
fish stocks) are certainly commonalities but these in themselves don’t define a single ‘region’, nor 
separate its sub-regions… The region is diverse and complex. For every generalisation that can be 
made… there are multiple exceptions. The region is connected but fragmented. (Morauta et al., 2013, 
p.49) 
Pacific Islands Countries and Territories (PICTs) were better characterised as a group of individually 
insignificant developing countries… each trying to do its own deals with bigger countries. There is 
little overriding sense of common interest among PICTs, a fact… known and exploited all the time 
by aid donors and foreign investors… National governments… are instinctively nationalistic, and 
ethnic groups… treat both neighbours and foreigners with suspicion, viewing them as potential rivals 
and robbers, while nevertheless managing to fall repeatedly under the spell of logging and other rip-
off artists… It’s worth repeating that this is not the Caribbean… indigenous populations and 
customary relationships are remarkably intact… Physical distance, historical isolation and ethnic 
identity seem set to continue to shape PICTs attitudes to each other for years to come. (T Hughes, 
2013)  
7.3.3.1.2. Development path and pace of regionalism  
Regionalism requires pooling with some agreed constraints over national sovereignty. To 
some, undertaking this path requires strong nation-states with the maturity to interact 
confidently with each other and outsiders. However as small, young nation-states with still 
recent colonial legacies, most are neither ready nor willing to sacrifice their sovereignty. As 
the majority of PICs (15) have territorial ties with metropolitan nations, forms of neo-
colonialism (in different dimensions) remain prevalent. The timing and path for regionalism 
must be addressed within such a regional historical context and development path: 
We are on a different journey. For Vanuatu we have nation building for 32 years. To get to the 
European Union it took 400 years and two wars that nearly broke down the planet. So all that tells 
me is not that Europe is developed and the Pacific is not. It tells we don’t want to repeat a lot of 
mistakes Europe made for us. But also what works in Europe isn’t necessarily going to work for us. 
There are a lot of lessons to learn and things to go through. This is where the regionalism model flat 
failed here because we are still at the height of sovereignty. And sovereignty means everything, right 
there rolling. [VDA.2] 
Why do we have these coups, votes of no confidence and corruption? Why is there no democracy? 
These are the kinds of issues confronting us. If you look at the history of Europe and America it took 
them 300 years to get democracy. We have only been independent for 40 years… It reflects the 
development status of a country and its ability to debate and implement public policy. It’s about 
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capacity and expectation and for us these are the big issues… And training the next generations 
quickly is not easy because people will say go away. The question then is do we have the luxury of 
doing it at our own pace, or do we need to get ourselves organised and address it, so that it won’t 
take us 300 years. It’s just that it’s not going to take us 40 years. That’s what people have to 
acknowledge. We are in a different place in history. For now the concern of most people is bread 
and butter issues. As long as politicians are delivering those, they aren’t going to ask how that was 
delivered... So a lot is about educating people, governance, and leadership because if you have good 
leaders change happens. And in addressing these issues, we need to face them in the context of our 
history and development. [RPS.3]    
7.3.3.1.3. Membership versus donorship  
An external resource dependency brings with it tensions, frustrations and layers of 
complexity that are additional to the existing difficulties of getting 25 countries to 
collaborate more effectively. With about 26 development agencies in the Region, the 
interplay of aid politics within the bilateralisation of aid and public policy diplomacy further 
complicates multilateral efforts to move towards integration. As well, the role of 
metropolitan countries (Australia and NZ) as members of the Region often conflicts with 
their roles as key donors to the PIF; likewise within the SPC in relation to the USA and 
France:  
Donor financing… invariably brings with it tensions and frustrations. On one hand accusations 
abound that donors ultimately control, through the power of the purse, the programmes of an 
otherwise sovereign membership organisation, and on the other hand that anything less than a hands-
on approach by donor agencies will not suffice in terms of meeting legitimate accountability 
requirements to their taxpayers… Managers within an organisation become as frustrated as donors 
do with governance, while both remain keen to get initiatives funded. The environment is then set 
for the ‘bilateralisation’ of the multilateral organisations’ agenda. (Morauta et al., 2013, p.76) 
Some policies FFA develops are towards the Pacific Plan. But FFA is different because its policies 
are driven by PIC governments. It’s really because the resources (fish) are with them. If you have 
the resources you have the power. That’s not the case with other PRIGOs. Their revenues come from 
donors. Therefore the metropolitan countries’ influences on their policies… providing most of the 
advice… It’s that kind of politics happening. Because it’s a natural tendency if I cannot control it 
then why should I give you the money? [RPS.21]   
Because our countries don’t have money they just tag along with what donors say. When a project 
finishes it doesn’t necessarily mean the policy is finished in achieving its desired outcomes. Donors 
may after three years say our priorities have changed. And this is where the whole thing collapses 
because governments would have no assistance to pick it up again. If they do they have to start all 
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over again. So it’s the complexity of operating in a small-state in the percentage you have in national 
capacity and the interplay of development partners’ processes that adds to complexity. [RPS.23]  
7.3.3.2. Stakeholder support and feedback—regional identity, ownership and 
legitimacy  
Support, and hence legitimacy of regionalism, centred on issues of ‘who is the region’, ‘who 
does the region belong to’ or ‘who is the Region accountable to’? In terms of ‘geographical 
space’, the region largely refers to the PICs, while in terms of ‘regionalism’ it refers both to 
the PICs and Australia and NZ as members. It has been in the interest of everyone, including 
major western interests, that Australia and NZ plays a ‘big brother’ role in the region; that 
responding to global issues (e.g. war on terror) requires strategic alliance amongst countries 
in the regional space. However, Australia and NZ’s (France and the USA also) inclusion in 
the region is regarded as a key element that makes Pacific regionalism an odd model 
compared to elsewhere. This view coincides with assessments and references made to 
regional development (e.g. MDGs) as belonging to PICs only, Australia and NZ excluded 
(from regional performance) even though they are PIF full members exercising a strong 
voice over regional agendas: 
The presence of Australia and NZ as full members of the PIF… has had a formative influence on the 
character of that body, the evolution of the ‘regional institutional architecture’ and the practice of 
regional co-operation. It is one of the most striking differences between the Pacific and Caribbean 
regional arrangements… equivalent to having the USA and Canada as full members of the Caribbean 
Community—an unthinkable concept for the independent Caribbean states. (Hughes, 2005, p.9) 
The (2012) UN’s MDG assessment of our Region as ‘no progress or deteriorated’ is unfair. The 
reality is that… each country is doing well. But when they pull the MDGs together as a Region, it 
doesn’t look good because it’s distorted due to PNG…xxx When grouped according to development 
status, Australia and NZ are excluded. The UN process discriminates against our own national 
processes. [RPS.1] 
Nevertheless the domination of Australia and NZ in the Forum has been a contested element 
in Pacific regionalism. Emerging to challenge such domination and existing forms of 
regionalism (particularly in the Forum) has been sub-regionalism. This trend is reflective of 
further division in the region, but also a reinforcement of geopolitics and sub-regional 
identities (e.g. Melanesia versus Polynesia). Others have regarded this tendency as Pacific 
                                                                            
xxx See section 1.2. 
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regionalism in search of a truer identity; that of sub-regionalism serving as a positive trend 
in progressing regional development given the vast diversities between PICs and the 
slowness of regionalism to exert tangible impacts:    
Australia and NZ are too strong in the Forum. Of course... They have the capacity to be voiceful. So 
one way is to do small groupings... The Melanesian Spearhead Group is coming out because these 
Melanesian countries have the population and resources. [RCS-M.1] 
One problem with trying to impose a regional framework like the Pacific Plan… is because of 
existing interests and politics… The Melanesians said we are going to do our own thing, bugger you 
guys… So Tuilaepa got pissed off and set up his Polynesian Leadership Group... Once we get these 
sub-regional groups working, that could make this concept of regionalism work. Because in the day-
to-day politics, each does their own thing. [RPS.4] 
A lack of regional identity was evident in an absence of ownership of the Region and its 
policies and their implementation. The regional architecture exists in isolation from Pacific 
societies. This was reflected in most national participants having little understanding of the 
Region and its impact. This limited accounting translates into meagre national support for 
regionalism, or willingness to implement its public policy agendas on the ground:  
Regional organisations are problematic. They aren’t a government and a lot of money is going to 
them. But what exactly do they achieve? They are getting bigger, sucking out every money in our 
names. [SIPS.13]   
Governments have to let go of sovereignty in areas where they can do well as a Region. But 
regionalism only works if it’s supporting national progress… If you just have regionalism to please 
donors and nice plans at this level, there’s no ownership of these institutions. The Region is huge 
with lots of money pumping into them but their impact is not seen. [RCS-M.2] 
In the Forum we are so shielded away from the rest of society, we’re a club of our own in retreat. 
(Anote Tong, Kiribati President, cited in ABC News (2013, August 8)) 
7.3.3.3. Leadership—governance and political will   
Given that PRIGOs operate under non-binding arrangements, their commitments to regional 
policies are based on good faith and a political will to drive regionalism at the national level. 
Leadership for regionalism is dependent on national leadership where leaders are the 
legitimate agents of the regional agenda. Accordingly leadership for regionalism depends on 
leadership at the national level. Yet most leaders have vested constituency interests often 
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conflicting with both regional and national interests. Such leadership depends fundamentally 
on national governance conducted within societal determinants and their role in public policy 
processes:  
Many are asking this same question, how can we get our countries from here to there? It boils down 
to our politicians. Because they say to address this but they are crooked. It’s that conflict of different 
constituency vested interests. Regional organisations are just like national public services. We’ve 
got 16 members instead of 1. That’s the complication… Rarely you get a politician coming here 
pushing this is what is important about my country. I have to make the hard decisions. It’s about 
government saying to its people there’s no gain without pain... That dialogue doesn’t happen much. 
That dialogue requires leaders with the vision. And I’m not sure we’ve got that. [RPS.2]  
Unless you got strong governments who are prepared to say no, you are still going to get ripped off. 
The potential of ocean resources is billions. But you’ve got to have strong leadership to make any 
change. The problem is because governments aren’t being criticised... Civil societies are cut out of 
the process. They don’t own the policies. Policies are to be contestable otherwise it’s not public 
policy. The stronger your governance system is, the stronger is your belief and value system and the 
more you can engage as a society with your government and its policy process. [RPS.18] 
7.3.3.4. Translation of policy  
7.3.3.4.1. Time, space and resources for policy  
Implementation requires resources of time, money and staff. With limitation here, resources 
and the prioritisation of their utilisation then becomes a vital but key challenge. The Region 
is now a crowded space where numerous issues were at times diffused amongst competing 
‘international’, ‘regional’, and ‘national’ interests, and over the focus about what should be 
implemented as a priority. Determining this is obviously problematic. Duplication in 
regional and national public service delivery was evident, while defining what are regional, 
as distinct from national public goods remains a vital issue. Streamlining major regional and 
national agendas is required to impart focus to implementation:  
In your prioritisation… how much time do you spend on international issues… when you’ve got bread 
and butter issues at home like sanitation, transport, health and education. We have to get our basics 
right. It’s a dilemma of national versus regional versus international. Just as a Secretariat the 
number of meetings we have is phenomenal. And we aren’t the only organisation. The civil service… 
got no jobs because they are in meeting after meeting. I haven’t even got into implementation if I 
haven’t got my policy right. That’s the danger… you get caught up in your own bureaucratic 
processes. [RPS.3] 
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A perception of the Region was that much of its focus has been on planning and developing 
policies. Yet that has not been accompanied by the time and resources needed to implement 
them, both requiring greater efforts to ensure local support and commitment. The effective 
translation of most existing regional policies to a level of national implementation has been 
inadequate:   
Why is implementation in the Region still failing? It’s because all the money is spent on the top-down 
approach… on expensive consultants, not in meaningful participation. Quality assurance and 
prosperity would only come when people participate in the economy. So policies are up there, not 
implemented. [RCS-M.2]   
Some have this perception that all we do in the Region is plan. Like here’s another framework. That’s 
the perception we need to be careful of. That all our investment, energy, time and money don’t get 
poured into too many plans, M&E and frameworks, whereas the important work of ensuring that 
communities… are supported through development initiatives aren’t missing out. [RPS.16]            
7.3.3.4.2. Capacity (to implement, monitor and evaluate) and implementation 
modality  
Most PICs do not have the qualified people or technical skills to implement a now ambitious 
regional, let alone national, agenda. Existing policies are largely seen as incompatible with 
the capacities of small bureaucracies in the Region (20 PICs have a population of around 
200,000 or less) (see Appendix A). Some national services are affected because some 
officials can be absent for up to 60-80% of their time trying to accommodate international 
and regional commitments: xxxi  
The issue with the Pacific is small administration. Here, a nurse cannot cope everyday with 10 
patients. The rate of turnover of our people is very high. You can see the rate at which our people go 
for regional and international meetings. Most are out of the country… 60-80% of the time. They put 
in the plan but nobody is there to implement it. That’s why a lot of policies fall down. [SIDA.6]    
There are a lot of policies and strategies but the real asset comes down to implementation. That’s 
where the political will is tested, the country’s capacity is understood in terms of its internal 
resources, and the financial ability of development partners to follow through. The term ‘capacity’ 
is often overused because it’s not just about training people. It’s the number of people. That’s a real 
issue for small island states… you spend most of your time out of country. [RPS.17]      
                                                                            
xxxi As an example, see Table 6.13 where 50.4% of items considered by Samoa’s Cabinet during 2009-2010 concerned 
overseas travel, an indication of the significant amount of time officials can spend overseas.  
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Implementation is not just about having the resources but also how they are utilised within 
the systems of programs, projects and activities to instrumentalise change processes. A key 
implementation modality in donor-funded programs has been the use of consulting services 
which can mean most net aid resources return to donor countries. As well the capacity needed 
to progress effective change has often been underestimated. This modality meant that 
effective donor-local actors’ relationships are vital for a policy to survive and sustain an 
implementation process in the local context. These were often not sufficiently attuned 
culturally or logistically:  
A donor might give a country $1million but $700,000 automatically goes back to the donor because 
of consultants they use. Even for the best countries in terms of confidence, only 25% of the aid is 
delivered using Samoa national systems. So it’s not only the capacity of the country to absorb the 
change, but also the capacity of donors to work together and with the locals. [RDA.2] 
Countries have wonderful policies… but they aren’t implemented well. It’s also the modality of 
implementation. Partners operate through overseas consulting services to implement. They go into 
countries and the locals are turned off. There’s no ownership and commitment. But then there are 
issues with donors not listening. Some projects failed because of personality clashes between 
consultants and locals. Often donors undermine the amount of resources that are needed for capacity 
building—they think that by putting someone in there for six months would resolve the issue, no. A 
lot of projects are about changing legislation. That’s not easy because it’s political, you need to do 
consultation and work with countries in changing mind-sets. That’s not an overnight thing. But 
projects are finite. [RPS.8] 
7.4. Summary of findings  
Based on the narrative of evidence presented in the preceding sections, Table 7.8 summarises 
key findings in terms of propositions emerging from the regional level. Chapter eight 
discusses these findings further, in comparison with findings from Vanuatu, the Solomon 
Islands and Samoa (see Appendix H), and against existing literature (in chapter two).    
Stage/category Key findings or propositions 
Initiation and adoption 
of policy 
1. Most policies originate from the political leaders and external 
actors.  
2. The adoption by PRIGOs of the ‘regional integration’ agenda 
under the Pacific Plan is limited.  
3. National and international agendas occupy the workload of the 
PRIGOs. 
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Formulation of policy 4. There is no single or consistent construction of ‘policy’. Policy 
is seen as manifestations at different levels at the intersection of 
international- regional-national interests and issues.  
5. Evidence-based policy is limited. The regional policy processes 
are ad hoc driven largely by ideological factors (local and 
policy transfers).  
6. Regionalism received limited dialogue or discourse amongst 
PICs. 
7. Policy formulation is largely top-down driven by regional 
public servants and consultants. Non-state actors’ participation 
has been limited, only given recent recognition.  
8. There is limited understanding about regional policies and 
awareness of the Region and its processes at the national level. 
Implementation of 
policy 
9. What is practised differs from policy. Policies and processes of 
the Region are driven by funding and justification for existence 
of agents.  
10. Agents’ personalities, the politics of aid and PRIGO interests 
are key determinants of what is practised.  
11. Various policies lack implementability given limited resources 
and capacity.  
12. The Pacific Plan implementation has been limited due to lack 
of shared understanding, ownership, resource allocation, 
domestic translation and clear focus from the PRIGOs and 
political leadership for the Pacific Plan. 
Policy process as a 
whole 
13. Factors or issues affecting the effective implementation of the 
regional policy agenda and realising its impact relate primarily 
to the complexity of the Region and its regional architecture, 
lack of regional solidarity, identity, legitimacy and ownership, 
dependency and vulnerability to external resources and 
influences, limited national resources and capacities and 
political leadership.  
14. Addressing these issues must be considered against the history, 
development status and the contextual complexities and 
diversities of the Region.   
Table 7.8: Key findings emerging from the regional level 
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CHAPTER 8: SYNTHESIS 
8.1. Introduction 
So what do the case studies; Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Samoa and the Region in the 
previous four chapters tell us about how public policies are initiated, formulated and 
implemented? Which factors were at play when policies were introduced and formulated, 
and which were critical during the process of implementation that led to effective (or 
ineffectual) results? This chapter addresses this study’s research question through a synthesis 
of findings across the four case studies), examining the commonalities and differences (the 
patterns) against the literature (chapter two). The following summarises these findings (see 
Appendices G and H): 
 Public policy is contextual. In a Pacific island country (PIC), public policy occurs 
through the interactions of three complex policy systems at domestic, regional and 
global levels; 
 As public policy has been shaped by these interactions, the nature and status of policy 
processes in the four case studies were as follows: 
 Public policies were largely shaped by political and external interests;  
 The heavily top-down nature of policy processes has meant society has been a 
neglected element; and 
 The use of evidence-based policy was limited; the ‘policies’ were largely those 
transferred from elsewhere and the ‘practices’ were ad hoc, driven mostly by 
ideological factors; 
 Implementation effectiveness reflected policies put into place, and occurs frequently 
when policies are based on participative and partnership approaches that build 
ownership, understanding and learning within the policy process for sustainability of 
change; 
 A realisation of these elements depended largely on interrelated factors of capability, 
implementation modality, policy culture and stakeholder support, and leadership; and  
 For development to impact significantly on society, these four factors must be 
developed within long-term development needs addressing society as the missing link 
in public policy, and an appreciation of the context’s continuing impact on 
development status.  
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Within this meta-analysis, a model was built from the overall patterns to arrive at a heuristic 
that prescribes key variables critical for effective implementation. The process adopted in 
this synthesis follows the research purpose and focus (see Figure 3.3)—that inquiring into 
the policy processes of any context necessitates examining the following dimensions at 
different but interconnected levels of a policy system: 
 What is the policy process? Level 1 of the synthesis in section 8.2; 
 What is the result? Level 2 in section 8.3;  
 How does the context influence policy? Level 3 in section 8.4; and   
 What are key variables contributing to the result? Level 4 in section 8.5 
8.2. The policy process 
[Level 1] 
As per methodology (section 3.3), grounding this inquiry involved two interrelated 
explorations: examining ten specific policies to gain deeper insights into the policy processes; 
and gaining a holistic understanding of the context within which these processes take place.  
8.2.1. Patterns evident from the ten policies  
8.2.1.1. Policy initiation and adoption  
Tables 8.1 and 8.2 draw out the origins and factors critical in the initiation of the ten policies 
within the four case studies.   
CRP, TRC, PSIP and PIRAMS were similar in their adoption as responses to crises of 
different dimensions in the three PICs. Other policies; TLR, PSC-ISP, SPP, Pacific Plan 
were path dependent manifestations of earlier reforms. The crises in Vanuatu and the 
Solomon Islands, relatively younger nation-states than Samoa, had strong roots in colonial 
legacies, and occured at critical points of state building. The Solomon Islands’ 1998-2003 
tension (societal impact); Vanuatu’s 1997 riot (confined to the capital); and Samoa’s 1999 
political turmoil—all resulted from poor political governance or leadership. At the same time, 
leadership was the core element facilitating the initiation of the ten policies. The crisis 
(society) and leadership (state) coupled with policy transfer (external) elements influenced 
adoption of these policies.  
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Source: Appendices G and H 
Table 8.2 highlights how leadership in all policies not only involved a change in government, 
prime ministership (or ministerial) role, but also strong direction from high levels of public 
administration. Exceptions included the CDF and ELR where administrative leadership was 
weak or suppressed. The CDF and ELR (unsuccessful cases) were primarily advanced for 
political propaganda purposes.  
Common across the CRP, PIRAMS, TRC and PSIP was their initiation in reaction to a 
compelling problem that warranted intervention. Exceptions included the PSC-ISP and SPP, 
seen as more proactive than earlier reform attempts. The CDF and ELR emerged from 
programs espousing rural development and decent employment, but were then transformed 
into politically self-serving programs. The TLR, TRC and PIRAMS (effective policies) 
targeted societal needs for improved telecom services, peace building and infrastructure.  
All ten policies involved instances of policy transfer as detailed in Table 8.2.  
Table 8.1: Origins of the ten policies and critical factors in their initiation  
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Source: Appendices G and H 
8.2.1.2. Policy formulation    
Table 8.3 compares the formulation process across the ten policies.  
Consistent across all policies, except the CDF and ELR, was the complex nature of the 
required change. The difficulties facing reform in a post-conflict state was evident in the 
lapses in the PSIP, leading to incremental redesign after only one year.  
Table 8.2: Nature of the crises, leadership and policy transfer in the ten policies  
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Source: Appendices G and H 
The CRP, PSIP, PSC-ISP, SPP, Pacific Plan, CDF and ELR all involved strong knowledge 
basis in ideological factors (i.e. beliefs, concepts or social constructions). However, 
contextual (evidence-based) knowledge including consultative processes were limited in the 
CDF and ELR and were regarded as imposed policies. The CRP, rooted in the Washington 
consensus (see section 2.4.1.3), as a state versus market model was consultative but lacked 
participative approaches. The TLR, TRC and PIRAMS (successful policies) all had a strong 
contextual (evidential and ideological) knowledge basis, involving strong consultative and 
participative approaches. International evidence and state versus society elements were 
considered in the design process. The incorporation of contextual, evidential and 
participative ingredients into later reforms (e.g. TLR, PSC-ISP) reflected some learning 
progression over time from earlier reforms. The PSIP, PSC-ISP and SPP had strong 
contextual evidential, consultative and participative bases as well. Their focus was more one 
of internal institutional change, their impact on society largely invisible to the public eye. 
The Pacific Plan had strong ideological bases in regionalism concepts and emanated from a 
review, but its formulation lacked consultative and participatory processes. The Pacific 
Plan’s limited translation in implementation was reflected in its lack of shared understanding, 
ownership and impact at the three PICs’ national level. 
Table 8.3: Critical factors in the formulation process of the ten policies  
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8.2.1.3. Policy implementation     
Table 8.4 compares the implementation process across the ten policies:  
 
Source: Appendices G and H 
Change processes across all policies were nonlinear. While broad policy parameters 
provided strategic direction, processes did not follow predetermined lines, often taking 
directions during implementation differing from original designs (intentions). Such 
redirections were unpredictable due to the influence of feedback loops (e.g. change in 
leadership, influence from other policies, lessons learnt and differences in reform 
expectations). Given the emergent and self-organising behaviour of actors and their 
interactions, adjusting program designs and approaches to implementation to 
Table 8.4: Modality and critical factors in the implementation of the ten policies  
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accommodating changes in the environment (feedback loops) became important in 
progressing the change process. For instance, the PSIP was transformed from a public 
service reform to a Ministry program, since it was hard to implement such a huge reform 
within a post-conflict system. Similarly, the PIRAMS accommodated reforms under the 
PSC-ISP that were not part of its original design. In a stable political environment, Samoa’s 
reforms were relatively more gradual, seen in the ways the PIRAMS and SPP were 
implemented, except for the 2002 government realignment which was sudden and not an 
original component of the PSC-ISP. In the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, emergent and 
flexible approaches were vital in the change process given political instabilities. For instance, 
the CRP underwent six changes in Prime Ministership (not counting other ministerial roles) 
during the 1994-2001 period. This compared to only one change at that level in Samoa in 
1998 (see Table 1.1).  
In the CRP, PSC-ISP, SPP and the PIRAMS (reforms implemented over ten years) change 
was ongoing, actors (individuals/institutions) were willing to continue following this path. 
At the same time, actors experienced reform fatigue by reverting to old practices. These 
‘ups’, ‘downs’ or ‘passiveness’ patterns were reflections in the nonlinearity of the change 
process, and an emergence of different paths influenced by different factors (feedback loops). 
The ‘ups’ (momentum) were perpetuated by such factors as changes in project management 
and funding, but leadership remained central. Conversely ‘downs’ or ‘passiveness’ were 
attributed to the lack of leadership needed to drive and continue the change process. The 
relative longevity of these policies enabled an assessment of patterns at different times. For 
example, the SPP underwent a cyclical path of ups, downs and passiveness under three 
different leaderships. In institutional reforms (e.g. SPP, CRP, PSIP, PSC-ISP), some changes 
were generational (long-term), dependent on social change (society), and could not be 
accomplished within a short-term, bounded government project timeframe.  
Differing across the three PICs was policy sovereignty or ownership; the ability of local 
actors to implement decisions independently while valuing available assistance, managing 
external dynamics, and maintaining positive relationships with external actors. For the PSIP, 
resourcing was controlled by RAMSI making it difficult for local managers to plan, 
manoeuvre the change process, or make decisions, particularly on resource mobilisation. 
This implementation modality of externally controlled resourcing, and the short-term nature 
of consultancy services, contributed to a lack of positive relationships between advisers and 
counterparts. This led to limited ownership, understanding and contextualisation of the 
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change process. Similarly, the CRP, targeting institutional change, ended up as a big bang 
structural program driven mainly by consultants concerned to meet loan conditionality, but 
limiting local ownership, understanding and contextualisation. Common in the PSC-ISP and 
the PIRAMS was strong policy sovereignty or ownership—attributed to the strong sense of 
national identity amongst local actors, a feature yet to materialise in Solomon Islands’ policy 
culture.  
Interrelated with all these factors was the participative nature of the implementation process. 
The TLR, TRC, PIRAMS and PSC-ISP initiatives used coordinated and partnership 
approaches where capacity development was built into the change process. As such, 
understanding, ownership and contextualisation of the implementation process also 
developed. These approaches recognised and utilised local knowledge, cultural aspects, and 
the roles of civil society actors. For the CRP, participative approaches and hence ownership 
were limited, a market versus public sector model being adopted to society’s neglect, and 
conflicting with social equity goals. The ELR and the CDF were not contextualised which 
led to negative impact. Common in all policies was involvement of development actors in 
the change process, foreign loans and aid used to finance design and implementation 
processes.   
In all policies, strong leadership was critical for ensuring change was implemented and 
sustained throughout the process. For instance, while political leadership was seen in the 
Pacific Plan’s initiation, it was not moulded into the implementation process, hence its 
limited operationalisation in regional and domestic political levels. Mixed leadership (strong 
versus weak to modest) was seen in implementation of the CRP, SPP and the PSIP, while 
negative leadership was assessed in the ELR and CDF. In all cases (the Pacific Plan to a 
lesser extent), neutrality in implementation was limited, and political interference in public 
administration real.  
8.2.1.4. Examining these findings against the literature  
These findings are not explicable by a single theory, given the complexity of what went on 
in the change process of the ten policies, and involving the interplay of multiple factors. 
Accordingly, a spectrum of six key findings are examined against the literature. 
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8.2.1.4.1. Policy initiation  
Finding 1: policy adoption in response to crises is consistent with the Multiple Stream and 
Punctuated Equilibrium theories (see sections 2.3.3.7 and 2.3.4.1.1). That is, policies are 
adopted when attention is given to a compelling problem, a window of opportunity opened 
to push through a policy solution. In accordance with the complexity theory (see section 
2.3.2.3), change occurs when the policy system is ‘at the edge of chaos’ (far-from-
equilibrium) influenced by feedback loops at bifurcation points. Crises in the three PICs, 
where the policy system (i.e. people as collective elements of the system) was ‘at the edge 
of chaos’, meant some change was inevitable given the impact of these crises. The feedback 
loops (bifurcation points) that led to the change (policy adoption) involved leadership 
(politics, agenda), policy transfers (appealing ideas, trends and models), development agents’ 
dynamics, and support (resources, technical assistance and agenda), all relating to the 
compelling nature of the problem (the crisis).  
However, adoption of a policy in response to crises as stochastic events is not consistent 
with the Multiple Stream and Punctuated Equilibrium theories. The evidence above shows 
that these policies (CRP, PIRAMS, TRC, etc.) were adopted not as random or sudden events, 
but as reactions to critical events involving complex historical contingencies. The 
Punctuated Equilibrium theory predicts that the policy process involves patterns of relatively 
stable incremental change, followed by shorter explosive change. Such a pattern appeared 
consistent with some reforms in Samoa because of the stability of the policy system. But not 
in the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu where the CRP, for instance, was a ‘big bang’ change, 
not incremental. It was more a complex interplay of several factors (crises, policy transfers 
of popular ideas around the Region, leadership and donors’ relations), within actors’ (donors, 
politicians and indigenous graduates) interactions that led to change initiation across the ten 
policies.  
Finding 2: leadership is demonstrated in the findings as a core bifurcation point in policy 
initiation and implementation. While leadership is highlighted by the Institutional Analysis 
and Development Framework (IADF) and Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (see 
sections 2.3.4.1.2), as important in the emergence of policy coalitions or co-operation, 
leadership is not treated here as a core factor of change in these prominent policy theories, 
including the Multiple Stream and Punctuated Equilibrium. Part of this limitation appears 
attributable to differences of context. These theories were constructed largely from contexts 
where formal coalitions and networks are institutionalised. Contrary to the three PICs’ 
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context, leadership is critical as the policy process is one of elite dominance given the 
prevalence of the big man or fa’amatai leadership, culture and politics (see section 8.4.1.3). 
Largely undervalued in these theories, moreover, is the integral role of development agents. 
It is no longer adequate to theorise policy processes in a developmental context without 
considering the role and dynamics of such agents and policy transfers (see section 8.2.2). As 
Sutherland (2000) states, ‘the increased pace and scope of reforms that occurred in the 
islands from the mid-1990s onwards cannot be explained outside the context of the donor-
driven regional reform agenda’. 
8.2.1.4.2. Policy formulation and implementation  
Finding 3: policies with contextualised processes involving consultative and participative 
approaches and responding to societal needs were more often implemented successfully, 
contributing to positive outcomes. The effectiveness of these approaches lies in local 
ownership, understanding, capacity building and learning—all crucial to progressing 
implementation and sustaining the change process. An absence of these approaches in 
policies regarded as imposed further contributed to ineffectuality. Their importance is 
supported by ethnographic research (Mosse, 2004), network and governance theories, the 
prominent IADF and ACF, and other theories emphasising collaboration (see sections 
2.3.4.1.2 and 2.3.4.3.1). Such findings validate other evaluation/reviews on the importance 
of participative approaches (Harris, 2007; Park, Howden, & Crimp, 2012; Paton & Fairbairn-
Dunlop, 2010). 
Reflecting on years as a consultant to the United Kingdom Department for International 
Development, Mosse (2004) states that ‘another thing the new ethnography of development 
shows is that governance brought by development schemes cannot be imposed; it requires 
collaboration and compromise… projects do not fail; they are failed by wider networks of 
support and validation’. Harris’s (2007) analysis of PNG’s political economy (seeking to 
understand the state’s failure to provide effective governance and development outcomes) 
pointed to ‘a variety of initiatives occurring at the local level that show promise for 
improving governance and development outcomes’… that have ‘emerged and (have) proven 
successful in bringing together local constituencies to cooperate in planning, implementing 
and operating local initiatives’. He points to the need for more work in understanding the 
extent to which the existence of such local ‘groups is correlated in shifts in ascription of 
legitimacy’. Further, Ferraris’s (2008) review of Pacific fisheries institutional reforms 
demonstrates that ‘the process should be inclusive and enabling to ensure long-term 
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sustainability of the change… stakeholders participation should develop a shared 
understanding of what needs to be changed  and why, how to bring change about, and 
acceptance of new rules, which need to be widely disseminated and well understood’.  
The ACF and IADF underscore ‘co-operation as precursors to change in policies or 
institutions’(Weible, Heikkila, deLeon, & Sabatier, 2012, p.8). However, these theories do 
not adequately capture the subtleties entailed in enacting collaborative public policy in 
settings where informal institutions (e.g. culture, relationships, and indigenous language) 
dominate the public sphere. Yet their utilisation can bring understanding, consensus, 
legitimacy, ownership and commitment to implementation such as in the CRP, TLR, TRC, 
PIRAMS and PSC-ISP. Yet these theories have largely conceptualised policy co-operation 
and networks with reference to formal advocacy groups and coalitions, particularly those 
employing economic-based and legal mechanisms. Collaboration in culturally-based 
contexts is ignored (Weare, Lichterman, & Esparza, 2014). This study’s findings 
demonstrate that participation, collaboration and contextualisation of policy require a 
recognition of local knowledge, cultural aspects, and the role of civil society. For example, 
some participants who have direct involvement in the CRP pointed to some wharves built 
on the dry sides in Vanuatu. Issues identified included a lack of consultation for local 
knowledge and inputs (see section 4.2.1.3). Also, for different cultural community leaders 
to understand the CRP (foreign language-based) concepts such as privatisation, strategic 
planning and reforms, the use of parables to translate these concepts into local languages 
facilitated an understanding of these concepts within local contexts.  
The importance of valuing social aspects in policy processes are largely supported by social 
construction theories (Yanow, 2000, 2004) and other studies. For example, Ratuva’s 
assessment of Nauru’s constitutional reforms shows the importance of local context where 
‘the use of the English language to satisfy the two foreign consultants posed two problems: 
the clarity in communicating local knowledge and the intention of local ownership of the 
change process’. This severely compromised intentions for the reform to be inclusive:  
Because most (community leaders) did not understand English and even the interpreted legal concepts 
and arguments, they were marginalised outside the communicative circle, thus severely compromising 
their influence within the community… In a community with strong communal and kinship bonds and 
where social communication was part of kinship networks, the validity of information was judged not 
by the presentation of the contents but by the reliability and legitimacy of the messenger… The 
contents of the message cannot be isolated and transmitted independently of the messenger but rather 
the two are inseparably part of a communicative process. (Ratuva, 2011, pp.251-253) 
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Finding 4: relationships with development actors are significant in the policy process. For 
instance, the lack of trust between counterparts and advisers led to the non-implementation 
of some activities under the PSIP. CRP was largely consultant-driven affecting local-
external relationships and worldviews. Law changes under the ELR were formulated by an 
ILO consultant with limited local inputs. Positive relationships were identified in the TLR, 
TRC and PIRAMS and hence the effectiveness of implementation. However, the dynamics 
and nature of local and foreign actors’ interactions are elements that remain largely 
unexamined in formulation and implementation theories.  
Finding 5: the findings about the policy processes (across all policies) as nonlinear and 
emergent in nature are supported by complexity theory (see sections 2.3.2.3 and 2.3.3.7). 
Compared to other prominent policy and development theories set out in chapter two, the 
behavioural aspects of a complex policy system (in the four case studies) featured strongly 
in the ten policy processes. The complexity theoretical lenses facilitate a better 
understanding of the nature of the change and its process, and in making sense of why the 
change happened as it did or not as intended, the complexities involved, and how context 
came into play.  
Finding 6: context is most significant in the whole policy process. Pollitt (2013) refers to 
context as the ‘missing link’ in theory (see section 2.5.2). The findings reiterate that public 
policy is contextual and needs understanding accordingly (see section 8.4) in terms of design 
and implementation.  
8.2.2. The general patterns  
8.2.2.1. Policy initiation/adoption   
Coded participant narratives across the four case studies in Tables 4.7, 5.4, 6.8 and 7.3 
(previous four chapters) are merged into Table 8.5 for cross-comparison. The coloured 
figures highlight the stand-out pattern across the four case studies: generally the genesis of 
public policy is less rooted in its context. That is, the society in which public policy is meant 
to impact upon, and in which the state is a part of, has been the missing link in policy 
processes examined here. Issues that enter the government agenda and then become public 
policies come largely from the top (political actors) or external (foreign actors). As well, 
policy adoption is political, influenced by local politicians and donor countries. Solomon 
Islands’ limited coding reflects the confinement of external influences to RAMSI; that 
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external dynamic was more intense in the Solomon Islands than in Vanuatu and Samoa. 
Differences in policy adoption across the four case studies emerged as a matter of degree:  
 
Source: Sections 4.3.1, 5.3.1, 6.3.1 and 7.3.1 
8.2.2.2. Policy formulation 
8.2.2.2.1. Construction of policy  
Coded participant narratives across the four case studies in Tables 4.8, 5.5, 6.9 and 7.4 are 
amalgamated into Table 8.6. Shown by the coloured figures, the overall pattern across the 
four case studies reveals four commonalities in the nature of policy formulation: 
 There is no consistent understanding about this thing called ‘policy’ at national and 
regional levels. Various documents are referenced as policies, an indication that the term 
‘policy’ is socially constructed;  
 While policy means different things, most participants refer to ‘policy’ as a (strategic) 
plan;  
 Regional and international agendas including aid policies are a composite of domestic 
and regional policy; and   
 There are few openly articulated political policy platforms.  
Table 8.5: Origins of public policy across the four case studies  
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Differences across the four case studies offer a spectrum. Hence the political/administration 
separation is messier and immature and hence more problematic in the Solomon Islands than 
in Samoa and Vanuatu. The Solomon Islands’ fragmented policy process was evident in a 
co-existence of two sets of national policy; the NCRA policy (political formulation) and the 
NDS (public administration formulation). Vanuatu’s PAA and Samoa’s SDS as national 
policy comprised public servants’ formulations, depicting some degree of 
political/administration separation.  
Table 8.7 (combining the coded narratives from Tables 4.9, 5.6, 6.10 and 7.5) further shows 
that a comprehensive view of policy requires understanding that policies manifest at 
different levels; broadly those that are macro (national), meso (sector/sub-sector) and micro 
(organisations/divisions/sections/ individuals). These levels interact with each other and 
with policies originating at regional and global levels. Given this interdependence, 
implementation of policy requires translation across other levels. However, while macro-
level plans exist, their integrated and consistent translation at lower levels is limited (but of 
greater prevalence in the Solomon Islands). Such crossover can render implementation 
problematic by limiting policy operationalisation. Here a common need to emerge was that 
of having consistent, up-to-date laws supporting implementation, and requiring a 
reconciliation of formal laws (state-based) and customs (indigenous derived).  
Table 8.6: Construction of policy—national and regional levels  
 
Source: Sections 4.3.2.1.1, 5.3.2.1.1, 6.3.2.1.1 and 7.3.2.1.1 
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Source: Sections 4.3.2.1.2, 5.3.2.1.2, 6.3.2.1.2 and 7.3.2.1.2 
8.2.2.2.2. How are policies formulated? 
Coded narratives from Tables 4.10, 5.7, 6.11 and 7.6 and about how participants experienced 
or saw policies being formulated across the four case studies are combined in Table 8.8. The 
patterns (see coloured figures) show the following commonalities: 
 The formulation process is predominantly top-down;  
 Most policies are constructed without proper consultation or stakeholders’ participation. 
Although consultative discourses have improved, civil society’s meaningful 
participation remains minimal;  
 Rational and evidence-based policy is limited (although much stronger at regional than 
national level);  
 The ‘policies’ are largely policy transfers (lacking recognition of local institutions) but 
the ‘practices’ are ad hoc driven mostly by ideological factors;  
 Stakeholders understanding of policies (and notions of public policy in terms of state-
society relationships) are limited; and 
Table 8.7: Levels of policies across the four case studies  
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 The key difference across the four case studies is direct involvement of the political level 
in policy formulation in the Solomon Islands. 
 
Source: Sections 4.3.2.2, 5.3.2.2, 6.3.2.2 and 7.3.2.2 
8.2.2.3. Policy implementation—a reflection of policy  
Limited implementation as per prevailing perception of the status of public policy in the 
Region (see section 1.1.1) reflects the actual nature of policies and how they were put in 
place. Consistent across the four case studies were views of various participants indicating 
that existing (development) policies are strategic plans mostly seen as fantasies isolated from 
societal realities. That is, the policy process is not embedded in its system (society), where 
policies (issues/demands) emerge from dynamic interactions within that systems, and for 
policies (change) to impact on that system and its elements (people). In large, these plans 
are: 
 Not contextualised and remote in their formulation from those who deliver the 
outcomes;  
 Not linked to implementation and resource allocation, being adopted largely to 
enhance the standing of politicians and officials, to justify actors’ functions, and to 
Table 8.8: Formulation of policy across the four case studies  
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access donor funding;  
 Contained ‘pie in the sky stuff’, ‘wish lists’ or ‘shopping lists’ which have everything 
a PIC could not possibly implement or deliver;   
 Based on foreign ideologies, taking-for-granted the influence of local belief systems 
on politics and practices of government and society; and   
 Limited in translation to the community in terms of how policies are operationalised, 
monitored, and evaluated in local contexts.  
8.2.2.4. Examining these findings against the literature  
8.2.2.4.1. The genesis or origin of policy 
The findings in section 8.2.2.1 are not consistent with pluralist and corporatist theories 
positing that the policy process consists mainly of interactions amongst interest groups, the 
state and bureaucracy (see section 2.3.3.5 and 2.3.4.1.2). These findings are consistent with 
the findings in Turner and Hulme (1997) that interest groups (the capitalists as the main 
constituents of society) (as per above theories) are limited and policy making is highly 
political (see section 2.4.3).  
The findings further demonstrate that current theories and previous studies (see section 2.3.5) 
underestimate the dominant role of political elites and donor actors in policy genesis. This 
is because current theories have largely conceptualised policy origins in state-society 
(internal) relations within a society dominated by capitalists in an independent polity. But 
Pacific states are neither fully economically independent, nor do they have vibrant capitalists. 
Instead, tribal-based island groupings and indigenous institutions dominate society. Yet, 
society’s voice in policy setting has been limited. This constitutes a significant democratic 
and development issue that must be addressed in ongoing public policy development.  
The complexity of interactions amongst state-external (political-donor) actors, and how they 
shape the genesis of public policy in PICs, is not fully captured by existing theories. Donor 
actors are part of the institutions, organisations or agents of PICs’ policy systems, not 
necessarily external elements due to their significant influences over development policy, 
resourcing and reform. Policy transfer theories resonate here, but they lack the power to 
explain why local actors take up transfers, and how policy transfers then influence the nature 
of implementation.   
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8.2.2.4.2. The formulation and implementation of policy 
In examining the findings in sections 8.2.2.2 to 8.2.2.3 against the literature, five key points 
stand out.  
Finding 1: the findings of limited evidence-based policy, and policy is not rational as 
orthodoxy insists (see sections 2.3.3.2 and 2.3.4.2.1). Social construction theories are in 
evidence across the four case studies. Hence there are different meanings and definitions of 
policy at various nested levels (individual, organisation, sector, national, regional and global). 
Policy is thus interdependent in formulations, implementation and context. For instance, the 
regional labour mobility policy will not get implemented unless it is translated to the (PICs, 
Australia and NZ) national level. However, ‘a failure to recognize the multi-level or 
embedded nature of public policies has been a hallmark of most literature on the subject of 
policy instrument’ (Howlett, 2009a, pp.73-74). Such failure is critical when explaining the 
implementation deficit evident in the Region (see section 1.1.1). What has been mostly 
referred to as policies (plans) remain at the highest meta-level in terms of aspirations, goals 
and fantasies with little calibration into tangible or actionable means and tools.  
Finding 2: an additional meaning of policy least touched on in the literature is ‘policy as 
espoused’ versus ‘policy as practised’. What is public policy in PICs then? In the three PICs 
examined, practices are dominated by strong, culturally-based polities where informalities 
and personal relationships are central to how things are done. The findings show that beliefs 
have shaped these practices, how they matter being largely taken for granted in formal policy 
processes. Paton and Fairbairn-Dunlop’s (2010) research showed the absence of using local 
institutions for climate change discussions, but these institutions shape Tuvaluans’ beliefs 
and views about climate change, which do not mirror framing of climate change in formal 
policies and international agendas. These findings are consistent with the ACF, positing 
policy as driven by coalitions with shared beliefs (see section 2.3.4.1.2), such as the 
fa’asamoa, a shared, deeply-held, belief system, absent in the Solomon Islands or Vanuatu. 
However, deep beliefs in PICs are complex involving dimensions of principles, values, 
customs, oral histories and languages. Such dimensions are left unexamined in the ACF and 
other policy theories. And while what is written, preached or espoused (in policy frameworks) 
differs from what is practised, there is a gap to bridge. That could be closed by examining 
the socially constructed nature of public policy and development issues in PICs, an as yet 
neglected area of the literature. 
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Social construction understanding helps determine the nature of power plays amongst actors 
and the knowledge basis of policy (as documented), which, in the case of PICs, are largely 
those of policy transfers—what is driving people to do the things they do,—which are their 
belief systems. Social construction can examine how an orthodoxy ‘fits into an ideological 
process of governing’ (Meier, 2009, p.6). The orthodox view of public policy, mostly 
technical through reference to a rational Weberian model of governance, is somewhat 
problematic when considering strong cultural worldviews in PICs. Here development issues 
are seen by participants as more cultural and relational than technical. As Levin (2013) points 
out in research about Pacific education, an over-reliance on technical remedies is part of the 
problem as Pacific development issues are not technical. This ‘technical apparatus’ to 
development aid policy in Oceania is questionable: actors operating in this development 
space are not rational (Hodge, 2014) but bound by the ideological positions and 
organisational politics within which they operate (Prince, 2012).  
Finding 3: the findings demonstrate that initiation of policy transfers is largely through aid 
policies and international regimes. Formal policies are put in place by local policy actors to 
justify or access donor funding and for nations to act as citizens of the international system. 
This finding is consistent with other studies (Peake & Marenin, 2008; Prince, 2012; Tisdell, 
2002; Young, 2005) (see sections 2.4.3 and 2.5.3). However, this study’s findings further 
explored how the policy process when influenced significantly by policy transfers and 
external interests affect policy ownership, learning and implementation sustainability. These 
are issues constantly raised by participants as central to implementation in a developmental 
context, but overlook in public policy and development theories.   
Finding 4: the dominant discourse’s notions of phenomena as predictable and controllable 
(see section 2.3.2.1) have noticeably influenced approaches to formal public policy across 
the four case studies; in particular, the production of various top-down plans and intentions 
for implementation. The findings challenge notions of predictability and controllability: 
PICs are decorated with such grafted-on pre-designs, now referred to as policies, yet of 
limited implementability because they were being developed mostly in isolation from 
societal realities and dynamics, and not owned by those who should implement them. 
Limitations in the translation of these policies on the ground was unsurprising given 
restricted societal development in the Region (see section 1.1.1).   
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8.3. Policy effectiveness  
   [Level 2] 
Depicted in Table 8.9 are the coded participant narratives on assessments of the ten policies 
and policies in general. The TLR, TRC and the PIRAMS were assessed as mostly effective 
in their immediate and long-term results, the ELR and CDF less so. The CRP, PSIP, PSC-
ISP and SPP results were mixed; some effectiveness was seen in immediate results but some 
long-term impact was either questionable, or yet to emerge. The Pacific Plan was also mixed 
in its results, most participants viewing regional policies as generally less effective. In 
general, most participants were sceptical in their assessment of the status, nature and impact 
of public policies. While acknowledging some positive ongoing developments, participants 
suggested that efforts could have been pursued differently had factors or issues of local 
context and implementation (discussed in section 8.5) been taken into account in the ‘why’ 
and ‘how’ of policy processes.  
 
Source: Participant narratives in previous four chapters 
Table 8.10 further summarises the qualitative assessments of the ten policies–what various 
participants meant in determining effectiveness (or otherwise). Their narratives 
demonstrated that, while public policy attempts have contributed to the development status 
of these PICs and the Region, they have also come with some undesirable costs. For instance, 
there was a perceived threat to sovereignty, a culture of resentment towards government 
policies and outside influences, poor morale including fear and mistrust among people, and 
a loss of social cohesion, identity and sense of community (particularly the Solomon Islands). 
Table 8.9: Success or non-success of public policy across the four case studies  
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Increased corruption was a widespread concern, politicians seen as powerful elites acting 
through self-serving behaviour at the expense of national interests.  
 
Source: Participant narratives (sections 4.2, 5.2, 6.2 and 7.2) 
Table 8.10: Qualitative assessment of success or non-success of the ten policies 
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Participant narratives indicated that public policy impact was often assessed through outputs 
(deliverables within projects timeframe), within insufficient consideration given to effects 
on the policy environment. For example, at the end of the CRP, all of its 42 target milestones 
were ticked off as completed, yet service delivery had deteriorated after CRP (S. H. Pal, 
2002) (see section 4.2.1). Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) as a government function and 
learning process, including evaluating long-term impacts of reforms, have been limited. 
Evaluations are often carried out by external experts and prompted by the need to introduce 
and design the next reform initiative. 
In examining these findings against the literature, conceptions are limited as to what 
constitutes effectiveness in relation to policy impact (see section 2.3.4.3.3). This study’s 
findings contribute to defining and assessing policy success/non-success in two 
dimensions—outputs (short-term/immediate) and outcomes (long-term) with overlapping 
levels of impact—as through individuals or organisations, and political, economic and social 
systems. Assessments of policy success/non-success were drawn from the participant 
narratives—from the perceptions or experiences of local policy actors.  
8.4. The context of public policy  
 [Level 3] 
To further comprehend the status of the policy processes and results presented, a 
comparative understanding is required—to see why things ‘are’, or might appear similar or 
different across the four contexts. This is ‘something that enables us to understand the 
different evolutions of public policy and management in different habitats’ (Pollitt, 2013, 
p.xviii). Participant narratives largely refer to it as the geographic-demographic, social-
political, historical and development level dimensions (see Table 1.1), co-influencing policy 
processes through the interactions of individuals, organisations, and institutions in the 
complex systems of the state, society, region and global levels.  
8.4.1. How the context featured in the ten policies  
Table 8.11 shows how such contextual dimensions featured across the ten policies. The 
successful policies took these dimensions into account in their design and implementation 
processes.  
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Source: Appendices G and H 
8.4.1.1. Geography and demography matter 
This study’s findings confirm that physical aspects significantly influence development 
status. They matter for policy contextualisation in terms of formulation and implementation. 
Table 8.11: How the context featured across the ten policies  
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Isolation, vulnerability and smallness also matter when individual PICs and the Region are 
set comparatively against global issues (trade, climate change, security, etc.). The Region’s 
implementation challenge lies in small administrations of limited capacities having to 
confront huge international and regional agendas in addition to local policy needs. Isolation 
from world markets and vulnerability affect the development of trade, infrastructure and 
education, people mobility and livelihood sustainability. Limited infrastructure due to 
geographical dispersion further compounds the lack of civic participation in policy processes 
and an awareness of government affairs.  
However, across-country comparisons show that physical determinants are relative and 
contextual. The significance of smallness in Samoa, when compared to Vanuatu, reveals the 
importance of not so much of population size, but of a small tight-knit homogenous society, 
where relationships are more intact. Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands’ geographical 
isolation (over 80 islands with no land borders) and ethnic diversity have substantially 
influenced societal fragmentation, rendering public policy and development highly complex 
and challenging tasks. Where a boat trip from the main island to another in Samoa takes an 
hour, it can take weeks in the Solomon Islands. What appears to matter more to the Solomon 
Islands in policy making and implementation is geographical dispersion, cultural diversity 
and historical development, less so smallness. This matters considerably for smaller states 
(Samoa, Vanuatu) as limited economies of scale and labour capacity impact on the nature of 
the policy process and implementation. Here, for example, policy actors become generalists, 
wearing multiple hats and given dual roles in government and society. 
8.4.1.2. History and the role of development actors matter 
Colonial legacies feature strongly, creating path dependencies. For example, Anglophone 
versus Francophone worldviews remain apparent in the dividedness of Vanuatu’s education, 
church, politics and ways its policies are formulated and implemented. The indigenisation 
of religion or the Christianisation of culture is evident across the three PICs in that religious 
and cultural distinctions of beliefs and principles are open to multiple interpretations and 
practices within society and political life. Most politicians assume multiple roles as chiefs, 
big men or church leaders, often seeing their appointments to office as callings from God. 
In Samoa, the church is not a separate institution but part of the fa’amatai (see Figure 6.1). 
Further, how sovereignty was achieved affects national pride and worldviews: Samoa and 
Vanuatu’s independence was viewed by participants as ‘fought for’, while that of the 
Solomon Islands was ‘bestowed’. Levels of effective sovereignty featured differently across 
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the three PICs. Samoa and Vanuatu are more independent in their policy systems, while that 
in the Solomon Islands had been subject to outside intervention (via RAMSI) over 10 years 
(2003-2013).  
The history of external influences remains significant. Overseas development aid (ODA) 
configurations (see red figures in Table 8.12) are shaped by diplomatic ties rooted in 
colonialism. Australia gives 46% of its bilateral aid to PNG (former trustee) while the US 
gives more ODA to its dependents (FSM, RMIs, Palau) (see Appendix A). France gives 
more to Wallis and Futuna, Vanuatu (former colonies) and regional organisations (SPC’s 
headquarter is in New Caledonia, a French territory). Similarly, NZ in relation to Samoa 
(former colony), Tokelau and Niue (realms). In contrast to the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, 
Samoa receives more ODA in multilateral (than bilateral) arrangements, reflecting 
coordination and multi-partnership in public policy diplomacy. Better development 
outcomes might therefore be expected from independent PICs receiving the most ODA. 
However, when viewed as aid per capita (at a localised level), the (nine) independent PICs 
receive less aid per capita than the (15) dependent/semi-dependent PICs. This aid versus 
diplomatic ties relationships begs the question of what is the intention of giving aid: is it to 
enhance state building and independence, advance donor countries’ interests in the region, 
or something of each. 
 
Source: Extracted from http://www.oecd.org/dac in January 2015  
Table 8.12: ODA (US$millions) by PICs and donors in 2013 
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8.4.1.3. Social-political dimensions matter 
An important further question is why the political system (and public policy) in Vanuatu and 
the Solomon Islands is more unstable and fragmented than in Samoa (see Table 1.1 and 
sections 4.3.3.1, 5.3.3.1 and 6.3.3.1). Samoa has remained a predominantly one-party state, 
while Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands have had coalition governments and a high 
proportion of independent candidates running in elections. Small parties have proliferated, 
while party hopping, votes of no confidence and changes in ministerial roles remain common. 
In the Solomon Islands, parties are short-lived, often only emerging near elections, whereas 
in Vanuatu parties exist with structures in operation. The nature of a political system reflects 
it’s social (and to some extent historical and economic) situations. The Solomon Islands’ 
fragile policy system reflects the impact of its recent tensions:  
We are a goldilocks country. Not too big. Not too small. Not too fractured. Not too unified. We have 
lots of islands but not too many like Solomon Islands… We have no history of any significant conflict 
so you wouldn’t have the difficulty of getting consensus, something you have in Solomon Islands. 
[VPA.1] 
Comparing Samoa (four islands, one language) to Vanuatu (80 islands, 115 languages) and 
the Solomon Islands (922 islands, 120 languages),xxxii illustrates the contextual differences 
shaping public policy challenges. The Samoan phrase ‘o le tagata ma lona faasinomaga’ 
signifies that individuals identify with where they come from; culture is their source of 
identity. Multiple communal cultures of Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands signify multi-
faceted belief systems and identities, defined at local levels. In the absence of a shared belief 
system that unifies society, nationhood is a contested notion causing political instabilities, 
whereas the fa’aSamoa unites society contributing to stability. These differences are 
apparent in the policy culture where fostering participative approaches and coordination are 
more challenging in the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu than in Samoa:  
Fa’aSamoa gave the strongest unified notion of any nation I’ve been to. It’s the glue that holds the 
whole fabric of society, government, everything… In Solomon Islands, it’s just the opposite. And 
that’s their problem... To say there’s a country called the Solomon Islands is rather a faulty 
expression. That concept of nationhood doesn’t exist. It’s just a collection of different racial groups 
put under one state. And when the state is dominated by one or two groups there cannot be anything 
but conflict. Then you add the overloads of corruption brought in by money from other countries and 
big companies that are in robbing the country... the Solomon Islands could be a wealthy state but its 
                                                                            
xxxii PNG, Cameroon, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu are the world’s top linguistically diverse countries 
http://www.ethnologue.com/statistics/country. 
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resources are stolen from them. The money has gone to individuals, not the government... If you do 
a reform in just one province, it can work. But if you have a one-size-fits-all project operating out of 
Honiara, it won’t work. [RDA.2] 
Cultural worldviews (fa’aSamoa, big man, wantokism) co-exist with others (e.g. religious 
and colonial impacts). Politicians and officials, as members of society, bring socially 
constructed views to the workings of government. They interact with processes and 
institutions underpinning the government and donor systems (often implicit to locals) to 
shape public policy. Social dynamics influenced by these perspectives, in a small culturally-
based society, affect internal and external working relationships. State-society relationships 
assume forms of patronage where allegiance as a politician or official is owed to the wantok 
or aiga at a village level. Remittances, a key contributor to GDP in Samoa, is an indicator 
of strong patronage under the fa’aSamoa. Moreover, tensions between state-society systems 
are manipulated for political propaganda purposes (e.g. CDF) which, in turn, furthers the 
patronage culture. Compounding this remains society’s lack of understanding of the state 
government system.    
8.4.1.4. Development status  
These findings highlight the importance of situating PICs’ or the Region’s development in 
the historical context to better understand how countries follow different development paths. 
Hence priorities vary across contexts and so, too, must the sequencing of policy. Figure 8.1 
tries to capture where the three PICs are located in their (public policy) development path in 
general. This path has involved three significant phases: post-independence (1960s/1980s), 
reform start (late 1980s/1990s), and continuation (2000s). The wavy arrows reveal that this 
path has not been smooth. It involved ups (growth) and downs (e.g. crises) triggering 
interventions exemplified by the ten policies examined in this study. The bullet points 
summarise the critical steps undertaken during each of these phases, still ongoing in most 
PICs. For instance, the first self-government building era involved establishing the basic 
machinery of government and human resource development, and where indigenous 
graduates could assume senior government positions from expatriates. By the late 
1980s/1990s, most PICs experienced the impact of global recessions and local crises while 
in the midst of nation-state building. Responses included structural adjustments followed by 
state institutional reforms (e.g. Samoa’s 15 institutional strengthening programs (ISPs)). 
Reforms continue with recent reflection on what has or has not worked. Regionalism has 
been re-emphasised, including the take-up of international policy regimes as PICs become 
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more integrated globally. In comparison, Samoa exhibits greater maturity being the region’s 
longest established sovereign state. Vanuatu follows (e.g. CRP), while the Solomon Islands, 
with its more complicated history, is still struggling to implement some basic governance 
reforms.  
 
 
Source: Author’s construct based on participant narratives and documentary analysis  
This comparison resonates in the literature noting the slow development progress of the 
Region, which arises from naive assumptions about countries following identical 
development paths. All countries are ‘developing’ but each is on a different path, is a crucial 
understanding when examining priorities on the ground, and designing policies to address 
them. Here reform is likely to fail or prove counterproductive if introduced without 
facilitating conditions in place. For example, the PSIP’s implementation took five years to 
gain ground as the Solomon Islands’ public service lacked the facilitating culture for this 
reform. Accordingly the PSIP was redesigned to strengthen the Ministry of Public Service, 
so it could have the culture and capability facilitating service-wide reform.  
Social-political, and economic dimensions are key explanatory factors in a country’s 
development status. So is the ‘how’ of development considered historically given that initial 
Figure 8.1: Development path in the three PICs and the Region 
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and previous interventions have created path dependencies shaping the trajectory of ongoing 
development efforts. Complexity theory suggests that a public policy system is sensitive to 
‘initial conditions’ (history); these conditions determine evolutionary capacity of a system 
because of the ‘irreversibility’ and ‘path dependency’ of change (Cairney, 2013b; Room, 
2011, p.7). However history, place, and time are dimensions largely neglected in public 
policy and development theories (Dussauge-Laguna, 2012; Howlett, 2009b; Pollitt, 2008, 
p.xi) in relation to how those dimensions shape policy processes and development status. 
The significance of these contextual dimensions to PICs (and other countries) lies in situating 
their development status within the historical development of nation-states worldwide. This 
points to lessons about the kind of policies to adopt, and how to sequence and design them 
considering PICs’ status as young nation-states in their development journey (see section 
1.2.).  
Variation in the development status of the three PICs lies in how the notion of being a nation-
state matures throughout society. In Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands, notions of nationhood 
(national identity, sovereignty) and statehood (state legitimisation) as the bases for national 
public policy are yet to take shape. ‘Melanesia nationhood remains a stubborn rock despite… 
the enormous problems of the region… decolonisation remains a crucial historical episode 
of deep meaning for these peoples’ (Gardner & Waters, 2013). Compare this to Samoa where 
nationhood existed before notions of statehood came into being. Often taken for granted in 
development theories and thinking are the notions that a nation-state already exists with the 
legitimacy and capability needed to formulate and implement a given public policy task for 
development, and in a rational manner. Pacific states were born in the last century’s 
decolonisation process.xxxiii Conceiving them as ‘developmental states’ mostly occurred in 
the late 1980s/early 1990s,xxxiv this emerged mainly in response to economic crises and to 
adjust economic situations to global imperatives. An overriding conscious approach amongst 
various politicians (particularly post-independence governments) as to what their roles are 
in a developmental state has been limited (see section 4.3.3.1.4 and 5.3.3): 
In Vanuatu we are trying to be a state but an unlikely state. The problem with the Melanesians is that 
we have too many nations within one nation. [VPA.2] 
                                                                            
xxxiii About 191 nation-states were created by 2000, 95% are postcolonial states (Roeder, 2007, p.6) (see section 1.2.1) 
xxxiv The ‘developmental state’ concept credits development primarily to state intervention through conscious and 
consistent policies as with the East Asian countries’ development experiences since the 1920s (Johnson, 1999; Leftwich, 
1995).  
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8.4.2. Public policy in its context 
The above discussion begs the question: what constitutes public policy in the settings 
considered? Emerging from these findings is the notion that, at the heart of public policy 
development in a Pacific state lies the paradoxical co-evolution of the state with its society 
(and indigenous system). Pacific people need to sustain the essence of their indigenous 
system: the values and principles underpinning their cultures, identities, social capital and 
societal governance. But they also need to participate in modern development which is the 
essence of the state’s public policy role. Pacific people clearly value their indigenous 
systems, but the state’s governance systems are often overlaid in ways that ignore them. 
Based on participant narratives, Box 8.1 outlines key elements of this paradoxical conception 
of public policy shaping state-society relations. 
 
The core of effective public policy is where the two systems find common grounds for 
development: a hybrid approach termed ‘Samoanisation’ (GoS, 2006), for example, where 
the strengths of both systems are optimally utilised. This is where the line of judging policy 
effectiveness is situated. Hence perpetuating suitable policies within Pacific states’ status of 
development and social dimensions requires a solid understanding of both systems. As 80% 
Box 8.1: A paradoxical conception of state-society relationships in a Pacific island state 
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of the population is governed by the indigenous system, this system is central to public policy 
development. Finding ways in which the two systems can co-function is the key 
development policy issue in Pacific island locations. However, as the findings show, policy 
processes have mostly neglected the indigenous society through lack of community 
improvement, overlaid by a growing state system revealing weak accountability. 
8.5. Key variables of policy success/non-success  
 [Level 4] 
In light of the findings presented so far, this last section offers a synthesis regarding critical 
factors determining policy effectiveness that require further attention in public policy 
development. Coded participant narratives across the four case studies in Tables 4.11, 5.8, 
6.12 and 7.7 are merged into Table 8.13 to show these critical determinants. The patterns 
(coloured) in Table 8.13 show that most participants regarded leadership as a fundamental 
issue. However, for the second and third factors, participants differed regarding priorities. 
Stakeholder support and feedback as well as people capability are priorities for the Solomon 
Islands and Vanuatu, whereas people capability and M&E were those for Samoa. For the 
Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and the Region, a united policy system and agenda depends on 
consolidating diverse communities or countries as stakeholders of one nation-state or region. 
 
Source: sections 4.3.3, 5.3.3, 6.3.3 and 7.3.3 
Given their interrelatedness, these determinants are condensed under four headings—policy 
culture and stakeholders’ support, implementation modality, capability and leadership.  
Table 8.13: Issues or factors central to implementation across the four case studies 
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8.5.1. Policy culture and stakeholder support  
The findings point to two components of policy culture and stakeholder support significant 
to policy effectiveness: collaboration between Pacific states and co-operation with their 
development partners. Figure 8.2 depicts how actors (across the state, society, market and 
international systems) interact through participation and partnership to facilitate policy 
understanding, learning, ownership and sustainability. The policy cases (section 8.2.1) 
demonstrated that dynamic relationships through operable partnerships, combined with 
inclusive participation of stakeholders to enact, reinforce and institutionalise the processes 
of learning, understanding and ownership of policy, are fundamental elements for sustaining 
the change process. No matter how well a policy is written, if it lacks the legitimate support 
and ownership of those implementing it, then the efforts of such implementation are limited.  
 
8.5.1.1. Within ourselves: state-society relationship  
Implementation is complicated when policy cultures are limited in terms of policy 
understanding and ownership—when policies are largely formulated from the top with little 
involvement of implementers. This arises through a lack of consolidated stakeholder support 
due to limited societal understanding and ownership of government, a lack of effective 
participation and neglect of social factors in policy processes.   
Figure 8.2: Various stakeholders/actors of public policy and their interactions  
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8.5.1.1.1. Consolidating community is about understanding government 
When comparing the four cases, an obvious question to emerge was how can we work with 
others if we cannot even work amongst ourselves as a nation? How can PICs talk about 
integrating as a region if society cannot integrate itself and work with its government? But 
then why is it that, at the local level, a village is clean but not an urban area? Why is it that 
a village can get together in self-organising ways to fundraise for a new church, yet cannot 
easily do likewise for a school? These questions highlight the potential for society to work 
together, showing collective support for a public policy in a communal culturally-based 
society, where people believe in the value of the church in bringing spirituality and the 
people together. It is also partly because the grassroots was directly targeted by the work of 
the church upon its arrival (see section 4.3.3.3). A school, by contrast, belongs to the state; 
not yet directly owned by the people. The state remains largely isolated from communities; 
its school could have been built without local authorities’ involvement.  
This analogy signifies that the legitimacy of the state system and its public policies are 
dependent on committed societal support and feedback from the people who are part of and 
should own that system. To own is to understand, but that requires a cultural transformation 
in how people collectively see their government’s role in promoting national interests, not 
in fostering patronage expectations. Leong and House’s (2012) research demonstrated that 
the  ‘success or failure (of water projects) cannot be differentiated on the basis of the rules 
that are played’ (as per institutionalists, see section 2.3.4.1.2) but ‘succeed mainly because 
they are embedded in a policy context’… where ‘legitimate institutions’ and ‘normative 
justifications’ of the state are built. The entrenchment of a culture of state ownership is 
critical for providing the consolidated support for public policy and its implementation.   
8.5.1.1.2. Understanding government is about meaningful participation  
While there are initiatives (section 8.2.1) in which inclusive participation has contributed to 
success, the findings (section 8.2.2.2) demonstrate that participation in terms of building 
sufficient community influences, energies and capabilities (feedback loops) in the public 
policy space remain sparse. Consultation occurs but inconsistently, often conducted from 
pro forma checklists used to justify pre-determined policies. Thus Sutherland (2000) 
assessed the 1990s reform process in various PICs as limited in consultation and 
implementation, and subject to much society protest. Limited participation signifies limited 
collaborative efforts for implementation, which reflects a lack of grassroots development 
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impact. Slatter (2014, p.105) indicates that ‘Pacific society values participatory, consensus-
based decision-making, but it cannot be claimed there is meaningful democratic 
participation’. Park, Howden and Crimp’s (2012) study shows that climate change 
vulnerability assessments in most PICs ‘inherently fail to provide the context-specific 
understanding required to precipitate informed development of adaptation policies and 
actions’. It makes sense, then, for small communities to value participatory mechanisms for 
communal benefits, but such values and mechanisms deserve fuller recognition in policy 
processes. 
8.5.1.1.3. Meaningful participation and collaboration is utilising social values  
Limited community participation is commonly attributed to the ignorance of indigenous 
societies. Ethnographer Leenhardt refers to New Caledonia as a society ‘written on the 
ground’ (Curry et al., 2012) to denote the importance of recognising that the mechanisms 
(principles, tools, legitimacies) for meaningful collaboration are grounded within society, 
yet often ignored. Bringing these mechanisms into the public policy (state-society) 
interactive space requires appreciative understanding by policy actors. This is critical in 
facilitating the ‘how’ of policy operationalisation on the ground and monitoring 
implementation impacts on people.  
Language clarity, for instance, is vital to contextualising understanding, communicating 
reasons for action, and influencing popular support for policy. This influence lies with 
indigenous authorities and their influence over their aiga/wantoks or the overlapping 
patronage networks like the fa’amatai. If traditional leadership grasps the purpose of a policy, 
then the legitimacy and capacity to inspire the wantok to support its translation into 
communities can be enacted within local people’s (cultural) worldviews or ‘lifeworld’ 
(Habermas, 1984; Hassall, 2010). Social interactions embedded in cultural principles such 
as vā tapuia (sacred spatial relationship) and tofā fetala’i (wisdom is knowledge sharing) 
exist to account for the importance of respect, trust and communicative understanding in 
relationships. Building community support cannot be done without the protocols that inform 
discussion and negotiations as they provide the basis for achieving buy-in from community 
actors. Mosse (2004) posits that ‘project models and their interpretations, upon which project 
success and survival depends, have to be secured and stabilized socially… through actively 
recruiting and enrolling other supporting actors who tie their interests to the representations 
of the established project order’.  
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It is commonly recognised in Samoa that the key incentive for purposeful participation and 
facilitating commitment is ‘recognition’ (amanaia). A recognition of various community 
roles legitimises the acceptance of an initiative—that your voice is valued, cultural protocols 
shaping and facilitating that voice acknowledged and respected. The three PICs differ in the 
recognition given to the social context in the ‘practices’ of public policy. The Solomon 
Islands has yet to fully appreciate the diversity of its cultural dimensions. Samoa and 
Vanuatu are learning to appreciate such dimensions, though that has created some paradoxes 
in the policy context (see section 8.4.2), while still being an element that appears to 
contribute to positive progress.   
8.5.1.2. With our partners—donor relationships  
Donor systems are a salient but complex component of the Region’s public policy 
framework. Donors’ roles are more significant as ODA demands increase (Davies & 
Pickering, 2015), and as various reforms are designed and implemented through donor-
funded programs using external actors. Commitments to country ownership, capacity and 
alignment, as well as mutual responsibility and accountability in development processes, are 
formalised through relevant bilateral and multilateral arrangements (OECD, 2005, 2011; PIF, 
2009b). 
Yet experienced realities (as per participant narratives) point to an inadequate 
implementation of these commitments. Banks et al.s’ (2012, p.183) analysis demonstrates 
that New Zealand’s aid ‘is not strongly based on geopolitical trends or imperatives of the 
region and the recipients there’… or on meaningful partnerships but on own domestic 
interests and individual agenda in Wellington ‘with a faith in the neoliberal market 
mechanism’. Schultz’s (2012) research highlighted a similar theme in Australia’s 
engagement with PICs. Donors, for their part, are critical of PICs’ lack of development 
performance to match ODA received. By contrast, local actors are critical of donors’ 
approaches, using ‘the power of the purse’ in dealing insensitively with local people and 
cultures, imposing their own agendas and inflexible aid systems. Despite good intentions, 
these issues are consistently raised in the narratives as contributing to limitations of policy 
culture, stakeholder support and policy effectiveness. These findings are not new: some 
scholars (Alley, 2006; Henderson, 2003; Ratuva, 2011; Sutherland, 2000) have voiced 
concerns about the detrimental effects of policies seen as driven externally. While some 
donors have acknowledged these concerns in their reporting, they are often ignored in 
practice as various participant narratives have highlighted.  
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In comparing the three PICs’ experiences, a country’s ability to manage these external 
influences is critical to success. Genuine working relationships and negotiated compromises 
between donor and local actors is important for progressing implementation (see section 
8.2.1). As Mosse (2004) postulates, ‘development interventions are driven not by policy but 
by the exigencies of organisations and the needs to maintain relationships’. Systems of 
relationships are personalised in a small, ethnically-based polity, experts needing to account 
for these relationships since they influence implementation. Lachapelle, Montpetit, and 
Gauvin’s research (2014) show that ‘individuals trust for expertise plays a crucial role in the 
overall opinion formation process’. Relationships matter because, while high level policy 
documents provide aspirational directions, it is the institutional practice determined through 
actors’ interactive interpretations of what a policy means in implementation that contributes 
to the translation of policies on the ground. 
8.5.2. Implementation modality  
Implementation modality refers to the systems (instruments, tools, procedures), adopted and 
built up within institutions, and that actors use to operationalise and monitor a policy as it 
undergoes change processes occurring at organisational and responsible individual working 
levels. Often macro-level plans are put in place but their operational systems remain 
underdeveloped. This is an implementation deficit that is generally perceived throughout the 
Region (see section 1.1.1), this is partly attributable to issues concerning implementation 
modality.   
Implementation requires a long-term process of cultural changes in individuals and 
institutions. However, this complex nature of a policy process often goes understated in 
reforms. The use of short-term consultancy-based programs for implementation hinder the 
normalisation of change because these programs are seen as operationally detached from 
local actors. Often a program/project appeared as something over there, it’s something new 
coming from others but it’s here to stay for five years until the funding (managed using 
donors’ systems) invariably runs out, experts finish their contracts, tick off the milestones in 
log frames and go away. Some involved in the project can try to stabilise the ‘developmental 
work’ experts have developed, depending on whether they understand it and have the 
resources and support to continue. Some consultants assess a program, but often assessment 
is about deliverables of milestones at the end of five years. Sometimes, a policy or system is 
superficially in place, but change in institutionalising new practices in actors’ mind-sets and 
organisational culture stay far from realisation. Five years on, when there is renewed donor 
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funding and interest, actors may repeat the same reform. Often the socio-political context of 
the public service institutions is disregarded. Socio-political dimensions shape local politics 
and underpin key issues concerning society’s development (as highlighted by these findings 
and Saldanha (2004), but remain marginalised elements in reforms. 
These findings are reflected by other assessments (Chasek, 2010; Levin, 2013). For example, 
Nauru’s constitutional reform shows that ‘the consultation team was driven by the desire to 
fulfil the requirements of the reform plan as expected by the project within the specified time 
and budget. Overall, the results reflected the failure of the five phases of the reform to 
generate and consolidate the support of Nauru citizens. The Nauru Government… referred 
to the results… as disappointing… while UNDP ironically referred to the reform as a success’ 
(Ratuva, 2011, p.257). Amosa (2007a, p.176) assessed Samoa’s reforms as ‘the emphasis 
was on changes in organisational structures, systems, procedures, and legislation… little 
attention was directed to transforming the beliefs and values of officials… to conform to the 
desired behaviour recognised by the reform’.  
Similar issues resonated in studies from non-Pacific developing settings (see section 2.4.1.5). 
‘Many governments remain deeply dysfunctional even after many satisfactorily completed 
projects introducing best practices advocated by international organizations… reforms are 
limited when governments adopt them as signals to garner short-term support… make 
governments look better, but these are seldom implemented and governments are not really 
better after the reforms’ (Andrews, 2013, p.xi). Peake and Marenin (2008, pp.59-60) further 
show that ‘the failure to have stronger impact through aid and assistance… to produce any 
meaningful long-term and enduring alternations in the police systems of countries being 
assisted… has resulted from the priority of donor over recipient interests, lack of knowledge 
about policing, non-appreciation of the complexities of local security conditions, and the 
inability to link conceptual advice to the practicalities of implementation’. Highlighted as 
well in the findings and supported by others (Cox, 2009; Fraenkel, 2006; Lua’iufi, 2010) is 
the impact of aid politics on implementation sustainability. Substantial ODA is given but 
most is a ‘boomerang’ given the use of overseas consultants for program design and 
implementation.   
These findings support theoretical syntheses (section 2.3.4.3.1) that implementation is not a 
separate, but an iterative part of an overall policy process involving multiple actors at various 
levels. Implementation cannot be just top-down or bottom-up; it requires collaborative 
approaches due to the complex (overlapping, paradoxical and unpredictable) nature of 
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development issues involving human and institutional behaviours. The evidence presented 
here, however points to predominantly top-down approaches to public policy, hence a lack 
of instrumentation on the ground. It follows that bottom-up notions are limited in 
implementation modalities across the four case studies. That is, implementation is commonly 
a process not built upon strong localised pragmatic and interactive practices of organisations 
and people, where ‘street-level bureaucrats’ (Lipsky, 1980) are involved in the 
operationalisation process for the change to fit, carry on and endure. Change takes time to 
be institutionalised, but attention to long-term public policy development (not only within 
the state but with society included) has been limited in current modalities.   
These findings suggest that existing theories need to account for the complex nature of 
implementation in a ‘developmental context’, and where development policies are largely 
subject to external resources, politics, ideas and policies. This requires conversations 
between development and policy theorists to address the ethnocentric nature of existing 
theories (see section 2.6).  
8.5.3. Policy capability  
Policy capability is highlighted in the findings as critical to success; a concept synonymous 
with ‘capacity’. However capacity is often narrowly conceived in policy theories as technical 
knowledge or as actors’ cognitive resources (Heikkila & Gerlak, 2013). The concept of 
‘policy capability’ not only accounts for technical ‘capacity’ but also the broad resource 
requirements (people, monetary, physical) and enduring processes of extracting, building 
and utilising these requirements at the individual and institutional levels of society and its 
state—the ‘ability’ to have ‘capacity’. This broader concept is rarely examined in the policy 
literature, or it is used to identify developing countries’ lack of development (Pritchett et al., 
2012).  
Filling that capacity has been a focus of international development (Development Aid 
Committee, 2008). While capacity limitations are often referred to as a contributor to 
underdevelopment, there is no agreement over what constitutes ‘capacity’. Thus Baser and 
Morgan (2008) state: ‘we were struck by the limited insights available about the why 
questions’ of capacity. Despite much focus on ‘capacity’, definitions and approaches remain 
vague and the search for appropriate frameworks and tools continues (Brinkerhoff & Morgan, 
2010). What this lack of capacity comprises (other than simply limited capacity due to being 
small), why is it lacking, and how it affects policy design and implementation are largely 
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unexamined questions. The findings offer some insights.  
8.5.3.1. Fiscal capacity 
Fiscal capacity, the government’s ability to generate revenue to finance its public policy 
programs, depends fundamentally on a modern or monetary economy. In PICs, most people 
continue to live in subsistence societies reinforcing reliance on indigenous systems for 
livelihoods and social capital. In the lack of a sustainable monetised basis, reliance on ODA 
and foreign borrowing remains, particularly for smaller PICs with limited economic viability. 
For the economically viable PICs (e.g. PNG or the Solomon Islands), corruption has 
impacted on development progress in terms of resource utilisation. Effective utilisation of 
available resources is also subject to implementation modality (section 8.5.2). Table 8.14 
gives the following indications about the nature of the three PICs’ fiscal capability:  
 Donors’ support contributes around 23% of these PICs’ local budget. However, Vanuatu 
and the Solomon Islands figures do not reflect total ODA as not all donor funding is 
channelled through the government financial system.  
 The limited domestic revenue (mainly from tax) is dominated by recurrent expenditure 
demands in maintaining the state system (e.g. payroll, operations, overheads, use of 
goods and services, debt servicing, social contributions). Development or investment 
initiatives are resourced mainly from ODA and loans.   
 As various factors come into play during implementation, utilisation levels (where data 
is unavailable) can differ from estimates in Table 8.14. For instance, the Solomon Islands 
2013 development budget was underspent by around 22%, attributable to limited ODA 
rationalisation, slowdown in ODA flows, and restricted program and project 
implementation due to capacity constraints (SIG, 2013a, p.3). Also, only 32% of 
Vanuatu’s budget support was received in 2013, attributable to delays in implementing 
projects and non-capture of aid in-kind in the government’s budget system (Vanuatu 
Government, 2014, p.19).  
 Samoa has the smallest payroll appropriation but the highest debt. The Solomon Islands’ 
declining payroll and debt figures reflected limited borrowing activities due to effects of 
the 1998-2003 tension and substantial aid support already made available via RAMSI.  
 250 
 
Source: Extracted from GoS (2013-2014); SIG (2012a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013h, 2014b); Vanuatu 
Government (2013a, 2013b, 2014) 
8.5.3.2. Human resource capacity 
Table 8.15 describes human resource capacity across the four case study contexts. Technical 
capability in the Solomon Islands was relatively low compared to that in Samoa and Vanuatu. 
High staff mobility affected policy and implementation continuity. Better utilisation of 
people’s capability will depend on having conducive working systems, an area requiring 
further development to varying degrees across these PICs. Noticeable in the Solomon Islands 
was the number of young expatriates occupying line government positions, while some 
indigenous graduates were unable to get employment. Across the three PICs, leadership 
culture of the big man and fa’amatai affected political/administration separation in providing 
independent advice and implementation. Informality remained a key feature across the three 
policy systems. 
Table 8.14: Fiscal capability across the three PICs 
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Source: Author’s construct based on participant narratives 
8.5.3.3. Implementation capacity: Aligning policy to capacity and capacity to policy  
The findings confirmed the view that limited capacity due to a small market of a PIC was a 
notable feature as highlighted previously (see section 2.5.2.2). They further suggest that 
existing policies, including legislation, are limited in implementation and enforcement or are 
part implemented, but slowly and in ad hoc ways, because of insufficient technical and 
financial capacities on the ground. However, this limited capacity is relative. For example, 
Samoa’s population is half that of the Solomon Islands but its basic technical and 
Table 8.15: Descriptions of human resource capability across the four case studies 
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administrative capacity (e.g. senior officials are mostly graduates) are more developed than 
in the Solomon Islands. This comparison affects the kinds of policies adopted and their 
design under limited capacity, which matters given the need for policies to adjust for capacity 
limitations.  
Furthermore, lack of capacity in PICs is often unappreciated in program designs. Often taken 
for granted in these program designs (see sections 6.2.2 and 7.3.3.4.2) and global 
performance assessments (e.g. MDGs) are assumptions that there exists enough self-
sufficiency of internal capabilities (political, technical and administrative) to develop and 
implement policies. This is not the case in small administrations, hence the reliance on 
external assistance. Issues concerning skills transfer and absorptive capacity are then critical 
for policy sustainability–reflecting the (in)ability of technical advisers to facilitate capacity 
building or the (in)ability of local actors to absorb a change (new rule, skill, behaviour or 
technology) and stabilise it as a normal way of functioning. Having more technical assistance 
could help, but often this is also about the right pace of change (e.g. quick versus slow, 
incremental versus radical) in reforms (see section 8.2.1.3) considering the real capacities 
on the ground (warm bodies, skills) to absorb and carry out the change. Sequencing reforms 
is thus vital; subjecting the same few change agents (in a small bureaucracy) and their 
institutions to too much change at one time can often lead to reform overload, operational 
fatigue, or the tendency to revert to old comfortable ways of management. Therefore, the 
ability to have flexible designs in order to facilitate adaptation (through iterative learning) 
during implementation is important.  
Another implementation capacity participants discussed (but which is rarely touched on in 
the literature) concerned local actors’ ability to comprehend various concepts (e.g. public 
administration, new public management, neoliberalism) in development discourse. This is 
significant because the nature of policy across the four case study environments are mostly 
of policy transfers (see section 8.2.2.2). As indicated in section 8.2.1.4.2, orienting local 
actors’ to this form of thinking and to what its concepts actually mean in their roles is in 
itself an important capability. The often perceived ‘foreignness’ of these concepts matters 
but it is also the ability to contextualise their meaning in local interpretation and application 
that is central to grounding implementation. At a Pacific executive leadership program held 
in Canberra in 2006 at which a Niuean official discussed a privatisation initiative, this 
researcher struggled to comprehend what it could possibly mean in an island country of 
1,200 people. The capacity of actors to contextualise international developmental thinking 
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into what is best practice locally is clearly challenging. This is a craft learnt by doing, using 
the ups and downs that experience imparts as reflective learning. The significance of 
contextualised understanding is the reason that all policy advice in Samoa is written in the 
indigenous language. While difficult in multiple language contexts, the self-organising 
ability of locals to develop Bislama or Pidgin as a national language offers some potential 
for contextualised policy learning in the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu.  
8.5.3.4. The broader public policy capability  
Addressing limited technical capacity through more externally-sourced assistance does not 
offer a panacea for PICs’ development. The capacity to effect and sustain public policy 
concerns societal capabilities and interventions taken to address capability requirements. 
This broad capability lies with the ability of governments to influence and utilise community 
resources to establish and sustain development. A central feature in PICs is indigenous 
ownership of resources (physical and people). The extraction and mobilisation of these 
resources for development through public policy, and for the development process to impact 
on society, depend fundamentally on how people perceive their government and its 
leadership role in those processes. This society’s ability to influence leadership to use 
resources effectively for national goods remains a long-term public policy capability for 
most PICs.  
Questions about what impact various reforms exert on state and societal development 
(Laking, 2010; So'o & Laking, 2008) necessitates a positioning of public policy capability 
within that broader context, being not just limited to public administration technical capacity. 
These findings show that limitation in a state’s capability reflects society’s lack of economic 
and social development. If most institutional reforms over the years (see Figure 8.3) have 
been about the organisational strengthening of the public service, then their impact has been 
limited to that extent. If most reforms did not target the political dimension and its links to 
society, then current capability levels speak for (and are contingent on) such a historically 
shaped developmental focus.  
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Figure 8.3: A nested view of capacity and how it has been approached in reforms  
To further illustrate, Samoa’s improved public service capacity has resulted from a historical 
focus on education as part of its development agenda. This improved capability has then fed 
back into ongoing development. In most Melanesian societies with rich natural endowments, 
literacy remains at comparatively low levels. This lack of basic public knowledge 
infrastructure, able to support public policy across dispersed islands, indicates potential but 
inadequately enhanced human resources, needed for this nation-state’s entire public policy 
capability. It is there, but yet to be harnessed and fed back into an ongoing development of 
people and society. As Bennett (2002) states, the ‘Solomon Islands suffered too from the 
lack of educated personnel… that the wider population was not critical of the processes of 
government’. This limited capability due to lack of development is often recognised in the 
Pacific as not a lack of basic needs (food, shelter, etc.) but a lack of opportunities enabling 
people to participate and bring out their potential. Sen (2009, p.233 cited in Qizilbash, 2012, 
p.11)  refers to this capability as ‘our ability to achieve various combinations of 
functionings’—what people are able to do and to be. These functioning abilities are the ‘yet 
to develop’ endowments of people—as a process and outcome of development. Figure 8.3 
depicted that policy actors’ (individuals/organisations) capabilities (cognitive, resources) are 
shaped (facilitated/constrained) by society’s capability within which they operate in terms 
of development levels (education, technology, infrastructure, opportunities, etc.).  
Laking’s (2010) assessment of PICs’ capacities has similarly highlighted various limitations 
of institutional, technical, administrative and political capabilities. As well, the DAC’s (2008) 
review of ‘40 years of development experience’ states that ‘donors and partner countries 
alike have tended to look at capacity development as mainly a technical process, or as a 
transfer of knowledge or institutions from North to South’… (but) ‘often failed to recognize 
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the critical importance of country ownership and leadership, and how they underestimated 
the importance of the broader political context within which capacity development efforts 
take place. The evidence suggests that what is necessary is a fundamental change in 
development practice, including focusing on capacity as an endogenous process’.  
Facilitating this ‘functioning’ or ‘endogenous’ capability, according to participant narratives, 
requires generational or transformational change (see section 8.2.1.3). This comes from 
social learning where a paradigmatic shift in belief systems occurs (see section 2.3.4.3.4). 
These findings (section 8.2.2.2.2) have established that practices of public policy are largely 
shaped by belief systems. Pacific dominant beliefs need changing for transformational 
change to occur, otherwise most people will continue to self-organise, reconstructing their 
interactions around indigenous and subsistence support systems. Development concerns the 
‘patron-client’ (state-society power) relationships, hence social learning is about changing 
beliefs and mind-sets in these relationships. They ‘shape people’s very ability to engage with 
participatory processes’, but how they influence the ‘intrigue of formal political systems’, 
and their ‘reception of and participation in development programmes’ are ‘seldom 
considered’ (Cox, 2009).  
Complexity theory (see section 8.2.1.4.1) predicts that transformational change occurs when 
people or society (as a system) operate ‘far from equilibrium’ where robust feedback loops 
challenge dominant beliefs (the status quo). Operating at such a critical point of change 
requires the public policy system (the state) to fit its context (the society) where the society 
and state systems co-evolve in symbolic and functional ways (structure, processes, beliefs, 
cultures, etc.) in a ‘fitness landscape’ (see sections 2.3.2.3 and 2.3.3.7). Feedback loops 
(social learning for societal understanding for state ownership and accountability) shape such 
a fitness landscape. Encouragement of strong feedback loops requires utilisation of society’s 
resources for endogenous capability to materialise and critical reflection on transfer models.  
8.5.4. Policy leadership  
The findings show that the realisation of the above three factors depends fundamentally on 
leadership because what gets implemented comes down to the decision makers. Good 
leadership facilitates collaboration, learning, partnership and capacity building. Ineffective 
leadership reinforces the status quo by constantly disrupting any forward momentum. The 
findings (section 8.2.1) highlighted that both political and public administration are vital to 
success. The first matters fundamentally in agenda setting and policy adoption (giving 
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legitimacy to a policy); the second (agents of change) featured strongly in formulation and 
implementation. However, this is a naive separation as formulation and implementation are 
political (e.g. CDF) with policies also originating from public administration leadership. 
What matters is the relationship between the two: political will (the head) is essential in 
providing strategic direction; while the commitment and capability of public administrators 
(the shoulders, arms and legs) are necessary for policy implementation and continuity. 
Others (Duncan, 2010, p.18; Levin, 2013, p.1) have also highlighted this centrality of 
‘political will’ in political economy.  
Also, consistent across all participant narratives is the fact that despite public policy being 
political, the political dimension has been the neglected areas in government reforms. That 
is, the core institutions or behaviours shaping the ‘leader-constituent interface’ have been 
ignored and parliamentary oversight and accountability have been weakened (see sections 
4.3.3.1, 5.2.2, 5.3.3.1, 6.3.3.1 and 7.3.3.3). As a result, political accountability remains a key 
problematic issue across the four case study environments, an issue connected to a lack of 
societal understanding and ownership of government (section 8.5.1). Then constituents and 
leaders often have confused views and expectations about the purpose of government and 
leadership. Often this is not subject to constructive criticisms about what is public policy in 
relation to national interests. These views and expectations of the public policy leadership 
are affected by various orthodoxies identified in Box 8.2, involving multi-layered roles 
influencing politics, power relations and state-society relations. These intersecting 
orthodoxies, bounded in social beliefs and practices are often voiced as the root of PICs 
public policy issues but they are also the key to addressing leadership issues for public policy 
in that context.  
 
Source: Author’s construct based on participant narratives 
Box 8.2: Leadership orthodoxies across the three PICs 
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An examination of different leadership theories (traits, behaviours, power, influence, 
followership, relational, situational, functional, transactional, transformational, etc.) 
(Andrews, McConnell, & Wescott, 2010; Argyris & Schön, 1996; Jackson & Parry, 2011; 
Teelken, 2012), indicates limitation to fully capture the complexity of Pacific leadership 
practices, and also how to address leadership capabilities from an orthodox perspective. For 
instance, Faaulufalega (2008) explains how educational leadership practices are influenced 
by fa’aSamoa, which differs in various aspects from conventional leadership models taught 
in professional development programs. 
The findings further show that addressing leadership is central to transformational change in 
public policy development. However, there are no straightforward answers to addressing 
leadership issues, particularly when leadership is an endogenous process embodied through 
actors’ interactions and practices in context. Participant narratives assert that most politicians 
lack ‘good understanding’ of notions of a modern developmental state (as most are more 
accustomed to indigenous worldviews). The narratives, however, point to an emerging class 
of well-educated politicians having good understanding but often still lacking practical 
leadership wisdom.xxxv Leadership development needs to build both: the capability to lead 
in the context of a developmental state while upholding local leadership principles so that 
local knowledge, social principles and context are not delimited in development thinking 
and approaches. This is a leadership requirement for the dialectic transformational progress 
of PICs (see section 8.4.2).   
8.6. Summary of synthesis—a model of public policy 
The meta-analysis of the synthesised findings across the four case studies presented here has 
discussed overall patterns against existing theories and empirical literature. An integration 
of the four levels or facets: (the policy processes, results, context and key variables for 
effective policy) in sections 8.2 to 8.5 of this synthesis led to a conceptualisation of this 
study’s overall findings into a model (Figure 8.4). The model is heuristic and could be 
utilised when thinking about designing and implementing public policies with a chance of 
being implemented and contributing to positive results. This model forms the scaffold for 
the normative implications of this study which are discussed in chapter nine. 
                                                                            
xxxv As with a Samoan saying ‘e poto le tautai ae leai se faautautaga ma se tofā’ (an educated leader lacking wisdom and 
principles). 
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Figure 8.4: A model of public policy 
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CHAPTER 9: IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
9.1. Introduction  
In this final chapter, I discuss the implications of this study’s findings. My study examined 
how public policies are adopted, formulated and implemented in a Pacific island state, using 
Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Samoa and the Region as contexts within which to inquire 
into national and regional policy processes. The interest lies in determining key factors at 
play when public policies are first introduced and developed, those which are critical during 
the process of implementation, and those that have led to either effective or ineffectual 
results. 
Chapters four to seven analysed the policy processes across the four contexts using a case 
study research design involving narrative inquiry, documentary analyses, participant 
observation, and grounded theory approaches to data collection and analysis (see chapter 
three). Participants’ own voices were utilised, imparting rich descriptions of the policy 
processes examined. Chapter eight synthesised the findings across the four case studies and 
discussed the overall patterns in light of the existing literature (in chapter two). Overall 
findings were synthesised conceptually into a model (Figure 8.4). As a core contribution of 
this research, this model demonstrates that: 
 Public policy (and development) is contextual and so context matters (Part A);  
 Successful policy implementation and sustainability requires participation, partnership, 
ownership, understanding and learning (Part B-2);  
 Reflection of these elements in the policy process depends on the intersection of policy 
culture and stakeholder support, implementation modality, policy capability and 
leadership (Part B-1); and  
 Public policy and its processes must be assessed on their impact on outputs and, more 
fundamentally, actual outcomes (Part C) of Figure 8.4. 
The model portrays, in a holistic and embedded manner, the interrelated factors and features 
shaping public policy and its desired results (or lack of them), based on my empirically-
informed construct of policy processes in the four contexts. Here, I sacrifice countries’ 
contextual particularities for the purpose of drawing comparison and generalisation based 
on overall patterns and using key differences to challenge generalisations. ‘Theories help us 
generalise, to identify common elements in multiple studies across time and space’ (Cairney, 
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2013a). In summary, my empirical findings are that,  
The success of policy depends on the mutually reinforcing factors of policy culture and stakeholder 
support, capability, implementation modality, and leadership. These factors are critical for ensuring 
that participation, partnership, ownership, understanding and learning are parts of the policy 
processes. The reflection of these elements in ongoing public policy development of a Pacific island 
state and the Region requires a fundamental shift in focus over the role of society, particularly the 
adaptive capability of its indigenous systems to legitimise notions of public policy in state-society 
relationships. 
This conclusion is now used to discuss the implications of the findings.  
9.2. Implications  
The theoretical implications are directed to scholars in the field of public policy and 
development, while practical implications are recommendations for policy and development 
actors. They include policy makers, implementers, development agents or partners, technical 
advisers, consultants as well as private sector and civil society actors and other practitioners 
working in and with developing states.   
9.2.1. Context needs to be made central   
9.2.1.1. Findings 
If public policy is contextual, then the context concerned must provide a fundamental focus. 
The model gives the contextual features (Part A) that are universal across Pacific island 
countries (PICs) which are also applicable to other small island developing states. For these 
small states, the differences across places are arguably matters of degree. Smallness (many 
small islands within many small islands nations), isolation, dispersion and vulnerability are 
features more prominent in PICs compared to other small states such as in the Caribbean as 
previous studies and this study demonstrate (see section 8.4).  
This study’s findings further point to two other contextual aspects central to public policy 
and development: the context of place and time in terms of setting, and designing and 
implementing change. The ‘time’ aspect signifies PICs as late developing nation-states when 
their development path is positioned worldwide. Effective decolonisation towards full 
sovereign independence remains incomplete in most parts of the Region. Path dependencies 
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of colonial legacies, and external fiscal dependency will remain vital for some years in public 
policy development. The ‘space’ dimension positions the dominant influence of the 
indigenous system on every aspect of society and human life—shaping the practices of 
public policy—as opposed to abstract espoused notions of public policy under imported 
systems of the state and contemporary policy transfers.   
9.2.1.2. Theoretical implications  
So what do these findings mean? First, theories must account for the evolutionary nature of 
public policy and development across ‘space’ and ‘time’, dimensions limited in public policy 
and development theoretical insights. Current theoretical lenses are typically westernised in 
construction. Experiences from other places are yet to gain light and be incorporated into 
existing theories to improve international relevancy. Countries vary in historical and 
developmental experiences and a platform guiding inter-space comparison and identifying 
the influence of critical points of development at different stages are yet to emerge in the 
field.  
Second, prevailing theories need to conceptualise public policy in a ‘developmental state’ in 
which institutions of nation-state are yet to develop authentically. Current theories are 
largely conceptualised on a taken-for-granted assumption that there is a pre-given nation-
state. In diverse societies in the Region, notions of nationhood and statehood, implications 
for legitimate public policy yet to emerge (see section 8.4.2). Bringing society collectively 
to understand, own, and hold their government accountable is vital for building these notions 
of public policy.  
Third, people’s social context needs serious attention when thinking about public policy and 
development if a legitimising of public policy (nation-state notions) is to occur. Cultural 
aspects of Pacific people and their societies are neglected in current theories and practices 
of development and public policy. However, their recognition in policy interventions is 
suggested in findings pointing to effectiveness. Such neglect is a precursor of policy failure. 
The influence of indigenous culture needs to be more appreciated in development theory and 
policy.  
9.2.1.3. Practical implications 
Accordingly, policy actors and development experts need to rethink their development 
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models and approaches in the Pacific. The relevant nuances of doing so are as follows:  
  Re-scale policies (strategic plans) to suit small bureaucracies and capacities of PICs. It 
is important to think strategically but act realistically in terms of implementability by 
taking into account local capacity, geographical isolation, economic viability and 
vulnerabilities;  
 Focus the development agenda (i.e. further reforms) on domesticating appropriate 
nation-state building strategies and activities in PICs social-political context. For robust 
home grown public policy to emerge, this is a priority in diverse societies;   
 Take account of limited societal education and social learning as important parts of 
nation-state building and development; 
 As priorities differ across contexts, sequencing reforms based on having the facilitating 
conditions (that is, what is feasible to be accepted and implemented) for certain reforms 
needs critical consideration in policy design and implementation. There is a need to 
remain mindful of the likelihood of unintended counterproductive consequences where 
the facilitating conditions for a reform are not in place first;  
 Development actors need to treat state versus indigenous (civil society) models as central 
for determining what is public policy and sustainable development in a Pacific context, 
not just on pure state versus market models. A market-based development process should 
also evolve from strengthening these state-indigenous society interactions. This includes 
taking into account the cultural context in policy because of their predominant and nested 
influences on local politics, relationships and dynamics and hence the social construction 
of public policy;  
 Development actors need to be more appreciative of the distinctive nature of smallness, 
isolation, vulnerabilities and colonial legacies in PICs and how these features also vary 
across countries due to historical, social, political and economic dimensions.xxxvi There 
is a need to take into account these specificities and path dependencies in the design and 
implementation processes of development policies; and 
 Improvement in the use of technology for online dialogue, meeting and exchanges in 
                                                                            
xxxvi For example, smallness in Samoa is significant because of a tight-knit homogenous society, not just small 
population. 
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order to limit the amount of time that policy actors spend out of country; this impacts 
significantly on local implementation capacity and service delivery.   
9.2.2. Society collectively needs to be brought into the public policy space  
9.2.2.1. Findings 
If public policy is about impact on people, then they need to be brought into the public policy 
space. The findings suggest that the public currently plays little role in policy settings. What 
is referred to as policy in these PICs is not ‘public’. This is the core public policy issue across 
the four case studies. It is linked to the issue of political leadership having limited 
accountability for public policy (i.e. national interest). The ‘genesis’ or ‘aetiology’ of public 
policy is not rooted or built from within the context it is meant to impact. While formal 
public policies are largely policy transfers, practices are shaped by belief systems. This 
weakness in formal processes of public policy means existing policies are not dialogical, 
validated and understood in context. The findings further show that policy is effective when 
it addresses societal needs and when there is stakeholder support, ownership and 
understanding. Transforming policy processes so that public policy takes root in society 
requires the involvement of the public. The ‘how’ of doing so is where the complexities lie 
given the interplay of contextual factors, belief systems, political self-serving agendas and 
external influences. Thus, the development agenda requires a more explicit focus on 
facilitating collaborative public policy and ownership of the state through proven 
participation. 
9.2.2.2. Theoretical implications  
The finding of ‘whom is policy for’ or ‘what purpose does policy serve’ needs addressing in 
the fields of public policy and development. Democracy and problem solving of society as 
the vision of the public policy field, appear to have been underemphasised in prominent 
theories (see section 2.3.1). If problem solving is addressed through rationality (reasoning, 
evidence-based policy) as policy orthodoxy insists, then rationality as the basis of public 
policy needs to appropriate social construction in locations where problems reside. However, 
the way we have typically situated rationality, which affects how development actors and 
practitioners see notions of public policy, is through Weberian models and the influence of 
the Westernisation of policy processes, transfers and development lenses.  
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The problem for PICs is that they have constructed a state system with principles based on 
rationality, conceived commonly in terms of imported models not well understood in society. 
With a life of its own, the state system beyond an immediate local setting faces limitation in 
its ownership and legitimacy, and a dislocation between current approaches and their 
relevance to the lived world of Pacific peoples. While one legitimate application of social 
values and principles, rationality also needs viewing as a concept that is constructed within 
a distinct place (society) not principally adhering to Weberian liberal governance notions. 
The implication here for policy makers and development practitioners is that it is through 
people’s involvement where rationality in public policy and development processes is built 
and validated. It is through such involvement that policy changes leading to enhanced 
effectiveness (Part B-1 of the Figure 8.4) can emerge and are facilitated.    
The highly socially constructed nature of public policy needs emphasising in public policy 
and international development theories. Development policy focuses too much on Western 
hegemonies, whereas development is a journey that is contextual, shaped by social 
constructions as to what constitutes development. Constructions through policy transfers are 
respected, but how they work on location requires serious attention to local institutions and 
cultures because these beliefs and practices shape actors’ worldviews and interactions. In 
taking them more seriously, the current gap between what is regarded as ‘policy’ and 
‘practice’ (of public policy and development) in PICs (and generally) can be addressed.  
9.2.2.3. Practical implications 
The practical implications of these findings suggest as follows: 
 Develop and implement culturally appropriate civic education initiatives aimed at 
building societal understanding of the state system and its role in public policy and 
development at various levels (schools, youth, women, church and traditional leaders). 
These initiatives should facilitate understandings of why society’s voice is vital in 
political accountability, governance, development and service delivery;  
 Strengthen the understanding of local policy makers, implementers and international 
development actors over the philosophies and underpinnings of the state system, and 
how these interface with indigenous systems; 
 Develop action-learning programs in which development actors and practitioners see the 
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two systems (state and indigenous) adapting to each other, where contradictions over 
resources, capabilities and governance are addressed through short and long-term 
reforms; 
 Create linkages between state and society systems to allow robust dialogue and debates 
amongst different actors, political leaders, development actors, implementers and 
stakeholders;xxxvii   
 Formally recognise the potential (resources, capacities, energies, values) of the 
indigenous system (civil society) in public policy delivery including the need to build 
adaptive capabilities among community groups; 
 Revitalise appropriate local (bottom-up) approaches in participative and consultative 
involvement so that transparency, information flows and understandings of public policy 
are improved, community actors empowered to engage and contribute to effect; and  
 Development actors to pay more attention to the socially constructed nature of public 
policy in PICs, rather than advocating mostly rational techniques and one-size-fit-all 
approaches.  
9.2.3. The political system needs to be the focus of further reforms  
9.2.3.1. Findings 
Public policy is political, so the political system and its linkages to society need focus in 
further reforms. Political and public administration leadership is fundamental to policy 
initiation and implementation. Transformational change requires transformational leadership. 
Effective and shared leadership facilitates collaboration and capability (people and fiscal 
resources) and development in public policy processes. In the ten policies examined and the 
narratives across the four case studies, leadership was identified as the most critical factor 
for policy effectiveness. Leadership is linked to political actors who must carry the society 
and facilitate necessary interactions to ensure policy effectiveness. However, reforms have 
largely neglected this political dimension of public policy.  
                                                                            
xxxvii The Pacific Institute of Public Policy carries out similar initiatives where political leaders publicly debate policy 
issues with community members involved. I have not seen these kinds of approaches in the Solomon Islands or Samoa. 
These initiatives need to be based more in rural communities where the influence of indigenous institutions are prevalent.   
 266 
9.2.3.2. Theoretical implications  
Leadership needs more centrality in prominent theories of public policy and development. It 
is acknowledged by various theorists (Advocacy Coalitions, Institutionalists, Multiple 
Streams, Rationalists, etc., see section 2.3.4) but they do not regard leadership as a key driver 
of change.  
9.2.3.3. Practical implications  
In practical terms, this means that: 
 Reforms should target the political dimension by improving the following: 
 The voting or electoral system;xxxviii  
 Parliamentary support, so that leaders are supported in the performance of their role 
as decision makers and in providing parliamentary oversight and accountability; 
and 
 Political policy (agenda) setting. For example, strengthen policy development and 
advocacy at the political level as this is the weakest area.  
 Leadership initiatives should target current and future leadership capabilities including 
improving understanding of the underpinnings of government, and orientation to today’s 
development trends and needs, but while also valuing orthodox or dual roles in 
institutions and notions of public policy and development in Pacific contexts. 
9.2.4. International support to continue but needs to be more appreciative of context  
9.2.4.1. Findings 
Given that local capability is limited, international support needs to continue but this support 
needs to be more accommodating of local context. Development actors (and their systems) 
are to be regarded as not separate, but integrated components of Pacific public policy systems.  
PICs’ fiscal dependency on donors’ technical and financial capabilities had led to strong 
                                                                            
xxxviii For instance, the practice in Samoa of candidates providing transport for voters needs to stop as this influences 
people’s voting on the day. Government to provide a public transport system or alternative mechanisms.   
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donor influences over local public policy dynamics. The findings pointed to successful 
policy interventions when positive partnerships and working relationships operate between 
local and external actors. Failure occurs when policy is viewed by local actors as imposed. 
Policy is more than a piece of paper; it has to be interpreted locally so it is validated and 
owned by those who implement it. Effective policy processes take into account local 
knowledge (principles, customs, relationships, legitimacies) about what is workable. The 
issue is not just about bilateral policy transfers—as the Pacific community is now part of the 
global policy system, but about ensuring that local conditions and philosophies are 
accommodated when designing and implementing policies. ‘Islandalism’ mentalities, and 
cultural dynamics are particularly strong in Pacific worldviews, relationships, and 
personalities hence the need to remain sensitive to these dynamics and institutions. Local 
actors can be alienated by more direct and confrontational personal approaches, which, in 
turn, undermines the need for the local ownership and understanding needed to effect and 
progress implementation.   
9.2.4.2. Theoretical implications  
Public policy theories need to integrate the role of donor actors and how their complex 
politics, dynamics and personalities (within the international development systems) interact 
with those of the domestic policy systems. For theories to have international applicability, 
they must be more accommodative of the dynamic, at times recursive, nature of public policy 
in aid-sponsored reforms interacting with local indigenous cultural systems.  
9.2.4.3. Practical implications 
In practical terms, this means the following: 
 Make participative approaches (stakeholders’ involvement) a fundamental component of 
development and aid policy, otherwise policy will continue to have little meaning and 
impact locally; 
 Donor countries, particularly Australia and New Zealand and their development actors, 
need to have mutual accountability (with Pacific policy actors) for the Region’s 
development processes and results. This is needed for effective development—rather 
than the current orientation of external agents taking a positivist worldview of the Region;  
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 International development actors need to seriously engage with the notion that imposing, 
or perceived as imposing, does not work and has had counterproductive effects;  
 Development actors working on program design and implementation processes must 
make people relationships, cultural worldviews and languages central in these processes, 
particularly when translating policy to local levels, and being held accountable for doing 
so;  
 Pacific policy actors must develop and then sustain trust relationships with donors’ actors 
and value the assistance provided. Consistently blaming external actors for results and 
approaches to policy adds no value; and   
 Develop twinning initiatives where young, future oriented Pacific graduates are able to 
work in overseas public policy settings (e.g. Australia, NZ), and to gain exposure to other 
working cultures (values and ethics). At the same time, experienced actors in donor 
countries (much older workforce) to work in PICs to provide coaching, mentoring, and 
other appropriate capacity building to younger professional workforces in the Region.    
9.2.5. The ways we think about public policy for development need to change  
9.2.5.1. Findings 
The findings point to issues of implementation modality. This needs serious attention in 
development policy—why and how aid is given, managed and delivered, and how reforms 
(change) are adopted, designed and implemented. The volatility of aid flows, coupled with 
the short-term projectisation of development policy reforms, often undermines intentions to 
build and sustain institutional and behavioural change. Reforms are largely designed and 
implemented for public sector strengthening outside societal inputs, understanding and 
functionalities in what civil society actors could offer. The complexities and practicalities of 
implementation, and how to sustain change, are often not appreciated or ignored due to the 
modality of aid configured and delivered reforms. As well, the findings revealed that 
complex reforms, when designed and implemented, are indeed a process that is nonlinear 
and emergent due to the dynamic interactions of actors involved. In addition, most strategic 
plans (e.g. Framework of Pacific Regionalism) remain as high level documents only, with 
limited translation to the operational level.    
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9.2.5.2. Theoretical implications  
Theories (policy and implementation) need to accommodate the complexities of operating 
in developmental settings, this to better synthesise accounts for enhanced international 
applicability. Development itself needs conceptualising as a public policy process of change, 
having no ideal endpoint but continuing to evolve along an unfolding path involving setbacks, 
advances, delays, and periods of stability and instability. These implications are 
acknowledged when using complexity theoretical lenses of public policy, though that has 
yet to develop consciously in the field of development and its theory, policy and practice. 
The roles of civil society and local institutions need fuller recognition in development theory, 
rather than being viewed mostly in terms of state versus market thinking and development 
models.  
9.2.5.3. Practical implications 
For practice, this means: 
 Policy makers and development actors need to accommodate a more adaptive and 
nuanced long-term view of development in reform design and implementation processes. 
This is because of the behavioural and social change that is needed for the sustainability 
of reforms; 
  Sustainability of the change process requires attention to local absorptive capacity, 
including the need to recognise local actors’ will for change as distinct from fatigue 
(individual, institution) in policy content, design, sequencing and implementation 
modality; 
 Policy makers and development agents need to consider the following gaps in formal 
policy frameworks and address them in current and future efforts: 
 Lack of coherent policy at the sector and organisational levels, an issue common across 
PICs and the Region, but particularly more prevalent in PICs such as the Solomon 
Islands;   
 Lack of instrumentalisation of policy at the community level (private sector, 
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indigenous sector, civil society);xxxix 
 Adaptation of modern laws and customs; 
 Mismatch between policy (that is, strategic plans) and politics;  
 Lack of robust and contested political policy platforms; 
 Balance between the take-up of global policy and designing locally workable policy 
instruments in order to address implementation deficits; 
 Shift of emphasis from excessive reviews of existing policies (wasting resources), to 
doing implementation tasks (e.g. Framework for Regionalism), and where policy can 
be corrected or redesigned through developmental reviews through iterative learning; 
and 
 Make monitoring and evaluation (M&E) a necessary component of policy reforms 
with capacity building programs, this to improve policy roles (formulation, design, 
implementation, M&E) in different parts of government;  
 Formalise through informed dialogue appropriate instruments, agreements and 
legislation providing for the partnership roles of private sector, civil society and 
indigenous sectors in development initiatives, and taking into account their status in 
terms of existing or required capacities. Develop initiatives that target capacities needed 
by these different sectors into the immediate and long-term; and  
 Target the rural urban divide in PICs by improving public service delivery and 
development (particularly infrastructure and education) in further reforms as this will 
also improve civil participation in policy processes and an awareness of government 
affairs.  
9.3. Conclusion 
This study contributes to better understanding (both empirical and theoretical) of the 
processes of public policy in Pacific locations. Numerous assessments and criticisms exist 
                                                                            
xxxix What instruments that are more appropriate in a PIC state-society context. TRC and enforcement of by-laws for 
fisheries and coastal environmental protection in Samoa are good examples of instruments that have worked.  
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of the slow or elusive improvement in development performance across the Region and 
various PICs (see section 1.1), but to date researchers have not properly examined how 
public policies are initiated, developed, and implemented so as to fully comprehend why 
these assessments and criticisms have been made. In the academic world, the theoretical 
currents of public policy are westernised and prevailing lenses for development primarily 
ethnocentric. This study has shed light on weaknesses and strengths in these theories and 
relevant implications for current approaches to public policy processes and practices in PIC 
settings and the Region. This research establishes a well-founded understanding of how 
policies are initiated, developed and implemented. In doing so, the critical factors (Part B in 
Figure 8.4) influencing policy effectiveness or its absence are identified, validated and 
developed into a model. The utility of this study, its strengths, limitations and areas for future 
research are highlighted below.   
9.3.1. Utility  
Where this study has made a novel contribution is demonstrating evidentially the actual 
nature of the public policy and key critical factors of policy success/non-success. The model 
(Figure 8.4), and the findings’ implications, can apply to other PICs. The specificities of the 
three PICs included were sacrificed to enable a making of generalisations based on overall 
patterns. A micro level model will not do justice to the complexity of public policy across 
PICs given the Region’s diversity. Factors and features (Part B) in the model are principle-
based and allow applicability in other settings, a model that can be extrapolated to non-
Pacific Small Island Developing State. Its application as heuristic, and adoption of the 
implications outlined vary across countries given the dynamical, emergent and paradoxical 
nature of human and social behaviours in these public policy settings, and given the 
variations in national historical development and local institutions. Further empirical 
applications across a wider range of jurisdictions can lead to a refinement and validation of 
this model.  
9.3.2. Strengths and limitations 
While the researcher had prior knowledge of previous policies and experience in the Pacific, 
this study was largely explorative in nature. It is the first on this topic in the fields of public 
policy and development. Taking this open approach informed the model depicted in Figure 
8.4 forming a synthesis of findings from across the four case studies. A multi-methodological 
approach and multi-country case study within an inductive, qualitative and grounded 
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research modality assisted this task. Established methodologies (case study, grounded theory, 
narrative inquiry, participant observation, documentary analysis) were adopted, together 
with Pacific culturally-based research methods that enabled a grounding of the findings and 
the model advanced. Establishing good relationships with local informants, and self-
transcription and coding of conversational interviews with participants, enabled the 
researcher to become immersed in their meanings of things and as they interpreted their 
social worlds.  
The model was developed inductively, using a replication or cross experiment design 
encompassing five data sets (pilot, Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Region and Samoa). 
Examining ten policies, in addition to obtaining a general meta-narrative of the policy 
environment across the four (country) case studies, proved more than adequate for 
addressing scepticisms about the limitations of generalisation, or inconclusiveness of the 
research’s findings. Risks of vagueness were seen as offset by the particularities and 
specificities provided by the ten policies utilised as sub-case studies.   
Taking a social constructionist perspective to this research provided a rich account of actors’ 
perspectives (experiences, observations, feelings) about their roles and understanding in 
relation to the ‘what’, ‘why’ and ‘how’ of public policy (as espoused and practised), as well 
as factors that they regarded as critical in policy processes. This approach is contrary to most 
inquiries into Pacific public policy or development issues, often advanced and approached 
from strong economic-based and objective perspectives, and what is needed for a neoliberal 
market economy in the name of good governance, this a predetermined view of how we need 
to see public policy and development in Pacific settings.   
Given the iterative and multi-methodological approach to this study, the analysis and 
synthesis contributed to a more diligent and rigorous research process. The richness offered 
by 128 interviews was not all utilised due to space limitations. However, nuances from each 
four case studies were used for comparisons and synthesis. 
9.3.3. Future research  
The following are areas recommended for future research:  
 An application of this study’s model in other PICs and non-Pacific context;  
 273 
 The strongly socially-constructed nature of public policy and development in PICs’ 
needs further exploration in detail regarding the different ways in which actors’ belief 
systems influence their constructions of policy and development as espoused and 
practised;  
 To explore what Pacific societies determine as development from their worldviews, and 
the extent that this can be ascertained; 
 An identification of critical points or factors at different stages of development, this 
based on inter-country experience to provide a platform (trajectory) of development 
across space and time. Pacific scholars and practitioners can learn much from this if it is 
well-researched;  
 The current gap between what is regarded as ‘policy’ and what is ‘practice’ in the 
conduct of public policy and development needs fuller investigation, and with a view to 
better alignment; and  
 Theoretical insights gained from an investigation into the nuances of what a Pacific 
development model should look like, in state versus society (indigenous) relationships, 
need further exploration.  
9.3.4. Final remarks 
There is no ‘silver bullet’ to solving development issues in the Pacific (or anywhere else for 
that matter), but this study has offered a comprehensive diagnosis as to where the key issues 
lie. It has examined how public policies are initiated, formulated and implemented so as to 
shed light on what is needed as a focus for their future improvement and effectiveness.
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APPENDICES  
A. Pacific island countries 
 
Source: PiPP (2010); Morauta et al. (2013); PRIGO websites; SPC Statistics (http://www.spc.int/sdd/) 
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B. Maps: Pacific islands region  
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C. Pacific regionalism’s brief history  
 
The region with its boundaries and identity as it is now understood, were colonial constructs 
as were the origins of the regional policy architecture. This originated in the aftermath of 
World War II when the South Pacific Commission (now ‘the Pacific Community’) was 
created in 1947 by Britain, France, Netherlands, the USA, Australia and NZ to assist in post-
war recovery and development through international co-operation. The South Pacific 
Conference (now the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, SPC) was subsequently created 
to service the Pacific Commission. However, the Commission’s mandate was limited to 
‘advisory’ functions to the participating governments; political and security concerns (e.g. 
nuclear testing, decolonisation) for the islands were forbidden. Demanding indigenous 
control, leaders of five independent Pacific states at the time, created, in 1971, the South 
Pacific Forum (now the ‘Pacific Islands Forum’, PIF) as the first regional political grouping 
created outside the SPC’s domain in 1971. The PIF’s establishment followed Fiji’s 
independence in 1970 and led by Fiji Prime Minister (PM) Ratu Mara with support of other 
PMs (Western Samoa, Tonga, Nauru and Cook Islands). Australia and NZ joined the PIF 
bringing its membership initially to seven. Membership has been subject to obtaining self-
government, allowing the region’s non-independent territories to gain associate or observer 
status in the PIF (see Appendix A). To service the PIF, the South Pacific Bureau for 
Economic Co-operation (now the PIF Secretariat) was established in 1972 (Fry, 1981, 1997). 
Since then the regional architecture has grown into the current nine PRIGOs. 
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D. Participant information sheet and consent form 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Project Title: Public policy processes in the Pacific islands: A study of policy initiation, formulation and 
implementation in Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Samoa and regional inter-governmental 
organisations 
Researcher:  Ms. Potoae Roberts Aiafi, School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington, NZ 
 
I am a PhD candidate at the Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. My thesis examines how public 
policies are initiated/adopted, formulated and implemented in small Pacific islands and what are the critical 
factors for effective implementation. Four case studies from Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Samoa and the 
main regional inter-governmental organisations will be the focus of this inquiry. The study aims to analyse the 
development of a public policy model that is applicable to the case of a small Pacific island context.  
 
I am Samoan and I have worked in the Samoa Public Service for 12 years prior to undertaking this research. 
The university has agreed on my area of study and granted ethical approval to carry out this research. The 
research is undertaken under the supervision of two academic supervisors and in accordance with the policies 
and procedures of the university.  
 
The practical details for the interview are covered in the consent form. The interview will be conducted based 
on the preferences that you choose in the consent form. It is very important to point out that participation in 
this research is voluntary and based on the participants’ willingness. Participants have the right to withdraw 
from the research within a period of one month from the date of the interview.  
 
The information gathered from the interviews will be the prime source of data. Names of individuals will not 
appear in the analysis, the thesis or any articles. Even in instances where direct quotes are used, it will not be 
possible by any means for you to be identified personally. The consent forms, hand notes, tape recordings or 
any other material collected in connection with the interview that may reveal your identity will be kept 
confidential to me. If information about the interviews is supplied to my supervisors or other supervisors or 
other researchers, it will be in a form that will not directly or indirectly disclose your identity. However, it is 
important to note that while every attempt will be made to maintain confidentiality with respect to your identity 
this may not always be possible in situations where your position is well known. 
 
The thesis will be submitted to the School of Government and it will be deposited in the University Library. 
The information gathered will also be used for one or more articles that will be submitted for publication in 
international journals. Such articles may be presented in academic or professional conferences. The information 
gathered will be destroyed three years after the full completion of my doctoral degree.  
 
If you have any questions or would like additional information regarding my research, please feel free to contact 
me or my primary supervisor, Associate Professor Graham Hassall using the contact details below.  
 
Your sincere responses during the interview will be greatly appreciated.  
 
Sincerely. 
 
 
Researcher                                               Under Supervision of: 
Potoae Roberts Aiafi  Associate Professor Graham Hassall 
PhD Candidate  Primary Supervisor  
Victoria University of Wellington  Victoria University of Wellington  
PO Box 600   PO Box 600 
Wellington, NZ  Wellington, NZ 
Email: Potoae.Aiafi@vuw.ac.nz    Email: Graham.Hassall@vuw.ac.nz  
Phone: +64-4-463 5233 ext 8379    Phone: +64-4-463 5047  
SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT 
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CONSENT FORM 
 
Project Title: Public policy processes in the Pacific islands: A study of policy initiation, formulation and 
implementation in Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Samoa and regional inter-governmental 
organisations I have been provided with adequate information relating to the nature and 
objectives of this research project and I understood that information.  
 
Researcher:  Ms. Potoae Roberts Aiafi, School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington, NZ 
 
1. I have been given the opportunity to seek further clarification or explanations regarding the research and 
they have been answered to my satisfaction.  
2. I understand that I may withdraw from this study within a period of one month from the date of the 
interview without giving any reason and in such cases all data related to me shall be destroyed immediately 
upon withdrawn.  
3. I understand that my personal identity will be kept confidential to the researcher and that information from 
this interview will not be made available to any other person in a form which would identify me. I also 
understand that the published results will not use my name or any personal details, and that no opinion 
will be attributed to me in any way that will identify me. Nevertheless, I understand that while every 
attempt will be made to maintain confidentiality with respect to my identity this may not always be possible 
in situations where my position is well known. 
4. I understand that the electronic recordings and all documents related to this interview will be stored 
securely and destroyed three years after the conclusion of the project.  
5. I understand that the information I provide will not be used for any purpose other than the uses mentioned 
in the Information Sheet provided to me, and any further use will require my written consent.  
6. I understand that the maximum length of the interview will be two hours.  
7. I understand that I will be contacted if necessary for further clarification on the information that I have 
provided for the purpose of the research as mentioned in the Information Sheet.  
 
Name:    …………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Preferred date for interview:  …………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Preferred time for interview:  …………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Preferred venue for interview (please specify a secure & quiet place) ……………………………………….. 
 
Consent on tape-recording the interview:           Agree        Disagree 
 
Consent on quotation:            Agree        (you will not be identified personally) 
 
Disagree   
 
Would like a written advanced draft of the interview to review and correct:   Yes          No 
(If yes, this will be provided in one month from the date of the interview). 
 
 
Date:  ……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
Signature: ……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
THANK YOU 
SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT 
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E. Codes for participant narratives 
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F. Initial coding tree 
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G. Critical factors of the policy processes across the ten policies 
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H. Findings across the four case studies  
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